National Populism as a Transitional Mode of Regulation

Like many of you, I have been trying to make sense of the current political landscape in the US and elsewhere, but I have also have been working on updating my argument about Network Culture—a historical phase marked by digital networks and neoliberal economics—and exploring what comes next. The result is this new essay on National Populism, not merely as a political ideology but as a transitional form emerging during capitalism’s shift from neoliberalism to what I term “AI Capitalism,” in which artificial intelligence becomes central to economic activity. There aren’t references to art or architecture here—those will come later, once the cultural outlines of this moment become clearer.

My interest is in how National Populism serves as a stopgap amid profound economic transformation. Populist movements promise restored manufacturing, national sovereignty, and cultural revival, yet in practice their policies accelerate financialization and deregulation, ironically undermining these promises. The tragic irony is that the National Populist base itself suffers the most: their legitimate grievances about economic dispossession are channeled into a movement that intensifies rather than resolves their obsolescence.

For two decades, beginning at SCI_Arc and concluding at Columbia’s Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation, and Planning, I taught a course called Network City. In that course, I employed the Regulation School’s framework of regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation to explore urban transformations accompanying the shift from Fordist mass production to post-Fordist flexible specialization. Through case studies such as the Park Avenue business district in 1950s New York, the shopping mall, the suburban office park, the so-called “creative city” movement, the Bilbao-effect, and the dot.com workplace we examined the interplay of economic structures, governance models, and spatial organization underlying contemporary networked urbanism. Since the 2024 election, several former students and colleagues have reached out, expressing frustration as they try to make sense of the changes underway today. This prompted me to reflect at length on the phenomenon of Trumpism—better known as MAGA, or more appropriately, National Populism.

Although my focus here is on the American manifestation of National Populism, which makes global news daily, this phenomenon extends beyond the United States, appearing in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Hungary, and India. Between 1990 and 2018, the number of populist leaders in power worldwide jumped fivefold (from 4 to 20), reflecting a global shift in political dynamics.1 Globally, 2024 was a bad year for most incumbents, but right-wing populism maintained its strength overall, gaining ground in countries like Germany and France. No longer an outlier, such parties are now firmly part of the political landscape.2 While China’s authoritarian populism differs substantially in structure and goals, it too reflects the global turn toward reactionary politics, with the Chinese Communist Party making more appeals to national identity and cultural restoration similar to other populist movements. Unlike my Network City project, I am not going to use this essay to write about the architectural and urbanistic manifestations. There is, as yet, no clarity to these—and I am still working on interpreting its cultural logic—but the general contours of ongoing societal shifts have become clearer. I should add that while I am increasingly wary of academic narratives in which capitalism is presented as the chief animating force of history, it only makes sense to talk about capitalism when we are talking about socioeconomic developments.

Contemporary progressivism struggled to offer a compelling vision capable of addressing the economic and social anxieties fueling populist resentment. Indeed, its efforts seem to have backfired, with the progressive politics of the Biden administration—elected to be a moderate caretaker administration—driving the Democrats further and further away from their core constituency while alienating many among the minorities Democrats sought to court with their vision of identity politics. This ideological failure created an opening that National Populism eagerly exploited.

While analyses of National Populism in America commonly emphasize its political dimensions in America—nationalism, isolationism, and identity politics—its economic role as a mode of regulation has generally been overlooked. I argue that National Populism should be understood not merely as a political ideology but as a transitional regulatory mechanism emerging during capitalism’s shift from neoliberalism toward a new economic order dominated by artificial intelligence—what I term “AI Capitalism.” Even if this transformation remains largely unconscious—it is hard to believe that Trump himself has any grasp of its full dimensions and certainly his rank-and-file supporters do not—and poorly theorized, it is well underway and will inevitably provoke profound conflict in the years ahead, not just between Republicans and Democrats, but within the GOP as well.

Before proceeding further, I should clarify what I mean by regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation, two concepts central to the French Regulation School’s approach to political economy, made popular in the United States by David Harvey’s Condition of Postmodernity.3 A regime of accumulation refers to the way capitalism organizes production and consumption to enable profit and growth over an extended period. It encompasses specific technologies, labor processes, consumption patterns, and capital-labor relations that allow value creation and capture. The Fordist regime of accumulation, for example, featured mass production, unionized labor, rising wages, and mass consumption, while the flexible accumulation regime that followed emphasized global supply chains, precarious employment, and debt-fueled consumption.

A mode of regulation, by contrast, comprises the institutional forms, networks, and norms that stabilize a given regime of accumulation. This includes everything from formal laws and financial systems to cultural practices and modes of state intervention. The Keynesian welfare state was the mode of regulation that supported Fordism, while neoliberalism and the attendant monetary policy ultimately emerged as the regulatory framework for flexible accumulation. As Harvey concludes, broader cultural logics correspond to these modes, characterized by modernism and postmodernism respectively. In each case, the mode of regulation attempts to temporarily manage capitalism’s inherent contradictions and crisis tendencies through specific institutional arrangements.

In “Almost Anything,” my essay on the work of architect Kevin Roche that modernism had three main cultural phases—its nascent pre-World War 2 state, high modernism of the postwar era, and the late modernism of the 1960s and 1970s when the ideology was exhausted. In turn, postmodernism was succeeded by network culture, a concept I explored as neoliberalism’s final cultural and economic logic, a period characterized by decentralized networks, fragmented identities, and pervasive commodification of digital interaction (it is arguable that a pop art-rock culture preceded postmodernism as a logic of flexible accumulation even as it overlapped with late modernism.4 However, network culture represented neoliberalism’s final cultural phase, inadvertently amplifying its inherent contradictions rather than stabilizing it. Through the deregulation and amplification of information flows, fragmentation of the polity into “networked publics” and the collapse of stable identities, network culture eroded political consensus, generating fertile ground for populist narratives.

Like network culture, National Populism is transitional in nature. Modes of regulation don’t last forever. They emerge in response to the contradictions of prior systems, stabilize a regime of accumulation, and eventually break down. Its primary features—economic nationalism, identity politics, and anti-intellectualism—suggest a complex effort to manage the transition between economic regimes, even if it seems unlikely that its proponents have any idea of (or plan for) what it might evolve into.

