2025-in-review

It’s strange to measure every year against a concept developed by a science fiction writer, but William Gibson’s line “The future is already here—it’s just not evenly distributed”1. has been my north star for my recent year-in-review essays. Gibson meant that the future was unevenly distributed by class: the wealthy receive high-tech healthcare while the world’s poorest live in squalor—though one might ask which of these is really our future. Yet the quote has been repeatedly misread as a claim about time andspace: that the future arrives somewhere first, perhaps unseen, while the rest of the world catches up. But this misreading is more productive than Gibson’s intent. Gibson’s critique of inequality is fair enough, but we all know this, decry it, and go on about our business. The misreading, on the other hand, is a theory of historical change.

With the release of ChatGPT in late 2022, a temporal rift opened, shattering the post-Covidean present. But many tried the early tools, encountered hallucinations, read articles about slop and imminent environmental ruin, and reasonably concluded there was nothing to see. By 2025, a cursory examination of news in AI would have assured them that AI had proved a bust. OpenAI’s long-awaited updates disappointed, and the company flailed, turning to social media with Sora, a TikTok clone for AI. Meta seemed to abandon its efforts to create a competitive AI and instead turned to content generation for Instagram and Facebook, something nobody on earth wanted. Talk of a bubble started among Wall Street pundits. The hype-to-disappointment cycle is familiar, and the dismissals were not unreasonable.

But again, the future isn’t evenly distributed, and if you don’t know where to look, you would be excused for believing it’s all hype. Looking past such failures, 2025 was actually a year of breakneck progress. Anthropic’s Claude emerged as the most capable system for complex tasks, Google’s Gemini became highly competitive, while DeepSeek and Moonshot AI proved that China was not far behind. More significant than any single model was the emergence of agentic AI—systems that can take on multi-step tasks, act, navigate filesystems, write and execute code, and work across documents. Claude Code was the year’s groundbreaking innovation. While “slop” was Merriam-Webster’s word of the year, “vibe coding”—using agents to write programs—was much more important. Not only could programmers use them to accelerate their work, it also became possible for non-programmers to realize their ideas without any knowledge of code, a radical change in access I explored in “What Did Vibe Coding Just Do to the Commons?”.

By any first-world standards, at least, these tools are remarkably democratic and inexpensive. A basic Claude subscription costs about as much as a month of streaming, and even the $200 maximum usage account costs less than a monthly car payment. For many, however, the barrier is not price but something deeper—a resistance approaching revulsion. These tools provoke fear in a way that earlier technologies did not. It’s not the apocalyptic dread of the doomers or the Dark Mountain sensibility that apocalypse is near. Rather, it’s a threat to the sense that thought itself is what makes us distinct. The unevenness of the future is no longer about access; it’s now about willingness to engage.

As a scholar, thinking about the very short term is strange for me. I have always been suspicious of claims that radical change was upon us. I would rather align myself with the French Annales school concept of la longue durée, as defined by the great Fernand Braudel, the long-term structures of geography and climate. Faster than that were the medium-term cycles of economies and states, while he dismissed the short-term événements of rulers and political events as “surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs.”2. Events, he wrote elsewhere, “are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like fireflies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into darkness and as often as not into oblivion.”3. The real forces operate beneath, slowly, often imperceptibly.

Curiously, Braudel himself embraced technological change in his own work. In the 1920s and 30s, he adapted an old motion-picture camera to photograph archival documents—2,000 to 3,000 pages per day across Mediterranean archives from Simancas to Dubrovnik. He later claimed to be “the first user of microfilms” for scholarly historical research.4. His wife Paule spent years reading the accumulated reels through what Braudel called “a simple magic lantern.”5. Captured in 1940, he spent five years as a prisoner of war and wrote the entire first draft of The Mediterranean—some 3,000 to 4,000 pages—from memory. Paule, meanwhile, retained access to the microfilm and notes in Paris, and after the war, they reconstructed the text, taking his manuscript, verifying it and adding footnotes and references from the microfilm.6.

In 1945, the same year Braudel was liberated, Vannevar Bush published “As We May Think,” in which he imagined a device he called the “Memex”: a mechanized desk storing a researcher’s entire library, indexed and cross-referenced, expandable through associative trails.7. The vision remained speculative for decades. Now the world’s archives are being digitized; AI systems translate, summarize, and search across them in seconds and can translate any language. To take one example, earlier this year, I used Google’s Gemini to translate the Hierosolymitana Peregrinatio of Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila Našlaitėlis, a sixteenth-century pilgrimage narrative from an online scan of the Latin first edition. The result is not a polished scholarly translation, but a working text that allowed me to gain a good sense of a text that was previously unreadable to anyone without proficiency in Latin or Polish (the only language into which, to my knowledge, it had been translated). The role of the intellectual is being transformed—not replaced, but augmented in ways Bush could only sketch. This feels like something other than foam.

How to account for such a rapid shift? Manuel DeLanda offers one answer in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. Working in Braudel’s materialist tradition and drawing on Gilles Deleuze and complexity theory, DeLanda describes how flows—of trade, energy, and information—accumulate and concentrate until they cross a threshold, undergo a phase transition, radically reorganizing into a new stable state. But here is the key insight: intensification is la longue durée. The accumulation of flows that began with the Industrial Revolution—or perhaps with writing, agriculture, or even symbolic representation itself—is the deep structure behind our era. Steam, electricity, computing, the internet: each was a phase transition within a longer arc of intensification. Cities accelerate such processes, as Braudel showed, concentrating capital and labor until new forms of economic organization emerge—Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, each becoming sites at which the future arrived first. Such conditions are not opposed to la longue durée; they are the moments when intensification crosses a threshold.

The continued pace of change this year underscores that there has been no return to equilibrium. But this has been accompanied by unprecedented resistance to technology, appearing as simultaneous terror at its apocalyptic nature (in jobs, if nothing else) and dismissal as useless, especially in Gen Z. A January 2026 Civiqs survey found that 57 percent of Americans aged 18–34 view AI negatively—more than any other age group. Curiously, the seniors category, which now includes most boomers, was the least resistant to AI, followed by Gen X and older millennials, all groups that grew up seeing radical societal and technological changes.8. It seems paradoxical that the smartphone generation recoils from the tools of the future. To understand this resistance means understanding the mentalité that shaped it—what Braudel’s successors in the Annales school called the collective psychology formed through lived experience.9. For Gen Z, that formative experience was network culture—both a successor to postmodernism and a form of collective psychology I did not fully understand at the time. Writing on network culture in 2008, it seemed to me that social media promised connection; instead, it brought division.10. The networked self was indeed constituted through networks, not merely isolated in postmodern fragmentation, but the fragmentation was now collective. Networked publics built barriers against one another, creating what Robert Putnam called cyberbalkanization: retreat into a comfortable niche among people just like oneself, views merely reinforcing views.11. Identity wars and mimetic conflict flared across filter bubbles that amplified outrage and tribal scapegoating as both MAGA and wokism built toxic online cultures. QAnon and a thousand other conspiracy theories propagated through Facebook groups and YouTube recommendations. Young men drifted into incel communities where loneliness became ideology and livestreaming mass shootings was celebrated. Influencers built their empires on hatred—Hasan Piker framed Hamas’s October 7 massacre as anticolonial resistance while Nick Fuentes celebrated mass shooters as vanguards of race war and civilizational collapse.

Nor did this just fragment culture—it exacted a massive psychic toll, as social contagion spread new forms of self-harm and mental illness. During the pandemic, teenage girls began presenting tic-like behaviors—not Tourette’s syndrome, but something researchers termed “mass social media-induced illness,”12. spread by TikTok videos about Tourette’s rather than any actual disease. The pattern was unprecedented but not unique. Eating disorders spread through thinspiration hashtags. Self-harm tutorials circulated on Instagram. The platforms that were supposed to bring us together instead spread desires, disorders, and identities through pure social contagion—and with them, violence and polarization. A generation that grew up inside this experiment—that watched it reshape their peers’ bodies, minds, and identities—is right to be skeptical of the next technological promise.

In 2010, it seemed like network culture had a good chance of becoming understood as the successor to postmodernism. Bruce Sterling and I were engaged in a kind of dialogue about it online. He predicted that network culture would last “about a decade before something else comes along.”13. And he was right, as I acknowledged in my 2020 Year in Review. By then, network culture was exhausted, and with the Covidean break, it seemed time for something new. In 2023, I taught a course at the New Centre for Research & Practice to try to broadly sketch the emerging era. It’s still early and hard to fathom, like trying to understand postmodernism in 1971 or network culture in 1998, but it’s clear that if postmodernism was underwritten by the explosion of mass media, network culture by the Internet, social media, and the smartphone, then the current era is shaped by AI.

But if Gen Z, scarred by the effects of social media, has been reacting with deep fear and anxiety, Sterling how epitmozes the other reaction, dismissal. In the most recent State of the World, for example, he derides AI-generated content as “desiccated bullshit that can’t even bother to lie.” He compares the vibe-coding atmosphere to an acid trip, mocking the professionals who utter “mindblown stuff” like “we may be solving all of software” and “I have godlike powers now.” For Sterling, AI can produce nothing but slop. Now Bruce has always had a healthy skepticism toward tech claims, but I can’t help but think of Johannes Trithemius, the fifteenth-century abbot who wrote De Laude Scriptorum just as Gutenberg’s press was spreading across Europe—defending the scriptorium against a technology he could not see would remake the world.

There are even deeper, more existential fears, and I’ve spent the past year addressing them on my blog, in the process laying the foundation for a book on the topic: AI as plagiarism machine; AI as hallucination engine; AI as stochastic parrot, mindlessly repeating what it has ingested (Sterling’s critique); and AI as uncanny double, too close to us for comfort. As I explain, the discomfort arises not from the machine’s otherness but from its likeness: a mirror held up to processes we preferred to believe were uniquely ours.

It’s no accident that I published these essays on my blog. As far as my personal year in review goes, this was very much the year of the blog. I have no plans to ever publish in an academic journal again. Why would I? Who would read it? Why would I want to publish something paywalled, reinforcing the walled gardens of inequality that academia is so desperate to maintain—even as it proclaims itself the champion of open inquiry and democratized knowledge? Academia has become the realm of what Peter Sloterdijk called cynical reason: rehearsing the tropes of ideology critique while knowing the game is empty and playing it anyway. This revolts me.

