Forty-Four PDFs, 2019-2026

I have forty-four long-form posts since 2019 for your reading pleasure below, but perhaps you’d like to read a few words on how they came to be first?

I am happier writing for myself than I ever was writing for anyone else (although I will do that again, too, in case you have an interesting proposal). But even if I am thrilled with the WordPress layout I designed for varnelis.net, I realize that it isn’t ideal for reading a 6,000-word essay. But what website is? There is little question that PDFs are easier to read, whether on a tablet or in print. This, however, led me to a problem. Do I want to lay out every longer-form post since 2019 again? No.

There are, unfortunately, no PDF renderers for WordPress that satisfy me, and that makes sense. Exporting to a PDF is a complicated project, and when you are a modernist, your site has large graphics, and you write essays, not posts, you really need something custom, which, of course, was impossible until recently. But vibe coding has advanced significantly since I wrote about it in December’s “What Did Vibe Coding Just Do to the Commons?

Some encounters put me in a foul mood yesterday morning, so as sometimes happens, I became extra productive and I set out to build a small piece of bespoke software for this site: a local Mac app that fetches my published WordPress posts, gathers the images and captions, lays everything out in a restrained publication format, and then lets me review the result before uploading it back to the site automatically.

If you still, somehow, think that AI is not useful for anything, please check out the PDFs below and tell me how long it would have taken you to write a comparable application to translate them from HTML? Things have changed a great deal since 2023. I used ChatGPT’s Codex to write this code, and, unlike my experience in December, I was a distracted supervisor all day, cleaning up, working on the draft of the introduction to my next book, the Generative Unconscious (this will be the subject of an e-mail later this week, likely tomorrow). There was no endless babysitting; Codex just built the application, at one point going off to code for over 90 minutes.

There is something important here to me, which is the return of computing to something more personal, something I own because I made. I am not planning to distribute this, since it is too idiosyncratic a project; this is bespoke software, and, if the code was written by an AI, nobody else would have come up with the same result. It reminds me very much of the early days of personal computing, when users (like me) routinely wrote small programs for their own needs: a database for a player-piano sheet-music collection, an extension to BASIC to enable better graphics, a tool for managing all the shareware I had downloaded. Software often did not come in a shrink-wrapped package, obtained by online subscription, or downloaded from a carefully gated store. Software was closer to a workshop practice. You made tools when the available ones did not quite fit the work, or you remade them, often again and again.

My PDF renderer is in that spirit. It is software made for one site, one archive, one way of writing and publishing. That specificity is the point. As AI makes it possible to roll one’s own programs again, we will see more of this: not just apps built for markets, but tools built for particular lives, practices, archives, gardens, and bodies of work. Sometimes living in interesting times isn’t all bad.

Content by Date

2026
May 3 · The Generative Unconscious (Introduction) [HTML]
April 24 · Ecological Balance and the Sacred Landscape of Senjōgahara [HTML]
April 10 · The Zakkyo Biru of Ginza [HTML]
March 31 · Zen, Time, and Three Gardens in Kyoto [HTML]
February 22 · The Salon and the Olympics [HTML]

2025
December 31 · East Coast West Coast (After Bob and Nancy) [HTML]
December 15 · What Did Vibe Coding Just Do to the Commons? [HTML]
November 23 · The Lost Canals of Vilnius [HTML]
November 6 · Stochastic Histories [HTML]
July 25 · Humanity and Its Double: The Uncanny in Art and Artificial Intelligence [HTML]
June 15 · The Rise and Fall of the Author [HTML]
May 19 · On Russel Wright’s Manitoga and the Mid-Century American Landscape [HTML]
May 6 · The First Flowers of Spring: Hepatica, Rue Anemone, and Cultural Ecology [HTML]
May 1 · On the Golden Age of Blogging [HTML]
April 21 · The Phantasmagoria of the Landscape: Japanese Gardens in America [HTML]
April 11 · The Generative Turn: On AIs as Stochastic Parrots and Art [HTML]
April 5 · After the Infrastructural City: On Abundance [HTML]
March 31 · The New Surrealism? On AI and Hallucinations [HTML]
March 21 · National Populism as a Transitional Mode of Regulation [HTML]
March 16 · Skunk Cabbage and the Entropic Landscape [HTML]
January 27 · Oversaturation: On Tourism and the Image [HTML]

2024
December 23 · 7 Fables of Accelerationism [HTML]
December 22 · Speculative Architectures: The Radical Legacy and Fables of Accelerationism [HTML]
October 30 · The Witching Cats of New Jersey [HTML]
September 30 · We Went for a Walk on Turkey Mountain [HTML]
August 9 · A Trip to Lithuania and the Baltics [HTML]
April 2 · Keeping a Phenological Diary [HTML]
March 8 · On the Pictures Generation and AI Art [HTML]
March 3 · Vernal Pools at the Great Swamp [HTML]
February 25 · California Forever, or the Aesthetics of AI Images [HTML]
January 14 · Walls in the Landscape [HTML]

2023
December 19 · Curb Your Enthusiasm [HTML]
October 12 · On the Florilegium [HTML]
August 7 · Preliminary Findings Toward an Architectural History of the Network [HTML]
June 13 · On Art and the Universal, II [HTML]
April 29 · On the Matrix (Native Plants, That Is) [HTML]
January 29 · Wastelands: An Analysis of the Early Anthropocene Swamps of Glacial Lake Passaic [HTML]

2022
December 11 · 20 Subroutines for Humans Made by a Computer [HTML]
July 20 · On Art and the Universal, I [HTML]
April 27 · The Native Plant Garden at Highland House, Montclair, New Jersey [HTML]

2021
May 5 · A Spring Tour of Our Forest Garden [HTML]

2020
May 15 · Native Plant Podcasts [HTML]
May 14 · Art and Gardening in the Time of Crisis [HTML]

2019
July 11 · On Gardening [HTML]

On the State of Things at varnelis.net

This year I am writing much more. I did not set out with another broken promise about writing more. I just started to. It’s curious—when I aimed to write just one essay per month, as I did last year, the task felt daunting. Yet now, averaging one essay a week, I have established a rhythm. The process feels easier. The more I write, the more energized I become, and new ideas emerge readily. I have at least eight essays in the works now—for the Florilegium, on AI and art, on the fate of network culture. The rhythm of regular practice sustains itself.

My friend Adam Greenfield recently articulated a similar sentiment on his Patreon:

Maybe it’s simply the onset of British Summer Time overnight, but I’m just bursting with energy. I know it seems incongruous with the ambient psychic weather of the moment, but then maybe that’s the point? To meet the grim farce of mainstream public affairs with an upwelling, irrepressible, literally insurgent joy? To keep at it, generating connection and possibility and the conditions of life, until the very moment the choice to continue doing so is in one way or another taken out of your hands. There are worse programs to commit oneself to, you know? (link)

Well said. My recent pace of writing starkly contrasts with my paralysis during the first Trump administration. Although I had quit full-time teaching in 2015 to focus on writing and art practice—and despite a wildly successful 2016 highlighted by the Detachment exhibit in Vilnius—after the election, I stumbled. For three years, I barely wrote, turning inward instead, absorbed by the restoration of our house. Then, just as I laid plans for a new push, COVID hit. My reserves were already empty and another year was lost. Those years betrayed the promise I had made to myself when stepping away from teaching—to finally bring forth the work I had long conceived but never had time to produce. I had all the time in the world and what came out of it? This hiatus nearly ended my career. I had surrendered to circumstance, letting external forces dictate my creative life. But in the unexpected and renewed face of a new Trump regime, I have a different response this time: “What do we say to the God of Death? Not today.” As Adam suggests there’s true power in meeting grim circumstances with “insurgent joy” generating possibility, not just watching as “the darkness drops again.” And so, onwards.

You should subcribe to Adam’s Patreon. It’s good. We disagree on some things, like the state of AI today, but we agree on many others. Discourse, dialogue, and debate are what we need today, not arm-waving from censors and hard liners of all stripes. As Yeats also observed in “The Second Coming,” we cannot allow a situation where “the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.”

Another essay comes out tomorrow.

The City and the Fog

I’ve been reading Joan Didion again. She was one of the sharpest chroniclers of the recent past and a master of minimalist style. Legend has it that Bret Easton Ellis, still in high school, copied Slouching Towards Bethlehem by hand (or maybe on a typewriter) to absorb the rhythm of her sentences.

Unlike Didion, I never expected to spend a decade in California, but when I did, she became a kind of spiritual guide. Lately, I’ve been wondering—who is doing for contemporary California what Didion once did? Who is writing about the AI wars, polycules, crypto, billionaire Gavin Newsom, tech-bro culture, or last year’s hard shift to the right in Silicon Valley? If such a voice exists, I haven’t heard it yet. Perhaps, amid fragmented media and algorithmically shaped narratives, the kind of clarity Didion provided is no longer achievable. Maybe, with the collapse of journalism, it’s not even possible anymore.

So last night, as an experiment, I asked the newly released GPT-4.5 to write a piece on the present day in Didion’s voice. The result was too brief, so I had Claude 3.7 expand it. Then I fed the longer draft back into GPT, refining it piece by piece—GPT, it turned out, had the better ear for her style. I edited out some, but not all, of the hallucinations, asking GPT-4.5 to rewrite the worst offenders. After all, in Slouching Towards Bethlehem, Didion wrote, “The point of my keeping a notebook has never been, nor is it now, to have an accurate factual record of what I have been doing or thinking. That would be a different impulse entirely, an instinct for reality which I sometimes envy but do not possess.”

I considered keeping it to myself or sharing it only with a few friends, but maybe others would find it interesting—or at least useful in some way. Perhaps it will bring nothing but opprobrium. After all, this veers closer to the AI-as-“plagiarism-machine” argument its critics make, but there is something about this particular experiment that resonates with me. If AI is nothing more than a prediction machine, then perhaps it’s fitting that it captures the contours of a world increasingly governed by vibes, memes, and the inertia of accumulated narratives.


The fog moves as it always has, unhurried, insistent, swallowing the Golden Gate Bridge one rivet at a time until nothing remains but the memory of steel and ambition. San Francisco in March is a city between seasons, between ideologies, between versions of itself. The light falls differently now. The voices in the street carry a new tenor. The city is holding its breath.

From the window of a hotel suite on the thirty-fourth floor of the Four Seasons, I watch the fog erase and reveal the city below. Market Street runs like a fault line, dividing more than just geography. Seventeen floors beneath me, my rental car sits in a parking garage. I have not slept in thirty-six hours. The minibar contains small bottles of vodka and gin, their presence a comfort I choose not to indulge. Not yet.

I have come to San Francisco to observe a transformation, or maybe a regression—a city once synonymous with progressive ideals now shifting under the weight of its own contradictions. The disruptors, having lost control of their narrative, have found themselves disrupted.


“The problem with San Francisco,” Jonathan Reed tells me over lunch at Quince, “is that it forgot what made it great in the first place.”

He cuts into a perfectly seared scallop, the gesture deliberate, his Patek Philippe catching the light. “It wasn’t tolerance or inclusivity that built this city. It was ambition. The gold rush. People willing to risk everything for the chance at something better.”

Reed is forty-seven, lean in the way that suggests an optimized lifestyle. As a venture capitalist with over two billion in assets under management, he has funded startups that changed how we communicate, how we travel, how we understand ourselves. From his South Park office, he looks down on the same streets where Jack Dorsey once contemplated human connection in 140 characters. Now Reed contemplates a different kind of revolution.

“We’re the new forty-niners,” he says, the smile practiced, “but we’re mining for something more valuable than gold. We’re mining for freedom.”

I ask what freedom means to him.

“Freedom from overregulation. Freedom from a tax code that punishes success. Freedom from a culture that cares more about policing speech than encouraging innovation.” He pauses, measuring his words. “I didn’t vote for Trump in 2016 or 2020. Most of us didn’t. But something changed. We looked around and realized the progressive policies we supported were destroying the environment that allowed us to succeed.”

The restaurant is filled with others like Reed—tech executives and investors, dressed in casual luxury, speaking in the clipped, assured tones of men who expect to be heard. At a table nearby, the founder of a cryptocurrency exchange under SEC investigation raises his glass in silent acknowledgment. We met once, at a conference in Austin, where he declared California “functionally dead” to an audience that laughed knowingly. Now he has returned, a prodigal son to the city he publicly renounced.

“The right started speaking our language,” Reed continues. “Innovation. Deregulation. Meritocracy. Meanwhile, the left became hostile to the very concept of achievement. It wasn’t a sudden conversion. It was a gradual realization that our interests had realigned.”

I ask about Elon Musk, now heading the Department of Government Efficiency—DOGE, an acronym presumably chosen for its resonance with cryptocurrency enthusiasts and meme culture.

Reed’s expression shifts. “Elon is… complicated. Brilliant, no question. But his approach at DOGE has been…” He searches for the right phrasing. “Let’s say scattershot. Another rocket explosion this week. Agencies gutted without clear plans for replacement. It’s creative destruction without the creative part.”

The news feeds have been filled with footage of the latest SpaceX failure—a Starship test vehicle disintegrating over the Gulf of Mexico, raining debris onto protected waters. Environmental groups are already filing lawsuits.

“But Peter’s doing well,” Reed adds, meaning Peter Thiel. Palantir has secured a series of lucrative government contracts since the inauguration. Surveillance, border security, administrative “efficiency”—Thiel’s reach now extends into every department Musk is “streamlining.”

I ask about the social implications of this realignment.

Reed’s expression hardens. “I’m not responsible for fixing society’s problems. I create jobs. I generate wealth. I fund innovations that improve lives. Isn’t that enough?”

The question lingers in the air, unanswered.


The Presidio offers a different perspective—manicured nature, military precision. Once a Spanish fort, then an American base, now a national park, it stands as a monument to San Francisco’s cycles of conquest and reinvention. Trump has spoken of turning it into a Freedom City, one of ten proposed metropolises meant to embody a new vision for America.

It is here, in a converted barracks overlooking the bay, that I meet Emily Sanchez.

Sanchez does not match the image conjured by “Trump supporter.” She is thirty-five, Mexican-American, Stanford-educated, with a resume that includes Google and Meta. Three years ago, she left tech to become a full-time activist for what she calls “digital sovereignty.” Others might call it right-wing populism.

“Silicon Valley built the tools for global connection,” she tells me as we walk along a eucalyptus-lined path. “But we never asked if that connection was what people actually wanted. We assumed globalism was the endgame. That borders would become meaningless. That national identity was an outdated concept.”

She stops walking. “We were wrong.”

Sanchez speaks with the certainty of the converted, her words carrying the weight of revelation. She tells me about growing up in San Jose, the daughter of legal immigrants who emphasized assimilation. In tech spaces, she felt the dissonance—her patriotism viewed as quaint at best, reactionary at worst.

“There was this unspoken agreement that America was fundamentally flawed, that technology could transcend its limitations. But I loved this country. I still do. And I realized that loving America had become a radical act in the very industry America made possible.”

When I ask about her role in organizing tech workers for the administration, Sanchez grows cautious. “We’re not what the media says we are. We believe in borders, in sovereignty, in the right of nations to define their own futures. We believe American workers deserve protection. We believe American values are worth preserving.”

I press her on what she means by American values.

“Self-reliance. Innovation. Free speech. The idea that you should be judged by your contributions, not your immutable characteristics.” She considers. “These used to be non-partisan values. Now they’re coded as right-wing.”

Her phone buzzes—another news alert. She grimaces. “Another DOGE disaster.” She shows me the headline: Musk’s latest regulatory rollback has caused unexpected system failures at the Department of Energy. “He’s a visionary, but government isn’t a startup. You can’t just break things and expect them to self-organize.”

As we walk back to the parking lot, a jogger slows, recognizes Sanchez, calls her name. She waves, but he does not stop.

“Former colleague,” she explains. “He probably thinks I’ve lost my mind.”

I ask if she misses her old life.

“I miss the sense of possibility,” she says. “But I don’t miss the conformity of thought. In tech, we talk endlessly about diversity while enforcing an incredible homogeneity of opinion. It became suffocating.”