Political scientist Cas Mudde defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology” that splits society into two antagonistic camps: “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite.” Populists claim to uniquely represent the true people’s will against self-serving establishment elites. Importantly, populism is “thin” because it does not on its own offer a detailed economic or policy program – it attaches to a “host” ideology. In the case of National Populism, the host ideology is nationalism or nativism. National-populist movements thus frame the elite as globalist traitors and champion the people as the native citizens of the nation-state, often scapegoating immigrants or foreign influences for domestic woes.5

According to John Judis, populism is fundamentally driven by questions of economic distribution—who gets what— even if the anger often expresses itself in cultural terms. In Western nations, decades of neoliberal globalization allowed corporations to outsource jobs and chase lower wages abroad, while domestic workers felt left behind. By the 2010s, this translated into voter frustration with mainstream parties and openness to outsiders promising to upend the status quo. Specifically, Judis underscores that both left and right populists (from Bernie Sanders to Donald Trump) challenged at least one pillar of post-1970s neoliberalism: the free movement of corporations and capital across borders. In practice, right-wing national populists tend to combine cultural backlash with economic nationalism—opposing free trade agreements, advocating tariffs or protection for local industry, and pledging to bring back manufacturing jobs. They often pair this with welfare chauvinism (maintaining or expanding welfare benefits for native citizens only) and skepticism of immigration. This agenda is offered as a corrective to the dislocations and inequities that globalization (and now technological change) have created.6

At the same time, many scholars emphasize that National Populism is a symptom of deeper structural changes. Economic insecurity, regional inequalities, and the decline of traditional industries set the stage for populist resentment. Cas Mudde and others observe that while populists loudly critique elites, most still operate within a capitalist market framework, often proposing few concrete changes to the economic system. In fact, once in power, populist leaders frequently implement a mix of contradictory policies—tax cuts and deregulation benefiting businesses and investors, alongside trade protection or fiscal stimulus to appease working-class supporters. This inconsistency hints that National Populism may be less an enduring model and more an interim balancing act.

The current wave of technological innovation—centered on artificial intelligence, automation, and data—is ushering in what I term “AI Capitalism.” This is a rather natural term, but it seems that it was introduced by Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle Mikkola Kjøsen, and James Steinhoff in their book Inhuman Power: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Capitalism as “actually-existing AI Capitalism.” Of course, a book written over six years ago is ancient history in AI terms and their reference is to the earlier use of narrow AI or machine learning algorithms. Just as “actually-existing socialism” was a reference to the deeply flawed nature of Communist regimes, the authors use the phrase to refer to the difference between machine learning and the generalist AI of the sort that ChatGPT and other LLMs have offered in the years since. Still, the authors get a lot right, emphasizing how major tech corporations “see the cognitive and biological limits of the human as a barrier to accumulation” and aim to bypass those constraints using machine learning, automation, and predictive analytics. In their framework, AI is not just another industry but a means of cognition—an infrastructure that is fast becoming a general condition of capitalist production, much like electricity or global supply chains in earlier eras. They also share my view that AI Capitalism will have a profound impact on labor, making vast numbers of workers obsolete, critiquing both right-wing and left-wing perspectives that downplay the threat of automation, arguing instead that AI-driven job displacement will be deep and systemic. They document how AI does not merely assist workers but actively records human labor in order to replace it—Amazon’s robotic warehouses, AI-driven call center automation, and algorithmic surveillance are all part of this trend. Indeed, they also understand that the result of this automation will be an ever-growing surplus population that capital no longer requires, making permanent unemployment and precarity central features of AI Capitalism. More than that, they propose that even the narrow concept of machine learning, makes AI an essential form of infrastructure, such as water or energy:

“If AI becomes the new electricity, it will be applied not only as an intensified form of workplace automation, but also as a basis for a deep and extensive infrastructural reorganization of the capitalist economy as such. This ubiquity of AI would mean that it would not take the form of particular tools deployed by individual capitalists, but, like electricity and telecommunications are today, it would be infrastructure—the means of cognition—presupposed by the production processes of any and all capitalist enterprises. As such, it would be a general condition of production.”7

In both their analysis and mine, “AI as infrastructure” will be controlled by oligopolistic firms—tech giants who are investing billions to advance AI and capture its benefits. My own view of AI Capitalism—which also draws upon general consensus in business and tech journalism and commentary on AI—is that it represents an emergent stage of capitalism in which data and AI algorithms become core components of economic production, augmenting and replacing intellectual and creative laborers the way that factory labor was replaced under post-Fordism. While new jobs will also be created (and optimistic scenarios suggest overall employment can remain stable in the long run), the transition will be tumultuous. Entire sectors – from manufacturing to clerical office work – are being reshaped.

AI Capitalism, then, is characterized by the extensive automation of labor, including not just manual tasks but also cognitive and decision-making processes, the centrality of data as a commodity, with companies collecting and monetizing vast troves of information to train algorithms, winner-take-most markets due to network effects and high R&D costs, leading to dominant tech conglomerates and increasing ties between big tech and the state, especially as governments seek AI advantages for national security and economic growth.

Note that my view of AI Capitalism does not require significant advances or breakthroughs over present-day technologies. It does not require sentient AI, but rather simply extrapolates current trends on a relatively predictable curve. It is entirely possible that the growth curve could be much faster—although increasing challenges with training new models, continuing problems with hallucinations, and the cost of compute and energy for that compute—suggest that is unlikely—just as it is possible that there will be barriers that will be extremely difficult to surmount. The slow implementation of full-self-driving vehicles is an example of the latter.

Financialization and inequality are another hallmark of the current era. Enormous wealth is being generated at the top of the economic pyramid, especially in finance and tech, but it’s not trickling down. Corporate profits and stock valuations have hit record highs in recent years, even as populist anger at “elites” grows. Such inequality and financialization fuel the very grievances populists leverage. Workers see the “Wall Street and Silicon Valley elite” amassing fortunes while their own jobs feel precarious. AI Capitalism promises greater productivity and new innovations, but it is also disruptive and disorienting. It is automating away livelihoods, rewarding a transnational investor class, and concentrating economic power in a few tech firms. Moreover, its key resources —data, code, capital—flow easily across borders, making it a fundamentally global system. This new paradigm has yet to fully mature or be guided by updated regulations and social contracts. National Populism can be seen as a reactive adjustment: a political attempt to grapple with these economic tremors using the familiar tools of nationalism and statism, even if, at present a tenuous alliance between the National Populist administration and AI Capitalism exists. It is unlikely to hold for much longer. AI is not merely an extension of neoliberal capitalism but a break from it. The rise of AI Capitalism represents a structural shift that National Populism cannot fully contain—one that will provoke deeper economic and political crises as AI advances.

History offers parallels that help us understand National Populism’s role as a transitional mode of regulation. The interwar period of the 1930s provides perhaps the most instructive comparison. With the Great Depression, the earlier liberal capitalism faced a profound crisis of legitimacy. That economic order, which had dominated since the late 19th century, could no longer deliver stability or growth. Into this vacuum stepped reactionary movements that mobilized workers disenfranchised by economic collapse and technological change.