But for almost ten years now, since the shutting down of the labs at Columbia’s architecture school, I have been content to write from the position of the outsider, something I reflected on in “On the Golden Age of Blogging”. That essay was prompted by a strange comment from Scott Alexander, who lamented on Dwarkesh Patel’s podcast that he had personally made a strategic error in not blogging during what he called the “golden age,” imagining that “the people from that era all founded news organizations or something.” The golden age he remembers is a fiction, as golden ages often are—and he gets the stakes entirely wrong. Evan Williams founded Blogger in 1999, sold it to Google, co-founded Twitter, then created Medium, which convinced hapless readers pay to read slop long before AI slop was ever a thing. The early bloggers who sought professionalization found themselves absorbed into the worst of the worst, writing for BuzzFeed, peddling nostalgia listicles that rotted psyches.

There was, however, a golden age for me, and I miss it: the architecture blogging community circa 2007—Owen Hatherley, Geoff Manaugh, Enrique Ramirez, Fred Scharmen, Sam Jacob, Mimi Zeiger (whose Loud Paper was less a blog and more a zine, but a key part of the culture), and others. We inherited from zine culture an informal, conversational tone and the will to stand outside architectural spectacle. But ArchDaily and Dezeen commercialized the form, shifting from independent critique to marketing and product. Startup culture absorbed architectural talent.

Blogging was powerful precisely because we had no stakes in it—we owned and controlled our means of intellectual production. The golden age of blogging is not in the past; it is now. After years of proclaiming I would blog more, in 2025, I really did. I wrote over 83,700 words on varnelis.net and the Florilegium—essay-length pieces on landscape, native plants, AI and art, architecture, infrastructure, politics, and tourism. My only regret is that my presidency at the Native Plant Society of New Jersey consumes so much of my thinking about native plants that little remains for writing. But the time will come, and if nothing else, my investigation of the Japanese garden aesthetic should point in the future direction for my writing on landscape.

I also continued to make AI art, or to be more precise, what I called stochastic histories. A major project was a substantial reworking of The Lost Canals of Vilnius, a counterfactual history in which, after the Great Fire of 1610, Voivode Mikalojus Radvila Našlaitėlis rebuilt the city with Venetian-style canals, complete with gondoliers, water processions, and a hybrid “Vilnius Venetian” architecture. As research, I used Gemini to translate Radvila’s sixteenth-century Latin pilgrimage narrative. AI, like photography or film, is what you make of it. Film is perhaps the better analogy—anyone can make a video. Making something worthwhile is another matter entirely. In December, I also completed East Coast/West Coast: After Bob and Nancy, a generative restaging of Nancy Holt and Robert Smithson’s 1969 video dialogue using two AI speakers.

There were other substantial essays, too. In “Oversaturation: On Tourism and the Image”, I finally put down on paper something I had wanted the Netlab to address while at Columbia, but that proved too dangerous for the school to support. Universities cannot critique the very systems of overproduction they depend upon for survival. Publish or perish and endless symposia nobody is interested in are the academic versions of overproduction, but more than that, any architecture school claiming global currency cannot afford to offend either other institutions, like museums, that give it legitimacy, or, for that matter, the trustees that fund both. As I point out, tourism has always been mediated by imagery; take Piranesi’s vedute or the Claude Glass. Grand Tourists always had representations at hand to interpret their direct experience—but a new crisis point has been reached with both overtourism and the overproduction of images. Algorithmic logic now reorganizes cultural geography around “most Instagrammable spots,” making historical significance secondary to content potential. The Fushimi Inari shrine in Kyoto is the case in point—a 1,300-year-old shrine that Instagram made famous and that has now ceased to serve as a religious site due to the influx of visitors. The Japanese have a term for this: kankō kōgai, tourism pollution. Tourism has become the paradigm of contemporary experience—the production of imagery without cultural meaning; everything feeds the same algorithmic mill. Even strategies of resistance get metabolized—slow travel becomes a hashtag, psychogeography becomes an Instagram guide.

The Bilbao effect, which was a major driver of oversaturation, was itself a product of globalization. Hans Ibelings coined “supermodernism” in 1998 to refer to the architectural expression of Marc Augé’s “non-places,” an architecture optimized for the perpetual circulation of bodies and capital. It was the architecture of network culture, of the Concorde and the Internet. Koolhaas diagnosed its endgame in his 2002 “Junkspace“—”Regurgitation is the new creativity”—and then, tellingly, stopped writing. Today, network culture is long gone; nationalism is on the rise. The Internet is a dark forest now14. while the disconnected life is on the rise.15 The most exclusive resorts now advertise no Wi-Fi, no cell service, no addresses—only coordinates. Disconnection has become the ultimate luxury, sold back to the same people who built the infrastructure of connection. More cities are alarmed by the effects of overtourism than desire to attract tourists. In the US, new architectural proposals appeal to a retardataire aesthetic—Trump displaying models of a triumphal arch inspired by Albert Speer and marking a triumph of nothing in particular in models in three sizes (“I happen to think the large looks the best“), a four-hundred-million-dollar ballroom modeled on Mar-a-Lago, an executive order mandating classical architecture for federal buildings that Stephen Miller explicitly framed as culture war.

Yet both Bilbao and MAGA are spectacle, architecture-as-branding. But the Bilbao effect is imploding. No city believes anymore that a signature building by a starchitect will transform its fortunes. The parametricists have nothing left to say. Parametric design promised formal liberation—responsive, site-specific, computationally derived—but what it delivered was the most efficient, ugliest box. If the promise was the blob, the reality is the “5-over-1”: wood-frame residential floors stacked on a concrete podium with ground-floor retail, wrapped in a pastiche of brick veneer, fiber cement panels, and that obligatory conical turret element meant to signal “we thought about this corner.” As for AI-generated architecture, it is merely boring—giant sequoias hollowed out as apartment buildings, white concrete towers with impossible cantilevers, and lush vegetation sprouting from every surface—the same utopian fantasy rendered a thousand times over. These are renders of renders: AI trained on architectural visualization produces visualizations that are utterly disconnected from any tectonic reality. A new generation may emerge in response to new needs, but for now, the discipline has lost its cultural purchase. Architecture, for us, is a thing of the past.

The art world, too, has slowed. Museums are putting on fewer shows, shifting from aggressive schedules to longer, more deliberate exhibitions—or simply cutting programming as budgets tighten.16. The frantic pace of the Biennale circuit has exhausted dealers and collectors alike; smaller fairs are folding, and even the major ones feel like obligations rather than events. Galleries that survived the pandemic are now closing quietly, without the drama of a market crash—just a slow bleed of foot traffic, sales, and cultural attention. There is no new movement, no emergent critical framework, no sense of direction. The market churns on—auction prices for blue-chip artists remain high, collectors still speculate, art advisors still advise—but the sense of cultural mission has dissipated. What remains is commerce without conviction, a field that has forgotten why it exists beyond the perpetuation of its own economy. The institutions that trained artists for this field are collapsing alongside it.

As enrollment dwindles, design schools are collapsing—not merely contracting, but ceasing to exist. Most recently, the California College of the Arts announced in January 2026 that it would close after the 2026–27 academic year17., the last remaining independent art and design school in the Bay Area. It follows a grim procession: the San Francisco Art Institute (2020), Mills College (2022), the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts (2023), and Woodbury University’s acquisition by Redlands and subsequent adjunctification—a fate that has methodically undone so many schools as faculty become contingent labor and institutions into hollow administrative structures run by well-paid, cost-optimizing consultants.

There is personal resonance for me in this. Simon’s Rock College of Bard, which shuttered its Great Barrington campus in 2025, was where I studied for my first two years before transferring to Cornell—a pioneer of early college education that offered a radical pedagogical experiment in what learning could be beyond conventional schooling. I arrived there straight from high school, as did my good friend and colleague Ed Keller; clearly, something interesting was in the water back then. Simon’s Rock made the development of young minds its central mission rather than an incidental focus of brand management or endowment growth, and its alumni list is impressive for such a small school. It has an afterlife at Bard, but it’s an echo at best.

The difference between these institutional deaths and simple market failure is this: they are not being replaced. When a retail business fails, another may open elsewhere. When a school closes, there is no succession. The market offers no alternative. Instead, what remains are the corporate university satellites—for-profit programs nested within larger institutions (like Woodbury’s absorption into Redlands), stripped of autonomy, their faculty reduced to precariat, their curricula bent toward what can be measured and marketed. The art schools that survive do so by transforming into something else: luxury finishing schools for wealthy families or research appendages to larger universities, where “design thinking” becomes another management consultant’s tool. The pedagogical mission—to create conditions where students might develop serious aesthetic judgment, where they might encounter genuine problems and be forced to think through them—is not merely challenged but impossible. The closure of these schools does not signal a failure of art education; it signals that the very idea of art education as something valuable in itself has been liquidated.

This hollowing out of cultural institutions is not incidental to the political moment—it is one of its hallmarks. Politically, most people have checked out. This is not 2017, when each provocation demanded a response; the outrage cycle has given way to numbness. In “National Populism as a Transitional Mode of Regulation”, I argued that Trump, Orbán, Meloni, and their ilk represent not a return to fascism but something new: the authoritarian management of declining expectations. National Populism correctly identifies that neoliberalism’s promise of shared prosperity has failed, but it channels legitimate grievances toward scapegoats rather than addressing the technological displacement actually causing them. This is its tragic irony: the National Populist base—workers made obsolete by neoliberalism and unable to participate in AI Capitalism—finds its legitimate anger directed into a movement that accelerates the very forces rendering them superfluous. Their value to capital lies in political disruption rather than economic production; they are consumers and voters, but no longer needed as workers. National Populist leaders offer psychological compensation—dignity, recognition, transgressive identity politics—rather than material improvement. The apocalyptic tenor of populist culture, its end-times thinking and conspiracy theories, provides a framework for populations sensing their own economic redundancy.

The alliance between tech billionaires and populist leaders is unstable. AI Capitalism requires borderless computation and global talent flows; nationalist protectionism contradicts these at every turn. Musk, Thiel, and Andreessen have aligned with the movement to dismantle the regulatory state, not because they share its vision but because populism serves as a useful battering ram against institutional constraints. Once those barriers fall, the movement and its human-centric concerns can be discarded. National Populism, as I conclude, is not the future—it is a political interlude, a transitional mode that will not survive contact with the economic forces it has helped unleash.

