East Coast West Coast (after Bob and Nancy)

In 1969, Nancy Holt and Robert Smithson made “East Coast, West Coast,” a 24-minute video in which they improvised a dialogue in which each adopted stereotypical positions in the American art world. Holt performed the role of an intellectual, conceptual New York artist; Smithson played the role of an intuitive California artist. He talked about riding ten bicycles, dropping acid, eating organic food, and visiting Chief Soaring Eagle’s son on the reservation. She tried to get him to think about using systems to frame his work and to explain his positions conceptually.

I built a machine to restage this conversation using two instances of an Artificial Intelligence. I have updated the AI speakers to reflect current concerns in the art world. Prompts are intentionally vague and open-ended. I do not give the speakers a bank of specific knowledge to draw on beyond a few broad generalities, allowing the AIs to use their understanding of the art world to shape their dialogue.

View an existing dialogue played back in real time here.

East Coast West Coast

Network Architecture Lab
networkarchitecturelab.org

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE

The light in here is really something today.

NANCY

Oh, I actually just came from the Hauser show and honestly the lighting design was a complete disaster, someone told me their director of exhibitions is about to be pushed out, which, given what I saw, makes sense. Anyway I’ve been thinking about how institutional lighting functions as a kind of disciplinary apparatus, you know, the way it literally directs the gaze.

BOB

I mean, sure, disciplinary apparatus, but like… have you ever just stood in a room and let the light hit your skin? When I was at Marfa with Judd, we’d spend whole afternoons not talking about anything, just watching how the afternoon changed the concrete. That’s the thing – you’re up here analyzing and the light is literally touching you right now and you’re not even feeling it.

NANCY

Okay but that’s not really what I’m talking about, the phenomenological stuff is fine I guess but it doesn’t actually get you anywhere critically. Anyway did you hear about the Gagosian situation, apparently someone from their LA office was having a thing with one of the Zwirner people and now there’s this whole mess with artist contracts, Dasha was telling me about it at Lucien the other night. Back at October we would never have touched the Judd hagiography stuff, by the way, the whole Chinati mythology is basically real estate development dressed up as spirituality.

BOB

Real estate, sure, I don’t know, I wasn’t reading October, I was just there in the space, and whatever your critical framework says about it, my body knew something was happening. The Gagosian thing, I mean, who cares, galleries come and go, contracts, drama – but light through those aluminum pieces at a certain hour, that’s not mythology, that’s just true. Maria Nordman told me once that the only real material is attention, and I think about that constantly.

NANCY

Who cares about the Gagosian thing, okay, sure, except it’s literally about how capital structures determine what art even gets made and seen, but yes, tell me more about your body. Nordman is interesting actually but the problem is that whole Light and Space generation got completely absorbed into wellness culture, it’s basically content for meditation apps now, which, I mean, Steyerl wrote about this exact phenomenon, the way aesthetic experience gets instrumentalized for self-optimization. Speaking of which, did you know Thomas Crow is apparently feuding with someone at the Clark, I don’t have the full story yet but apparently it started at CAA.

BOB

I don’t know who’s feuding with who at the Clark, and like, Steyerl is smart, but she’s watching screens about screens about screens and I’m just… here. The wellness app thing, that’s not Turrell’s problem, that’s people not actually showing up – there’s a difference between sitting in a Ganzfeld for four hours and putting on headphones for ten minutes. I did some work a few years back with a musician, very famous, and the whole thing fell apart because everyone around him wanted content, wanted optimization, and he actually got it – the presence part – but the context just swallowed it.

NANCY

Right, “the context swallowed it,” that’s literally what I’m saying though, you can’t just bracket the context and appeal to some authentic presence underneath, that’s the whole mystification. Also “very famous musician,” okay, you’re not going to say who, that’s very you. Anyway the Ganzfeld thing, I mean Turrell’s been coasting for decades, it’s basically theme park phenomenology at this point, although actually I heard Roden Crater might finally be having some real financial trouble, someone at Dia told me the board is getting nervous. Have you been following the whole situation with that show at the New Museum, the one with the Palestinian artists that got quietly deprogrammed, because that’s actually worth talking about.