These movements, particularly fascism in Europe, presented themselves as defenders of national workers against both international finance and communist revolution. Like National Populism—which directly references them—they promised to restore national greatness through economic autarky, rearmament, militaristic foreign policy, and the protection of traditional industries. Yet despite their frequent anti-capitalist rhetoric, their actual economic function was quite different. Rather than reversing industrial capitalism, they accelerated industrial concentration, technological modernization, and the development of new production methods while miring their respective economies into deeper crisis. The historical irony is that fascism, particularly in Germany and Japan, served as a bridge between liberal capitalism’s collapse and the emergence of postwar Fordism-Keynesianism. By forcibly reorganizing economic institutions and centralizing industrial capacity, it inadvertently prepared the ground for the corporatist, mass-production economy that would follow.

Political economist Karl Polanyi later analyzed this period as a kind of “double movement.” Free-market capitalism in the early 20th century had disembedded itself from society, leading to rampant inequality and instability. Society then pushed back with a countermovement demanding protection from the market’s ravages. This counter-reaction took both progressive forms (social democracy and the New Deal’s welfare capitalism) and regressive forms (fascist or ultra-nationalist regimes). In Polanyi’s view, fascism was a path where democracy was sacrificed to safeguard capitalism through authoritarian means, once liberal democracy seemed unable to cope.8

Of course, the New Deal in the United States offers a democratic counterexample to fascism’s transitional role. Facing the same global Depression, the Roosevelt administration established new regulatory frameworks, labor protections, and social welfare systems that facilitated the shift to Fordist mass production without abandoning democratic institutions. Similarly, Scandinavian countries navigated the post-WWII transition to coordinated market economies through negotiated compromises between capital, labor, and the state. These examples remind us that while economic transitions inevitably create disruptive pressures, societies retain agency in determining how those pressures are managed.

Today’s national populism can be seen as a similar search for a stopgap solution amid economic upheaval. As in the 1930s, we see widespread disillusionment with liberal elites and international cooperation. Populist leaders invoke economic nationalism—tariffs, border walls, strongman negotiation against foreign competitors—to shield people from global market shocks. In the United States, for example, Donald Trump’s administration has taken a distinctly 1930s-style approach on trade, imposing sweeping tariffs to protect domestic industries. However, these measures can at best provide only fleeting relief before they backfire. Despite tariffs on China and other nations, the overall U.S. trade deficit soared to its highest level in over a decade during Trump’s first term (the combined trade gap hit $679 billion in 2020, up from $481 billion in 2016.9 While the bilateral deficit with China shrank, U.S. companies simply shifted imports to other countries. This underscores a key point: Nationalist economic policies struggle against the structural realities of globalized production.

Today’s transition differs significantly from the 1930s, though the pattern of reactionary politics during economic transformation remains instructive, with “America First” directly appealing to quasi-fascist nativism of that era. Our moment is unique due to the fundamental break in the relationship between technology and human labor. Previous technological revolutions transformed labor without eliminating its centrality to production. This isn’t simply another step in automation but a complete restructuring of capital-labor relations, potentially rendering human labor largely superfluous to capital accumulation. This explains why conventional economic responses—neoliberal flexibility or neo-Keynesian stimulus—appear increasingly inadequate. It also explains also why National Populism will not be able to maintain its tenuous alliance with AI Capitalism and why National Populism is doomed to policy failure. 

With neoliberalism unravelling, National Populism functions as a holding pattern that obscures deeper transitions to an AI-driven, increasingly post-labor capitalism. While its rhetoric centers on jobs, sovereignty, and cultural restoration, the economic forces it unleashes point in a different direction altogether—one that will ultimately make its core constituencies obsolete.

This transition explains many of National Populism’s contradictions. On the one hand, it promises to restore manufacturing jobs and industrial prosperity; on the other, it accelerates financialization and deregulation in ways that undermine those very promises. Protectionism and economic nationalism are at odds with the borderless nature of AI Capitalism, yet numerous tech leaders such as Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, and Palmer Luckey have aligned themselves with the movement while others, notably Sam Altman, Mark Zuckerberg, and Tim Cook have taken pains to pay tribute to Trump.

Several key tensions highlight this contradiction:

  1. Global Supply Chains vs. Tariffs: As noted earlier, populists can slap tariffs on imports, but multinational companies often reroute rather than truly reshore production. Modern manufacturing relies on components sourced worldwide. Complex industries like AI and electronics depend on rare earth minerals from Africa, semiconductors from East Asia, and engineering talent from everywhere. Efforts to localize entire supply chains face high costs and resistance from industry.

  2. Labor Automation vs. Job Promises: National populists frequently campaign on restoring lost industrial jobs (coal mining, steel, factory work), but the harsh reality is that many of those jobs have been eliminated more by automation than by trade. For instance, U.S. manufacturing output is near historic highs, but it employs far fewer workers than decades ago, because robots and software allow far higher productivity per worker. The push for AI and productivity improvements directly undercuts the promise of traditional jobs.

  3. Skilled Immigration and Tech Talent: AI Capitalism is fueled by human talent – engineers, scientists, and entrepreneurs often drawn from a global pool. Yet the nationalist thrust of populism includes harsher immigration restrictions and xenophobic rhetoric that can drive away needed talent. In particular, while many Indian Americans—who now dominated Silicon Valley leadership—supported Trump’s candidacy and he named Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence and Kash Patel as Director of the FBI, anti-Indian rhetoric has increased among National Populists since the election. An uneasy tension masks a potential flare-up.

  4. Data and the Digital Economy: Data flows are intrinsically transnational – an AI system might train on user information from millions of people across dozens of countries. Nationalist policies that demand strict data localization or “internet sovereignty” can conflict with the way digital businesses operate. The nation-state finds it hard to assert economic control when information itself ignores borders.

National Populism emerges as a transitional form managing contradictions in a system under profound transformation. Its base consists primarily of people made obsolete by neoliberalism yet unable to participate in AI Capitalism—remnants of an industrial proletariat rather than knowledge workers or financial elites. This demographic differs from both Marx’s proletariat and the neoliberal precariat, presenting capitalism’s greatest challenge since the industrial revolution. With their economic function eliminated, this class’s cultural grievance becomes weaponized political force. Their value lies in political disruption rather than economic production. Though economically redundant, they remain consumers and political actors with legitimate grievances. Yet National Populism’s solutions cannot address the technological forces causing their obsolescence, and their political mobilization ironically accelerates the transformation threatening them.

This surplus position explains National Populist leadership’s unusual relationship with its base. Unlike traditional movements promising material improvements, it offers psychological compensation—dignity, recognition, and transgressive identity politics. Leaders provide cultural and political meaning to those capitalism has discarded rather than economic salvation. This impending abandonment explains populist culture’s increasingly apocalyptic tenor. End-times thinking, conspiracy theories, and decline narratives provide psychological framework for populations sensing their economic redundancy.