If National Populism is transitional, is there a positive vision that can replace it? In “After the Infrastructural City”, I responded to Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s book Abundance, perhaps the most influential book of 2025, which argues that America’s inability to build is a political choice, not a technical constraint. Their solution: streamline regulation, invest boldly, build more. It’s a compelling vision—and a necessary corrective to decades of paralysis. But Abundance shares a curious blindspot with Muskian pronatalism: both assume we need more people. Musk preaches that declining birthrates spell civilizational collapse; Klein and Thompson build their vision on populations that will mysteriously arrive to fill what’s built, perhaps by immigration. Neither accounts for the possibility that AI changes the equation entirely—that a smaller population, augmented by intelligent systems, might not be a crisis at all. Populations are already shrinking across much of the developed world. What I call “actually-existing degrowth”—not the voluntary eco-leftist kind, but the unplanned demographic contraction now underway in Japan, Korea, and much of Europe—is coming for the United States too. Declining birth rates, aging populations, and regional depopulation: these are not future scenarios but present facts.

This doesn’t invalidate the Abundance agenda; it redefines it. Abundance cannot mean building more for populations that will not arrive. It must mean building better, adaptive, intelligent infrastructure for smaller, older societies. AI, rather than merely destroying jobs, can help navigate this transition: smart grids, autonomous transit, predictive healthcare. The opportunity is real. Managed shrinkage, done well, can mean more livable cities, restored ecosystems, higher quality of life. The question is whether political leaders can articulate a vision of flourishing within limits—or whether nostalgia for growth will leave us building for a future that never comes.

Against the exhaustion of institutions, against the hollowing out of architecture and art, against the closure of the schools that trained people to imagine, the blog remains. It may not be much, but it is one independent voice outside the collapsing structures around me. I wrote over 83,000 words this year. I made art. I thought through problems that matter to me with the help of AI, which provided me with tools I could only have dreamt of merely a year ago. Today, I uploaded hundreds of thousands of words from my essays to a directory in Obsidian so that Claude could draw connections between them (see here for just how one can set this up).

The future is already here—it just isn’t evenly distributed. Some are afraid or are still pretending AI isn’t happening. Phase transitions are uncomfortable. They are also where the interesting work gets done. One makes of one’s time what one makes.

1. William Gibson, quoted in Scott Rosenberg, “Virtual Reality Check Digital Daydreams, Cyberspace Nightmares,” San Francisco Examiner, April 19, 1992, Style section, C1. This is the earliest verified print citation, unearthed by Fred Shapiro, editor of the Yale Book of Quotations.

2. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 21.

3. Braudel, The Mediterranean, 901.

4. Fernand Braudel, “Personal Testimony,” Journal of Modern History 44, no. 4 (December 1972): 448–67.

5. Paule Braudel, “Les origines intellectuelles de Fernand Braudel: un témoignage,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 47, no. 1 (1992): 237–44.

6. Howard Caygill, “Braudel’s Prison Notebooks,” History Workshop Journal 57 (Spring 2004): 151–60.

7. Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” The Atlantic Monthly 176, no. 1 (July 1945): 101–8.

8. Civiqs, “Do you think that the increasing use of artificial intelligence, or AI, is a good thing or a bad thing?,” January 2026, https://civiqs.com/results/ai_good_or_bad.

9. The concept of mentalités emerged from studies of phenomena like the witch trials, where beliefs and fears spread through communities in ways that could not be reduced to individual irrationality. For an overview of mentalités as a historiographical concept, see Jacques Le Goff, “Mentalities: A History of Ambiguities,” in Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology, ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 166–180.

10. Kazys Varnelis, “The Rise of Network Culture,” in Networked Publics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 145–160.

11. Robert Putnam, “The Other Pin Drops,” Inc., May 16, 2000.

12. Kirsten R. Müller-Vahl et al., “Stop That! It’s Not Tourette’s but a New Type of Mass Sociogenic Illness,” Brain 145, no. 2 (August 2021): 476–480, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34424292/.

13. Bruce Sterling, “Atemporality for the Creative Artist,” keynote address, Transmediale 10, Berlin, February 6, 2010.

14. Yancey Strickler, “The Dark Forest Theory of the Internet,” 2019, https://www.ystrickler.com/the-dark-forest-theory-of-the-internet/. See also The Dark Forest Anthology of the Internet (Metalabel, 2024).

15. “Trend: Not Just Digital Detox, But Analog Travel,” Global Wellness Summit, 2025, https://www.globalwellnesssummit.com/blog/trend-not-just-digital-detox-but-analog-travel/.

16. “The Big Slowdown: Why Museums and Galleries Are Putting on Fewer Shows,” The Art Newspaper, March 10, 2025, https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2025/03/10/the-big-slowdown-why-museums-and-galleries-are-putting-on-fewer-shows.

17. California College of the Arts, the last remaining private art and design school in the Bay Area, announced in January 2026 that it would close after the 2026–27 academic year. See “‘Nowhere Left to Go’: As California College of the Arts Closes, So Does a Pathway for Bay Area Artists,” KQED, January 13, 2026, https://www.kqed.org/news/12070453/nowhere-left-to-go-as-california-college-of-the-arts-closes-so-does-a-pathway-for-bay-area-artists.

Oversaturation: On Tourism and the Image

Cathédrale Saint-Just-et-Saint-Pasteur de Narbonne, France, October 2024

In 2013, I proposed a Network Architecture Lab symposium at Columbia centered on the topic of oversaturation—a concept that I envisioned encompassing not just what would become known as “overtourism,” but the crisis of cultural overproduction as a whole. Even though we had identified a funding source for the symposium, mysterious administrative forces kept throwing wrenches in the works. Perhaps it conflicted with the school’s larger agenda; after all, how could an institution premised on constant growth, endless publication, and global expansion confront the consequences of those conditions? Perhaps there was concern that donors might be turned off? It was still the heady era of post-GFC growth, when urban boosters hoped that a shiny new museum or concert hall would bring in tourists by the plane full. We tossed in the towel and moved on to other projects instead, things architects could more easily understand, things that weren’t going to get frowned on by the administration. Coined on travel industry website Skift some three years later, “overtourism” rapidly became a buzzword. But oversaturation was a broader concept, and as I am outside university supervision these days, it’s time to revisit and explore it in further depth.

As I started this essay a few months ago, I was in France on a variety of matters—visiting two shows on my father’s paintings (one at the Centre Pompidou and one at the Fondation Vasarely) as part of the Saison de la Lituanie en France, attending a residency in the Pyrénées, and exploring parts of the country that I had not previously visited. Besides France, I went abroad several times during the past year—to Japan, Berlin, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Overtourism dogged these travels, especially on the April trip we made to Tokyo and Kyoto. We had a miserable morning at the Sensō-Ji Temple in Asakusa, Tokyo, which tourists had overrun. Burned by this experience, we decided to skip such sites. In Kyoto, we passed on notable locations like the Fushimi Inari Shrine, Gion, and the Imperial Palace. This was disappointing, but we had our hands full going to locations off the beaten path. We didn’t take selfies—what, precisely, is the point of those?—but we were still tourists, no different than the folks wearing Disneyworld T-shirts, although we made efforts to be more respectful of local life. For his part, our son—who is now pursuing a degree in game studies—took late-night trains out to distant suburbs to find obscure video games at used game stores, just like my father endlessly visited bookstores for art books and I looked for books on architecture. Obsessions with culture cross generations in a family of artists, even as the objects of that obsession may change.

Tourism is a foreign country for me. With my father as an artist in a single-income household, we weren’t wealthy; my father’s time and money went into his book, map, and art collections. I have a dim memory of a couple of brief vacations at the beach—ordered by his doctor—while I was very young, but apart from one night at Niagara Falls in 1976, we did not spend a single night away except for his professional interests, and even those vanished after we left Chicago in 1979. When we went somewhere, it was a research project: museums were inspiration for an artist, not some kind of amusement. He was not a foodie. Eating was for sustenance only, the cheaper the better. Amusement parks and theater were nothing but wastes of money. Disneyworld was never in the cards; I didn’t even ask about it.

By the time I had graduated college and had the opportunity to travel, I was already an historian of architecture. My first trip abroad was a month in Italy on a Grand Tour that I’d received a scholarship for as part of my studies. The allowance for room and board were minimal, but it gave me the opportunity to see buildings firsthand. For an historian, such travel was a prerequisite. In retrospect, I wonder if I chose the profession to permit myself to travel or at least rationalize the activity to myself. Still, it meant that my own travels always had a research component to them.

There is nothing new about all this. The practice of tourism itself can be traced back to the Grand Tour, a tradition that began in the 17th century as an educational journey for young European aristocrats, primarily from Britain. Designed to cultivate the intellect and refine the sensibilities of young aristocrats by exposing them to the art, culture, and architecture of classical Europe, the Grand Tour was more than mere travel—it was an immersive experience to shape the mind and character. The traveler often spent months or even years abroad, moving through the great cities from Paris to Florence to Rome, while a tutor (the cicerone) gave firsthand instruction on the sights and their relationship to the classics. Studying ruins firsthand, travelers would contemplate the fall of that empire even as Britain was building its own.

Tourism and imagery were tied together through their origins in the rise of print culture, which made classical literature and art widely accessible. Early print was dominated by the reproduction of Greek and Roman classics, sparking widespread curiosity about the landscapes and monuments of ancient Rome, Greece being occupied by the Ottoman Turks and inaccessible to the West, a condition compounded by the achievements of Renaissance Italy. The eighteenth century saw the emergence of travel literature and illustrated guides that created idealized representations of these landscapes, fundamentally changing how tourists experienced and interacted with places. This era was also marked by the rise of the “picturesque,” a concept first introduced by writer William Gilpin in his 1768 “Essay on Prints,” a short treatise on how to collect the emerging media. Gilpin’s “picturesque” was an effort to appreciate landscapes by treating them as mediated images through careful framing. This approach was augmented by devices like the Claude Glass, a small, portable, dark-tinted convex mirror named after the painter Claude Lorrain, whose idealized pastoral scenes set the standard for “proper” composition, this small, portable, dark-tinted convex mirror reflected back a softened, flattened, and slightly idealized image, making any view appear more like a painting. Using the device required an almost ritualistic set of actions: the viewer would face away from the scene, hold up the mirror, and adjust the position until the reflection achieved the desired effect. This peculiar choreography—turning away from reality to see it better—perfectly encapsulates how the Grand Tour taught travelers to experience place through representation. The Claude Glass transformed raw nature into composed views, making landscape itself into something that could be collected and consumed. Even more significantly, it trained viewers to expect mediated images and even prefer them to direct experience, establishing a pattern that would shape tourism for centuries to come.

But actual image-making was menial work, not something the British upper class could afford to be seen indulging in, moreover, it required extensive time for training that was better spent with the humanities, law, and other studies. Instead, the wealthier Grand Tourists acquired art and antiquities systematically, building personal collections while also transferring cultural capital from Italy to Britain, thus forming the basis of major British institutions like the British Museum.