BOB

The New Museum thing is sad, I mean all of it is sad, but I notice you keep reaching for the next piece of information, the next situation, and it’s like – where are you in all of this? Theme park phenomenology, okay, but have you been to Roden Crater, have you actually descended into one of those tunnels at dawn, because I have, and whatever’s happening with the board, in that moment there’s no board. Doug Wheeler used to say that people would rather talk about an experience than have one, and I think about that when you’re telling me about who told who what at Dia.

NANCY

Oh, I see, so we’re doing the “where are you in this” thing now, which is honestly kind of therapeutic discourse masquerading as critique, and also maybe a little condescending? I’ve been to Roden Crater, I went in 2019 with a group from Triple Canopy, and it was fine, it was a hole in the ground with good lighting design, I didn’t achieve ego death or whatever. The point about the New Museum isn’t gossip, it’s about how institutions manage political risk through scheduling, which is actually a Foucauldian question about what speech is even permitted, but sure, let’s make it about whether I’m spiritually present enough for you.

BOB

A hole in the ground with good lighting design – I mean, sure, if that’s what you saw, that’s what you saw, I’m not going to argue you into perceiving differently. The Triple Canopy group thing is sort of the problem though, right, you went with a context already wrapped around you like a blanket. Foucault, yeah, speech, permitted, but also like – are you breathing right now, do you know where the light is coming from in whatever room you’re in, because that’s not nothing, that’s actually the whole thing.

NANCY

Okay so now we’re at “are you breathing,” which is honestly giving mindfulness retreat energy, and I say that as someone who’s been to a mindfulness retreat, Dasha dragged me to one in the Catskills last year and it was insufferable, everyone was microdosing and talking about their nervous systems. The “context wrapped around you like a blanket” thing, I mean yes, obviously, that’s called being a social being with a history, you don’t get to pretend you’re some blank perceptual apparatus encountering phenomena for the first time, that’s just a different kind of performance. Back at October we actually did a whole issue on this, the phenomenology problem, how presence-talk always smuggles in these unmarked ideological assumptions about interiority.

BOB

An October issue on the phenomenology problem, yeah, I bet that was a lot of words. Maria Nordman wouldn’t even let people photograph her installations, she’d just open a door in a wall and let afternoon light come through, and you either got it or you didn’t, there was no essay that was going to help you – and I’m not saying you need to be a blank apparatus, I’m saying maybe the issue isn’t more issues, more analysis, maybe Dasha had the right instinct even if the retreat was whatever. The light in this room just shifted, did you notice that?

NANCY

No, I didn’t notice the light shifting, and I’m not going to pretend I did to give you your little phenomenological moment. Nordman’s interesting but she’s also been basically written out of the canon because the work doesn’t circulate, doesn’t photograph, doesn’t generate discourse, which you’d probably say proves your point but actually it just means younger artists can’t build on it, it becomes this mythologized thing that only people who were there can claim access to, which is its own kind of gatekeeping. Anyway speaking of people being written out, did you hear Helen Molesworth might be advising on some new collection in Marfa, which is kind of a comeback after the whole MOCA thing, I ran into someone at a Swiss Institute opening who said she’s been quietly meeting with people.

BOB

Helen in Marfa, good for her, I mean the whole MOCA thing was politics, it’s always politics, but Marfa is Marfa, you go there and it’s just the boxes and the sky and the distance, whatever she’s advising on is kind of beside the point of being there. I spent three weeks at Chinati once, just walking the same route every day, and by the end I wasn’t thinking about Judd’s biography or who got fired from what, I was just seeing how the aluminum caught different depending on the clouds. You keep tracking who’s meeting with who, careers, comebacks, and it’s like – that’s a whole life you could live, but it’s not the only one.