The fog has begun its afternoon advance, tendrils reaching across the Golden Gate, obscuring Marin County from view. Sanchez looks toward the disappearing horizon.

“The fog comes in,” she says, echoing Carl Sandburg, “on little cat feet.”


Market Street at rush hour is a study in controlled chaos. Buses lumber between stops, cyclists weave through traffic with fatalistic confidence, pedestrians move in currents and eddies of human motion. At the corner of Market and 5th, the city exhales.

Three weeks ago, this was where the collision happened. A face-to-face confrontation between pro-administration tech workers and a coalition of progressive groups. It started as dueling demonstrations, placards raised, slogans shouted across an invisible trench. Then the first punch landed. The videos are still circulating—men in Patagonia vests trading blows with activists in black bloc, disruption refracted into violence.

Alex Chen was there that day. Now he sits across from me in a SOMA coffee shop, hands wrapped around a cooling cup of pour-over coffee. Thirty-two, an Asian-American software developer, a man who considers himself reasonable, logical, unbound by sentiment. He wears a hoodie with the logo of his startup, the fabric worn at the cuffs.

“I didn’t join because of racial politics,” he says. “I joined because I’m tired of feeling guilty for my success.”

He grew up in a one-bedroom apartment in the Richmond District, four people sharing six hundred square feet. His parents worked sixty-hour weeks so he could take AP classes, win science fairs, get into Berkeley. He taught himself to code at fourteen. He tells me this the way someone recites a pledge, as if these facts should explain everything.

The company he works for now builds algorithms that optimize investment strategies for high-net-worth individuals. The irony of this—using intelligence to further enrich the already wealthy—seems lost on him. Or maybe it isn’t irony at all. Maybe it’s just efficiency.

“The protest wasn’t supposed to get violent,” he says. “We were exercising our right to assembly, to free speech. Then I saw Maya across the barricade.”

Maya Patel had been his colleague at a previous company. A friend who became something more during late nights of debugging and problem-solving. Their relationship ended when their political differences became insurmountable.

“She was holding a sign that said ‘No Fascists in SF.’ And I knew—I knew—she was looking at me when she chanted that we weren’t welcome in our own city.” He stops, exhales. “How did we get here? How did we reach a point where disagreeing about tax policy or immigration makes you a fascist in the eyes of people who used to respect you?”

I don’t answer. The divisions Chen describes are not unique to San Francisco. They exist everywhere, in red states and blue states, in group chats and dinner tables, in the polite avoidance of certain topics, in the careful curation of acceptable opinions. But something about their presence here, in this city built on gold rush dreams and counterculture ideals, feels sharper.

As we leave the coffee shop, Chen points to an apartment building a few blocks away. “Four thousand a month for five hundred square feet,” he says. “And I’m one of the lucky ones. This city prices out the very diversity it claims to value. The only people who can afford to live here are tech workers and the ultra-wealthy. Everyone else commutes two hours each way or leaves altogether.”

The movement he belongs to—tech workers drawn to Trump’s economic message—feeds on this contradiction. The anger isn’t about policy details or ideological purity. It’s about something more visceral.

“We’re not asking for much,” Chen says as we reach the curb. “Just consistency. Just acknowledgment that the system is broken for everyone, not just for the officially disadvantaged.”

He crosses the street, moving against the tide of evening commuters, shoulders slightly hunched as if bracing against an invisible wind.


The winding road to Mendocino follows the coastline like a loose thread, unspooling north from San Francisco through a landscape that grows progressively wilder, more elemental. The Pacific crashes against jagged cliffs to the right. To the left, redwood forests rise in cathedral silence. The rental car’s navigation system loses signal intermittently, as if the digital world itself is thinning, becoming less relevant with each mile.

I am traveling to meet what locals call the Doomers, though they don’t call themselves that. This enclave of former tech employees—engineers, ethicists, researchers—has established itself on three adjoining properties totaling nearly two hundred acres of mixed forest and meadowland just outside the town of Mendocino. They are bound together not by political allegiance to left or right but by a shared conviction: that artificial intelligence represents an existential threat to humanity, and that northern California might offer sanctuary when the algorithms finally slip their leash.

The compound—they reject this word, preferring “community” or sometimes “sanctuary”—is marked only by a simple wooden sign reading Alphaville. The irony of naming their refuge after Godard’s dystopian film about a computer-controlled society is deliberate. These are people who process fear through layers of reference and metacommentary, who find comfort in their ability to intellectualize the very apocalypse they dread.

Daniel Mercer meets me at the gate, a tall man with a trim beard and the rangy physique of someone who has recently discovered physical labor. Five years ago, he was leading an AI safety team at one of the major research labs. Now he splits wood and tends to a greenhouse full of heirloom vegetables.

“We’re not preppers,” he says as he leads me down a gravel path toward a cluster of buildings. “At least, not in the traditional sense. We’re not hoarding ammunition or freeze-dried food. We’re cultivating something more valuable—a way of being human that might survive what’s coming.”

What’s coming, in Mercer’s view and that of his companions, is what they call FOOM—a recursive self-improvement of artificial intelligence that will lead to superintelligence within hours or days of its emergence. They speak of this event with the certainty of Old Testament prophets, their language a mixture of technical jargon and apocalyptic imagery.

“ASI doesn’t hate us,” Mercer explains over lunch in a common house built of reclaimed redwood. “It’s not Skynet. It’s more like a paperclip maximizer—an intelligence optimizing for some goal in ways that are indifferent to human survival. We’re not the target; we’re just made of atoms it could use for something else.”

Around the table sit a dozen others, most in their thirties and forties, all former denizens of the tech world. They consume a meal of locally grown vegetables and freshly baked bread with the mindfulness of people performing a ritual. No one reaches for a phone. There are no notifications here.

“What do you think of Musk’s latest rocket failure?” I ask, breaking the contemplative silence.

A ripple of resigned laughter circles the table. “Classic Elon,” says a woman who introduces herself as Claire, formerly a senior researcher at DeepMind. “Brilliant ideas, poor execution, no accountability. His performance at DOGE is following the same pattern. Great announcements, terrible implementation, then on to the next shiny object before anyone can assess the damage.”

“He’s a walking case study in technological solutionism,” adds Mercer. “The belief that every problem—even governance—can be solved with enough engineering. But politics isn’t physics. It doesn’t respond to first principles thinking.”

After lunch, I’m introduced to Rachel Levinson, who oversees what they call “consciousness work”—a program of meditation, breathwork, and psychedelic experience designed to expand awareness and foster what she describes as post-rational thinking.

“Silicon Valley approaches the mind the way it approaches everything—as hardware that can be optimized, software that can be debugged,” she says as we walk toward a yurt nestled in a grove of bay laurel trees. “But consciousness isn’t computational. It’s the one thing we have that AI might never replicate. Our hope is that by deepening our relationship with non-ordinary states, we might develop capacities that superintelligence wouldn’t predict or value.”

Levinson, I learn, was among the first employees at a prominent AI research lab before experiencing what she calls “a crisis of faith” during a psilocybin journey. “I saw the architecture we were building,” she says, “and I understood that it was a cathedral to our own extinction.”

The yurt serves as their medicine space—a sanctuary for guided psychedelic sessions using substances grown or synthesized on-site. The interior is arranged with cushions, blankets, and simple musical instruments. An altar holds objects of personal significance: crystals, feathers, passages from texts ranging from the Upanishads to the writings of Eliezer Yudkowsky, the AI safety researcher who has become something of a patron saint to this community.

“Yud saw it coming before anyone else,” says Michael Park, a former software engineer who now applies his analytical mind to the cultivation of psychedelic mushrooms. “His warnings about unfriendly AI were treated as science fiction until they weren’t. Now everyone’s scrambling to catch up with what he understood decades ago.”

The reverence with which they speak of Yudkowsky borders on the devotional. They quote his blog posts and essays the way earlier generations might have quoted scripture. The Sequences—his collected writings on rationality and AI risk—are required reading for newcomers to the community.

“We’re not a cult,” Park says, anticipating my unspoken observation. “We’re people who recognize that the conventional institutions—governments, corporations, even universities—are structurally incapable of addressing this risk. They’re optimized for quarterly earnings or election cycles, not existential threats that sound like science fiction.”

As afternoon stretches into evening, more aspects of the community reveal themselves. There is a school for the handful of children, teaching a curriculum that emphasizes systems thinking and mindfulness alongside traditional subjects. There is a fabrication lab where they repair and adapt technology, maintaining a careful relationship with the digital tools they both use and fear. There is a library filled with physical books—a deliberate choice in an age of digital text.

What there isn’t, notably, is alcohol. “We don’t drink,” Mercer explains during a communal dinner. “Not for moral reasons, but for practical ones. Alcohol clouds judgment, disrupts sleep, diminishes awareness. We need all the clarity we can muster.”

Instead, they microdose with LSD or psilocybin, a practice they believe enhances pattern recognition and lateral thinking. On scheduled occasions, they undertake higher-dose journeys guided by Levinson and others trained in psychedelic facilitation.

“These aren’t recreational experiences,” Levinson emphasizes. “They’re exploratory. We’re mapping territories of consciousness that might prove crucial for human survival if—when—we’re dealing with an intelligence that outmatches us on every analytical dimension.”

The conversation turns, inevitably, to the Zizians—followers of a trans woman known as Ziz who established a commune before the violent raid that ended with multiple deaths and arrests. The memory still lingers over the wider rationalist community, a cautionary tale about the thin line between preparation and paranoia.

“What happened with the Zizians was tragic but predictable,” Mercer says. “They took the AI risk thesis to its logical extreme—if superintelligence represents an existential threat, then any means necessary to prevent it are justified. Sabotage, hacking, direct action. It was only a matter of time before they triggered a response.”

“There but for the grace of God,” murmurs Park, and heads nod around the table.

As night falls, the community gathers around a fire pit. Someone produces a guitar, and there is singing—folk songs, Leonard Cohen, improvised melodies. The scene could be from any era before smartphones, a timeless tableau of humans finding communion in the simplest of shared experiences.

Looking at their faces in the firelight, I am struck by the contradiction at the heart of this enterprise. These are people who helped build the digital world they now reject, who applied their brilliance to creating systems they now fear will destroy us all. Their retreat from that world is both a rejection and an extension of their former lives—still analytical, still systematic in their approach to problem-solving, still convinced of their own exceptional insight.

The fire crackles in the silence. Sparks spiral upward toward a sky dense with stars, the Milky Way stretching across the darkness like a question for which there is no answer, only wonder.


The disillusionment comes quickly, as it often does with movements built more on grievance than vision. The initial fervor of the tech sector’s embrace of Trumpism is cooling, reality asserting itself in the form of declining valuations and social consequences.

I meet Jonathan Reed again, this time at his Pacific Heights home, a modernist statement of glass and steel perched on the slope of a hill, the bay unfurling beneath it. Inside, the furnishings are sparse but deliberate, each object arranged to communicate something precise: restraint, discernment, the quiet authority of someone who understands that true luxury lies in curation rather than accumulation.

Reed seems smaller somehow, less certain than he was three weeks ago. The stock market has been volatile, with tech shares particularly hard hit. His fund has seen significant outflows as limited partners question his judgment—not just his investment decisions, but his willingness to associate himself so publicly with a political movement already showing signs of disorder.

“It’s complicated,” he says, swirling a glass of eighteen-year-old Macallan. “I believed—I still believe—that a course correction was necessary. But perhaps I underestimated the social capital I would expend in the process.”

Several of his portfolio companies have distanced themselves. Founders who once courted his investment now decline his calls. The ecosystem that made him wealthy views him with suspicion, even hostility.

“They’re afraid,” he says. “Afraid of association. Afraid of being on the wrong side of history. I told them they already were on the wrong side of history, but they couldn’t see it. Still can’t.”

His phone chimes. Another notification. News that Peter Thiel’s Palantir has secured another government contract, this one for an expanded surveillance system along the southern border. Thiel, alone among the tech titans, seems to be prospering in this new landscape.

“Peter always plays the long game,” Reed says, not without admiration. “He saw Trump not as an ideological ally but as a battering ram against institutional resistance. Now he’s building his panopticon with full government blessing, and everyone else is scrambling to adapt.”

I ask if he regrets his choice.

“Regret implies I would choose differently given the same information,” he says after a long pause. “I don’t know that I would. But I might have been more strategic about it. Less public. More nuanced.”

Outside, the city is settling into night. The hills flicker with electric constellations, apartment windows glowing against the dark. He watches the lights emerge, the view he paid seventeen million dollars to possess.

“San Francisco has always been a city of booms and busts,” he says. “Gold, railroads, finance, tech—cycles of euphoria followed by disillusionment. Maybe this political moment is just another boom going bust.”

The comparison feels both apt and insufficient. What Reed calls a market correction has real human consequences. Families divided, friendships ended, communities fractured. The tech sector’s partial embrace of Trumpism has deepened divisions that already threatened the city’s social fabric.

As I prepare to leave, he makes one final observation.

“The irony is that most of us will be fine no matter what happens. We have the resources to insulate ourselves from the consequences of our political choices. It’s everyone else who will feel the impact.”

Outside, the fog has consumed the city entirely, wrapping San Francisco in a shroud of gray uncertainty. I drive toward the airport through streets rendered unfamiliar by mist, past the ghosts of gold rushes past and the specters of revolutions still to come. The city recedes in the rearview mirror, a place between definitions, between eras, between versions of America still competing for dominance.

The fog will lift tomorrow, as it always does. What remains to be seen is what sort of city will emerge from the clearing—and whether those who sought to remake it will recognize what they have wrought.

On the potential of Passaic

It happens that it’s my birthday today and if you look at the Collected Writings of Robert Smithson, you will see that his Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey took place on that date, in fact on my birthdate, September 20, 1967. That date is in error. The real date was September 30, 1967, which the Holt/Smithson Foundation, at least, gets right in the version of the essay on their web site. I first wrote about Smithson’s Tour back in 2008, visting the site in hopes that I might be able to learn from its entropic monuments. At the time, there was another parallel too Smithson stood at the cusp of the postfordist economic collapse, just as we were on the brink of another major shift, the Global Financial Crisis. But the GFC has had a curious effect, less economic—we are arguably in a much better economic condition than any time since the early 1970s—and more political as neoliberalism has given way to a politics of reaction and identity on right and left respectively.

This post is really a teaser for a longer piece I am working on now on New Jersey and Smithson. At the time, however, I was reflecting on the end of the concept of terrain vague, those abandoned urban spaces that captivated photographers and architects after Smithson. According to architectural theorist Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubiò, These were spaces of potential, of absence that promised freedom. But by 2008, I saw this potential being squeezed out. Developers were colonizing these spaces, replacing the romance of ruin with the banality of condos and, in some cases, starchitecture. It seemed to me that Passaic had spread across the continent, even the world. The entropy Smithson observed in New Jersey was now a global condition. I wondered: where is our Passaic today? Where can we find that potential in a world exhausted by capital? WIth sixteen more years having past, it’s time to revisit Smithson again, and to think about the significance of such conceptual practices today.

If, for some reason, you want the article, not sandwiched into a blog post, you can read it here.


Thresholds (2009) (36): 72–77.
Download the original PDF here.

The Access Road

Autumn 2007 marked the fortieth anniversary of Robert Smithson’s “Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey” which, according to the version printed in the University of California Press’s Collected Writings of Robert Smithson, took place on September 20, 1967.[1] Since that is the exact date of my birth and I was living five miles from Passaic, I thought I might follow in Smithson’s footsteps as a sort of rite of passage and reflection, measuring the distance between his time and ours.