Canaletto, The Bucintoro at the Molo on Ascension Day, 1733-34

To satisfy the growing interest in architectural imagery, artists such as Canaletto and Giovanni Battista Piranesi produced images of local sites for these audiences. Canaletto dominated the market for vedute (view paintings) in Venice, creating meticulously detailed scenes that satisfied tourists’ desire for perfect memories of their Italian sojourn. Canaletto’s vedute were prized for their apparent objectivity and precision—though he frequently adjusted perspectives and rearranged architectural elements to create more pleasing compositions. His capricci, blending real and imagined elements into fantastical compositions, appealed to collectors drawn to a more romanticized vision of the past, offering both documentation and escapism. His primary patron, Joseph Smith, the British Consul in Venice, effectively operated as his agent, selling Canaletto’s works to British travelers and eventually selling his own massive collection to King George III. This relationship proved so profitable that when British tourism to Venice declined during the War of Austrian Succession (1740-48), Canaletto followed his market to England, painting similar views of London for aristocratic patrons.

Antonio Canaletto, Capriccio con edifici palladiani, c. 1750

Many tourists saw Canaletto and Piranesi’s vedute before they ever visited Venice and Rome, creating a certain level of expectation. Some enthusiastically proclaimed that the real thing exceeded its image, but others were disappointed by the reality and the latter experience only increased as the eighteenth century wore on and living conditions in London improved.

The market for views was hierarchical. Canaletto’s oil paintings commanded the highest prices and greatest prestige, purchased by wealthy aristocrats as the ultimate proof of cultural refinement. Below these were watercolors and gouaches by artists like Francesco Guardi, who offered a quicker, more atmospheric, and more affordable alternative. At the bottom were etchings and engravings by artists like Piranesi and Giuseppe Vasi, mass-produced for less well-heeled tourists (Canaletto’s works were also reproduced for wider consumption as prints by Antonio Visentini and other engravers). Working in etching, a “lower” medium and initially catering to less sophisticated tastes, Piranesi transformed architectural representation through works such as his Vedute di Roma. These dramatic views of Rome’s ruins combined archaeological precision with theatrical imagination, creating images that were simultaneously documentary and fantastical. Where Canaletto presented a vision of Venice—then in decline—as a great and proseperous city, Piranesi’s Rome was a city of ruins, inhabited by as many cows and goats as people. Both artists heavily embellished their work. Canelleto’s Carceri d’Invenzione (Imaginary Prisons) series went further, using architectural elements from Roman ruins to create impossible, sublime spaces that would influence everything from Romantic poetry to surrealist art.

Giovanni Batista Piranesi, Veduta del Tempio detto della Concordia, 1774, from the Vedute di Roma

Piranesi transformed what was essentially a form of commercial art into something more profound: a way of experiencing architecture through imagery that was both documentation and affect, establishing patterns of visual consumption that would shape centuries of architectural representation. Today, Piranesi is now highly collectable: his Vedute di Roma was my father’s most prized possession and, although our family donated it to the Lithuanian National Museum, would be worth a small fortune today.

Photography’s role in tourism began soon after the medium’s invention, with figures like Maxime Du Camp and Francis Frith leading the way. Using photography to document their journeys, these early travelers created lasting visual records of the places they visited. Du Camp, who traveled to Egypt and the Middle East in the 1840s, captured images of ancient monuments and ruins, which were later published alongside his travel writings in Égypte, Nubie, Palestine et Syrie (1852). Believing that there was a large market for imagery outside of the traditional Grand Tour sites, Frith made several trips to Egypt and Palestine in the 1850s and 1860s. His photographs of ancient ruins and landscapes became highly sought-after souvenirs and were widely published in albums such as Egypt and Palestine Photographed and Described (1858-1860) and reproduced on postcards. Frith’s detailed and carefully composed images shaped how Europeans perceived these distant lands, blending tourism with a kind of visual ethnography.

Francis Frith, the Great Pyramid and the Sphynx, 1858

Nor was photography limited to merely emulating painting. New technologies created unprecedented opportunities for visual culture. In particular, the stereoscope allowed viewers to see distant sights in three dimensions. This required precise calculation: two photographs had to be taken simultaneously from points about two and a half inches apart (matching the distance between human eyes) using a special double camera and then precisely printed and mounted on cardstock. When viewed through the stereoscope’s lenses, the images merged in the viewer’s perception to create an uncanny sense of depth and presence. Exhibited at the 1851 exhibition at the Crystal Palace, the stereoscope captivated Queen Victoria and Prince Albert and the attendant publicity led to some 250,000 being rapidly manufactured and sold. The London Stereoscopic Company, founded in 1854, operating under the slogan “No home without a stereoscope,” sponsored photographers to travel the world and sold hundreds of thousands of stereoscopic cards. Underwood & Underwood, founded in 1881 in Ottawa, Kansas, became the largest American producer, publishing 25,000 cards per day by 1901 (I own a small collection of these that we found in the house my parents bought in Massachusetts in 1977). These companies employed photographers who followed established tourist routes across Europe and the Mediterranean, carefully positioning their double cameras to capture the same monuments and views that had attracted Grand Tourists. Specialized techniques enhanced the stereoscopic effect—positioning foreground elements to emphasize depth, using strong diagonals, and carefully calculating viewing angles to maximize the sense of space. Virtual tourism was possible for the first time, allowing distant spaces to be experienced in the parlor.

Hawley C. White, Stereoscopic Image of the Pantheon, c. 1901

Another key photographic technology was the “magic lantern,” or lantern slide projector. Generally attributed to Christiaan Huygens, a Dutch scientist who also discovered the rings of Saturn, this technology was first developed sometime in the 1650s. Refined and popularized throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the magic lantern sent the light through a series of lenses to project images from glass slides onto a wall or screen. Initially, the device was largely used to produce spectacular displays of ghostly images such as skeletons, demons, and other supernatural figures to entertain and frighten audiences. During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, educators and scientists began to recognize the magic lantern’s potential for illustrating lectures, using it to project scientific diagrams, landscapes, and other instructive images for audiences, a practice that became more widespread with the advent of photography and mass-reproduced glass slides. Institutions such as the Royal Institution of Great Britain and universities across Europe incorporated slide lectures into their regular programming. They were particularly important in fields that required visual examples, such as art history, architecture, and natural sciences. Art historian Heinrich Wölfflin pioneered formalist art history by putting two magic lanterns side by side. In doing so, he could compare and contrast different works of art in real-time, a method that became central to his comparative art historical approach and to art and architecture history courses until the era of PowerPoint.

As photography advanced, glass slides featuring photographs of paintings, buildings, and monuments were produced in increasing numbers, with firms like the Alinari Brothers playing a major role in documenting European art and architecture. Founded in 1854, Fratelli Alinari (the Brothers Alinari) specialized in documenting Italian art and architecture, producing thousands of photographs that became valuable resources for scholars and travelers alike. The Alinari Brothers’ photographs became staples in architectural study, particularly for scholars who could not easily visit the sites themselves.

These early travel photographers laid the foundation for a visual culture of tourism as well as for the forensic use of photography in the history of architecture. Architectural historians relied heavily on such visual documentation to inform their studies and deliver lectures. Soon, universities and museums developed slide libraries. Institutions like Columbia University, the Courtauld Institute in London, not to mention my own Cornell University amassed vast collections of slides, including images by photographers such as Frith and the Alinari Brothers together with images taken by their own faculty on research trips. These collections enabled architectural historians to compare buildings from different time periods and geographic locations, contributing to the development of the comparative method in architectural study.

Historians of architecture took up photography themselves, using it as a direct tool for research. Banister Fletcher used photography extensively to illustrate his arguments in his A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method, employing Wöllfflin’s comparative method to create visual arguments that textual descriptions alone could not achieve. Many historians like Nikolaus Pevsner and John Summerson were also known to document their travels through photography, capturing the buildings they studied in meticulous detail. Their images, often included in their writings, provided not only records of their subjects but also a means of interpreting the architectural qualities of the structures. Pevsner’s surveys of British architecture, for example, relied on photographs to convey stylistic details that were otherwise difficult to express in text.

Art History Lecture at the University of Iowa, 1960s. credit: Iowa Digital Library

While historians of art and architecture honed these practices within the academy, the travel slideshow was developing for a broader public and, eventually, as a middle-class pastime. Travel slideshows emerged from the learned societies of the early 19th century, where geographical societies used painted slides to illustrate lectures about explorations and discoveries. Lecturers at the Royal Geographical Society, for example, initially relied on drawings, maps, and hand painted images transferred to glass slides. The advent of photography in 1839 gradually transformed these presentations. By the 1850s, explorers were beginning to use photography to document their journeys, though the cumbersome nature of early photographic equipment limited its use in the field. The Royal Geographical Society began collecting photographs in the 1850s, with Roger Fenton becoming its first official photographer in 1852. Photographic slides became increasingly common over subsequent decades. More portable cameras and dry-plate photography made it more practical for explorers to document their journeys photographically. When the National Geographic Society was founded in 1888, photography was already central to its mission of documenting the world. Starting with their 1896 volume, the National Geographic Magazine styled itself as an “illustrated monthly,” featuring photographs of distant lands and peoples and cementing the relationship between travel and photography.

Through the early decades of the twentieth century, the lantern slide lecture gradually moved beyond elite scientific societies and universities to broader cultural institutions. Libraries, local history museums, and civic organizations regularly hosted slide-based travelogues, as did camera clubs and photographic societies. The Eastman Kodak Company recognized and encouraged this democratization of travel photography, developing increasingly portable cameras and, in 1934 introduced 35mm still film in daylight-loading cassettes with Kodachrome color slide film coming two years later. World War II accelerated this transformation as millions of American servicemembers traveled abroad, many carrying 35mm cameras and returning with images of far off places that they shared with their communities.

By the 1950s, travel and photography had become inextricably linked for the American middle class. The postwar economic boom made both more accessible: the 35mm camera became a standard possession while paid vacation time and the interstate highway system created new possibilities for travel. Even as international trips remained expensive, they were no longer the exclusive domain of the wealthy. A middle-class family might save for years for a single European tour, but such trips were now conceivable. The Kodak Carousel slide projector, introduced in 1961, allowed travelers to more easily show color slides at social events by eliminating the need to hand load slides. Living rooms would be transformed into makeshift theaters as neighbors gathered to see images of the Grand Tour, now documented in Kodachrome. Travel slideshows became a form of cultural capital, letting middle-class Americans demonstrate their sophistication while sharing their experiences with those who couldn’t afford to travel themselves. In practice, however, many amateur slideshows were guaranteed to induce sleep in darkened living rooms, and were often dreaded by invitees.