Prominent economic advisers to National Populism exemplify this contradiction. The Trump administration’s first term demonstrated this pattern: corporate tax cuts, financial deregulation, and trillion-dollar deficits expanded financialization while ostensibly supporting “forgotten Americans.” In the second term, massive cuts to government programs have been accompanied by promises for further tax cuts. Far from challenging Wall Street dominance, these policies intensified the dominance of financial capital over investment in infrastructure or manufacturing. Similarly, other National Populist regimes have expanded sovereign debt while reducing capital controls, allowing financial speculation to flourish under nationalist cover.

Expanded debt—both sovereign and personal—creates the financial infrastructure that AI Capital requires. AI-driven finance depends on massive data flows, algorithmic trading systems, and complex financial products—all enhanced by the deregulatory impulses of populist governance, as well as investment capital that will be marshalled for AI development. In the meantime, vast amounts of consumer and government debt will be generated to maintain consumption as human labor becomes less necessary.

National Populism’s cultural production deserves deeper examination as it prefigures AI Capitalism’s relationship to truth and reality. The movement thrives on an algorithmic curation of reality that mirrors the digital platforms its supporters often claim to distrust. While denouncing “fake news” and mainstream media, National Populism embraces synthetic realities and alternative fact structures that erode consensus-based truth regimes. Trump himself emerged from reality television, a medium endemic to network culture where authenticity is performative rather than substantive. This collapse of real/fake distinctions itself prefigured the AI-generated media landscape now emerging.

By destabilizing conventional epistemological frameworks while failing to offer coherent alternatives, National Populism prepares society for AI-based reality systems. When truth is already fractured and institutional authority delegitimized, algorithmic authority fills the vacuum. The populist assault on expertise and traditional knowledge production thus inadvertently paves the way for algorithmic governance of information—a core feature of AI Capitalism.

To fully understand the contradictions between National Populism and AI Capitalism, we must examine the ideological movement rapidly gaining traction among tech elites: Effective Accelerationism, or “e/acc.” This movement represents a radical departure from both traditional capitalism and neoliberalism. Unlike both National Populism and neoliberalism, which at least nominally center humans in their economic vision (whether as workers or consumers), like Futurism, e/acc explicitly rejects human-centric considerations in favor of maximum technological acceleration.

E/acc represents the ideological vanguard of AI Capitalism—not merely embracing technological change but actively working to remove all barriers to its maximization. Its philosophical roots extend beyond recent tech discourse to the darker corners of 1990s critical theory, particularly the work of Nick Land, who developed an influential framework of cybernetic Lovecraftianism—viewing technological acceleration as an unstoppable, inhuman force consuming human civilization. His concept of “hyperstition” posited that certain ideas function as self-fulfilling prophecies, bringing themselves into reality through their circulation. Today’s e/acc movement, championed by figures like venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, represents a corporate-friendly version of Land’s darker vision. Andreessen’s “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” repackages accelerationist ideas without Land’s gothic aesthetics or explicit anti-humanism, but retains the core principle: technological development must proceed regardless of social consequences.10

Peter Thiel’s position within this framework is particularly revealing. Despite funding National Populist politicians, Thiel’s philosophical outlook aligns closely with accelerationist principles. His dictum that “competition is for losers” reflects the e/acc view that market competition should be transcended by monopolistic control of technological development. Elon Musk occupies an even more contradictory position. While publicly expressing concerns about uncontrolled AI development, his business practices aggressively advanced automation across multiple sectors. Notably, Grok, the LLM he had developed at X is noted for having the weakest guardrails of any model developed in the US.

When we examine how these leading tech figures have embraced right-populist movements, we see a clear pattern of strategic alignment despite apparent ideological differences. Thiel was one of the few Silicon Valley luminaries to back Donald Trump in 2016. He spoke at Trump’s convention and later served on his transition team. Thiel’s motivations connect to his long-standing critique of what he sees as the complacency of the post-Cold War establishment. His support for Trump can be understood as a desire to disrupt the old regime that, in his view, had become mired in regulatory and bureaucratic inertia. Trump’s populism, with its contempt for “experts” and norms, was a blunt instrument to weaken the existing order. Musk initially kept politics at arm’s length, but by the early 2020s, feeling slighted by the Biden administration which did not invite him to an event celebrating Detroit’s investment in electric vehicles, he increasingly echoed right-populist talking points. Musk’s purchase of Twitter (now X) and his shift to reinstating banned right-wing accounts and attacking mainstream media narratives endeared him to populist conservatives. By aligning with populists, he gains a base of fervent supporters who see him as fighting the liberal establishment. This populist fandom can be leveraged to pressure policymakers to advance a techno-libertarian agenda that benefits his enterprises. At the same time, he has been aggressive in attacking other tech leaders who he feels threaten his business interests, notably Sam Altman, CEO of the current artificial intelligence leader, OpenAI. Andreessen, too, made a similar ideological journey. Once considered a moderate tech optimist, he swung to the right in recent years amid frustrations with the regulatory state. They, along with other tech figures like former PayPal executive David Sacks, share a belief that the political establishment is overly meddlesome, imposing burdensome regulations, antitrust actions, and taxes that impede Silicon Valley’s vision. 

Still, the conflict between e/acc and National Populism is inevitable even if temporarily concealed. E/acc views border controls, worker protections, and cultural conservatism as inefficiencies to be eliminated; National Populism depends on these very structures for its political identity. The current alliance exists because both movements oppose the administrative state and regulatory oversight, but for fundamentally different reasons—National Populism because it views these institutions as corrupted by globalist elites, e/acc because it sees them as impediments to technological acceleration. This temporary alignment explains why tech billionaires have become willing funders of populist movements despite their obvious ideological differences. For e/acc adherents, National Populism serves as a useful battering ram against the regulatory state—once those barriers are demolished, the movement and its human-centric concerns can be discarded. Ultimately, the National Populist base is fundamentally incompatible with AI Capitalism’s trajectory. Primarily low-skill and low-tech, this demographic faces increasing economic obsolescence within an AI-driven system. This incompatibility runs both ways. The base actively despises the very symbols of AI Capitalism, exhibiting a virulent hatred of electric vehicles and rejecting the cultural markers of technological elites, notably Tesla. After Musk’s alliance with Trump, the manufacturer has seen sales crater both in the US and worldwide.

As I pointed out earlier, the nationalist orientation of populist movements also directly conflicts with AI’s inherently global infrastructure. AI Capital demands borderless computation, global talent pools, and transnational flows of data. The economic vision of National Populism, with its emphasis on borders, national sovereignty, and protected markets, contradicts the fundamentally planetary scale that AI-driven capitalism requires to function efficiently.