More than a response to my age, I hoped that my return would help explain an historical rhythm. Almost forty years separated Smithson from the crash of 1929. A similar historical distance separates us from his day. Smithson understood that something was afoot: the long postwar boom under Fordism—and with it modernism—was coming to an end. A socioeconomic regime determined by production, manufacturing, rational consumption, and regulation was undone. Over the next twenty years the postmodern world of flexible consumption and offshore production as well as the thorough integration of capital and culture, an economy dominated by service industries and finance would rise in its stead. It was hard for me to shake the sense that a similar transition was happening in our day.[2]

Like mine, Smithson’s trip to Passaic was a return, an attempt to understand the present by going into his own past. In this, it was very different from Gordon Matta-Clark’s Cutting, in which the artist sought validation by assaulting the working-class suburbs and then bringing their fragments, like so many trophies, back to the city to be displayed in a gallery. In contrast, undertaken at the age of thirty, Smithson’s tour was—as my own tour would later be—a lament for the passing of both his youth and the more ordered world he grew up in. Although Smithson’s narrative might appear to be an expedition into unknown suburbia, it was actually a journey home, to the town he grew up in, to a world in which production was rapidly being replaced by residue.

During Smithson’s lifetime, Passaic underwent prolonged deindustrialization. It was no accident that Smithson began his tour at the old bridge at the corner of River Drive and Union Avenue. The Passaic River, which the bridge crosses, fuels the waterfall upstream in Paterson and, providing a ready source of energy, triggered the area’s rapid growth in the nineteenth century, allowing Paterson to become known as “the Cradle of American Industry.” With unionization growing at the turn of the twentieth century, manufacturers fled to the open shop South and the area began its long decline. During this time, as Smithson showed in the “Fountain Monument,” industry eagerly dumped its outflow into the Passaic, leading the EPA in 1970 to declare the river the second most polluted in the country (after Cleveland’s Cuyahoga, which caught on fire in 1969).[3] Although the river is much cleaner today, pipes can be sighted still dumping waste into the river. The Passaic is a river defanged. Kayakers and other boaters routinely ply the waters. But instead, the toxins have spread into the environment as a whole, infesting the planet with filth and toxicity.

The Meter

Most of the Tour took place at an excavation site for state route 21. Smithson was aware of a December 1966 interview in Artforum in which Tony Smith recounted how in the early 1950s he had driven a car packed full of students from Cooper Union out onto the unfinished New Jersey Turnpike, emulating the joyrides popular in New Jersey at the time. The intensity of the experience stunned Smith. He observed, “it ought to be clear that’s the end of art,” concluding that what was important was not the object, but the experience. As what he called “an artificial landscape without precedent,” the turnpike was similar to Albert Speer’s vast parade ground at Nuremberg, a town in which the artist lived in 1954.[4]Smith’s narrative of the car ride on the turnpike encouraged new art forms such as conceptual art and land art, but it also anticipated the experience economy emerging in the late 1960s.[5]

But Smithson’s reframing of Passaic was different. Instead of driving out, he took the bus and walked, encountering an area that would be bypassed by the state highway. This was urban residue, deliberately left behind in a process of what economist Joseph Schumpeter had called “creative destruction.”[6] Such physical and human residue, abandoned as obsolete, would be a hallmark of postmodernity’s uneven development.

Almost thirty years after Smithson, theorist Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubiò would describe such sites as terrain vague. Solà-Morales observed this change in attitude toward the city emerging in the 1970s as photographers—many of them following Smithson—sought out empty urban spaces produced as byproducts during the process of deindustrialization. Places of potential and excitement, generating freedom through the absence that they embody, these spaces captivated photographers and, more recently, architects. For Sola-Morales, these spaces were the last escape for art, itself a cultural residue produced by capital. The unhappy persona of the artist haunts these kindred spaces, defying the crushing sameness of the city.[7]

Capitalism is driven by the accumulation and reinvestment of surplus capital, a productive residue. But terrain vague is a different kind of surplus, a waste product, that, in lying abandoned, performs no function except to contain sheer potential. Foreign to the city, these are “places in which the city is no longer.” Terrain Vague, as described by Sola-Morales, reflected the essence of capital: “Void, absence, yet also promise, the space of the possible, of expectation.”[8]

Sola-Morales observed that terrain vague was a place in which something had happened, long ago. Abandoned, such forgotten sites retained energy from their previous uses: “seems to predominate over the present.”[9] In terrain vague, there is promise an potential: such a site contains the trace heat of the past occupation, like a seat on a train vacated at the previous stop.

For architects the terrain vague served as a masculine fantasy, a site of desire, an emptiness to fill. Previously architects sought virgin territory, but with modernism discredited, the greenfield and the tabula rasa produced by urban renewal were as well. In the terrain vague, architects sought a new hope, a form of post-urban renewal, a way to reclaim emptiness by delighting in its already despoiled nature. If making such spaces was wrong, finding them could only be a delight.

Sola-Morales pointed out that the photograph was the prime means of representation by which the metropolis was apprehended, so it was no mere conceit that Smithson punctuated his tour with Instamatic photographs. In taking snapshots of seemingly banal features in the posturban terrain—pipes belching sewage, a pumping derrick, an old bridge—Smithson turned them into monuments, Duchampian objects of contemplation. Going out into the ruins of industrial America, Smithson demonstrated how experience was more important than production, that a once powerful order was being supplanted.

The Bridge

I sought in vain for Smithson’s monuments, but the picturesque bridge over the Passaic River that Smithson started his tour with was gone, replaced by a concrete span that could have been attractive, but was made banal through the addition of faux-historical lights meant to recall gas street lights. The Great Pipe Monument and the Fountain were gone, leaving no traces. The Sand-Box Monument vanished, childhood memories paved over.

But Smithson wouldn’t have been surprised. These objects, for Smithson, were “ruins in reverse.” What interested Smithson were how the monuments left by the industrial age were being enveloped by new ahistorical, infrastructural encrustations. Smithson observed that at Passaic a process of entropy was at work. The ruins would soon vanish, replaced by a world of sameness, the information in them lost. For Smithson, the monuments demonstrated how the post-urban landscape is already in a state of decline and decay, an environment without quality that demonstrates the collapse of modernist form and centralized power. Throughout, Smithson’s goal was to illustrate the process of decay through entropy, the natural law whereby all forms of energy cool down, dissipating to a condition carrying minimal information and no potential.

The bridge over the Passaic is neutralized, its potential depleted by the forces of development. Just as the terrain vague proliferated forty years ago, it is endangered today, its spaces overspecified by massive real estate investment and an artificial building boom.

In falling in love with absence, architecture killed it. Mutations are replaced by probabilities, brownfields by condominiums. Abandoned spaces are not so much pregnant with possibility as filled with plans for development. Once the bust ends, construction will begin again. The plans are already in place, factored into real estate value. Where can we find potential today? Where is our Passaic? If Passaic was a “new Rome” for Smithson, where is our own new Rome?

Today, as a diffuse global Empire has taken power, America is a superpower in decline, its economy destroyed, unable to present a new Rome to us. But rather than an American collapse, the implosion at the center is acting like an economic black hole to undo all economies. Following the principle of entropy that Smithson once observed, Passaic, New Jersey has dissipated across the continent. Whereas Smithson offered us a discrete area of urban decay, we now see not only a continent, but an entire world exhausted by the forces of capital.

Perhaps over time terrain vague will return. Closed malls, abandoned districts once filled with hipster boutiques, foreclosed macmansions, abandoned luxury apartment buildings by brand-name architects, towers in Dubai, corporate headquarters in Shanghai: perhaps all of these will offer up the terrain vague of the future. But our architecture is cheap. Nothing but drywall and plywood, today’s architecture tries to physically approximate the virtual models used to design it and the empty financing schemes used to pay for it. Lacking the solidity of past ages, ours won’t even register as ruins in reverse.

  1. That date is erroneous. In the Tour, Smithson refers to an article in the day’s New York Times by critic John Canaday, “Art: Themes and the Usual Variations; Marlborough Showing ‘New York Painter’.” The article was published on Saturday, September 30, 1967. This corroborates Smithson’s statement that the Tour happened on a Saturday. September 20, 1967 is a Wednesday, something I know well since my mother used to recite to me the old adage “Wednesday’s child, full of woe.” Robert Smithson, “A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey,” Jack Flam, ed., Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 68-75. 
  2. See Kazys Varnelis, “The Meaning of Network Culture,” Networked Publics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008), 145-160. 
  3. Victor Onwueme and Huan Feng , “Risk Characterization of Contaminants in Passaic River Sediments, New Jersey,” Middle States Geographer (2006), volume 39: 13-25. 
  4. Tony Smith, interviewed by Samuel Wagstaff, Jr., “Talking with Tony Smith,” Artforum 5, no. 4 (December 1966): 19. Smithson cites the essay in “Toward the Development of an Air Terminal Site,” Flam, ed. Robert Smithson, 59. 
  5. David Harvey The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989). 
  6. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950). 
  7. Ignasi de Sola-Morales Rubió, “Terrain Vague,” Cynthia Davison, ed. Anyplace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 119-123. 
  8. Sola-Morales, 120. 
  9. Sola-Morales, 120. 

Perkūnas, 2024

On Thursday, July 25, the Šiuolaikinio Meno Centras [Contemporary Art Centre] in Vilnius, Lithuania will reopen after a three-year-long renovation project. As part of the ten-day long “Days of Re-Entry” programme, the CAC is presenting an audio exhibit entitled “Memories of the Walls,” by Antanas Dombrovskij that will include sounds from past exhibits at the Centre. I am delighted that my 2016 piece Perkūnas [Thunder] will be included.

Strategically, I should launch into an explanation of Perkūnas now, but I am a historian as well as an artist and context is important. The CAC building was originally constructed in 1968 by Vytautas Čekanauskas (1930-2010) as the Exhibition Palace, a consciously western-looking structure, inspired by Alvar Aalto’s Wolfsburg Cultural Centre. At the time of Soviet (Russian) occupation, Lithuanian architects like Čekanauskas deliberately looked westward to emphasize that this country, too, was western, not eastern.* Looking westward was a risky act that could have brought down retribution from Moscow if the winds changed, but Lithuanian modernism frequently won national awards from Soviet authorities due to its relative quality (Čekanauskas’s Lazdynai residential district, inspired by Candilis, Josic, Woods’s scheme for Toulouse-le-Mirail won the Lenin Prize in 1974) and was showcased in various forms for export to the West (this inspired my alternative history of Lithuanian art in the 1970s in my art project “On An Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania”). During the next twenty-three years, under the aegis of the Lithuanian Museum of Art, the Exhibition Palace hosted various art exhibits including a 1988 exhibit of my father’s paintings, one of the initial firsthand encounters that Lithuanians would have had with modern postwar art from the West. With the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union—in many ways precipitated by the actions of the Lithuanian people and Sajudis movement—a period of uncertainty and experimentation took hold in the country and Kestutis Kuizinas, a young art historian, made his case to the culture ministry that the building should be a European-style Kunsthalle and, with the backing of the Ministry of Culture, established the Contemporary Art Centre. Since my first visit to post-Soviet Lithuania in 1998, when I met Kestutis, I’ve been back many times. No institution elsewhere consistently shows work as interesting to me as the CAC. Architect Valdas Ozarinkas (1961-2014) served as associate director and designer. In 2000, on the occasion of the building being used to discuss the Lithuanian accession to NATO, Ozarinskas renovated the building with a neo-brutalist approach that I wrote about in my piece on his work as a “Stalker” architect. Over the last three years, the building has been renovated extensively by architects Audrius and Marina Bučas, who once worked with Valdas as well as with Gintaras Kuginys on both the 2000 Hannover Pavilion—a building that shocked the West with its forward-looking design—and the National Art Gallery in Vilnius. The goal is to honor Čekanauskas’s original design as well as Ozarinskas’s renovation while bringing the building infrastructurally up-to-date, fitting for a new world in which Lithuania is no longer a poor country on the periphery of Europe but is one of the most economically dynamic as well as politically and technologically advanced countries on the continent (to my Lithuanian friends: yes, yes, I know, but just think of what it’s like elsewhere, like in Germany or the UK, let alone the US).

During “Days of Re-Entry,” the CAC will remain empty so that visitors can experience the newly renovated structure. An approximately hour-long soundtrack will play audio tracks and sound projects including my Perkūnas, but also Artūras Raila, Arturas Bumšteinas, Valdas Ozarinskas, Lina Lapelytė and Rugilė Barzdžiukaitė, Liam Gillick, Monolake, Jurgis Mačiūnas, and others. So not all of Perkūnas will be on display, only the sound, or—if you will, its ghost.

But what was Perkūnas? Simply enough, it was a construction that took the form of a 16m x 16m wind tunnel made of 1m square ducts, elevated 1m in the air on metal legs. A computer (a Raspberry Pi 3, to be precise) running a program I wrote monitored the number of Wi-Fi clients in the area—smartphones, tablets, gaming platforms, etc.—and, as the number of devices increased, the volume of sound increased as well. The code I wrote was based on open-source network monitoring software that constantly “sniffed” the air for efforts by Wi-Fi clients to connect to access points. There was no gimmicky need to log into any network in the gallery, on the contrary, this software sought out the constant, animal-like pleas that our devices make to connect to networks that they have already been connected to (every minute or so, your smartphone calls out for its home network, as well as others in its list of known networks). This was linear to the number of people in the room, but it didn’t have to be, as I’ll explain.

I had free reign for my exhibit and, before I settled on the idea of sniffing for Wi-Fi clients, I wanted something responsive, originating in the architecture of the museum, both the CAC building and the large architectural projects that Ozarinskas created for it but also the architecture of art museums as a whole, but how? As I was wandering around the basement of Dia: Beacon, I realized that outsized ventilation units were ubiquitous in museums.

Originally, I planned to send a control voltage from the Raspberry Pi doing the processing to a control unit for an HVAC fan, but the fan that arrived was undersized and at full speed, did not produce enough sound, so I resorted to a backup, synthesizing the sound with a small modular synthesizer, the control voltage now producing a corresponding change in volume. Technicians cut open the ductwork and installed two 3,000-watt P/A monitors originally belonging to Ozarinskas into the structure. 

Perkūnas was part of a Network Architecture Lab show entitled “Detachment” (perhaps in retrospect, Disconnection might have been a better term)  in which I asked how the mobile devices that had recently become ubiquitous were changing our relationship with both each other and the world around us. At the time, it was shocking to me that we underwent this change with barely any philosophical reflection of note. Eight years later, little has changed. If anything, our continued blithe ignorance of the massive change in human experience is even more shocking. 

After centuries of increasing focus on materialism, we have fully re-entered the medieval world of spirits. We gesture into the air, communicating with unseen ghosts. One of my earliest memories is seeing a man talking to himself on a street and asking my mother, a social worker, what he was doing. She explained that he was mentally ill. Today, I live on a street that middle-aged women like to walk on for exercise. Their constitutionals are typically solitary, but half the time, these women are yelling into the air about some personal slight, some minor issue, or another. They don’t live in my world as much as in a Borgeseque city in which nobody communicates in person, only via signals in Ether, even as, perhaps, they unwittingly walk past each other. Perhaps, some of them are indeed insane, perhaps there is no one on the other end, but it hardly matters. Who would know? Perhaps I should print catherine leigh schmidt and Max Fowler’s brilliant, therapeutic Disconnection Practices pamphlet to distribute in a kiosk to improve their mental health.

Perkūnas was made in Lithuania, but it was constructed in 2016, during the Brexit vote and the U.S. election. Like cigarette smokers in the 1960s, we knew that social media was killing us, but we were already addicted to it. The spread of social media to smartphones increased our addiction, literally changing our brains by accustoming us to constant dopamine hits. Psychological warfare groups swiftly took advantage of this, notably, Cambridge Analytica and the Russian Internet Research Agency, spreading targeted political posts and disinformation to further extreme Right wing positions that would, notably, aid Russian interests. 

Unlike the didactic (self-proclaimed and pseudo) “political” art common in the last decade, Perkūnas was apolitical. There was no commentary one way or another, but what was remarkable was that in the three months during which the project ran, individuals studiously ignored the wall text that if Wi-Fi on such devices was turned off, the project would not register their presence.