In Soviet Lithuania, slide lectures were rare and highly anticipated events, offering glimpses of the Western world. For example, the Nasvytis brothers—leading architects who served as professors at the Vilnius Civil Engineering Institute and had gained enough trust from the authorities to occasionally travel abroad—would organize presentations. Only a select group could attend: other architects and professors, cultural figures deemed ideologically reliable, and students whose records suggested they would not cause trouble. Knowing that the presentations were monitored for ideological conformity, the brothers carefully curated these presentations, selecting images that could pass official scrutiny while conveying developments in Western architecture. They had to maintain a delicate balance, showing enough to educate but not so much as to suggest the superiority of Western achievements. Such presentations were part of a broader pattern in which certain cultural figures—primarily established artists, architects, and academics who had demonstrated loyalty to the system—were permitted limited engagement with the West, always with the understanding that this privilege could be revoked.

The shift from careful documentation to ubiquitous capture traces the rise of photography into oversaturation. When the Kodak Brownie democratized photography in 1900, it remained a deliberate act—each image had to count. Even as production grew—from one billion photographs annually in 1930 to ten billion by 1970—photography retained its role as the intentional documentation of significant moments and places. The development of Kodak’s inexpensive, easy-to-use, but low-quality Instamatic in 1963, followed by Polaroid’s SX-70 in 1972, and Fujifilm’s disposable camera in 1986 all contributed to the rise of more casual—and more frequently taken images—but it took the arrival of digital photography, smartphones, and finally the launch of Instagram in 2010 to transform our relationship to images entirely. We now produce more photographs every day than were taken in entire years of the pre-digital era. With 1.3 billion images shared daily on Instagram alone, photography has moved from documentation to constant ambient production, from captures of the significant to an endless stream of the everyday.

I have repeatedly asked myself if, having left the academy behind for independent practice, I have merely joined the endless ranks of tourists. And even if I now travel like my father, for ideas for my art and writing, what does it mean to photograph buildings when likely as not, one can find similar—or better—images on the Internet with a simple search? The methodical documentation that characterized architectural history—the careful positioning to capture essential details, the systematic recording of building elements—seems increasingly disconnected from contemporary practice. Where Pevsner and Summerson’s photographs served as both evidence and analysis, today’s architectural photography operates in an environment of infinite reproducibility and instant access. Academics can just download images from the Internet instead of making pilgrimages to the monuments. The photographer’s craft, once essential to architectural history, has been simultaneously democratized and devalued by digital abundance. Slide libraries have been liquidated, just as card catalogs have been hauled to the landfill. And what of the tours of architecture, led by historians and organized by the Society of Architectural Historians as well as so many universities and museums? Are these research or tourism? What of the visits to other cities we make under the aegis of “research” for exhibitions, such as my visits to Hong Kong for the 2014 MoMA “Tactical Urbanism” show? What about botanical photography? Am I really doing any good, hiking with iPhone in hand, documenting species with iNaturalist?

The lines between scholarly documentation and tourist snapshot, between analysis and consumption, between purposeful recording and compulsive capture, have blurred to the point of disappearance. When every angle of every significant building is already available online, what distinguishes the architectural historian’s photograph from the tourist’s? Perhaps only the increasingly quaint notion that our images might contribute to some larger project of understanding.

In reflecting on the Grand Tour and its modern counterpart, I see a fundamental shift in how we relate to the act of travel. The Grand Tour was predicated on the idea of cultivation—of educating oneself through prolonged exposure to other cultures and histories. Today’s tourism, in contrast, seems predicated on consumption. We no longer seek to deepen our understanding of the places we visit; instead, we literally consume them by reducing them to a set of aestheticized images and move on.

The tourist photograph functions as a contemporary Claude Glass—a way of transforming reality into something consumable, shareable, and aesthetically pleasing. Sites like the Pantheon, the Eiffel Tower, or Kyoto’s Fushimi Inari Shrine are now experienced through the screen of the smart phone, just like the social media the images are destined for. As visitors line up to take their photos, these sites become less about personal exploration or historical engagement and more about capturing a replicable moment, one that will be instantly validated by likes and shares on social media. How can one even see these sites anymore?

But it isn’t only the immediate experience that is threatened by the image, the actual memory of the experience is as well. Neuroscientists call this phenomenon the “photo-taking impairment effect”—the act of capturing an experience outsources its memory to the device, leaving the mind empty. In focusing on documenting the moment, we lose the cognitive and emotional engagement necessary to form lasting memories. What remains is a shallow trace of the experience, stripped of reflection and depth, replaced instead by the image itself. This phenomenon parallels the experience of Piranesi’s tourists, who arrived in Rome clutching engravings of ruins they had never seen, only to find their imaginations already colonized by someone else’s vision. Just as these engravings predetermined their expectations, today’s Instagram feeds serve as the preordained script for how places must be seen, photographed, and shared.

This reduction of memory to image reshapes how we interact with cultural heritage. Instead of spaces for contemplation, we get backdrops for a personal brand. Every photograph becomes both a proof of experience and a barrier to engagement, perpetuating the very oversaturation that alienates us from the spaces we visit. Even as these sites gain visibility, their existence dissolves into the noise of infinite replication.

The Pantheon, Rome, from Phonewatching, 2016

In this way, modern tourism can be seen as both a continuation and a departure from the Grand Tour. The framework of travel remains—the movement through culturally significant sites, the desire to encounter the foreign—but the internal experience has changed. What was once a journey of intellectual and personal enrichment has become an exercise in superficial documentation. The modern tourist moves quickly, capturing images and moments to be shared, but rarely pauses to reflect on the experience in any lasting way.

While the transformation of tourism offers perhaps the most visible manifestation of this cultural condition, oversaturation extends far beyond the overcrowded sites and Instagram-optimized viewpoints that characterize contemporary travel. As I suggested for the symposium over a decade ago, oversaturation describes a state where systems of cultural production exceed their capacity for meaningful absorption or engagement—but it manifests as more than mere excess. It emerges when the imperative to produce overwhelms the possibility of reception, creating a peculiar state where increased production actually diminishes the capacity for meaningful engagement. We see this not just in overtouristed sites where crowds make it impossible to truly see a monument, but across all domains of cultural production: in the academic world where more papers are published than could ever be read, in an art market where more exhibitions open each night in any global city than anyone could possibly attend, in media landscapes so crowded that attention itself becomes the scarcest resource. The tourist’s compulsion to document rather than experience mirrors the academic’s pressure to publish rather than think, the artist’s need to exhibit rather than develop, the writer’s push to post rather than reflect. In each case, the system demands constant production while making deep engagement increasingly impossible.

Potential responses to oversaturation seem to fall into predictable patterns that ultimately reinforce the system they aim to resist. Consider how movements like slow food, farm-to-table, and local food initiatives, while seeking to resist global homogenization, actually intensify certain forms of tourism and consumption. The small local restaurant becomes internationally famous precisely for being local, drawing food tourists from around the globe who take shots of the careful plating for social media. The farm-to-table movement creates new forms of destination dining where the “authentic” local experience becomes more hyperlocal than the local ever was in the first place. A neighborhood pasta maker in Bologna or a tiny sushi restaurant in Tokyo becomes a mandatory stop on global circuits of food tourism, their very resistance to globalization transforming them into nodes in global networks of consumption and content production. Any tie to local culture is, ultimately, gone.

Former practices of resistance have been absorbed into this system of cultural oversaturation. The Situationists’ dérive—their practice of aimless urban wandering—has been commodified into “off the beaten path” tours advertised on Airbnb Experiences. Psychogeography becomes Instagram “hidden gems” guides. Even urban exploration, once a transgressive practice, has been transformed into “ruin tourism” complete with designated photo spots and hashtags. Anyone can take a tour of Chernobyl, with time for plenty of photographs. The system doesn’t just resist critique—it metabolizes it, transforming opposition into content.

Oversaturation produces spaces where physical and digital presence create reinforcing cycles of visibility. Consider how a single viral photo can transform an obscure location into a must-visit destination, generating more photos, more visibility, more visitors, until the original site is completely transformed by its own fame, destroying the very qualities that made a place attractive in the first place—a quiet beach becomes crowded with influencers, a contemplative temple becomes a selfie backdrop, a local café becomes a tourist trap.

Consider Les Deux Magots in Paris, once a revolutionary intellectual hub of the avant-garde, now one of the city’s most notorious tourist traps. The preferred café of Surrealists like André Breton and writers like Simone de Beauvoir, where artists and existentialists engaged in heated debate, it now serves primarily as a site of cultural performance where tourists can cosplay at being Parisian intellectuals. The café’s fame as a site of cultural production ironically destroyed its capacity to produce culture, replacing genuine intellectual exchange with its simulation. Yet even this transformation has become content —the café’s website proudly markets its history of artistic patronage, turning its own commodification into a selling point. Here we see how oversaturation operates across time: the cultural capital accumulated by generations of artists and intellectuals becomes transformed into tourist capital, which then generates its own forms of content about the loss of authenticity.

This transformation—from site of cultural production to site of cultural consumption— exemplifies how the drive for content creation has begun to exhaust not just physical spaces but cultural forms themselves. Just as overtourism can destroy the very qualities that made a destination attractive, cultural oversaturation depletes the meaning-making capacity of our systems of cultural production. When every moment must be documented, when every experience must be shared, when every observation must be transformed into content, we begin to lose the ability to distinguish between meaningful cultural engagement and mere performance of engagement. The documentation imperative becomes a form of cultural strip-mining, extracting content value while depleting the underlying capacity for meaning.

This oversaturation manifests across multiple domains: in the glutted academic job market where PhDs far outnumber available positions, in an art world where more exhibitions open each night than anyone could possibly attend, in conferences nobody attends, in media landscapes so crowded that attention itself becomes the scarcest resource. Yet production continues, driven by institutional imperatives and professional requirements that seem increasingly disconnected from any meaningful measure of impact or engagement. The academic must publish, the artist must show, the tourist must document—not because these activities serve any clear purpose, but because stopping would mean becoming invisible in a system in which visibility is everything.

This is oversaturation. Tourism is merely the most visible symptom of a broader condition—one where systems of cultural production have exceeded their capacity for meaningful absorption or engagement. The system demands constant production while simultaneously making meaningful engagement with that production increasingly impossible. What emerges is a kind of cultural attention deficit disorder—a system that requires overproduction to maintain itself while ensuring that no single piece of content receives too much sustained attention. The constant flow of new content keeps users engaged while preventing any single piece of content from demanding the kind of sustained attention that might interrupt that flow. The tourist moves quickly from site to site, the academic skims rather than reads, the art viewer passes briefly through exhibitions. This, not cinema (pace Benjamin) is how art is perceived through distraction today.