As David Graham noted in The Atlantic, tech elites often don’t mind the “populist assaults” on establishment corporations or institutions, because they themselves operate somewhat outside the old corporate world. The venture-capitalist mindset of  Thiel, Musk, and Andreessen leads them to “like disruption. They don’t care if the old companies get turned upside down.”11 This startling insight reveals how even when populists attack Big Tech or Big Finance, they wind up helping rival tech entrepreneurs by hobbling their competitors or opening up new opportunities.

It seems clear that National Populism is not the future—it is a political interlude, a failed attempt to resist a transition that is already happening. Its economic promises are illusions, but its function is important: it provides a reactionary buffer that delays the recognition of AI-driven economic transformation. The real question is not whether National Populism can survive, but what system will replace it once it is no longer useful to those who are actually shaping the next economic order. The historical parallels I outlined earlier are instructive. Nazi Germany was a horrific regime, but economically it served as a transitional phase between liberal capitalism’s crisis and the postwar German economy. Similarly, Pinochet’s Chile served as a bridge from state-centered developmentalism to neoliberal market fundamentalism, using authoritarian political power to forcibly reshape economic institutions. National Populism similarly represents a reaction to the collapse of a prior order that inadvertently speeds up the transition to what comes next. Its anti-intellectualism and political disruption provide cover while AI consolidates its position and remakes the economy in ways that will ultimately make National Populism irrelevant. We can only hope it will be less violent than its predecessors. 

The transition from neoliberalism to AI Capitalism, with National Populism as its flawed mediator, represents one of the most significant economic and political reconfigurations of our time. What remains uncertain is not whether AI Capitalism will emerge—this transition is already underway—but what form it will take and how democratic institutions might channel its development. For the National Populist base, this presents a tragic irony: their legitimate grievances about economic dispossession are channeled into a political movement that accelerates rather than addresses the forces rendering them obsolete. National Populism correctly identifies that neoliberalism’s promise of shared prosperity has failed many communities. Its critique of unaccountable elites resonates because it contains elements of truth. The hollowing out of industrial regions, the concentration of opportunity in a few coastal hubs, and the growing chasm between the technological elite and everyone else are real phenomena that demand response. Their fate represents perhaps the central political question of our time: what happens to human populations that capital no longer requires?

What has been missing, however, is a vision that can address these issues rather than channel discontent toward convenient scapegoats. The challenge for forward-looking thinkers is to develop models that harness AI’s productive potential while ensuring its benefits are broadly shared. This requires reimagining both the state’s role in managing technological change and capital’s relationship to labor in an era when traditional employment may no longer serve as the primary mechanism for distributing income. The transition from neoliberalism to AI Capitalism will likely be as tumultuous as the shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation was in the late 20th century. Just as that earlier transition generated new modes of regulation (neoliberalism) and cultural logics (postmodernism, then network culture), our current moment demands fresh thinking about how societies can navigate technological transformation without sacrificing democratic values or human welfare.

The failure of Democrats, themselves dominated by a Progressive Populist base, in the 2024 presidential elections—alongside broader struggles facing neoliberal governments globally—highlights the inadequacy of existing political and economic models. Even progressive initiatives stumbled by entangling themselves in narrow, identity-based frameworks. For example, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ed Markey’s Green New Deal, and the climate provisions in Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, addressed vital environmental challenges but undermined broad appeal by prioritizing specific communities or businesses based on identity criteria. Such approaches, however well-intentioned, offered rhetorical ammunition to National Populists, who portrayed them as divisive rather than inclusive.

Indeed, both Progressive and National Populists have shared an underlying assumption of scarcity, treating economic and social resources as fundamentally limited, to be divided among competing constituencies. This scarcity mindset shapes public discourse, turning debates over essential goods like housing, healthcare, energy, and education into zero-sum struggles. The National Populist alliance with accelerationist tech elites reveals the fundamental instability of this arrangement. What comes next will depend on our collective capacity to imagine and implement more robust, equitable, and democratic responses to the AI revolution—responses that acknowledge technological change while insisting human flourishing, not technological acceleration for its own sake, must remain central.

Yet even as I wrote this piece, a promising alternative emerged in Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s book Abundance. Klein and Thompson reject the scarcity mindset entirely, arguing instead for a return to a fundamentally American optimism, harnessing technological innovation to drive productivity growth and ensure broadly shared prosperity. They show how conflicts in housing, healthcare, energy, and education result less from genuine resource constraints than artificial scarcity imposed by outdated regulations, NIMBYism, and captured markets. Crucially, Klein and Thompson’s vision does not ignore equity or sustainability concerns. Instead, they argue we can achieve inclusive prosperity through ambitious, targeted reforms that prioritize growth, innovation, and democratic oversight. This abundance-oriented approach offers a path beyond the zero-sum thinking of populism or the unchecked accelerationism of tech elites. Such a pragmatic yet ambitious vision may provide the conceptual foundation for a new mode of regulation capable of managing AI Capitalism’s contradictions, guiding us toward a future where technology serves democratic values and human flourishing rather than supplanting them.

1. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “High Tide? Populism in Power, 1990-2020”
https://institute.global/insights/politics-and-governance/high-tide-populism-power-1990-2020.

2. Richard Wike, Moira Fagan, and Laura Clancy, “Global Elections in 2024: What We Learned in a Year of Political Disruption,” Pew Research Center, December 11, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/12/11/global-elections-in-2024-what-we-learned-in-a-year-of-political-disruption/#the-staying-power-of-right-wing-populism.

3. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (New York: Blackwell, 1991). For an understanding of the regulation school, see Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (London: Verso, 2015).

4. Kazys Varnelis, “The Meaning of Network Culture,” Eurozine January 14, 2010, https://www.eurozine.com/the-meaning-of-network-culture/?pdf, originally published as “Tinklo kultūros reikšmė,” Kulturos Barai, no 9. 2009, 66-77 and, in an earlier version as “the Meaning of Network Culture,” Networked Publics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008), 145-164.

5. Cas Mudde, “Populism in the Twenty-First Century: An Illiberal Democratic Response to Undemocratic Liberalism,” The Andrea Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy, 2020. https://amc.sas.upenn.edu/cas-mudde-populism-twenty-first-century

6. German Marshall Fund and John Judis, “Three Questions With John Judis,” German Marshall Fund US, https://www.gmfus.org/news/three-questions-john-judis

7. Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle Mikkola Kjøsen, and James Steinhoff, Inhuman Power: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Capitalism (Pluto Press, 2019). For the discussion of a “trajectory towards a capitalism without human beings … a permanently unemployed section of the working class that consistently grows larger … [along with] the superlative growth of the surplus population…” see 140-141 in particular. On AI as infrastructural, see 30-31.

8. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 136–140, 245-256.