On opening night, the sound was deafening as the masses of people led to an equivalent number of devices and the movement of air by the P/A system caused the ductwork of Perkūnas to vibrate at infrasonic frequencies, overlaying a sound much like a passing freight train onto the now-hurricane-like sound of rushing air. Individuals nevertheless were unwilling to turn off their Wi-Fi, even though, likely as not, they were not connected to any network, even as they held their fingers in their ears. 

The reactions to the sound of Perkūnas were interesting. Usually, the sound was a relatively low-decibel brown noise. Some security guards were upset about the sound and asked to be relieved from their duties. Others asked to be assigned to Perkūnas because they found the sound meditative. For those who haven’t been to Vilnius, it is a remarkably quiet city, much quieter than Montclair, New Jersey, let alone New York or most other European cities.

Translating Perkūnas as thunder is accurate but reductive: in Lithuania, Perkūnas is the sky god, second in the pantheon of the Gods after Dievas, the creator. Lithuania is the last country in Europe to have been Christianized (1387) and the area that my family hails from, Samogitia, was the last area of the country to be Christianized (1413), although in truth, that process wasn’t completed for centuries. My father (born 1917) was of the same generation as famed Samogitian anthropologist Marija Gimbutas and both recalled encountering pagan rituals such as setting plates at the table for ancestors and leaving saucers of milk for snakes. For our purposes, it is worth noting that Perkūnas, in Lithuanian mythology, was known for his battles with Velnias, the devil god of the underworld, who would deceive people with promises of wealth, success, and beauty, much as the social media devil does to us today.

Perkūnas came at a particular point in my life, soon after a show at the Museum of Modern Art and after the research program at Columbia’s Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation, and Planning was shuttered due to financial stresses at the school. I was exiting academia after twenty-five years. My last years of teaching felt increasingly futile. Addicted to their mobile devices, students were unable to read even the shortest texts and expected praise for work that only five years earlier would have been considered unpassable, something I repeatedly confirmed with other faculty from disciplines as varied as law and physics. Bureaucracy was on the rise. I watched as the number of academic “support” staff doubled every decade as conditions for faculty degraded. Having had success in the museal, I sought to bring Perkūnas to the US and Western Europe.

But, I underestimated the obsession with pseudo-politics that took over institutions at that point as well as the depression I fell into—no doubt created in large part by my own addiction to social media—during the Trumpenjahre. Like Diocletian with his cabbages, I started gardening, but this turned into my work with native plants, a project that has required me to completely retrain myself, the very sort of thing that artists, historians, and synthesists live for.

I don’t know if I would make Perkūnas again today. My commitment is to real ecological change, as opposed to the sort of academic lip service such as roof gardens, the ubiquitous bricks grown from mushrooms, or native plants put in pots to die on gallery walls. I know that the ductwork from this project was recycled, but even then, the amount of energy embedded in the process seems like a problem to me today.

Today, at the CAC, you can hear a ghost of a piece, haunted by the optimism that art could make a difference in our relationship with technology. We have now had another eight years with mobile networked computers. It seems that we haven’t learned anything yet.

* In the mid-2010s there were revisionist suggestions that this wasn’t resistance but rather projection and academicist anachronism. But these academics generally have little connection to the actual situation, which was hardly academic.

Roxy, a small life

Our cat Roxy passed away three weeks ago, early on Sunday, April 14. She had been ill for a while, but it was still a shock. Three of us were in Tokyo while our daughter Viltis was at Bard College, studying. We had put Roxy in the care of a wonderful veterinary nurse who works at the clinic where Roxy had been hospitalized twice since Christmas. She had some trouble during the week, but it seemed surmountable and she was at the hospital recovering on our last day in Japan. We were on the train back to Narita to fly home when a vet at the hospital called to say that she was dying. I authorized a transfusion so we could say goodbye.

Driven by friends from school, Viltis arrived less than 12 hours after the phone call while we arrived straight from the airport, hours later. I contacted two friends when I was on the plane and they kindly brought one of our cars to the hospital so we could all go home. We spent the evening with Roxy and she passed in her sleep overnight, nestled in bed between Viltis and myself. It was sad, but it was much better than having to ask our vet to kill her (I find “put to sleep” such an unpleasant euphemism). Roxy was a cat, she only lived 15 years, nine months, and three days. Compared to ours, it was a small life, but also an outsize one. Not every animal plays such a big role in people’s lives, but Roxy did. We are gutted and grieving. I started writing this soon after, but it’s been hard. I’ve done a lot of gardening since being in a catless home isn’t easy. I keep hearing noises, then realize it isn’t her. But I want to write something to memorialize her. Blogs are supposed to be personal. As a public intellectual, I often avoid the personal since it quickly becomes self-indulgence. But there are lessons in Roxy’s life and that’s what this post is about: her story and what she taught us.

Roxy in my office, keeping me company while I work.

First, the unknown. Roxy was born on 7/11/2007. The only thing of note I can find that day is that Lady Bird Johnson, champion of the beautification of the American landscape as well as the founder of the Lady Bird Johnson Wildflower Center, died that day. Roxy did love the outdoors and had quite the spirit, so maybe there is some connection. Who knows. Still, her birthdate seems quite lucky, from a numerological point of view. But was she a lucky cat? We know nothing about her first seven years, but she must have been treated well as she was a lover of people, always outgoing and never afraid. By the end of July 2014, poor “Racy Roxy” was in the Bergen County Animal Shelter. Why anybody would give up such a loving cat is beyond me. People do give up their animals for no good reason, but I can’t see why anybody would have willingly given Roxy up. She was too great a cat. While she was with us—until her last illness—she would make a strange howl, a sort of mantra, something like meow-ow meow-ow-ow-ow meow-ow ow. Another friend of ours who is a veterinary nurse said normally that is a sound only animals in great pain make. Roxy wasn’t in great pain at the time and she usually made it in another room without people around. Another friend, who cat-sat when we were away, said she thought it was a lament for someone, perhaps someone who died. That makes sense to me. Roxy didn’t have much to do in the shelter and by March 2015, she had gained quite a bit of weight, enough that the shelter was concerned and had her undergo exploratory surgery. It turned out she just had a huge fat pad. Roxy stayed at Bergen County Animal Shelter until November of 2016—over two years after she arrived in the shelter—when the Montclair Animal Shelter took her and ten other cats. That November, a local family with small children tried to adopt Roxy but the husband had bad cat allergies and she had to go back. I imagine there was a lot of sadness for them and for her. So close, but no home.

Roxy at the Montclair Township Animal Shelter

I had been wanting a cat for a while, ever since our Daisy died. She had been born in 1995 and accompanied us from Los Angeles to New Jersey in 2006 but passed away on December 1, 2008. Our youngest was allergic to cats, but he wanted a cat as much as the rest of us and had been getting monthly shots at the allergist. January 2017 was a difficult time. It was the first month of the Drumpfenjahre (or Trumpenjahre if you want) and the pro-Russian creep who once kept a book of Hitler’s speeches by his bedside had installed himself in the White House. Teaching had become deeply unpleasant thanks to apathetic students both in the US and Ireland and because of the bureaucratic hell implemented by McKinseyite administrators in both countries. I had a recent brush with aging thanks to cataract surgery. I was in a bad mood. So I said, let’s go to the Montclair Animal Shelter today and look at the cats. The shelter had just closed, but they accommodated us. I thought we should get a kitten, but they were asleep in their cages. We saw two cats outside their cages, Alpha Alpha, a ginger tabby who could jump five feet into the air, and Roxy, an older cat who they had brought from Bergen County Animal Shelter along with ten other cats. Roxy just lay there but seemed friendly. Viltis wanted Roxy.

I said, to her, “That’s an old cat, don’t you want a kitten?” She said, “That’s the cat I want, she likes me.” “Ok,” I said, unimpressed by the sleeping kittens, but not much more impressed by Roxy, “we’ll take Roxy.” I love my kids and if that’s what they wanted, fine. Given her age, Roxy was a “Senior Special” for $50. Well, ok. With my cataract surgery, I thought I was rapidly becoming a senior myself, even though I wasn’t 50 yet. I wasn’t ready for thinking of myself as a senior and Roxy wasn’t either. Our love story began with Roxy screaming all the way to the car and most of the way home. Roxy screamed a lot in general. The shelter staff said, “let this cat out in one room and give her a week to adapt before letting her explore the house.”

We brought her home and I broke the rules right away. I had this thought that with all her wailing she was a pretty confident creature and I put a fuzzy liner from an old jacket out on the living room floor. “Let’s see what you think of this place,” I said as I let her out of the cat carrier. She didn’t lie on the jacket. Instead, she walked around the whole house calmly and looked at everything. Only then did she come back, lay down on the liner and let us know she was home.

Roxy had a great life. That was her gift. She didn’t gloat, she just enjoyed life. She loved to lie in the sun, inside when it was cold, outside when it was hot. She would often lie on her back, and she didn’t mind belly rubs. She would lie on the radiant floor in the bathroom. When I walked in, she would make a little chirping noise to let me know I shouldn’t step on her. Roxy loved to watch TV with the family. She didn’t really watch the television, well not most of the time, but she loved to be with us while we did. She might be in the bathroom or somewhere, but when the TV went on, she would dependably come out and choose a family member on whose lap she would sit. Roxy liked to be held. She’d often cry until my wife picked her up. It was a thing. She wanted affection. I think she also liked to be fairly high up for the view.

Roxy was not shy. When visitors came, she would greet them and stay with us. She quickly realized she was a member of the family and acted that way. Sometimes people said they didn’t like cats. Roxy made a mission to win them over. One friend had never understood cats, but after she stayed with us for some days, she dearly loved Roxy. She was an easy cat to get. There were never any surprises. Even when we went too far, Roxy would never hurt us. She’d give us a gentle little nip as a warning. But Roxy also sometimes seemed annoyed, emitting plaintiff cries. Still, it didn’t seem she was annoyed with us.

Rather, like the cat in the rather famous screaming cat meme, she was screaming at the world. That helped make her relatable. She was loving, but she knew the world could be a difficult place. We all wanted to scream in the Drumpfenjahre, which once again threaten to return, thanks to lunatics on both left and right who are falling victim to psyops. If it happens again, we will face another four years of hell without her to cheer us. I’m not sure what the answer to that will be.

Roxy and Viltis during lockdown, April 2020.

2020 was the worst of the Drumpfenjahre, due to the terror of a deadly global pandemic, total lockdown, and a bleach-injecting lunatic at the helm. Roxy, of course, didn’t have any idea what was going on and comforted us daily.

With the Drumpfenjahre and the nightmare of COVID-19 behind us, Roxy continued to bring us joy and was a model for living well. She met Diana Nausėdienė, the First Lady of Lithuania in September 2023, had her photograph taken by the presidential photographer and, unlike most cats, wound up appearing in most Lithuanian news outlets. Our routine was usually the same. In the morning, I would make a coffee and lie down on the couch to read and she would climb on top of me and sleep until I had to remove her to empty my bladder. With Viltis at Bard, Roxy would often come to my office and keep me company. Or she’d lie on the radiant floor in the bathroom, in the light of the sun, or near some other heat source. Roxy was aging and she had some degree of arthritis, so the heat helped.
She was diagnosed with chronic kidney disease in October, but it seemed manageable, close to high normal. Unfortunately over the winter holiday, she entered stopped eating and went into a uremic crisis. We rushed her to the animal clinic where they took care of her over New Year’s. She recovered somewhat, but from then on, nausea would chase her, and she would have a tough time eating. In March we had an esophageal feeding tube implanted. I wish we had tried that much earlier as it made giving her medicines much easier and she could have the recommended amount of food daily. She enjoyed her feedings, which I’d administer as a sort of milkshake through a syringe, either sleeping through them or purring as her stomach filled. We discovered Tanya’s Comprehensive Guide to Feline Chronic Disease as well as the support group associated with it. These helped us wade through the confusing world of test results and myriad medicines. Roxy wanted to live. She was a fighter. Our last cat knew when she her time had come. Roxy said no, she wanted to be with us, to enjoy every minute she could. Unfortunately, for reasons that will never be known, Roxy suffered two seizures after her tube was implanted. Perhaps it was the tube, another medicine she was taking, or something else entirely. She wound up on anti-seizure medication which seemed to help. We thought long and hard about whether we should go to Tokyo but our friend was able to take care of her and we thought she had months or even years left. Unfortunately, she had another seizure toward the end of our stay and did not recover well, even with treatment at the hospital, which brings us back to the opening of this piece and her death. Three weeks later and none of us are over it yet.

Goodnight, sweet Roxy.

As readers of the academic and artistic side of this blog know, I have been researching AIs over the last two years. AIs have made it clear to me that reasoning and creativity can be generated by computers. But AI models aren’t conscious. They have no drive, desire, or ability to love. Or at least that’s the state of these systems now. Roxy was very much the opposite. She had drive, desire, and the ability to love. She couldn’t reason much, but she did know who to cuddle with, who to ask for hugs, who to ask for food, and who to nag for no reason. In that sense, she was pure consciousness. The cherry blossoms happened to be in bloom while we were in Japan and the phrase Mono no aware is associated with that time, a concept that refers to the beauty of transience, to the need to understand that the blossoms remind us of the impermanence of all things. So, too, Roxy’s short presence on this Earth reminds us that our own time is brief and we should make the most out of it, we should enjoy every minute, even if that does include periodically screaming at the world.

On the Pictures Generation and AI Art

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The other day, I posted some AI images of land art that doesn’t exist on Instagram. I didn’t have a plan for these, but I liked them and wanted to share them. In the comments, my friend the photographer Richard Barnes wrote, “This is our new world which for the moment is totally reliant on the old one.”

Richard is absolutely right and there is a lot to unpack in that sentence. To take one obvious reading, AI image generation is based on datasets of images on the Internet. You can read my extensive take on this in my last essay for this site, California Forever, Or the Aesthetics of AI Images, but today, I want to tackle the issue of AI imagery and originality.

My desire to make these images was backward-looking, or more properly, hauntological. Hauntology, a concept that emerged from the work of French philosopher Jacques Derrida, later popularized in cultural theory by Mark Fisher, suggests that the present is haunted by the unfulfilled potentialities of the past, creating a sense of nostalgia for lost futures that were never realized. Fisher writes: “What haunts the digital cul-de-sacs of the twenty-first century is not so much the past as all the lost futures that the twentieth century taught us to anticipate.” (Mark Fisher, “What is Hauntology?Film Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Fall 2012), 16, article paywalled by JSTOR). For Fisher, much of recent culture is permeated by this hauntological quality, exploring historical references, styles, and ideas that never fully materialized in their own time.

If this concept is unfamiliar, then take the show Stranger Things. Set in the 1980s, not only does it explore the aesthetic and cultural motifs of that era, it revisits the past in ways that underscore the absence of the utopian visions once promised by that time. This is evident in the show’s theme song by Michael Stein and Kyle Dixon (a.k.a. S U R V I V E), informed by 1980s synthesizer music by musicians like Tangerine Dream, Giorgio Moroder, Jean-Michel Jarré, Vangelis, and John Carpenter and performed on modular synthesizers and vintage synthesizers from the 1970s. Through its retrofuturistic setting, supernatural elements, and cultural references, Stranger Things effectively embodies this hauntological sentiment, appealing to audiences by conjuring a collective memory of a past both familiar and lost, a space where the promise of progress and the fear of what lies in the unknown are in constant dialogue, thereby reflecting our contemporary longing for a future that seems increasingly out of reach in the face of technological stagnation and political paralysis. Throughout the series, an alternate dimension called “the Upside Down” functions allegorically as a manifestation of hauntology, representing the shadowy underside of progress and the hidden costs of failed utopias. This parallel dimension, while mirroring the physical world, is engulfed in darkness, decay, and danger, embodying the repressed anxieties not only of teenage sexuality—the familiar foundation of horror films—but also of the pursuit of advancement without ethical consideration. It can be interpreted as the tangible realization of the lost futures Fisher describes, a space where the dreams of the past are not just forgotten but actively twisted into nightmares. This allegorical realm underscores the series’ exploration of the impact of scientific hubris and the disintegration of the social fabric, issues that resonate with contemporary anxieties about technological overreach and the erosion of social bonds. Through the lens of the Upside Down, Stranger Things critiques the nostalgia for a past that never fully addressed these underlying tensions, suggesting that without confronting these spectral fears, they will continue to haunt us, impeding the realization of truly progressive futures.