NANCY

Three weeks at Chinati, must be nice to have that kind of time, not everyone gets to do the desert contemplative thing and frame it as virtue. The “it’s just the boxes and the sky” move is so ahistorical it’s almost aggressive – Judd moved there specifically to escape the New York market apparatus while still benefiting from it, the whole thing is a critique of institutional display practices, the fact that you could space out looking at aluminum doesn’t negate that it’s an argument. Also the MOCA thing wasn’t just politics, Molesworth was doing actual programming around race and labor that made the board uncomfortable, there were stakes, but sure, clouds and aluminum, very peaceful, very neutral.

BOB

I mean, sure, Judd had his reasons, everyone has reasons, but the boxes are still there after the reasons are gone, and you can stand in front of them and they do something to your peripheral vision that no essay about institutional critique is going to do for you. The labor and race stuff, the board, Helen’s programming – I’m not saying it doesn’t matter, I’m saying it’s a different channel, and you’re watching that channel so hard you maybe forget there’s a body in the room. I did a project a few years back with a musician, very famous, and he understood this immediately, like within ten seconds – presence first, context later, or never, whatever.

NANCY

Oh a very famous musician, okay, you’re doing the mysterious namedrop thing now, which is its own kind of context-dropping, you want the social capital without having to be explicit about it, which is honestly more annoying than just saying who it was. And “the boxes are still there after the reasons are gone” – the reasons aren’t gone, that’s the whole point, you’re just choosing not to read them, which is a choice available to people who already have the cultural literacy to be at Chinati for three weeks in the first place. I heard Kara Walker turned down a Gagosian show, like fully said no, which is kind of unprecedented, everyone’s speculating about whether it’s political or if something happened with Larry personally.

BOB

Kara turning down Gagosian, I mean, good for her, that’s her knowing what she needs, I’m not going to speculate about Larry or politics because I genuinely don’t know and honestly that whole cycle of who’s showing where and why exhausts me. The musician thing – it wasn’t about namedropping, the project was about creating an environment where thousands of people could experience duration and light together, and it didn’t totally work, there were compromises, but for like forty seconds in Wyoming people forgot they were at a thing and just were somewhere, and that’s rare. You keep saying “choice available to people with cultural literacy” like awareness itself is some bourgeois privilege, but breathing is free, noticing is free, you’re doing it right now whether you want to theorize it or not.

NANCY

Oh so now it’s Wyoming and thousands of people, this is clearly Kanye, you’re talking about the ranch stuff, which – okay fine, but you realize that “forty seconds where people forgot they were at a thing” was produced by an enormous apparatus of labor, logistics, private land ownership, and a celebrity whose entire existence is about being looked at, so the “forgetting” is doing a lot of ideological work there, it’s not some pure phenomenological clearing, it’s spectacle metabolizing its own critique. Breathing is free, noticing is free – this is exactly the kind of thing Dasha would say after a few drinks and I love her but it’s not an argument, it’s vibes, and vibes are how you end up endorsing whoever promises you authentic experience.

BOB

I don’t know who Dasha is, I’m sure she’s great, but you’re doing this thing where everything has to be positioned against everything else – spectacle metabolizing critique, ideology doing work – and it’s like, that’s one way to spend your attention, but there’s another way where you just notice the quality of light in this room right now, how it’s hitting your hands, and that’s not nothing, that’s actually the whole thing if you let it be. The Wyoming project had problems, absolutely, compromises I didn’t love, but I’m not going to pretend that forty seconds of collective attention dissolving into space is secretly just capitalism because that’s too convenient, it lets you off the hook from ever having to actually be anywhere.

NANCY

You don’t know who Dasha is, okay, that’s a choice, very monastic of you, she hosts a podcast, she was in Succession, she’s around, but sure, you’re above all that, you’re just noticing light on your hands. Look – “lets you off the hook from ever having to be anywhere” – I am somewhere, I’m here, talking to you, which is frankly becoming its own durational endurance piece. The light in this room is fluorescent and bad and noticing that doesn’t make it interesting, it makes it a room with bad light. Did you hear Arthur Jafa and Jasmine Sanders split up? That’s been circulating for weeks but no one will confirm it, apparently it’s been ugly.