9. Doug Palmer, “America’s Trade Gap Soared Under Trump, Final Figures Show,” Politico, February 5, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/05/2020-trade-figures-trump-failure-deficit-466116

10. Marc Andreessen, “The Techno-Optimist Manifesto,” Andreessen-Horowitz web site, https://a16z.com/the-techno-optimist-manifesto/

11. David A. Graham, “The Fakest Populism You Ever Saw,” The Atlantic, July 19, 2024, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2024/07/trump-vance-fake-populism/679100/ 

Umbrellas in Hong Kong

Given the Netlab's work for the Uneven Growth show at MoMA, the unfolding events in Hong Kong demand comment. Although they events are dramatic and their immediate outcome is entirely unclear at the moment, they aren't anything we should be surprised about. Last spring I posted a scenario that we developed for the show titled Hong Kong, 2047. It's worth taking a look at if you haven't had a chance to do so yet. Essentially, our point is that the sort of crisis being played out in Hong Kong is evidence of a growing tension between the mainland and the coastal cities. The mainland has two routes it can follow: a humiliating capitulation along the route toward losing power and a crackdown that will make the eventual lose power exponentially greater.

Simply put, the demographic bubble in the PRC will collapse over the next couple of decades. As it does so, coastal cities like Shanghai, Guangdong, Hangzhou, and Nanjing will grow in both population and power. Such coastal cities will be closer to New York or Tokyo in outlook than to the declining inland of the PRC. If the CPC has any sense, they understand that this is coming their way and that the situation in Hong Kong is a precussor to broader tensions between the mainland and emerging coastal cities (or city-states) in the next forty years. The sort of controls that China places over the Internet today will be harder to exercise in the future as technology will allow ways to route around restrictions to proliferate: the new emphasis on unbreakable security protection in the iPhone 6 is an example of this new condition.    

Undoubtedly members of the CPC—and certainly the PLA—will want to crack down hard on the protestors in Hong Kong. If this will bring temporary relief, it will also make the inevitable process of dissociating the rising coastal city-states from the mainland more difficult. 

Now again, we're talking about a process that will take decades, not something with immediate and obvious consequences so don't look for independence flags to fly over Guangzhou anytime soon. More geriatric forces in the CPC will be tempted to go for the quick fix since they won't be around to see the consequences, but the tensions we outlined in our document seem to be ever more real today. What happens in the next few days may just decide the tenor of future negotiations when the PRC can no longer act with such impunity.     

On the Invasion of the Ukraine

Just because I study the Internet doesn't mean I don't think it's full of idiocy. Take for example the widespread NOAA map showing radiation spreading across the Pacific from Fukushima. Pity that it's not representing radiation but rather the height of waves produced by tsunamis. Alas, the Russian invasion of the Ukraine is no different, as a perusal of recent tweets on the matter say.

I won't dignify the inanity by actually quoting these tweets but some of these just blew my mind, like the one that suggested the invasion is created by the press to distract from ongoing negotiations over the Tran-Pacific Partnership Treaty.

The fact of the matter is that this is the biggest political crisis the world has faced since the fall of the Soviet Union and is extremely unlikely to turn out as well as that did. 
 
Quite obviously, the sovereignty of a nation is under attack. The pretext is a familiar Russian script: "ethnic Russians are under duress." Why are they under duress? Because the puppet regime that Putin installed in the Ukraine and that bankrupted the state fell? If they are under duress, where are the crowds on the streets welcoming them? Where is the footage of the duress they are facing, so easily made in our networked day?
 
For centuries Russia has been a belligerent neighbor, seeking to expand its territory at a given opportunity. Its leadership understands this plays well at home and, with the success of Sochi behind him, Putin has decided to go for the gold and demonstrate how no one can touch him. 
 
Thus far, US President Obama's statements suggest that he thinks of this largely as "a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing" and is not considering military options. More sensibly, Lithuania and Latvia have invoked Article 4 of NATO. Militarily unchallenged, Putin's invasion of the Ukraine will not cease with Crimea and, if still unchallenged, will bolster his desire to rebuild "Greater Russia." 
 
Not only is there a threat against a host of countries such as the Baltic States, of which I am a card-carrying member, there is another threat than anyone should consider. Those of us old enough to remember the fall of the Soviet Union also remember that there were joint calls for the Ukraine to rid itself of its nuclear weapons. The Ukraine did so in return for a treaty that guaranteed its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the last few days that has been undone. So now, put yourself in the shoes of countries that can have—or will have—nuclear weapons and really shouldn't have them, countries like North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan? Or Israel? If faced with pleas to eliminate their nuclear weapons in exchange for territorial security, just how will they react in the future? 
 
Obama is already going down in history as an exceptionally weak President, his only saving grace being that he isn't an outright catastrophe like his predecessor and foreign policy has been a particularly weak point (not that domestic economic policy or his handling of national healthcare were strong points). How he handles the biggest challenge his administration has yet faced may well define how his presidency is remembered. 

A Decade in Retrospect

Never mind that the decade really ends in a little over a year, it’s time to take stock of it. Today’s post looks back at the decade just past while tomorrow’s will look at the decade to come.

As I observed before, this decade is marked by atemporality. The greatest symptom of this is our inability to name the decade and, although commentators have tried to dub it the naughties, the aughts, and the 00s (is that pronounced the ooze?), the decade remains, as Paul Krugman suggests, a Big Zero, and we are unable to periodize it. This is not just a matter of linguistic discomfort, its a reflection of the atemporality of network culture. Jean Baudrillard is proved right. History, it seems, came to an end with the millennium, which was a countdown not only to the end of a millennium but also to the end of meaning itself. Perhaps, the Daily Miltonian suggested, we didn’t have a name for the decade because it was so bad.

Still, I suspect that we historians are to blame. After Karl Popper and Jean-François Lyotard’s condemnation of master narratives, periodizing—or even making broad generalizations about culture—has become deeply suspect for us. Instead, we stick with microhistories on obscure topics while continuing our debates about past periods, damning ourselves into irrelevance. But as I argue in the book that I am currently writing, this has led critical history to a sort of theoretical impasse, reducing it to antiquarianism and removing it from a vital role in understanding contemporary culture. Or rather, history flatlined (as Lewis Lapham predicted), leaving even postmodern pastiche behind for a continuous field in which anything could co-exist with anything else.

Instead of seeing theory consolidate itself, we saw the rise of network theory (a loose amalgam of ideas from the theories of mathematicians like Duncan Watts to journalists like Adam Gopnik) and post-criticism. At times, I felt like I was a lone (or nearly lone) voice against the madding crowd in all this, but times are changing rapidly. Architects and others are finally realizing that the post-critical delirium was an empty delusion. The decade’s economic boom, however, had something of the effect of a war on thought. The trend in the humanities is no longer to produce critical theory, it’s to get a grant to produce marketable educational software. More than ever, universities are capitalized. The wars on culture are long gone as the Right turned away from this straw man and the university began serving the culture of networked-enduced cool that Alan Liu has written about. The alienated self gave way to what Brian Holmes called the flexible personality. If blogs sometimes questioned this, Geert Lovink pointed out that the questioning was more nihilism than anything else.