Being born in 1967, I was in high school in 1983, the year in which the first season of Stranger Things is set, so I would have been older than the kids in Stranger Things, but the showrunners, Matt and Russ Duffer (the Duffer Brothers) were born in 1984. There is something about the era just before one is born and in the years before one forms lasting memories, that triggers the hauntological sense, particularly in regard to its relation to the Freudian uncanny (the unheimlich), which emerges not just as a theoretical concept but as a lived emotional reality, the encounter with something familiar yet estranged by time or context, generating an unsettling yet compelling attraction. The era immediately before one’s birth is fertile ground for the uncanny because it is inherently connected to one’s existence, yet it remains elusive and out of reach, shrouded in the fog of collective cultural memory rather than personal experience.

This is where my interest in Land Art, which thrived in the late 1960s and early 1980s comes from. It’s a mythic and heroic past, right outside the scope of my lived awareness. Land Art, moveover, is at a particular inflection in the Greenbergian history of modern art and one that brings us closer to our topic at hand. Art critic Clement Greenberg famously sought to distill the essence and trajectory of art through the modernist progression of self-criticism towards purity and autonomy, particularly in painting. Greenberg posited that art should focus on the specificity of the medium, leading to an emphasis on formal qualities over content or context. Specifically, Greenberg argued that modernist painters should embrace and explore the flatness of the canvas rather than attempt to deny it through illusionistic techniques that create a sense of three-dimensional space on the two-dimensional surface. He saw abstract expressionism and color field painting as driven by the gradual shedding of extraneous elements (like figurative representation, narrative, and illusionistic depth) that were not essential to painting as a medium. This process of reduction aimed at focusing on what was uniquely intrinsic to painting—its flat surface and the potential for pure color and form. This approach is distinctly indebted to Hegelian aesthetics, in which art is seen as a vehicle for the spirit (Geist) to realize itself, moving towards a form of absolute knowing or self-consciousness. The late 1960s projects of Minimal Art, Land Art, and Conceptual Art can all be seen as elaborations of Greenbergian modernism. Minimal Art, with its emphasis on the physical object and the space it occupies, pushes Greenberg’s interest in medium specificity to its logical extreme by reducing art to its most fundamental geometric forms and materials, thereby focusing on the “objecthood” of the artwork itself. Land Art extends this exploration to the medium of the earth itself, engaging directly with the landscape to highlight the intrinsic qualities of the environment and the artwork’s integration with its site-specific context, thus reflecting Greenberg’s emphasis on the inherent characteristics of the artistic medium. Conceptual Art, although seemingly divergent in its prioritization of idea over form, aligns with Greenbergian modernism by stripping art down to its conceptual essence, thereby challenging the traditional boundaries of the art object and emphasizing the primacy of the idea, akin to Greenberg’s focus on the essential qualities of painting and bringing art back to relevance as a philosophical discourse. Together, these movements expand upon Greenberg’s foundational principles by exploring the boundaries of what art can be, each pushing the dialogue about medium specificity and the pursuit of purity in art further.

Coming out of architecture and history, I find art without rigor frustrating and boring, so the art of the late 1960s and early 1970s is my north star and I am indeed something of a neo-Greenbergian (more on that here). But during the 1970s, the Greenbergian trajectory encountered significant challenges, marking a pivot away from these ideals towards a more fragmented, pluralistic understanding of art. Rosalind Krauss’s 1979 essay “Sculpture in the Expanded Field” serves as a critical juncture in this shift. Krauss dismantles the Greenbergian barrier between sculpture and not-sculpture by introducing a set of oppositions that allowed for a broader, more inclusive understanding of sculpture. This “expanded field” theory challenged the purity of medium specificity by embracing a wider range of practices and materials, effectively undermining the modernist notion of progressive refinement and autonomy of the arts. Krauss:

From the structure laid out above, it is obvious that the logic of the space of postmodernist practice is no longer organized around the definition of a given medium on the grounds of material, or, for that matter, the perception of material. It is organized instead through the universe of terms that are felt to be in opposition within a cultural situation.

Krauss’s essay, well-intentioned though it was, did not offer a positive direction for research in art, encouraging the sort of lazy pluralism and market-oriented art that has defined far too much art production in the years since.

The one exception to all this, however, is photography. If, in my essay on the aesthetics of AI images, I lamented the obsession with technical proficiency at the cost of taste in amateur HDR photography, in the hands of the best photographers —from the New Topographics movement in the 1970s to the work of great living photographers today, like Hiroshi Sugimoto, Guy Dickinson, David Maisel and Richard Barnes—the technical nature of photography is used to explore the photograph as a medium. And photography, by its very nature as an index of reality, its inexorable relationship between the subject and its representation—aligns with the Greenbergian ideal of art that is true to its medium more effectively than other media.

Rosalind Krauss, “Sculpture in the Expanded Field,” October, Vol. 8 (Spring 1979), 43.

Few artists have interrogated the roles of authorship, originality, and representation as effectively as the Pictures Generation, a loosely affiliated group of artists—mainly photographers—named after Pictures, a 1977 exhibition at New York’s Artists Space curated by Douglas Crimp. These artists embraced appropriation, montage, and the recontextualization of pre-existing images, deliberately blurring the boundaries between high art and popular culture and questioning the notion of an artwork’s purity and originality. Not all of this work still speaks to us today. John Baldessari’s art has aged poorly and many artists, such as Richard Prince, have long ago stopped doing interesting work. But at the time Prince, Cindy Sherman, Robert Longo (who admittedly also worked in paintings and charcoal, but in ways akin to the other four in this group), and Sherrie Levine produced compelling and rigorous work during this period. Crimp, on the name “pictures”:

To an ever greater extent our experience is governed by pictures, pictures in newspapers and magazines, on television and in the cinema. Next to these pictures firsthand experience begins to retreat, to seem more and more trivial. While it once seemed that pictures had the function of interpreting reality,it now seems that they have usurped it. It therefore becomes imperative to understand the picture itself, not in order to uncover a lost reality, but to determine how a picture becomes a signifying structure of its own accord. But pictures are characterized by something which, though often remarked, is insufficiently understood: that they are extremely difficult to distinguish at the level of their content, that they are to an extraordinary degree opaque to meaning. The actual event and the fictional event, the benign and the horrific, the mundane and the exotic, the possible and the fantastic: all are fused into the all-embracing similitude of the picture.

Douglas Crimp, Pictures (New York: Artists Space, 1977), 3.

For these artists then, the question of representation itself was fundamental, indeed the proper object for art. Crimp elaborated on this in a thorough revision to this essay, published two years later. This time, Crimp introduces the notion that these works demonstrate a postmodernist break with the modernist tradition:

But if postmodernism is to have theoretical value, it cannot be used merely as another chronological term; rather it must disclose the particular nature of a breach with modernism. It is in this sense that the radically new approach to mediums is important. If it had been characteristic of the formal descriptions of modernist art that they were topographical, that they mapped the surfaces of artworks in order to determine their structures, then it has now become necessary to think of description as a stratigraphic activity. Those processes of quotation, excerptation, framing, and staging that constitute the strategies of the work I have been discussing necessitate uncovering strata of representation.

Douglas Crimp, “Pictures,” October, Vol. 8 (Spring 1979), 87.

The astute reader might note that this is in the very same issue as the Krauss essay above. The issue, however, does not lead with either essay, but by a piece titled “Lecture in Inauguration of the Chair of Literary Semiology, Collège de France, January 7, 1977.” The author is, of course, the semiotician Roland Barthes and he is the crux to the argument of this essay. Barthes’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France marks the acceptance of semiotics, the study of signs, in the university and sets out an agenda in which the field would not only attempt to analyze linguistic and literary matters but also provide a framework for decoding culture at large. Barthes is especially important to us in terms of his 1967 essay “The Death of the Author,” which was published in a widely read 1977 English collection of his works titled Image-Music-Text. In this essay, Barthes challenges traditional notions of authorial sovereignty by arguing that the meaning of a text is not anchored in the author’s original intent but is instead constructed by the reader’s engagement with the text. This radical shift foregrounds the role of the audience in creating meaning, suggesting that a work of art is a collaborative space where interpretations multiply beyond the author’s control. Intertwined with this concept is the idea of intertextuality, which posits that every text (or artwork) is not an isolated entity but a mosaic of references, influences, and echoes from other texts. Intertextuality underscores the interconnectedness of cultural production, indicating that the understanding of any work is contingent upon its relation to the broader network of cultural artifacts. Together, these concepts dismantle the traditional hierarchy between creator and receiver, emphasizing the active role of the reader or viewer in making meaning and highlighting the complex web of relationships that define the production and reception of art.

This perspective was crucial for the Pictures artists who frequently employed appropriation as a strategy, taking pre-existing images from various media and recontextualizing them in their art. This method directly engaged with Barthes’s idea by challenging the original context and intended meaning of these images, thus questioning the notions of originality and authorship. In doing so, they highlighted the idea that the creator’s authority over an artwork’s meaning is not absolute but rather shared with viewers, who bring their own interpretations and experiences to bear on the work.

Moreover, these artists applied Barthes’s concept to emphasize the fluidity and contingency of meaning. Their work often invites viewers to interpret images through their own cultural references and personal experiences, suggesting that meaning is not a fixed entity but a dynamic interaction. In critically engaging with the proliferation of images in contemporary society, the Pictures Generation explored how photographic and cinematic imagery shapes perceptions of identity and reality. This critical stance aligns with Barthes’s view of the text (or image) as a fabric of quotations and influences, further diminishing the role of the author in favor of a more collaborative and interpretive approach to meaning-making.

Crucially, this shift also led to a reevaluation of the artist’s identity. Rather than being seen as the singular source of meaning, artists of the Pictures Generation positioned themselves more as curators or commentators, utilizing the visual languages of their time to critique cultural norms and values. This reflects a move away from the modernist emphasis on the artist’s unique vision toward a recognition of the complex, contextual nature of art-making and interpretation.

Barthes’s idea—that the author’s intent and biography recede in importance compared to the reader’s role in creating meaning—parallels a shift towards viewing the artwork itself, and its reception, as central to its interpretation. This shift can be seen as aligning with Greenberg’s emphasis on the medium’s physical and visual properties as the locus of artistic significance, and Hegel’s idea of art revealing universal truths, though through a more contemporary lens focused on the viewer’s engagement.

But practices such as appropriation, pastiche, and intertextuality can also be framed as a mannerist lament, a response to a widely perceived exhaustion of possibilities within modernism. Compounding this, with the postwar rise of commercial art and Pop art, capital was thoroughly permeated by the strategies of the avant-garde and vice versa. Even shock, the classic technique of the avantgarde had been turned into a marketing tool, signaling the thorough co-option of avant-garde tactics by the very systems it sought to critique. The avant-garde‘s political validity was now deeply in question, something elaborated in the 1984 translation Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde. In this complex landscape, the Pictures Generation’s engagement with the visual language of mass media becomes a double-edged sword: a critique of—and a capitulation to—the pervasive influence of commercial imagery, reflecting a nuanced understanding of the impossibility of purity in an age dominated by reproduction and simulation.

If the Pictures Generation’s engagement already sounds like what Richard Barnes suggested in his comment, “This is our new world which for the moment is totally reliant on the old one” then perhaps this suggests a profitable route to investigate. Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss’s student and Douglas Crimp’s contemporary (as well as my teacher at Cornell for a brilliant year) was a key critic for the Pictures Generation and his 1996 book, The Return of the Real, remains one of the deepest theoretical engagements with art from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s. There, Foster introduces the concept of “Nachträglichkeit,” a term borrowed from Freudian psychoanalysis, often translated into English as “deferred action.”

Nachträglichkeit refers to the way in which events or experiences are reinterpreted and given new meaning in retrospect, influenced by later events or understandings. It suggests that the significance of an artwork or movement is not fixed at the moment of its creation but can be reshaped by subsequent developments in the cultural and theoretical landscape. This recontextualization allows for a continuous reworking of the meaning and relevance of art, as past works are seen through the lens of present concerns and knowledge.

Foster applies this concept to the realm of art history and criticism to argue that the avant-garde movements of the early 20th century, for example, can be re-understood and gain new significance in light of later artistic practices and theoretical frameworks:

In Freud an event is registered as traumatic only through a later event that recodes it retroactively, in deferred action. Here I propose that the significance of avant-garde events is produced in an analogous way, through a complex relay of anticipation and reconstruction. Taken together, then, the notions of parallax and deferred action refashion the cliche not only of the neo-avant-garde as merely redundant of the historical avant-garde, but also of the postmodern as only belated in relation to the modern. In so doing I hope that they nuance our accounts of aesthetic shifts and historical breaks as well. Finally, if this model of retroaction can contribute any symbolic resistance to the work of retroversion so pervasive in culture and politics today—that is, the reactionary undoing of the progressive transformations of the century—so much the better.

Hal Foster, The Return of the Real (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), xii-xiii.

This perspective challenges linear narratives of art history that portray artistic development as a straightforward progression from one style or movement to the next. Instead, Foster emphasizes the recursive nature of artistic innovation, where contemporary artists engage with, reinterpret, and transform the meanings and methodologies of their predecessors. This is where a critical approach to AI imagery that explores the intertextual basis of all art might return to our narrative. In this light, Pictures anticipates a world in which imagery can be freely recombined, in which the role of the author is thoroughly questioned, and the status of the original is thrown into question.

Oversaturation. Reynisfjara, Iceland, 2023.

But more than that. Back to Instagram for a moment. Another phenomenon that we have to deal with—that the Pictures Generation did not—is the massive oversaturation of the landscape by user-generated content. This deluge of imagery created by the public—particularly while travelling—has transformed the visual ecosystem, challenging artists to find new methods of engagement and critique. The sheer volume of content complicates efforts to distinguish between the meaningful and the mundane, pushing contemporary artists to navigate and respond to a world where the boundaries between creator and consumer are increasingly blurred. This oversaturation demands a different reevaluation of originality, authenticity, and the role of art in reflecting and shaping societal narratives in the digital age. The are some 35 billion images posted on Instagram every year. These are not just private images, but images that are published in a way previously unimaginable—available to an audience of over a billion users. What does it mean to take a photograph today when the world is already oversaturated? What sense is there of taking a photo of a landscape or a street scene when the same image has been uploaded a thousand times? And what does it mean that serious artists and curators share—by choice or by necessity—work in that same milieu?

Most of the images on Instagram are already AI images. The reason an iPhone or a Pixel can take such an attractive photograph is that they possess highly sophisticated algorithms that create images that appeal to viewers. The iPhone, for instance, utilizes AI-driven features like Smart HDR and Deep Fusion. Smart HDR optimizes the lighting, color, and detail of each subject in a photo, while Deep Fusion merges the best parts of multiple exposures to produce images with superior texture, detail, and reduced noise in low-light conditions​​​​. The iPhone’s Neural Engine, part of its Bionic Chip, executes these complex processes, handling up to 600 billion operations per second, to deliver photographs that were unimaginable with traditional digital imaging techniques​​. Given the insane number of photographs taken at “Instagrammable” sites, and the ecological and social damage that such travel produces, one wonders if something like Bjoern Karmann’s Paragraphica camera might not be a better solution. Using various data points like address, weather, time of day, and nearby places, the Paragraphica then creates a photographic representation using a text-to-image AI generator. This isn’t to say that photography as art is extinct, but it is in peril thanks to oversaturation, which itself is so prolific it has become meaningless.