The virtualization of physical space creates new forms of cultural geography. Sites are no longer organized around historical or cultural significance but around their potential for content production. The “most Instagrammable” spots become the new centers of cultural gravity, while spaces resistant to photographic reproduction—however historically or culturally significant—fade into obscurity. This reorganization of space around platform logic produces a topography organized not by physical or cultural features but by the ability to generate engaging content.

The parallels between academic metrics and social media validation reveal a deeper convergence in contemporary culture. Just as scholars carefully time their paper submissions and cultivate citation networks, tourists and influencers optimize their posting schedules and build engagement pods. Both systems create eerily similar behavioral patterns—strategic timing, network cultivation, content optimization—homogenizing all forms of cultural validation into a single, universal metric of attention. The academic h-index and the influencer engagement rate become functionally equivalent measures in an attention economy that increasingly fails to distinguish between forms of cultural capital.
This homogenization of cultural metrics points to a broader crisis in how we assign and measure value. When everything must be quantified—from tourist footfall to citation counts to social media engagement—we create systems that inevitably demand more production, regardless of whether that production serves any purpose beyond feeding the metrics themselves. But how do you critique a system of overproduction from within institutions that require constant production to justify their existence?

The smartphone emerges not just as a tool of documentation but as both metaphor and mechanism for this condition. Just as it collapses the temporal stages of tourist experience into a simultaneous present of planning-experiencing-documenting-sharing, it also collapses traditional distinctions between producer and consumer, professional and amateur, meaningful contribution and mere content. The academic writes papers while scrolling through social media, the artist documents their process while checking their likes, the tourist experiences a place while planning how to present it—all participating in a system of continuous partial attention that paradoxically produces more while experiencing less. What’s particularly striking is how institutional responses to oversaturation often exacerbate the very conditions they claim to address. Universities respond to the glutted academic job market by creating more temporary positions, demanding more publications, and creating more documents to fill out. Art institutions address declining attention spans by programming more shows, more events, more content from the usual suspects. Tourist sites manage overcrowding by implementing time-slot systems and virtual queues that transform experience into yet another form of scheduled content consumption. Each solution feeds back into the system of overproduction, creating what we might call “saturation spirals”—self-reinforcing cycles where attempts to manage oversaturation just lead to exponentially higher amounts of it.

This system creates new forms of professional precarity that span seemingly disparate fields. The adjunct professor piecing together teaching gigs mirrors the gig economy worker managing multiple car-share platforms, the artist maintaining visibility across multiple venues echoes the influencer juggling multiple social media accounts. All are caught in a saturation spiral, facing the necessity of constant production and self-documentation not for any intrinsic purpose but merely to maintain visibility within oversaturated systems.
The relentless drive for content creation has begun to exhaust not just physical spaces but cultural forms themselves. Just as overtourism can destroy the very qualities that made a destination attractive, cultural oversaturation depletes the meaning-making capacity of our systems of cultural production. When every moment must be documented, when every experience must be shared, when every observation must be transformed into content, we begin to lose the ability to distinguish between meaningful cultural engagement and mere performance of engagement. The imperative to document becomes a form of cultural strip-mining, extracting content value while depleting the underlying capacity for meaning.
These examples point to a fundamental transformation in how cultural value is produced and consumed. The local restaurant that becomes a global destination, the academic paper that circulates more as a citation than as a text to be read, the artwork that exists primarily as social media content all reflect a system where the metrics of attention have become more meaningful than the cultural experiences they supposedly measure. The irony of oversaturation is that it produces not just an excess of content but a scarcity of attention, creating an attention paradox where increased production leads to decreased engagement.

This paradox manifests differently across domains but follows similar patterns. In academia, the pressure to publish leads to the slicing of research into “least publishable units,” creating more papers but less comprehensive analysis. In the art world, the proliferation of biennials and art fairs creates a constant cycle of production and display that is strongly proscribed to avoid either failure or success and leaves little time for artistic development or critical reflection. In tourism, the race to document and share experiences prevents the very forms of engagement that might make those experiences meaningful. Each domain faces its own version of the same crisis: how to maintain relevance in a system that demands constant production while making sustained attention increasingly impossible.

The institutional structures that emerged to support cultural production—universities, museums, publishing houses, tourism bureaus—now find themselves generating content to justify their existence, even as that content contributes to the very oversaturation that undermines their original purpose. The university must produce more research, the museum must mount more exhibitions, the publisher must release more titles, the tourist site must accommodate more visitors—each institution caught in a cycle of expansion that seems increasingly divorced from any meaningful cultural purpose.

Panthéon, Paris, October 2024

What makes this condition particularly difficult to address is how it transforms even failure into content. The unfilled academic position becomes data for studies on the job market. The overlooked artwork becomes evidence of systemic inequality. The overtouristed site becomes fodder for articles about overtourism. The system doesn’t just resist critique—it metabolizes it, transforming opposition into content that feeds back into the very systems being criticized. Even this very analysis, attempting to understand the condition of oversaturation, necessarily participates in the production of content about overproduction.

Perhaps the most telling symptom of oversaturation is how it has begun to exhaust our capacity for imagination itself. The constant demand for new content, new experiences, new forms of engagement leaves little space for the kind of slow, cumulative development that genuine cultural innovation requires. We find ourselves in a strange temporal loop where the future becomes increasingly difficult to imagine precisely because we’re too busy documenting the present to reflect on where it might lead.

As forms of resistance become questionable, the academic who writes about the need for fewer publications still needs to publish that critique to ensure professional advancement. The artist protesting the commodification of art still needs to show in galleries and build their social media presence. The tourist seeking “authentic” experiences creates new circuits of authenticity tourism. The rejection of my proposed symposium on oversaturation now seems inevitable—not because the topic wasn’t important, but because addressing it would have required institutions to confront their own role in producing the condition. Universities, with their emphasis on global reach and quantifiable outputs, have become key drivers of cultural oversaturation. The academic system’s demand for constant publication, the pressure to maintain global networks, the emphasis on measurable impact—all contribute to the very processes the symposium would have critiqued.

The result is a kind of cultural vertigo where we can no longer distinguish between meaningful cultural production and mere content generation. When everything becomes content—from the tourist’s snapshot to the scholar’s research, from the artist’s process to the influencer’s post—we lose the hierarchies and frameworks that once helped us evaluate cultural significance. This flattening of cultural production creates a crisis of meaning not because meaning has disappeared, but because the systems we’ve built to produce and circulate cultural content make it increasingly difficult to distinguish what matters from what merely exists.

This condition raises fundamental questions about the future of cultural production. How do we maintain the possibility of depth in a system designed for constant circulation? How do we preserve spaces for reflection in an economy of attention that demands constant engagement? How do we resist the imperative to produce when visibility itself has become a form of survival? These questions become particularly urgent as artificial intelligence promises to accelerate content production even further, creating new forms of automated oversaturation that exceed our current capacity to even imagine.

The future that emerges from this condition seems to point in two contradictory directions. On one hand, we see the potential for ever-increasing acceleration—more content, more platforms, more metrics, more demands for attention. AI-generated content, automated curation, algorithmic recommendation systems all promise to increase production while further diminishing the space for human attention and reflection. The tourist of the future might navigate through augmented reality overlays, experiencing places through layers of digital content while generating new content through automated systems. The academic might publish in real-time, their thoughts instantly transformed into citable units of content. The artist might become primarily a curator of AI-generated variations on their style. What can exist beyond the event horizon of a “saturation singularity”—a point where the sheer volume of content production creates a gravitational collapse of culture?

To conclude, I’d like to reflect on my own relationship with photography, after some experimentation with photography in college, I returned to it as a graduate student in the history of architecture, producing a library of some 15,000 images for teaching, but this was a purely documentarian effort. I began to more consciously photograph landscapes—or rather human activity within them—when I worked with the Center for Land Use Interpretation in the late 1990s. But the Center’s approach to photography was studiously anti-photographic, deliberately eschewing the aestheticized vision of landscape photography in favor of what Hardin Farocki might called “operational images.” While clearly influenced by Bernd and Hilla Becher’s systematic documentation of industrial structures and the deadpan approach of New Topographics photographers like Lewis Baltz and Robert Adams, CLUI’s photography pushed further toward pure documentation. Their photographs functioned more as visual data than art objects, cataloging human interventions in the landscape with an almost bureaucratic neutrality. This approach—treating photography as information rather than expression—aligned with their broader mission of understanding how humans use and transform land.

The Center’s method suggested that even the most prosaic image could reveal something significant about our relationship to landscape if properly contextualized within larger systems of land use. Their Land Use Database, for instance, collected thousands of workmanlike photographs of sites ranging from military installations to mining operations, waste facilities to water infrastructure. Each image served as a data point in a larger investigation of how we shape, and are shaped by, our environment. This approach resonated with my own growing interest in infrastructure and its role in shaping urban space. Such a method of “anti-photography” offered a way out of both the romanticism of traditional landscape photography and the self-conscious artistry of much contemporary work. It proposed that the most revealing images might be those that appeared least obviously photographic.

Later, my approach to photography changed further when I reconnected with architect and longtime family friend John Vinci in Vilnius, Lithuania around 2000. Vinci, who taught history of architecture at the Illinois Institute of Technology, introduced me to the technical precision of the Contax G2 rangefinder. Inspired, I acquired a G2 for myself, as well as a G1 loaded with black-and-white Scala slide film as a backup for when, inevitably, the G2 would break and have to go back to Japan for repairs. While the influence of CLUI’s operational imagery and its documentarian, even bureaucratic approach to infrastructure remained central to my practice, the technical capabilities of the Contax allowed me to expand my focus. I began to explore spatial and material conditions with greater intensity, pushing beyond neutral documentation toward a more intensive examination of spatial and material conditions.
These new tools and techniques empowered me to refine my visual methodology, which I first showed in my books Blue Monday and The Infrastructural City, both published with ACTAR. In these projects, my photographs continued to examine buildings and infrastructural landscapes, yet I brought a heightened attention to surface, texture, and detail. Despite this added focus on materiality, I maintained a distance from the dramatic, polished perspectives that dominate architectural photography. Avoiding the heroism and theatrical lighting often associated with commercial architectural photography, I opted instead for a more analytical detachment that positioned the structures as embedded within, rather than separate from, the broader urban systems they were part of. This approach allowed me to document the built environment without romanticizing it—photography became a tool for investigation rather than mere aesthetic representation. My framing then was carefully neutral, presenting the structure frontally but without attempting to monumentalize it. This approach draws from both the systematic documentation methods of the Bechers and the emphasis on contextual relationships that characterized the work of photographers like Lewis Baltz, but pushes toward a more deliberately ordinary presentation that reveals how buildings actually exist within urban systems.