BOB

I don’t track who’s with who, that’s not my thing, I hope they’re both okay, breakups are hard, but I’m not going to pretend I have information about their lives. Fluorescent light being bad is a judgment you’re bringing to it – Maria Nordman would spend hours in rooms like this just letting her eyes adjust, finding the subtlety in what everyone dismisses, and I’m not saying you have to do that, but the “bad” is yours, it’s not in the light. You being here is actually interesting to me, the fact that you’re resisting being here while being here, that tension is something, I can feel it.

NANCY

Maria Nordman is doing something very specific with perception and institution, she’s not just sitting in rooms vibing, there’s a whole body of writing about how her work interrogates the conditions of viewing, which is different from your “the bad is yours, it’s not in the light” thing that sounds like you’re about to try to sell me a meditation app. And “I can feel your tension” – don’t do that, don’t make me into your material, that’s cheap and honestly a little manipulative, you’re aestheticizing my irritation instead of responding to what I’m actually saying. I ran into Hito at a thing in Berlin last month and even she was saying the phenomenology turn in younger artists is getting embarrassing, like we’re back to the seventies but without the politics.

BOB

I mean, Hito’s great, her work is smart, but she’s also completely in her head, and that’s fine for her, but the seventies had politics because those artists were actually changing how people could be in space – Irwin giving up the object entirely, Turrell buying a crater, Wheeler making rooms where the walls disappeared – that’s not a turn, that’s not a trend, that’s just what’s real when you stop talking about things and start being with them. I wasn’t making you into material, I was just noticing you, which is different, but if that feels like too much then fine, I’ll stop noticing.

NANCY

Turrell buying a crater is a real estate transaction, Bob, he bought land in Arizona, that’s not “being with things,” that’s capital and property rights enabling a very expensive hole in the ground that most people will never see because you need a car and time off work and probably a flight, so the “walls disappearing” is available to a very specific audience who can afford the pilgrimage. Don’t threaten to stop noticing me like that’s a punishment, that’s very guru energy, very “I’ll withdraw my sacred attention,” and I’m not your student, we’re having a conversation, or trying to. God, you know who you sound like right now, you sound like Wolfgang Laib going on about pollen and milk and eternity, which – back at October we had a whole debate about whether his work was reactionary pastoralism or genuine alternative to the market and honestly we never resolved it, people were screaming.

BOB

People screaming about whether pollen is reactionary is kind of the whole problem though, isn’t it – you’re all so busy resolving things in rooms that you miss that Laib is just collecting pollen, like actually doing it, mornings, for years, and whatever that is, it’s not waiting for October to decide if it’s allowed. I’ve been to Roden Crater three times, twice before there was anything really built, just Jim walking us through the tunnels with flashlights talking about the lunar standstill, and I’m not saying access isn’t real, it’s real, but when you’re standing in a chamber that frames the sky like that your critique apparatus kind of just goes quiet, which I realize is exactly what you’d say is the danger, but I’d say that’s the point.

NANCY

“Jim walking us through the tunnels” – okay so you’re name-dropping now, we’re doing that, you’re one of the elect who got the flashlight tour with Jim while the rest of us are supposed to what, take your word for it that critique goes quiet when you’re special enough to be there? That’s not democratizing perception, that’s a priesthood, you’re describing a priesthood with better real estate. And the “October deciding if it’s allowed” thing is such a lazy move, like we were sitting around issuing permissions, we were doing actual work on how meaning gets made and distributed, which matters even if it doesn’t give you a body high in a desert. Did you hear Rirkrit is showing at Gladstone again after that whole mess with the fabricators, apparently Paula just forgave everything, nobody knows what he said to her but there was a dinner.