But back to the turn of the millennium. This wasn’t so much marked by possibility as by delirium. The dot.com boom, the success of the partnership between Thomas Krens and Frank Gehry at the Guggenheim Bilbao, and the emergence of the creative cities movement established the themes for this decade. On March 12, 2000, the tech-heavy NASDAQ index peaked at 4069, twice its value the year before. In the six days following March 16, the index fell by nine percent and it was not through falling until it reached 1114 in August, 2003. If the delirium was revealed, the Bush administration and the Federal Reserve found a tactic to forestall the much-needed correction. Under pretext of striving to avoid full-scale collapse after 9/11, they set out to create artificially low interest rates, deliberately inflating a new bubble. Whether they deliberately understood the consequences of their actions or found themselves unable to stop it, the results were predictable: the second new economy in a decade turned out to be the second bubble in a decade. If, for the most part, tech was calmer, architecture had become infected, virtualized and sucked into the network not to build the corporate data arcologies predicted by William Gibson but as the justification for a highly complex set of financial instruments that seemed to be crafted so as to be impossible to understand by those crafting them. The Dow ended the decade lower than it started, even as national debt doubled. I highly recommend Kevin Phillips book Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism to anyone interested in trying to understand this situation. It’s invaluable.

This situation is unlikely to change soon. The crisis was one created by over-accumulation of capital and a long-term slowdown in the economies of developed nations. Here, Robert Brenner’s the Economics of Global Turbulence can help my readers map the situation. To say that I’m pessimistic about the next decade is putting it lightly. The powers that be had a critical opportunity to rethink the economy, the environment, and architecture. We have not only failed on all these counts, we have failed egregiously.

It was hardly plausible that the Bush administration would set out to right any of these wrongs, but after the bad years of the Clinton administration, when welfare was dismantled and the Democrats veered to the Right, it seemed unlikely that a Republican presidency could be that much worse. If the Bush administration accomplished anything, they accomplished that, turning into the worst presidency in history. In his review of the decade, Wendell Barry writes "This was a decade during which a man with the equivalent of a sixth grade education appeared to run the Western World." If 9/11 was horrific, the administration’s response—most notably the disastrous invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, alliances with shifty regimes such as Pakistan, and the turn to torture and extraordinary rendition—ensured that the US would be an enemy for many for years to come. By 2004, it was embarrassing for many of us to be American. While I actively thought of leaving, my concerns about the Irish real estate market—later revealed as well-founded—kept me from doing so. Sadly, the first year of the Obama administration, in which he kept in place some of the worst policies and personnel of the Bush administration’s policy, received a Nobel peace prize for little more than inspiring hope, and surrounded himself with the very same sorts of financiers that caused the economic collapse in the first place proved the Democrats were hopeless. No Republican could have done as much damage to the Democratic party as their own bumbling leader and deluded strategists did. A historical opportunity has been lost to history. 

Time ended by calling it "the worst decade ever."

For its part, architecture blew it handily. Our field has been in crisis since modernism. More than ever before, architects abandoned ideology for the lottery world of starchitecture. The blame for this has to be laid with the collusive system between architects, critics, developers, museum directors and academics, many of whom were happy as long as they could sit at a table with Frank Gehry or Miuccia Prada. This system failed and failed spectacularly. Little of value was produced in architecture, writing, or history.

Architecture theory also fell victim to post-criticism, its advocates too busy being cool and smooth to offer anything of substance in return. Perhaps the most influential texts for me in this decade were three from the last one: Deleuze’s Postscript on the Society of Control, Koolhaas’s Junkspace, together with Hardt and Negri’s Empire. If I once hoped that some kind of critical history would return, instead I participated in the rise of blog culture. If some of these blogs simply endorsed the world of starchitecture, by the end of the decade young, intelligent voices such as Owen Hatherley, David Gissen, Sam Jacob, Charles Holland, Mimi Zeiger, and Enrique Ramirez, to name only a few, defined a new terrain. My own blog, founded at the start of the decade has a wide readership, allowing me to engage in the role of public intellectual that I’ve always felt it crucial for academics to pursue.   

Indeed, it’s reasonable to say that my blog led me into a new career. Already, a decade ago, I saw the handwriting on the wall for traditional forms of history-theory. Those jobs were and are disappearing, the course hours usurped by the demands of new software, as Stanley Tigerman predicted back in 1992. Instead, as I set out to understand the impact of telecommunications on urbanism, I found that thinkers in architecture were not so much marginal to the discussion as central, if absent. Spending a year at the University of Southern California’s Annenberg Center for Communication led me deeper into technology and not only was Networked Publics the result, I was able to lay the groundwork for the sort of research that I am doing at Columbia with my Network Architecture Lab.

The changes in technology were huge. The relatively slow pace of technological developments from the 1950s to the 1980s was left long behind. If television acquired color in the 1960s and cable and the ability to play videotapes in the late 1980s, it was still fundamentally the same thing: a big box with a CRT mounted in it. That’s gone forever now, with analog television a mere memory. Computers ceased being big objects, connected via slow telephone links (just sixteen years ago, in 1993, 28k baud modems were the standard) and became light and portable, capable of wireless communications fast enough to make downloading high definition video an everyday occurrence for many. Film photography all but went extinct during the decade as digital imaging technology changed the way we imaged the world. Images proliferated. There are 4 billion digital images on Flickr alone. The culture industry, which had triumphed so thoroughly in the postmodern era, experienced the tribulations that Detroit felt decades before as the music, film, and periodicals all were thrown into crisis by the new culture of free media trade. Through the iPod, the first consumer electronics device released after 9/11, it became possible for us to take with us more music than we would be able to listen to in a year. Media proliferated wildly and illicitly.

For the first time, most people in the world had some form of telecommunication available to them. The cell phone went from a tool of the rich in 1990 to the tool of the middle class in 2000. By 2010, more than 50% of the world’s population owned a cell phone, arguably a more important statistic than the fact that at the start of this decade for the first time more people lived in cities than in the country. The cell phone was the first global technological tool. Its impact is only beginning to be felt. In the developed world, not only did most people own cell phones, cell phones themselves became miniature computers, delivering locative media applications such as turn-by-turn navigation, geotagged photos (taken with the built in cameras) together with e-mail, web browsing, and so on. Non-places became a thing of the past as it was impossible to conceive of being isolated anymore. Architects largely didn’t have much of a response to this, and parametric design ruled the studios, a game of process that, I suppose, took minds off of what was really happening.