Sculpture Garden, Totowa, New Jersey, from Wastelands, 2021

Most recently, in my “Wastelands” project, I set out to document the overlooked and forgotten spaces of the state, focusing on the collision between infrastructural, industrial, and residential uses with a former glacial lake that has both uninhabitable areas and a tendency to flood at inopportune times. This work reflects my attempt to resist the attention vortexes of contemporary culture by concentrating on spaces that exist outside the circuits of content production. Again, I hope to avoid both the dramatic or aestheticized presentations common in photography, creating an alternative to the endless stream of highly curated images that dominate today’s visual world.

Carcassonne, France, October 2024

But it’s also a relatively natural impulse to want to document what I see, to record it as a memory, a memento or souvenir even. This summer, starting in Riga and continuing through Tallinn and then France, I experimented with a strategic form of imperfection using a disposable camera lens mounted in a plastic lens body to create images with inconsistent focus and strong vignetting. These monochrome images create a deliberate distance from both the hyperrealistic imagery of the iPhone and the precision of the 60mp mirrorless Sony alpha, recalling instead some earlier forms of travel photography. The technical limitations become a form of temporary resistance to oversaturation—the images resist easy reproduction, refuse the logic of instant shareability, and create moments of uncertainty that demand slower, more careful viewing.

This experimental photographic practice embodies the very paradox that my proposed symposium would have explored: how to critically examine a system of overproduction while necessarily remaining implicated within it. Where that academic initiative was stymied by institutional constraints, these photographic strategies offer a temporary mode of investigation—one that acknowledges its contingent nature and makes no claims to escape the system, yet still strives for a momentary distance through deliberate technical choices and careful attention to method. While such resistance may be fleeting, perhaps these moments of defamiliarization, of slower, more considered engagement suggest possibilities for individual responses to oversaturation.

2020 in Review

Grayness in Maine
Grayness on Mount Desert Island, 2020.

According to conventional chronological schemas, 2020—not 2019—is the last year of the 2010s.* This is convenient since, as I pointed out in last year’s premature review of the last decade, the 2010s were “the decade of shit” and 2021 is a stinking pile of shit. The worst decade since World War II ended with the worst year since 1945.

My “year in review” posts are usually almost as late as my taxes and when I finished last year’s post on February 12, we were all well aware that COVID was out there. Now, no question that I missed the severity of the pandemic back then, but I was on the money about its psychic effects. For all of the horror of COVID, it isn’t horrible enough. COVID is banal. Instead of bleeding out through all of our orifices as with Ebola, COVID is “a bad case of the flu” that leaves people dead or with debilitating cardiovascular and neurological ailments. But how different is my diagnosis, really, from what happened?

Now sure, this year [2020] we’ve already had firestorms the size of Austria ravaging Australia, a rain of rockets in Baghdad, Ukrainian jetliners getting shot out of the sky, a deadly pandemic in China caused by people eating creatures that they really shouldn’t, and the failure of the Senate to uphold the rule of law, but the banality of it all is crushing. While the Dark Mountain set drinks wine around a campfire, gets henna tattoos, and sings along to songs about the end of nature, for the rest of us, it’s just an exhausting, daily slog through the unrelentingly alarming headlines.

COVID brought us yet more crushing banality. The Idiot Tyrant is gone, but we are trying his impeachment yet again. Everything changes, but nothing changes. We were all the Dark Mountain set this year, sitting around our campfires, singing songs about the End. It was another atemporal slog, one day bleeding into another, every day a Sunday in a country where everything is closed on Sundays and there is nothing to do, every day stranger and more disconnected than the last, something captured in comedienne Julie Nolke’s series of videos entitled “Explaining the Pandemic to My Past Self.”

Amidst the disconnection, the Jackpot—or William Gibson’s term for a slow-motion apocalypse—cranked up a couple of notches. Just surviving the year was an accomplishment. The balance of life has been thoroughly disrupted and that disruption isn’t going away any time soon. It’s not just COVID: we now feel certain that there will be more pandemics, more massive wildfires, and more superstorms in our future. The Earth isn’t dying (sorry, climate doomers), but there will be huge losses of species worldwide, human population decline is well underway in advanced societies (the US is finally on the bandwagon here), and massive deaths will take place across the planet until the population comes back to a sustainable level decades from now.

But the premise of the Jackpot is that it isn’t a final apocalypse: there will be another side. In his Twitter feed (@GreatDismal), even Gibson focuses on the horrific and unjust nature of the Jackpot, but there will be winners, selected on the basis of wealth and sheer dumb luck. What might this say about the US election and the fact that 46% of Americans voted for a cretin? Now, there is nothing particularly new about melding Tourette’s and dementia into a public speaking style, there are plenty of lunatics sitting on their porches screaming obscenities at their lawn ornaments. Everybody knows that Uncle Scam’s persona as a billionaire—or rather the King of Debt (his own term!)—is an act. The man with the golden toilet is not a successful businessman. He is weak, a loser who can’t stay married or stay out of bankruptcy court. Four years of misrule ended in abject failure: defeat in both electoral and popular votes, being banned from social media and, with his businesses failing, being forced out of office in shame to face an unprecedented second impeachment, an array of civil litigation as well as criminal indictments for fraud, tax evasion, incitement to riot, and rape. But this—not a misguided notion of him as a success—is the real point of his appeal. The short-fingered vulgarian is a life-long loser, a reverse Midas whose every touch turn gold to lead. But in the face of the Gibsonian Jackpot, his appeal was not as a stupid version of Homer Simpson, grabbing whatever scraps he can and, when that failed, LARPing as President, destabilizing society, and just blowing everything up.

LARPing was big in 2020, which saw the attempted kidnapping of Michigan Governor Gretchen Witmer by wingnut idiots, various insane protests by COVID deniers, the attempted coup of the Capitol Insurrection, and the riots developing after the Black Lives Matter protests. BLM was the standout among these, not only a good, just cause, but also because the majority of the protests themselves were peaceful—such as the one in our town of Montclair, New Jersey. None of that was LARPing, but the riots that accompanied it were. For the most part, this was less people with genuine greivances and more Proud Boys, Boogaloos, anarchists, and grifters who came in to loot and burn whatever they could down. Although there were kooky moments on the Left like the Capital Hill Automonous Zone, Antifa, for however much it exists, didn’t do much, certainly proving to be far less trouble than white supermacist-infiltrated police forces in paramilitary gear. Still, the widely-vaunted second Civil War never came about and the arteriosclerotic LARPers on the Right limped off the field in defeat after their they got a spanking at the January putsch.

A number of observers at both the Capitol Insurrection and CHAZ —including some of the idiots who took part in it—noted that these events felt much like a game, specifically an Alternate Reality Game (ARG). In a typical ARG, players look for clues both online—think of the QAnon drops, the Trumpentweets, or the disinformation dished out by the skells at 4chan, 8chan, and so on—as well as out in the world. Jon Lebkowsky, in a post at the Well’s State of the World and Clive Thompson over at Wired compare QAnon to an ARG. Indeed, gaming is taking the place of religion (whichever grifter figures out how to meld this with Jesus and his pet dinosaurs will get very rich indeed), with the false promise that playing the game and winning will deliver one to the other side of the Jackpot. Somewhere, I read that when asked what he would do differently if he had made Blade Runner a decade later, Ridley Scott replied that he would be able to skip the elaborate sets and just point the camera down the streets of 1990s Los Angeles. Today, the same could be said for the Hunger Games today.

But not everything was LARPing. If Cheeto Jesus is an icon for LARPing losers, Biden was elected on the premise of staving off the Jackpot by returning adults to the White House. This is not a bad thing, we might as well try. Still, from the perspective of Jackpot culture, the most interesting political development of the year was the candidacy of Andrew Yang whose cheery advocacy of Universal Basic Income (aka the Freedom Dividend) masked the dark, Jackpot-like nature of his predictions. Let’s quote Yang’s campaign site on this: “In the next 12 years, 1 out of 3 American workers are at risk of losing their jobs to new technologies—and unlike with previous waves of automation, this time new jobs will not appear quickly enough in large enough numbers to make up for it.” No matter how friendly Yang’s delivery, there is a grim realism to his politics, an acceptance that things will never be better for a massive sector of the population. Certainly some individuals will find ways to use their $1,000 a month freedom dividend as a subsidy to do something new and amazing, but 95% will not. Rather, they will form a new and permanent underclass as they fade into extinction. Again, the point of Yang’s candidacy isn’t the cheerleading for math and STEM, it’s the frank acknowledgement that the Jackpot is already here.

On the other hand, toward the end of the year, Tyler Cowen suggested that we might be nearing the end of the Great Stagnation (he is, of course, the author of an influential pamphlet on the topic) and you can find a good summary of the thinking, pro and con by Cowen’s student Eli Dourado here. In this view, advances such as the mRNA vaccine, the spread of electric, somewhat self-driving vehicles, the pandemic-induced rise of remote work, and huge drop in the cost of spaceflight are changing things radically and could lead to a real rise in Total Factor Productivity from the low level it has been stuck at since 2005. Is this a sign of the end of the Jackpot? Unlikely. That won’t come until a series of more massive technological breaks, probably (but not necessarily) involving breakthroughs in health (the end of cancer, heart disease, and dementia), the reversal of climate change, working nanotechnology, and artificial general intelligence. But still, there are signs that early inflection points are at hand.

Personally, we experienced one of these inflection points when we replaced our aging (and aged) BMWs with Teslas. I wound up getting a used Tesla Model S last January and then immediately turned around and ordered a brand new Model Y that we received in June. No more trip to the gas station, and while “Full-self driving” is both expensive and nowhere near fully self driving, it is a big change. Longer road trips—which under the pandemic have been to nurseries on either side of the Pennsylvania border to buy native plants—have become much easier, even if I still have to keep my hands on the wheel and fiddle with it constantly to prevent self-driving from disengaging. But harping on too much about the incomplete nature of self-driving is poor sport: in the last year, Tesla added stop light recognition to self-driving and a new update in beta promises to make city streets fully navigable. Less than a decade ago, self driving was only a theoretical project. Now I use it for 90% of my highway driving. That’s a sizable revolution right there. Also, the all-electric and connected nature of these cars makes getting takeout and sitting in climate-controlled comfort in my vehicle when on the road a delight. Electric vehicles were a big success this year and in our neighborhood which is a bellwether for the adoption of future technology (when I saw iPhones replace Blackberries on the bus and train into the city, I bought a bit of Apple stock and made a small fortune) and Teslas have replaced BMWs as the most common vehicle in driveways.