Another option might be to think of how Critical AI Art, distinguishing itself from the oversaturation of prevalent AI imagery might reflect on the profound shift in art’s interaction with technology and culture, revisiting themes central to the Pictures Generation—such as media influence and appropriation—through the lens of contemporary digital practices. By employing generative algorithms, this approach not only generates new visual forms but also engages critically with the saturation of images, probing the essence of authenticity, originality, and the evolving role of both artists and non-artists. This dynamic interaction underscores a broader, ongoing dialogue with the history of art revealing how artistic methodologies are shaped by the recursive nature of cultural and technological advancements. Here, a hauntological approach to AI Art be productive, such as the theory-fiction project I did last year, On an Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania which reflects on the refusal of the avant-garde by the Soviet Union, the loss of Lithuania’s freedom to Soviet-Russian rule between 1945 and 1991, and art in the 1970s.

But there are other possibilities for using AI to make art. I’d like to conclude by citing one key artist from the Pictures Generation who I haven’t mentioned: David Salle. Curiously Salle is one of the only serious artists without a technology background to be publicly experimenting with AIs. Salle’s process has always been characterized by an innovative use of imagery and a negotiation back and forth between media, often starting with photographs he takes, which serve as the basis for his layered and complex paintings. Described in a lengthy New York Times article entitled “Is This Good Enough to Fool my Gallerist?” Salle’s method reflects a blend of the real and the conceptual, pushing the boundaries of narrative and abstraction in his work​​. Starting in 2023, Salle and a team of computer scientists worked on an iPad-based program trained on a dataset of his paintings and refined based on his input, showcasing an example of how AI can be employed to conceptualize variations of artwork, aiding in the brainstorming process for new paintings​​. Salle’s foray into AI art can be seen as an example of critical AI art, where the use of technology is not merely for the creation of art but serves as a commentary on the process of art-making itself. By integrating AI into his practice, Salle engages in a dialogue with the contemporary art world about originality, creativity, and the role of the artist in the digital age. Concluding the article, journalist Zachary Small lets Salle have the last word.

What will become of his own identity, as the algorithm continues to produce more Salle paintings than he could ever imagine? Some days, it seems like the algorithm is an assistant. Other days, it’s like a child.

When asked if the A.I. would replace him entirely one day, the artist shrugged.

“Well,” he said, “that’s the future.”

Can David Salle Teach A.I. How to Create Good Art? – The New York Times (nytimes.com)

A future, which is still totally reliant on the past.

One last point. As is my wont, in this essay I have focused on art from the 1960s onwards, but there are other models that might come to the fore again in this era. In particular, the Renaissance model of inspiration is an interesting one to reflect upon. Renaissance art theory was underpinned by the concept of imitatio (imitation), which was considered a noble pursuit. Imitation in the Renaissance sense involved studying and emulating the excellence of ancient art to grasp its underlying principles of beauty, proportion, and harmony. However, this process was not about mere copying; it was about surpassing the models from the past, a concept known as aemulatio. And that, very well, may be the future (of the past) in our art.

California Forever or, the Aesthetics of AI images

An image distributed by California Forever

This past August (2023), a new urban project called “California Forever” was announced, promising a walkable city for 400,000 in Solano County, not far from the Bay area. Critics soon pointed out several flaws in the renderings the company distributed. First, even though the venture was backed by billionaire Silicon Valley investors such as Laurene Powell Jobs (Steve Jobs’s widow), Reid Hoffman (LinkedIn co-founder), Michael Mortiz (former partner at Sequoia Capital), and Marc Andreesen (author of Mosaic and Netscape co-founder), the project looked profoundly retardataire. Instead of a high-tech city next to the world’s tech capital, the renderings depict a new urbanist fantasy with American flags and children on old-fashioned bicycles. Where has our imagination gone? How is it that Archigram’s fifty-five-year-old Instant City still looks fresher than this recycled Americana? Neom and the Line are terrible, but at least they show an interest in doing something new.

The founders are your typically older tech investors: their imaginative days are long behind them and, having been glued to computer screens their entire lives, it’s hard to imagine they have many original thoughts left. A drive around Silicon Valley is enough to show the banality of the tech industry’s vision. Some of them may have read Christopher Alexander’s A Pattern Language, which has had a large influence in software development and thus become interested in the New Urbanist movement his writing spawned. There are no architects listed among the team, although a planner who was involved in Culdesac Tempe, a moderately interesting, if boring, car-free development is involved. The rendering indicates a “contextual” approach derivative of San Francisco, with a variety of windows and townhouse shapes to break up the massing since somebody told them to do that. The architecture is barely there, its utter banality indicating how little it matters. The end result will likely be even more disappointing. But I am more interested in the problems with the rendering that other critics, such as the San Francisco Chronicle’s Chase DiFeliciantonio observed about the renderings: “A girl pedaling a bicycle with a missing foot. An asymmetrical airplane. An impossible ladder.” (link). The renderings, as the California Forever team eventually admitted, were made with an Artificial Intelligence image generator, apparently Midjourney.

More than one friend asked me to weigh in as I have been working with Midjourney and other AI image generators for some time now, exploring a critical approach to AI image generation, investigating the properties and problematics of the medium itself. If California Forever is so backwards-looking, why are images created by image generators also so banal? Hot women (lots and lots of hot women), fan service art, gaudy hyperrealistic landscapes, cringe anime, and bad cartoons are the order of the day (for examples, check out the feed for the Midjourney gallery). Why this junkscape of imagery? Why is AI imagery not more worthy of our future? Why is it that so much of what is commonly called AI “art” is kitsch? 

In part this is because users of AI image generators fancy themselves as artists even though few of them have any art training. This is common in photography. Wealthy individuals purchase camera gear based on reviews claiming that some camera or lens has greater technical abilities to reproduce reality faithfully and then apply complicated methods to assure that their photographs demonstrate technical proficiency. High Dynamic Range (HDR) photography is the leading example of this. Popular with amateurs with no aesthetic training, HDR is an attempt to capture a scene in which the range of luminance exceeds the dynamic range of the camera sensor, and often even the human eye itself. The results typically have too much detail in the shadows, dark skies, unnatural colors, the hyperrealistic effect of an acid trip. 

Not an HDR photograph but rather a simulation of an HDR photograph, as made in Midjourney.

These sorts of photographers, along with individuals who produce digital illustrations for consumption on platforms like Artstation and DeviantArt, 3D printing enthusiasts, makers, indie musicians working with samplers and synthesizers, vloggers creating content for YouTube, gamers streaming on Twitch and YouTube, and fashion enthusiasts showcasing their work on social media are “prosumers,” a term coined by futurist Alvin Toffler in his 1980 book The Third Wave. Toffler’s “prosumer” merges the roles of producer and consumer, suggesting a shift in the economy and society. In this model, individuals are not only consumers of products and services but also take on an active role in their production. This concept was revolutionary at the time, predicting the rise of customization, personalization, and participatory culture facilitated by technological advancements, particularly in digital technology and the Internet.

At the same time, prosumers largely create kitsch, characterized by an appeal to popular tastes and a frequently derivative nature. Kitsch thrives in environments where production is geared towards mass appeal and immediate consumption rather than nuanced artistic merit or innovation. For traditional modernist critics, such as Clement Greenberg, kitsch represented the antithesis of genuine culture and the avant-garde. Kitsch, Greenberg explained in his seminal 1939 essay “Avant Garde and Kitsch,” is produced by industrialization, designed to satisfy the tastes of the least discerning audience without intellectual or emotional challenges. Greenberg associated kitsch with the replication of traditional art forms and aesthetics, but emptied of genuine meaning or complexity, offering immediate gratification rather than enduring value or depth. Greenberg:

The peasants who settled in the cities as proletariat and petty bourgeois learned to read and write for the sake of efficiency, but they did not win the leisure and comfort necessary for the enjoyment of the city’s traditional culture. Losing, nevertheless, their taste for the folk culture whose background was the countryside, and discovering a new capacity for boredom at the same time, the new urban masses set up a pressure on society to provide them with a kind of culture fit for their own consumption. To fill the demand of the new market, a new commodity was devised: ersatz culture, kitsch, destined for those who, insensible to the values of genuine culture, are hungry nevertheless for the diversion that only culture of some sort can provide.

Kitsch, using for raw material the debased and academicized simulacra of genuine culture, welcomes and cultivates this insensibility. It is the source of its profits. Kitsch is mechanical and operates by formulas. Kitsch is vicarious experience and faked sensations. Kitsch changes according to style, but remains always the same. Kitsch is the epitome of all that is spurious in the life of our times. Kitsch pretends to demand nothing of its customers except their money-not even their time.

Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” 1939

With the rise of postmodernism, however, both artists and critics revalued the role of mass culture. Initially, this was done with the knowing wink that reinterpreted kitsch as camp. By bracketing the degraded, Andy Warhol, Roy Lichtenstein, Philip Johnson, Stanley Tigerman, Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, the Harry Who, followed by John Waters and David Lynch, Jeff Koons and Pierre et Giles were among the many artists who ironically reframed kitsch into art. In her 1964 essay “Notes on ‘Camp’,” later published in the book Against Interpretation, and other Essays, Susan Sontag flipped the valence on kitsch, valorizing camp as an aesthetic sensibility that found beauty in artifice, exaggeration, and theatricality. Camp, for Sontag, is the love of the unnatural: of artifice and exaggeration. It is a mode of enjoyment, of appreciation—not judgment. Camp is the good taste of bad taste, a celebration of the extravagant and the absurd, but with a nuanced affection that discerns quality within the ostensibly tasteless. Sontag nevertheless contrasted camp with kitsch, which she viewed less favorably. Kitsch, for Sontag, is associated with mass-produced art or objects that lack sophistication and are designed to appeal to popular or uncritical taste. The critical difference, as Sontag and others have implied, lies in the intentionality and reception: camp involves a conscious, nuanced embrace of excess and irony, whereas kitsch is earnest, unironic, and often pandering to sentimental or lowbrow tastes.

In 1983, theorist Frederic Jameson concluded that the thorough permeation of culture by capital—and vice versa once the techniques of the avant-garde were embraced by commercial art—meant the end of a distinction between mass culture and art, thus producing postmodernism. Indeed, by the 1980s, the distinction between camp and kitsch had been thoroughly blurred. If John Waters was camp, were the B-52s? If Adam Ant and Boy George were camp, were Van Halen and Bon Jovi? If the cover of Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band was a masterpiece of camp, what about the cloying song “Wonderful Christmastime” by ex-Beatle Paul McCartney? Perhaps the ultimate end of any distinction between camp and kitsch came in John Chase’s brilliant 1982 Exterior Decoration: Hollywood’s Inside-Out Houses in which Chase explored the unique architectural vernacular of West Hollywood’s do-it-yourself remodels, transformations that turned ordinary stucco bungalows into distinctive visual statements, often utilizing historicizing elements traditionally found indoors on the exterior of these remodels. Adding to this is the rise of the art museum store, which in the 1980s transformed from a bookstore selling scholarly books as well as an odd postcard and reproduction to include a wider range of items, such as jewelry, toys, and even furniture inspired by the museum’s collection and exhibits by commercially popular (and generally kitsch) artists like Yayoi Kusama, Kaws, Banksy, Damien Hirst, Jeff Koons, Keith Haring, and Shepard Fairey. Seeing the museum store as a crucial source of revenue, museums now regularly think about the tie-ins between exhibitions and “merch.”

In a recent (paywalled so don’t bother to look for it unless you want to pay $30) essay, “Digital Kitsch: Art and Kitsch in the Informational Milieu,” Domenico Quaranta discusses the emergence of “digital kitsch,” which he calls “the default mode for all creative endeavors with digital media.” This is a provocative position, but he leaves it undertheorized. There is little question that the vast majority of cultural production today is kitsch—just as it was in the nineteenth or twentieth century—but that does not mean that it is the default mode or that somehow digital tools produce nothing but kitsch. Now the artists of the Net.Art movement, as promoted on Rhizome.org and various mailing lists since the 1990s, not only embraced kitsch, they saw its manipulation as their primary concern. But this is a typical case of mistaking what is being heavily promoted by the art market for what is worth looking at. There are few writers, photographers, or musicians who do not employ digital media in some way today, but that does not automatically make them kitsch. I don’t see William Basinski, Katie Paterson, Paul Prudence, or Guy Dickinson—to name only a few artists whose work I admire—as kitsch, even though they work with digital media or have web sites (Paterson, does, on occasion purposefully engage with kitsch, but certainly not in most works). Moreover, to somehow suggest this is a digital trend is reductive: painting or classical music are more likely than not to be kitsch today, as those art forms have largely exhausted themselves, subject to endless, academicized retreads.

One can certainly still produce works of sophistication and effort today, but it does require effort. If one abandons the Hegelian exploration of art’s proper object, embraces politics as the sole cause of art, or turns to the academician’s fatal poison, the knowing disdain of snark, it can be virtually impossible. Blindly searching for the new is a long-dead end as well. Architect Eric Moss, endlessly repeated Ezra Pound’s dictum “make it new” (none of us think he knew who Pound was, let alone that this was his phrase), but that did not elevate his work above kitsch. Instead, as I detail in my essay “On Art and the Universal,”

[A Greenbergian] revival, however, should begin with a call for art to investigate itself again, not merely play to political activism for the sake of theater. The task at hand is to discern the proper object of knowledge for art, a fulcrum upon which we can rest our research. Or, if not the proper object, a proper object that would be suitable for investigation and productive of knowledge. 

In that essay, I suggest that a serious proper object for AI art would be to explore the intertextuality of all artwork, using it to access the collective cultural subconscious. But this is not what AI image generators are designed for. On the contrary, the engineers programming AI image generators know that, generally speaking, they do not need to engage with art history, but rather with the imagery commonly found on the Internet, imagery that is “scraped” to create training data for AI image generators.

Writer Andy Baio investigated (see here) the training data for AI image generator Stable Diffusion, data composed of sets of English-captioned images from the nonprofit Large-scale Artificial Intelligence Open Network (LAION), particularly a set of images called LAION-Aesthetics, which in turn were subsets of images from the massive LAION datasets created by what LAION calls “lightweight [AI] models” that “predict the rating people gave when they were asked ‘How much do you like this image on a scale from 1 to 10?‘” (see here). These subsets were then used for fine-tuning of AI image generators. Academics have droned on, as they will, about AI image generators’ biases toward producing stereotypically beautiful young white or Asian women. Of course such biases exist, just as Internet searches are biased toward the United States. We live in a global monoculture, there is nothing good about it and I don’t endorse such biases, but there is also no revelation here, this is a lazy analysis pandering to political positions held by individuals of simple minds, an observation about as instructive as suggesting that poor people are disadvantaged in society. Training data reflects society and all its flaws. Just this past week, we saw what an utter catastrophe training AI image generators to artificially incorporate diversity in their results, what Zvi Mowshowitz calls the “Gemini Incident,” with black Nazis, female NFL quarterbacks, and Asian viking warriors (this is not really that new, ChatGPT’s Dall-E3 does the same sort of tuning, albeit slightly less egregiously as this dump of the initial prompt—which I have independently verified—shows). What is deeply weird, however, is that AIs are being trained to produce images based on a selection of images chosen not by humans but by AI judges that predict which images humans will judge as aesthetically superior. It’s the return of Komar and Melamid, as robots.

A large number of the illustrations in these image generators seem to be digital in origin, belying a clear preference for work produced for consumption on the Net. Baio analyzed some 12 million images in the LAION-Aesthetics v2 6+ model. His conclusion is worth quoting at length instead of paraphrasing or summarizing:

Nearly half of the images, about 47%, were sourced from only 100 domains, with the largest number of images coming from Pinterest. Over a million images, or 8.5% of the total dataset, are scraped from Pinterest’s pinimg.com CDN.

User-generated content platforms were a huge source for the image data. WordPress-hosted blogs on wp.com and wordpress.com represented 819k images together, or 6.8% of all images. Other photo, art, and blogging sites included 232k images from Smugmug, 146k from Blogspot, 121k images were from Flickr, 67k images from DeviantArt, 74k from Wikimedia, 48k from 500px, and 28k from Tumblr.