Connections proliferated as well, with social media making it possible for many of us to number our "friends" in the hundreds. Alienation was left behind, at least in its classical terms, as was subjectivity. Hardly individuals anymore, we are, as Deleuze suggested, today, dividuals. Consumer culture left behind the old world of mass media for networked publics (and with it, politics, left behind the mass, the people, and any lingering notion of the public) and the long tail reshaped consumer culture into a world of niches populated by dividuals. If there was some talk about the idea of the multitude or the commons among followers of Hardt and Negri (but also more broadly in terms of the bottom up and the open source movement), there was also a great danger in misunderstanding the role that networks play in consolidating power at the top, a role that those of us in architecture saw first-hand with starchitecture’s effects on the discipline. If open source software and competition from the likes of Apple hobbled Microsoft, the rise of Google, iTunes, and Amazon marked a new era of giants, an era that Nicholas Carr covered in the Big Switch (required reading).   

The proliferation of our ability to observe everything and note it also made this the era an era in which the utterly unimportant was relentlessly noted (I said relentlessly constantly during this decade, simply because it was a decade of relentlessness). Nothing, it seemed, was the most important thing of all.

In Discipline and Punish, Foucault wrote, "visibility is a trap." In the old regime of discipline, panopticism made it possible to catch and hold the subject. Visibility was a trap in this decade too, as architects and designers focussed on appearances even as the real story was in the financialization of the field that undid it so thoroughly in 2008 (this was always the lesson of Bilbao… it wasn’t finance, not form, that mattered). Realizing this at the start of the decade, Robert Sumrell and I set out to create a consulting firm along the lines of AMO. Within a month or two, we realized that this was a ludicrous idea and AUDC became the animal that it is today, an inheritor to the conceptual traditions of Archizoom, Robert Smithson, and the Center for Land Use Interpretation. Eight years later, we published Blue Monday, a critique of network culture. I don’t see any reason why it won’t be as valuable—if not more so—in a decade than it is now.   

I’ve only skimmed the surface of this decade in what is already one of the lengthiest blog posts ever, but over the course of the next year or two hope to do so to come to an understanding of the era we were just in (and continue to be part of) through the network culture book. Stay tuned.

Trouble in the Infrastructural State

 

Remember Christopher Hawthorne’s bizarrely off-kilter review of the Infrastructural City in the LA Times? Hawthorne thought we missed the mark when we suggested that a rabidly self-centered politics— coupled with massive levels of complexity and skyrocketing costs—ended the era of big infrastructure in Los Angeles, leaving in its wake a dysfunctional ecosystem of jury-rigged, often-privatized infrastructures. Instead, Hawthorne took Obama at his word when he thought he would build a new WPA and pined for OMA-designed windmills of the coast of Catalina Island. But that’s the difference between many journalists and academic researchers: the former have to sell stories, the latter have to draw verifiable conclusions.
 
By now its clear that there will be no new WPA-style initiative under Obama. There will be no new Herzog and de Meuron nuclear plants rising in the Mojave, no new Zaha Hadid sewage plants in Malibu. So now its time to take stock of where Los Angeles and California are really heading and the future seems grim.  
 
Take a look at  "The Ungovernable State," a chilling account of California politics in the Economist. California is collapsing due to the very same sort of politics that we identified in the Infrastructural City. Los Angeles, and the infrastructural state of California are exacerbated conditions of neoliberal government, virtually incapacitated by the local interests, individualism, and extremism that rules politics today. 
 
It’s a different end-game from the one that Mike Davis identified in the City of Quartz: things aren’t ending with a racial bang bang but with a political stalemate, but its a bad end nonetheless. What should concern us is that if California is an exacerbated condition, its still a model for neoliberal government: New York, for example, is close behind. This was the real lesson of the Infrastructural City. Only facing up to that reality, not pining for windmills or a new WPA, is going to help.   

The Californian Candidate?

Unquestionably, the election of Barack Obama is the end to a long global nightmare, an affirmation by Americans that we are neither evil nor idiotic as a country. But we need to stand guard too. Obama’s first choice, chief-of-staff Rahm Emmanuel is a Zionist and former investment banker, two very questionable allegiances in my book. There’s Hilary Clinton and the other former members of the Clinton cabinet, suggesting that this might be business as usual for the Democratic machine. If that wasn’t enough, there is Robert Gates’s continued presence as defense secretary, another odd choice since a 180 from Bush policy seemed in order. 

But I want to raise another issue here, this time about change.gov? Now on the one hand, after eight years of outright lies and deceit, I relish the promise of governmental transparency. On the other hand, I wonder about the promise of participation that the site holds out. It smacks of the Californian Ideology, the idea that new technologies will bring about a libertarian democratic techno-utopia. I’m not sure that change.gov really meshes with some of the choices that Obama’s made in his Cabinet. Moreover, I worry about it being smoke and mirrors. Now I can’t imagine anything being even half as bad as the last eight years, but the Cabinet is hardly a model for transparency…

The Big Sort

Last week’s Economist contains a provocative discussion of The Big Sort. Why The Clustering of Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart. I’ve long been interested in the phenomenon of demographic clustering. See for example, the essay that I co-wrote with Anne Friedberg for the Networked Publics book. According to this model, mobility is leading individuals to cluster in communities of other like-minded individuals. In Bill Bishop’s book, and the Economist article, the concern is with the consequences of such clustering for politics. Americans increasingly don’t talk to people with political views unlike themselves. Instead, we live in liberal urban environments or conservative exurbs or whatever community turns us on. I don’t suspect Europe is going to do much better. The EU has changed dramatically in the last two decades and, with the freedom of mobility that Europeans enjoy, old ties like language and family are going to dissipate over time, in favor of a similar clustered world.

The consequences for politics are relatively clear, if distrubing, but this "big sort" also has consequences for urbanism since politics is such a huge part of thinking about cities. So when we think of dredging up Jane Jacobs yet again for models of thinking about the city, let’s remember the ideological context and the larger complexities of such situations.

super tuesday

Larry Lessig has a twenty-minute video up on his site about why he favors Obama over Clinton. 

Lessig makes the choice between the two clearer than ever.

architecture is politics

I’m reworking part of the Networked Publics book and ran across a post by Mitch Kapor titled "architecture is politics." Compare this with my earlier post about Lawrence Lessig’s use of the term architecture in his book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. Again, as any reader of Mark Wigley’s The Architecture of Deconstruction knows, such references are far from idle.

As readers of this blog now, I’m thoroughly bored by idle speculations in architectural form (as if we still needed that). Kapor’s post is useful in reminding us that architecture has a much more important role to play in society and that its future is tied to how we think of the Net.