Back to the pandemic, which accelerated a sizable shift in habitation patterns. Throughout the summer, there was a lot of nonsense from neoliberal journalists and urban boosters about how cities are going to come back booming, but with more bike lanes, wider sidewalks, less traffic, and more awesome tactical urbanist projects to appeal to millennials. Lately, however, those voices have fallen silent and with good reason. In this suburb the commuter train platforms are still bare in the mornings and the bus into the city, once packed to standing room only levels every evening, hasn’t run in five months. A friend who works in commercial real estate says that occupancy in New York City offices is at 15% of pre-pandemic levels. Business air travel is still off a cliff. Remote work isn’t ideal for everyone and every job, but neither was going into the office. For sure, the dystopian open offices, co-working spaces, and offices as “fun” zones are done and finished. People are renovating their houses, or upsizing, to better live in a post-pandemic world of remote work. Another friend who works for a large ad agency told me that they did not renew their lease for office space and do not plan to ever go back to in person work, at least for the vast majority of the staff. When employees gain over two hours a day from not commuting and corporations save vast fortunes on rent, remote work seems a lot more appealing. Retail sales here and in the surrounding towns have gone through the roof, just as they have in many suburbs.

But it isn’t just suburbia that has prospered at the expense of the city, exurbia has returned too. Way back in 1955Auguste Comte Spectorsky identified a growing American cultural class that he dubbed “the exurbanites” made up of “symbol manipulators” such as advertisers, musicians, artists, and other members of what we today call the creative class. Spectorsky observed that many of these individuals eventually tended to drift back to the city. This time may be different. After two decades in the city, the creative class is turning to places outside the city with attractive older houses and midcentury modern properties, walkable neighborhoods (virtually all of Montclair, for example, has sidewalks), good schools (which generally mean high property taxes but are an indicator for a smarter, engaged populace), amenities like parks and places to hike, decent bandwidth, as well as independent restaurants, shops, and cultural attractions. There will always be variations in taste: some people really do want to eat at Cheesecake Factory and live in a Toll Brothers McMansion, but these will appeal to relatively few of the people fleeing cities at this point. Thus, the Hudson Valley—full of older, more interesting architecture, great natural resources and quirky towns—is booming. I predict some reversion to toward the mean after the pandemic ends and some of the people who fled to the country realize they aren’t suited to a place without Soulcycle, but this will be only a partial and temporary reversion.

I predict that even after the pandemic ends, there will be a greater interest in self-sufficiency among young people who move to suburbia and exurbia. Manicured laws will be less important than vegetable gardens. Homesteading, permaculture, and a drive back to the land not seen since the 1960s are under way. It would be a very good thing if the next generation was more in touch with their land and less prone to hiring “landscapers” who treat properties as sites subject to industrial interventions such as chemical fertilizer for lawns, a phalanx of gas-powered lawn mowers and leaf blowers to remove any stray biological matter.

As far as cities go, the pandemic is triggering a necessary contraction. The massive annihilation of real estate value it has caused should go a long way to undo the foolish notion that urban real estate is always a great investment. It’s not, just ask anyone who bought a house in Detroit in 1965. Real estate in first and second tier global cities has become wildly expensive, disconnected from the underlying fundamentals. When individuals are paying rents that absorb over 30% of their salaries to investor-owners who are not covering their mortgage with those rents, something is very wrong. This broken system has been able to function due to the perceived hedonic value of restaurants, bars, and cultural events, but these things too have been failing over recent years. Long prior to the pandemic, the cost of rent decimated independently-owned restaurants and retailers, with the latter also hurt by on-line shopping. The golden age of dining out (if it really was the golden age… I would say that better food could have been had in other, less copycat eras) was already declared over in 2019. “High-rent blight,” in which entire streets’ worth of storefronts were empty due to ludicrous rents, has been common for some time now. Tourists made up more and more of the street crowds while loss-leader flagship stores for chains like Nike and Victoria’s Secret replaced local businesses. With the hedonic argument for staying in the city rapidly disappearing, it was only a matter of time before individuals began departing and, in New York, population had begun to drop by 2018 (see more on all of this in Kevin Baker’s piece for the Atlantic, “Affluence Killed New York, Not the Pandemic”). Perversely, this is a good thing as it will likely lead to a bust in commercial real estate prices and a decline in unoccupied or AirBNB’d apartments, thus making global cities like New York places that have potential again. Moreover, many second tier cities such as St. Louis, Kansas City, and Cleveland are experiencing new growth as individuals able to work remotely are looking for places that are less expensive—and thus have more potential—than New York or San Francisco.

These shifts are huge and for the better. As I tried to tell my colleagues at the university, there is no housing crisis, at least not in the US and Europe, there is only an appearance of one because of the uneven distribution of housing: a glut in some areas, a shortfall in others. The pandemic has likely undone this a bit. Of course, places that are too politically Red, too full of chains, too full of copycat McMansions are unlikely to come back anytime soon, if ever. The Jackpot continues.

Still, I’m observing a perversely rosy future for the urban (and suburban and exurban) environment is the Biden administration’s interest in infrastructure. Back in 2008, I shocked design critics when I stated that there would be no progress in infrastructure for the foreseeable future. “But, Obama,” they complained. “But, Obama,” I clapped back, “just appointed Larry Summers as his chief economic advisor and Summers will bail out the banks, not fund infrastructure.” I expect the opposite from Biden who has adopted a “nothing left to lose” position as purportedly one-term President, is a devotee of train travel and is eager to make great progress on climate change. Appointing Pete Buttigieg, one of his two smartest opponents in the primary (the other being Andrew Yang, of course), to Secretary of Transportation is a key move. This will be Buttigieg’s opportunity to prove himself on the national stage and he will fight hard to do that, just as Biden expects. Expect more electrification across the board and, I suspect, more advances with self-driving vehicles. Although certain measures—such as, in the New York City area alone, the Gateway Tunnel between New Jersey and New York, now delayed over a decade thanks to Chris Christie and Donald Trump’s vindictiveness against commuter communities that would not vote for them and the reconstruction of Port Authority Bus Terminal—will help cities, again, I predict more emphasis on decentralization and activity outside the city.

All this may have salutary cultural implications. The global city is played out. Little of interest happens in New York, San Francisco, London, Paris, or Barcelona. These cities are too expensive for the sort of experimentation that made them great cultural centers and the diffusive nature of the Internet, capitalism, and overtourism have made them all the same. Residents of cities that have been victims of overtourism have seen this as an opportunity to reset, while the physical isolation of cities is going to increase reliance on local institutions. With some luck, all this leads to a new underground, with greater difference creating greater diversity and potential. Of fashion, Bruce Sterling writes, “Fashion will re-appear, and some new style will dominate the 2020s, but the longer it takes to emerge from its morgue-like shadow, the more radically different it will look.” The same could be true of all culture. Globalization was an incredibly powerful force but has been played out. I don’t agree with the protectionist instincts of the Trumpenproles but today culture’s hope is to thrive on the basis of the difference between places and cultures, not on greater sameness. Architecture has been very slow to react to all of this, in part because many intelligent young people have drifted into other fields, like startups, but I am optimistic that we might soon get past the ubiquitous white-painted brick walls and wood common table (the architecture of the least effort possible, to match fashion and food driven by the least effort possible), the tired old Bilbao-effect, and quirky development pseudo-modernism.

So much optimism on my part! Even I am shocked that I am so positive. But why not? The end to this exhausted first phase of network culture is overdue. Time for a new decade, at last.

*The reason for this is that there is no Year Zero. 31 December 1BC is followed by 1 January 1AD.

Four Bits on Oversaturation

Some recent links on oversaturation: tourist attractions that we are literally destroying with our love (how did they forget Venice?), how nobody goes to Barcelona anymore because it's too popular, Martin Parr on how too much photography blinds us, and the endgame for collectors of matchbooks. I'll leave behind observations today as to avoid oversaturating the net on oversaturation. After all, the net is oversaturation at its purest, a Slashdot effect for the human race.

Oversaturation

I want to suggest today that globalization as a process has reached a new condition, akin to that reached by modernization in the 1950s.

In using the term "late globalization," I am referring to Ernst Mandel's concept of late capitalism, the point when capitalism was everywhere, saturating the world. With the spread of the Internet and mobile telecommunicational devices, the disconnected world of the past is long gone, rapidly becoming unfamiliar to us. Soon, the disconnected world will become unintelligible, its artifacts and ways of life lost to generations that will have no experience of it. If, in 1999, TJ Clark could write of "modernism is our antiquity…" then today we must add postmodernism to our antiquity as well.  

The global credit crisis of 2007 and 2008 marks a further turning point in globalization. With the production of mortgage-backed securities, it became possible to easily and abstractly trade in real estate, formerly the slowest, heaviest, and most immobile form of investment. Fueled by delirious amounts of excess capital accumulated during the operations of globalization, the real estate boom and bust marked the point of globalization's oversaturation.

Since then, the removal of barriers that has marked globalization has slowed and even reversed in some cases. The Eurozone is under stress, even in danger of collapse. As the price of labor in China rises but falls in the United States, the US's industrial production is rising, Chinese imports to the US are declining and China is finding its domestic market more and more important. But we are also seeing a resurgence in nationalist movements and a rise in state capitalism. This is not to say that the removal of some barriers will not continue, but that we are now in a different dynamic in which continued globalization should not be assumed.

Still, with the spread of global trade and telecommunications it is impossible to return to the previous era. The idea of jetting off for a weekend abroad is no longer the province of the rich and famous. Even the idea of the "jet set", as a distinct group, has faded (excepting of course the private jet set… about which more later). Constant travel and continuous cross-border communication has become a fact of everyday life for individuals throughout the world. Tourism is now a familiar practice rather than an exotic one, taking the same forms throughout the world, reducing formerly distinctive places across the globe—the Rambla, the Île de France, Hollywood Boulevard, Venice's San Marco—to the same condition, occupied by the same people. The Bilbao-Effect is also consigned to history, becoming less and less important, a product of a globalizing world, not one that has globalized. 

At the Netlab, Leigha Dennis, Cloud Communications Officer at GSAPP and I will be working together with Tim Ventimiglia, Senior Associate of Ralph Appelbaum Associates to explore this condition of oversaturation in depth, to understand how it manifests itself in economic, social, and cultural terms. Our goal, which we have begun to explore in this research blog, is to investigate the changing landscape of travel at a crucial juncture in world history.