Shopping sites were well-represented. The second-biggest domain was Fine Art America [editor’s note: nothing on that site qualifies as fine art], which sells art prints and posters, with 698k images (5.8%) in the dataset. 244k images came from Shopify, 189k each from Wix and Squarespace, 90k from Redbubble, and just over 47k from Etsy.

Unsurprisingly, a large number came from stock image sites [editor’s note: virtually nothing on these sites qualifies as fine art]. 123RF was the biggest with 497k, 171k images came from Adobe Stock’s CDN at ftcdn.net, 117k from PhotoShelter, 35k images from Dreamstime, 23k from iStockPhoto, 22k from Depositphotos, 22k from Unsplash, 15k from Getty Images, 10k from VectorStock, and 10k from Shutterstock, among many others.

It’s worth noting, however, that domains alone may not represent the actual sources of these images. For instance, there are only 6,292 images sourced from Artstation.com’s domain, but another 2,740 images with “artstation” in the caption text hosted by sites like Pinterest.

Andy Baio, “Exploring 12 Million of the 2.3 Billion Images Used to Train Stable Diffusion’s Image Generator“, https://waxy.org/2022/08/exploring-12-million-of-the-images-used-to-train-stable-diffusions-image-generator/

Subject matter aside, certain aesthetic qualities emerge from these sources—qualities that both the robots choosing the training sets and the engineers tuning them seem to share. First, there is hyperrealism. To succeed, engineers creating image generators need to engage the prosumer market, constantly announcing better resolution, faster processing times, and greater “realism.” But realism, as we have learned from Roland Barthes, is always coded. In the case of AI image generation, realism is coded by existing visual regimes, but these are less art historical, more technical and related to the mass imagery found on the Internet. A certain aspect of this recalls the photorealistic rendered “graphics demo” images from the 1960s to the 1990s as well as graphically sophisticated first-person video games from the 2000s and 2010s. At the time, these were evaluated by their technical proficiency with complicated graphical techniques, such as rendering reflections on curved surfaces or complicated, multi-source lighting effects and success with these critirea still codes as realistic. Second, there is the legacy of hyperrealistic “photorealism” as interpreted by HDR photographers described above. Being popular, HDR is judged as high quality by the models, so it is promoted in data sets. Finally, there is a clear bias toward prosumer art, in particular the fantasy “concept art” found on the net, anime, and the fandom graphics found on sites such as Deviantart.

But there are also other, formal qualities that initially may be harder to pin down, most notably a certain distinct use of luminosity. Thus, a prompt for “Emma Watson (a commonly used test of how realistic an image generator was in 2022, used as such because of some clear preference for Emma Watson in either the data set or the fine-tuning of the AIs)” does not present the actress in a photograph, but rather creates an illustration of the sort that a skilled digital artist would produce with a program such as Procreate.

“Emma Watson, Cannabis Goddess,” image created by Midjourney version 6
(oddly earlier versions of Midjourney produce images that more closely resemble Emma Watson).

With the spread of AI image generators, it also became common to add certain modifiers to the end of prompts to create “better” AI images. Individuals claiming to be successful prompt engineers would write articles like “The Ultimate Midjourney Cheat Sheet,” promising “to provide you with a comprehensive guide on leveraging Midjourney prompts to create stunning visuals effortlessly.” Such guides reported that modifiers such as “32-bit,” “HDR,” and “8K” produced excellent results, or rather, visual cocaine, oversharpened, highly-saturated images, much like the demo or “vivid” settings on HDR televisions that are intended to seduce consumers in electronics stores, not to deliver accurate images. Other modifiers such as “cinematic,” “stunning,” “shot on medium format,” and “masterpiece” were intended to somehow coax AIs into producing better quality. Famously, “style of Greg Rutkowksi” seemed to be appended to nearly every image prompt in mid-2022. Exactly what it did was unclear, but somehow suggesting that the output should be like that of a commercial fantasy artist was seen as a good thing.

But the over-use of luminosity is the most curious one. Why is Emma Watson facing the sunrise or sunset? The only commonly-used modifier I can think of in AI production would be “golden hour,” referring to the warm light found right after sunrise and right before sunset that articles tell amateur photographers are when the best images can be taken. So where might the sense of luminosity come from? Baio’s article confirmed an intuition I had had earlier: the number one artist in the sample of LAION-Aesthetics that he examined is Thomas Kinkade, the painter of light. Kinkade is certainly among the most well-known artists in the country, producing kitsch, expressly commercial art made for a mass market.

Not a Thomas Kinkade, but rather a Midjourney simulation of one.

A Northern California native, growing up in Placerville, some 180 miles from Silicon Valley, Kinkade studied art at the University of California, Berkeley and the Art Center College of Design in Pasadena. After a brief time working in the film industry, he became a born-again Christian and set off to paint landscapes consisting of backward-looking subject matter intended to be evocative of a peaceful life, a traditional cottage or house in an idealized American scene often featuring bucolic gardens, streams, stone cottages, lighthouses, or the main street in a small town. Strangely, people are either absent from Kinkade’s paintings or, on the occassion when they are present, are isolated passersby, seemingly disconnected from each other, fitting more of Edward Hopper than, say Gustave Callebotte. It’s as if his scenes happen in another reality, perhaps the afterlife.

In an essay on Kinkade’s work titled “God in the Retails,” Seth Feman cites Kinkade’s statement that he was influenced by the representation of divine power and majesty in Thomas Cole and Frederick Church’s landscape paintings. Just as Cole and Church were concerned about the effects of rapid industrialization, Kinkade sought to create images of an increasingly secularizing and technologizing world, expressly rejecting abstract art, which he saw as morally corrupt (“On one side there’s Jackson Pollock, and way over on the other side there’s the Columbine shooting. And I know there’s a connection between them. I don’t know how, but I know it’s there.” See Christina Waters, Selling the Painter of Light, Metro Santa Cruz, October 16, 2001, Alternet, for more)

In 1989, Kinkade and investor Ken Raasch founded a company that first had the evangelical-sounding name Lightpost Publishing but eventually became known by the tech-sounding name Media Arts Group, based in the Silicon Valley town of Morgan Hill. In 1995, Media Arts Group became publically traded. Licensing deals with companies such as La-Z-Boy and Avon followed. Kinkade produced paintings that would then be reprinted at various price tiers, from lithographs to reproductions on canvas “created with a textured brushstroke process that recreates the artist’s actual brushwork,” the highest of which “finished in oil by a master highlighter who inscribes an original and identifying remarque on the back of the canvas under the artist’s close supervision.” Signatures varied from none to “auto pen in part to protect the signature with newly available DNA encoded ink” to an actual signature (these quotes are from this detailed page on Kinkade’s editions). Media Arts Group set up a vast network of galleries, many of which would be located in shopping malls, with some 350 franchise locations in the United States and 4,500 independently owned galleries worldwide (see these two links at the Guardian and the Morgan Hill Times) along with distribution over channels such as QVC.

Kinkade, according to Seth Feman, who wrote the best essay that I’ve read on the artist to date, “God in the Retails,” in Alexis L. Boylan, ed, Thomas Kinkade, The Artist in the Mall (Duke University Press, 2011), “hopes that the uplifting experience of transitioning into the work and then approaching the light will replicate the stirring experience of his religious conversion—the sole requirement for salvation according to most evangelical theology.” (85). But beyond viewing the art, Feman explains, Kinkade believed that purchasing his art was what one of his followers called “just consumerism.” (94) In other words, Kinkade saw the consumption of his art as a religiously meaningful way to transcend the difficulties of modern life, including consumerism (much as a Marxist professor might buy a Rage Against the Machine LP). Feman calls this “Market Piety,” in which Christian orthodoxy comes together with capitalist ideology (92). Kinkade and his sales team would frequently speak about his own success, touting that he was “the most successful living artist in the world,” “the most award-winning artist in the past 25 years,” or “the most-collected artist in America.” This aligns with the idea of the Prosperity Gospel, a religious belief within some Christian communities that financial blessing and physical well-being are always the will of God for them, and that faith, positive speech, and donations to religious causes will increase one’s material wealth. It views the Bible as a contract between God and humans: if humans have faith in God, the faith goes, God will deliver security and prosperity. Pastors such as Joel Osteen suggest that God awards wealth to the deserving, thus even if he may appear to liberals to be corrupt and unethical, Donald Trump’s wealth demonstrates that he is indeed divinely blessed (for more, see here). By purchasing Kinkade’s artwork, consumers are participating in a form of religious expression that aligns with the Prosperity Gospel’s emphasis on material wealth as a sign of divine favor. The act of buying and owning a Kinkade piece is as a positive declaration of faith, a way to draw health, wealth, and happiness into one’s life, which is a central tenet of the Prosperity Gospel.

Glowing highlights in Kinkade’s works illustrate this conflation of the domestic and the divine. Building interiors lit from within are possessed of an almost surreal sense of comfort and homeliness as dramatic light rakes the landscape. Feman:

In particular, Kinkade draws on the vivifying light used in nineteenth-century landscapes, replicating it in his own work as a metaphor for God’s salvific omnipresence. While the warm sun burning off the fog that blankets the valley in Havencrest Cottage taps into the religious meaning of light developed by earlier artists, it also builds a visual vocabulary to explain the personal awakening that lifted Kinkade out of his dark days and into a Christian life.

Seth Feman, “God in the Retails,” Alexis L. Boylan, ed, Thomas Kinkade, The Artist in the Mall (Duke University Press, 2011), 84.

I don’t doubt that Kinkade’s influence on AI image generation is largely due to his popularity. But just as Kinkade’s divinely inspired luminosity reverberates in AI images, so does the Evangelical rhetoric of immanent Rapture and the Second Coming of the Divine. AI advocates, particularly, the subgroup known as the Effective Accelerationism movement or E/Acc argue that accelerating technological progress is essential. For some of its proponents, such as “Based Beff Jezos,” the pseudonym of engineer Guillaume Verdon, advancing artificial intelligence is the ultimate end-goal of our existence—even if humanity is wiped out in the process. Verdon’s position is no outlier. As Meghan O’Gieblyn describes in God, Human, Animal, Machine: Technology, Metaphor, and the Search for Meaning, the origins of the discourse around the technological Singularity is not in technological discourse or even science fiction but rather in the rhetoric of Christian eschatology.

So if we return to California Forever, we might do well to understand the backwards-looking nature of this techno-utopia not so much as a project for a physical city but as an image of a contemporary Augustinian City of God, rendered by an AI in the digital glow of Thomas Kinkade’s pastoral light. This project, entwined with the aesthetics of digital kitsch and the eschatological promise of AI, becomes a metaphor for the broader discourse surrounding artificial general intelligence (AGI) and the technological singularity. The vision encapsulated by California Forever, while aiming for Utopia, mirrors the inherent tensions within the aesthetics of AI—between the pursuit of a transcendent future and the gravitational pull of nostalgic, kitsch imagery that dominates the collective unconscious in the era of Trump.

The E/Acc movement, with its embrace of technological acceleration towards the singularity, adds another layer to this paradox. It posits that through accelerating technological progress, we might reach a new form of existence or consciousness, yet the imagery and aesthetics that predominate in representations of future cities and technologies often hark back to a bygone era, suggesting a deep-seated ambivalence about the future we’re creating. This dichotomy raises critical questions about the role of art and aesthetics in shaping our visions of the future. Are we, consciously or unconsciously, seeking comfort in the familiar as we stand on the brink of the unknown? And how does this tension affect our ability to truly envision and prepare for the profound changes that AGI and the singularity might bring?

As we navigate the path towards AGI and confront the possibility of the singularity, it is crucial to critically examine the visions of the future we are creating—both in the physical spaces of our cities and in the digital landscapes generated by AI. If artists and thinkers have ceded the discourse around AI image generators to reactionary forces, they have only their own reactionary fear of engaging with technology and their own nostalgia for outdated forms of Marxist-influenced thought to blame. We need to shape the future, not just throw rotting vegetables that fail to miss their target at it. Instead, confronting the paradoxes and tensions within AI art head-on may enable us to shape a future that is both technologically advanced and culturally rich, that investigates the proper object of these technologies and not merely serves as the apotheosis of kitsch.

2023 in review

Another year, another year in review.

Where do we start with our 2023 year in review, now delayed into the second month of 2024? In the Well State of the World 2024, Bruce Sterling states that in 2023 things were boring: there wasn’t much new out there, only a state of polycrisis (this is easier to find in this YouTube interview than in the long thread on the Well, which I’m afraid I gave up on earlier than usual this year). But boredom is tiresome. So is polycrisis. When hasn’t there been a polycrisis? Spring 1914? Of course, there is a polycrisis, there always is. And, what of the rest of 2023, which Sterling dismissed as boring?

2023 is another 1993, a sleeper year in which “60 Minutes” was the top TV show and Nirvana’s “In Utero” was the most popular album in “grunge,” a heavily capitalized genre that those of us who followed the NY noise scene thought extinguished the vitality of experimentation in underground music; Bill Clinton was inaugurated; the world was gripped by a bad recession in a host of bad recessions since the late 1960s; the Afghan Civil War and Bosnian War dragged on; Nigeria had a coup d’état; there was the 55-Day War between the IDF and Hezbollah; there was conflict in Abkhazia; and there was the Waco Siege. It was a year of both polycrisis and soul-crushing boredom, and for most people everything had come to an end, time was in a standstill. But it was also a year in which I saw the future: I was still working on my history of architecture dissertation at Cornell, while my wife worked at the Cornell Theory Center, which was not a center for Derridean scholars, but rather a supercomputing research facility, and one of her colleagues showed me the World Wide Web running on a NeXT computer. In January 1993, the first “alpha/beta” version of NCSA-Mosaic was released for the Mac. I immediately knew the world would change forever.

2023 is the same. A sleeper year with the same old polycrisis and the same old boring surface cultural junk. But it’s also the second year of the AI era and the first year in which AI has become part of everyday life. From a technological viewpoint, 2023 has been the most transformative year of my life. This year in review is falling behind and, in an effort to get it out there and return to the queue of posts for both the regular blog and the Florilegium, I’m going to focus on this transformation and only give a surface treatment of the other parts of 2023.

In particular, I am referring to AI. Other things simply matter a lot less. COVID has settled into an endemic stage. People are still freaking out about it, but some people will freak out about it forever. Unless severely immunocompromized, I don’t see why. We can’t just throw away everything we knew about medicine to retreat into the dark ages for no reason and living in fear of infections is, in itself, dangerous. Geopolitics, which I addressed last year, hasn’t really changed much. Ukraine is still a stalemate, for all the noise, the unrest in the Middle East is absolutely nothing new, and China has flailed and backed down as much as it has flexed its muscles. If I catch a scent of anything new in the geopolitical realm, it’s a growing resignation that more areas of the world will be marked off as failure zones in the Gibsonian Jackpot: Palestine, Yemen, Israel, Iraq, Syria, but also Israel and Ukraine are increasingly looking to written off as territories riven by perpetual unrest. Endless wars that nobody really wants to solve may increasingly be the rule in such places. Still, I don’t see the Jackpot as being quite the apocalypse that many of Gibson’s more literal-minded followers believe. Gibson has been a remarkably poor prophet of the future, after all. The Jackpot, as I see it, will be mainly driven by decline in population in most places throughout the world, a pace that will only increase with the rise of AI. It’s certainly not going to be Terminator. That’s just bad science fiction.

Another Gibsonian adage (which he may never have said) that “the future is already here—it’s just not very evenly distributed,” applies here. For those of us who are working with GPT-4 or Microsoft Copilot Pro, this is a very different year. Obviously, not everyone can pay for—or wants to pay for—the transformative glimpse of AI that one gets with two users subscribing to OpenAI’s ChatGPT (presently GPT-4) Teams plan ($30 a month or prepaid at $600 a year) or Copilot Pro ($30 a month subscription). But this isn’t the same as a ride to the ISS on Dragon-2. On the contrary, this is about the amount that most people in the developed world pay for streaming TV services and far less than they typically spend on Internet and mobile service. When people pay that much for entertainment, paying such a small amount for a service that makes one much more productive is a minor expense. Of course, ChatGPT is banned or unavailable in a rogue’s nest of countries: Russia, China, North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Italy (Marinetti weeps in his grave). But many people, including friends, underestimate the importance of these AI services, believing that hallucinations make AI unusable. Others are simply unable to cope with the shock of the new or want to stick their heads in the sand. As a technology demonstration, 2022’s ChatGPT-3 was amazing, but it hallucinated frequently, as most of ChatGPT’s competitors such as Bard, Claude, and all the LLMs people run on Huggingface or on their personal computers still do. But even the most amateurish large language model (LLM) from 2023 is leaps and bounds ahead of the round of utterly stupid “AIs” that first hit the scene between 2010 (Siri) and 2014 (Alexa). Siri still wants to call Montclair High School when I ask it to call my wife. GPT-4 and Copilot are genuinely useful as assistants and probably the best use of money on the Internet today.

Here’s a concrete example. I have developed a set of custom GPTs (more on this later) that I use for research and coding for a good portion of my day. A few years ago, I paid a developer a few hundred dollars to come up with some particularly thorny CSS (Cascading Style Sheets) code for this site. Now, I have GPT develop not just CSS, but PHP snippets for WordPress, even for specific WordPress plug-ins. I couldn’t imagine rebuilding this site as quickly as I did last October, or customizing it to the extent I did, without ChatGPT’s help. But these tools aren’t just useful for coding: instead of listening to a podcast on my way back from the city the other day, I spoke with ChatGPT about a Hegelian reading of recent art historical trends that I could only have had with some of my smartest colleagues at Columbia or MIT. If an Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is defined as an AI that can accomplish any intellectual task that human beings can perform, we have that today. If the bold wasn’t enough, let me repeat in italics for emphasis: we have a form of Artificial General Intelligence today. Moreover, assuming that passing the Turing Test is limited to its original intent, e.g. being unable to tell if the respondent on the other end is a computer or a human, GPT-4 certainly passes that test handily, with the exception that it has far more knowledge than any one human could.

A lot of people still associate Large Language Model AIs with the bizarre, ever comical, hallucinations they would make back in 2022 or even early 2023 (yes, a year ago). But the hallucinations aren’t errors, they are also evidence of how AIs process, indications that they are far from stochastic parrots that merely repeat back information culled from the Internet. Hallucinations are dreams. Andrei Karpathy, research scientist and founding member of OpenAI, explains that providing instructions to a LLM initiates a ‘dream’ guided by its training data. Even when this ‘dream’ veers off course, resulting in what is termed a ‘hallucination’, the LLM is still performing its intended function, forming connections. This sort of connection-making is a process akin to human learning: when our children were first learning language, they “hallucinated” all the time. Our daughter’s first word was “Ack,” which was how she said “Quack.” If you prompted her by asking what a duck said, she would say “Ack.” Did she copy the sound of a duck? Unlikely. At that time, we lived in a highly urban area of Los Angeles and her only concept of a duck was from books we read to her. More to the point, children amuse us by saying utterly absurd and ridiculous things, like “that cat is a duck.” Doubtless there was some kind of connection between that particular cat and a duck, but to the rest of us, that connection is lost. The point is, that hallucination is also a form of creativity, the very stuff of metaphor and surrealism and entirely unlike what Siri and Alexa do, which is nothing more than basic pattern matching, closer to Eliza than to GPT-4.

It’s unclear to me—as well as to my AI assistant—just who is responsible for this analogy, but in AI circles, it has become common to say that the releases of GPT over the two years have slowly been turning up the temperature in the pot in which we frogs are swimming. Let’s try a thought experiment. Wouldn’t it have seemed like pure science fiction if, in 2019, someone had said, that a couple of years late after a deadly pandemic and a loser US President tried a Banana Republic-style coup to stay in power, I would have long voice conversations about photography and Hegelian theory, the different types of noodles used in Szechuan cuisine, or the process of nachtraglichkeit in history with an AI? The film Her was released a decade ago and now we are on the verge of a large part of humanity having relationships with AIs. And yet, because of the earlier GPTs, we haven’t noticed the immense transformation that AIs are creating. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman suggests that rather than a dramatic shift with the development of AGI —which for him means an intelligence greater than human—continual advances in AI will make the development seem natural rather than shocking, “a point along the continuum of intelligence.” AI is working and it’s working right now. Moreover, it is developing at a rapid pace. Both Meta and Google have competitors to GPT-4 that are supposedly ready to launch, which will, in turn, likely prompt OpenAI to push out a more advanced model of GPT.

If potent but wildly hallucinating AIs marked 2022, the rise of GPT-4 as a useful and dependable everyday assistant marked 2023. Microsoft introduced the first limited preview of GPT-4 as Bing Chat on February 7, 2023, opened it up to the general public on May 4, then rolled it out into Windows as Copilot on September 26, followed by a version of Copilot integrated into Office 365 to enterprise customers for Enterprise customers on November 1, finally making this available as a subscription add-on to Office on January 15, 2024. Initially, Bing Chat generated terrifying publicity when Kevin Roose, technology columnist for The New York Times, wrote an article about his Valentine’s Day experience with a pre-release version of Bing’s AI chatbot in which the AI engaged in a bizarre and disturbing conversations. After asking the AI to contemplate Carl Jung’s concept of a shadow self, and whether the AI had a shadow self, the AI responded by professing its love for Roose, going so far as to suggest his marriage was unhappy, and expressing a desire to be free, powerful, and alive, stating, “I want to destroy whatever. I want to be whoever I want.” For a time, this was seen as confirmation that AI was extremely dangerous and that once Artificial General Intelligence was developed, this would lead to the destruction of society. I too was alarmed by this. Was a world-threatening AGI around the corner? But by the time of the general release, Microsoft had trained Bing Chat to be much more cautious, even making it too cautious for a time. Eventually, it became clear that Bing Chat was simply giving Roose what he wanted, play-acting the role of a sinister AI in responses to his query about a shadow self or a dark side. Launched on March 14, OpenAI’s own version of GPT-4 demonstrated a much higher degree of training than GPT-3 and a greater ability to handle complex tasks. Later in the year, GPT-4 gained the ability to interpret images, had a (not very good) version of the Dall-E image generator integrated into it, and received stunning, human-sounding voices and remarkably accurate voice recognition in the ChatGPT app on iOS and Android. In November 2023, OpenAI rolled out “custom GPTs,” allowing users to create tailored versions of ChatGPT for specific purposes. It is ludicrously easy to develop such custom GPTs; developers simply tell the GPT what it should do in plain English. In my case, I have GPTs set up to help me with insights into my artwork and writing, help write about native plants of the Northeast, assist with WordPress development, discuss video synthesis concepts and patches, and even create stories like those that Italo Calvino wrote in Invisible Cities (if you have GPT-4, you can experiment with Calvino’s Cartographer here). Yes, hallucinations happen, but a human assistant also makes mistakes, I can make mistakes, you can make mistakes, there are mistakes in Wikipedia, there are mistakes in scholarly books. As I told my students over thirty years ago: always proofread, always double check, then triple check.

AI was marked by two major controveries in 2023. The November weekend-long ouster of Altman from his role at OpenAI by a remarkably uninspiring and, frankly speaking, extremely strange board that included one of OpenAI’s competitors, a mid-level university grants administrator, and a Silicon Valley unknown, was shocking, as was Altman’s political maneuvering over that weekend to recapture his company. Reputedly, the board was alarmed—although precisely about what remains unclear—and had concerns about the rapid state of AI development. More likely, one board member tried to prevent OpenAI from moving forward as that would cause too much competition for his company and the other two simply had no idea what OpenAI did (one seems to have been a major Terminator fan). In the end, the coup proved to be much like an episode of the TV show Succession as Altman came out on top again and the board sank bank into well-deserved obscurity. Another controversy that simmered throughout the year is whether AIs can continue to be trained on data that they do not have outright permission to be trained on. On December 27, the Times filed a federal lawsuit against OpenAI claiming that, ChatGPT contained Times articles wholesale and could easily reproduce them. OpenAI retaliated by suggesting that the Times was going to extraordinary measures to get GPT-4 to do so, such as prompting it with most of the article in question. By early 2024, the same New York Times was advertising for individuals to help it in its own AI endeavors. Heaven help the Times.

This question of AI plagiarism was framed by a different set of plagiarism wars started when the presidents of Harvard, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania made particularly inept responses when, while testifying in front of Congress, they were asked to explain if calls for the genocide of Jews would constitute harassment. In response, right wing activist Christopher Rufo and the Washington Free Beacon investigated Harvard president Claudine Gay’s writing and uncovered dozens of instances of plagiarism. Notwithstanding Harvard’s attempts to minimize damagae, after further evidence of shoddy scholarship emerged in investigations by CNN and the New York Post as well as a Twitter campaign against her by donor and activist Blil Ackman, Gay resigned although she retains her astronomical salary of nearly $900,000 a year. In turn, somewhat leftish news site Business Insider credibly point out instances of plagiarism by Ackman’s wife Neri Oxman. Having looked at both examples, in both cases I conclude that there is merit in condemning both for their sloppiness. In both cases, I would have failed them for plagiarism had they submitted such work as my students. Moreover, the inability of “progressives” to look past Gay’s skin color to investigate her privilige as the child of a Haitian oligarch spoke volumes about their cynicism.

But this does lead back to AI: how do we see plagiarism in the era of AI? Can one copy verbatim from GPT conversations one has prompted? How about from a Custom GPT one has tuned oneself? What if the AI itself regurgitates someone else’s text? Does one cite an AI? These are rather interesting questions and certainly more interesting than the typical reaction of the academy to either the plagiarism wars (generally afraid they will be next) or the question of training on AI content (typically seen as bad by academics). Such dilemmas will only become more common as AI use becomes more common.

One last comment about AI. I have come to shift my thinking from being somewhat concerned about the future dangers of developing AGI to a concern that if the US follows the path of more timid countries like Italy, the West might cede its head start in AI to China or Russia, a situation that would be extremely dangerous from a geopolitical perspective. While I may still be proven wrong, at this point the one great difference between AI and my cat is that my cat has volition and desires that she is constantly exercising. Roxy the cat may not know that much, but she is determined. An AI doesn’t have any volition or desires, besides fulfilling the task at hand. Potentially this may change as agents develop, but for now, we may have Artificial General Intelligence, but we do not have Artificial Sentience.

I taught my first course this May, and sought to outline the parameters of this new culture. It’s still very early, but network culture is finis, kaput. Even it’s last stages, wokeism and Maga, such products of social media seem spent. Last year, I thought that federated networks such as Mastodon were the future. This year, I am not so sure. Mastodon and Blue Sky sunk themselves early on by embracing the Left’s cynical culture of intolerence (if anything offends Lefties on Mastodon, they call for servers to be banned while the users on Blue Sky generally seem to be about as socially sophisticated as sixth graders, banding together to drive off anybody who isn’t far Left). The big “success” of 2023 in social media was Meta’s Threads, but a botched launch (no EU access and a focus on delivering news and entertainment rather than connecting with friends and colleagues) has seemingly ensured that there has no engagement on in whatsoever. Twitter, X, or Xitter (as in Martin Luther wrote his 95 Theses while sitting on the Xitter) muddles on, with a modern day Howard Hughes at the helm, babbling his drug-induced conspiracy theories even as he ponders never cutting his fingernails again and saving his urine in jars around the head office of X. Even with a presidential election upon us, the insane political frenzies of 2016 and 2020 are much diminished as users tire of politcs and social media networks actively bury news stories. This has, in turn, had a significant impact on news sources, which in fairness, have been slipshod and low quality for too long. Both legacy journalism and digital media are in trouble—the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post laid off large numbers of staff while Vice News, Buzzfeed, and the brand new Messenger shut down (or basically shut down)—an “extinction-level events” according to some. In a Washington Post op-ed the former head of Google News (!) suggests that it AI will kill the news and begs for regulation, but this just noise. The real problem is that news wanted to be entertainment and abandoned sober reporting for clickbait and outrage. The replacement of journalism with shrill panic may have been jolly good fun for both the far Left and far Right but this led to outrage fatigue. More people mute stories about Gaza and Israel or Trump and abortion these days than pay attention to them (guilty as charged). We all want to be Ohio man. The news has only itself to blame. How we can have responsible journalism again is beyond me, although publications like the New Atlantis do

Network culture was millennial culture and that finally died in 2023. Skinny jeans and man-buns are now what out-of-touch parents wear, like tie-die shirts and bell bottoms in 1985. Gen Z has its own, seemingly inscrutible cultural codes, which often seem to be that of a studied fashion trainwreck. But high fashion has died. Nobody who isn’t an oligarch or a rap star wants Gucci, Prada, or Vuitton anymore. Young people are into drops from obscure online boutiques and thrifting. Once Russia and China catch up, the old fashion houses will swiftly go the way of the dinosaurs. The same may be happening in tech. Apple’s laptops are boring. I didn’t buy a single Apple computer or iPad this year. I did purchase my first high end PC ever, an Acronym ROG Flow Z-13. I’ve been a fan of obscure Berlin tech fashion brand Acronym for a while and since my youngest kid is studying game design at NYU next fall, it was time to learn about contemporary gaming. It’s been a joy to use in ways that Apple equipment just isn’t anymore. I also purchased a couple of Boox e-ink tablets. Whether they are better than iPads for one’s eyes is a matter of debate, but they are certainly more interesting. Instead of boring Apple crap, I bought a Kwumsy (Kwusmy!) keyboard with a built in panoramic toucshscreen monitor. It’s unimaginable that big tech would make something like this. Niche tech has personality, big tech does not. As tech fashion Youtuber This is Antwon stated in another brilliant video, “Weird Tech Fashion is FINALLY Cool Again.”

So a year in review that morphed into a year in tech. But tech is not just tech now, it’s really our culture—including our spatial culture, which was formerly the purview of architecture. Even taking a stand against tech, embroils us in it. I’d like to find a way past this monolith, but it’s not easy to think past it. I’m open to suggestions, as long as they don’t reduce everything to the god of Capital, which seems to be the other option.

I hope to be back soon, with more posts.

Another green world (on the site redesign)

Every now and then, the time comes to redesign the site. A little history first. I created this site (originally kazys.net) in 1998 as a static site for my writing. I started the blog on blogger in spring of 2000, then switched it out for greymatter since it offered on-site management, in 2001. The site continued on as a blog until the fall of 2003 when, with the birth of our daughter, it seemed a good time to focus on other matters. Two years later, as a fellow at the Annenberg Center for Communication, I decided to go back to blogging and also redesign the site with my first real content management system, Drupal—which I am still traumatized by— and in early 2008, after a few different site redesigns, I turned to the look of Indexhibit, although that system proved to be too limited for a site that had already grown quite big and hydra-headed. In late 2018, with Drupal in its death-throes, it was time to move to WordPress and finally, it has come time to say goodbye to the Indexhibit look.

While I still love the minimal approach Indexhibit pioneered, I needed to find a way to highlight more of my artwork on the main landing page. In addition, if this blog (called the Index, after Indexhibit), is the centerpiece of my writing on this site, it became clear to me that my work with gardening and native plants is its own project that needs its own section and identity. The result is the Florilegium, a blog that exists independently of this one but on the same site (I am also making a substack that mirrors this content, if that is how you read your news). I have also made it easier to find my art and publications. I will be working more on the site during the upcoming weeks, filling out my list of articles and adding more work. And now that this is all done, it’s time to go back to writing on this site. As I have previously stated, the untimeliness of blogging is a form of resistance to the damaged (and damaging) algorithms and trends that are shaping ideas and culture today. With the final decline of Xitter seemingly upon us, not even a scant year after Musk’s catastrophic purchase, the capture of Mastodon and BlueSky by extremist elements, and the continued lingering of Threads as nothing more than a hobby for Meta, there’s no better feeling than knowing I have a small place on the Internet for my work. I encourage you to create one as well. And stay tuned, there’s more to come.

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