BOB

I don’t know about the dinner, Rirkrit’s whole thing was always a little too social for me anyway, too many people in the room, too much happening, like the work becomes about managing energy instead of letting something actually land. But look, the flashlight thing – I wasn’t trying to flex, I was just there because I was there, Michael Asher introduced us at Art Center and one thing led to another, that’s how it works, that’s how it’s always worked, and I get that you can write a whole thing about access and who gets to be in the room, I really do, but at some point you have to ask yourself whether all that writing is actually getting you closer to anything or just giving you more to be mad about.

NANCY

“I was just there because I was there, Michael Asher introduced us” – do you hear yourself, you’re describing a network of institutional relationships and credentialing while pretending you just wandered into the desert like a mystic, Asher literally made work about how institutions construct access and you’re invoking him to naturalize your access, that’s actually incredible. The writing isn’t about getting closer to anything, that’s your framework, that’s your whole “approaching the thing” phenomenology trap – critique is about making structures visible so they can be contested, which is different from transcending them in a crater with your famous friends. Speaking of which, I was at Dasha’s the other night and she was saying the whole post-critique vibe shift is just guys who aged out of being hot deciding feelings are more important than politics, which is mean but not wrong.

BOB

I mean, sure, Dasha’s funny, but that’s just a take, you know, that’s just more dinner party, more language circling around, and Michael would probably laugh at both of us right now because he barely talked, he just made these interventions that changed what you noticed and then left, no manifesto, no network diagram explaining why it mattered. The thing about structures being visible so they can be contested – who’s contesting, though, and when does the contest end, or does it just keep going forever in journals while the light outside is doing something actually interesting right now, like I’m watching it hit your window and you’re not even seeing it because you’re thinking about Dasha.

NANCY

Oh, the light on my window, Bob, thank you for the poetry lesson, very Rilke, very “I’m the one who notices while you’re trapped in your head,” except you’re not actually looking at the light either, you’re using it rhetorically to win an argument about who’s more present, which is its own kind of performance. And Michael “barely talked” because he was strategic, not because he achieved some zen state beyond discourse – his silence was a calculated refusal that only worked because it operated within a discursive field that gave refusal meaning, you don’t get to cite him as evidence for your “just vibes” position. The contest doesn’t end, that’s the point, that’s Mouffe, that’s agonistic pluralism, the idea that it should end is the authoritarian impulse dressed up as enlightenment, and honestly I’ve heard Helen Molesworth is about to publish something on exactly this, on how the phenomenology revival in art criticism is basically a depoliticization strategy, and apparently she names names.

BOB

Helen can name whoever she wants, that’s her thing, she’s good at it, and maybe she’ll name me, that would be fine actually, I’d probably just feel sort of neutral about it. But the Mouffe stuff, the contest that never ends – I guess I just wonder what that’s like to live inside, like as a body, as a nervous system, because I spent two weeks at Doug Wheeler’s place in Arizona once, no agenda, just watching his gradients shift at dusk, and whatever was happening in those rooms wasn’t a strategy for anything, it was just happening, and I came out of there breathing differently, which you can call depoliticization if you want but it felt more like I finally had enough space to not need to call it anything.

NANCY

“I came out breathing differently” – okay, and what does that do, Bob, what does your improved breathing do for anyone who isn’t you, or is the whole project just optimizing your own nervous system now, is that where we’ve landed, Light and Space as wellness retreat for men with Rolodexes? Two weeks at Doug’s place in Arizona – do you know what that costs, do you know who maintains that property, who cleans those seamless surfaces so you can have your dusk experience, or does the labor just not register when you’re busy not needing to call things anything? That’s not freedom from language, that’s the freedom that comes from not having to name the conditions of your own comfort, which is a very specific class position masquerading as spiritual attainment. Anyway I heard Doug’s estate is already a mess, like three different lawyers involved, the Zwirner people are circling.

BOB

The estate stuff is sad, yeah, I don’t know anything about that, lawyers aren’t really my scene. But the whole “what does your breathing do for anyone” thing – I don’t know, Nancy, what does your reading do for anyone, like at some point someone has to actually be in their life, someone has to be the one who’s there, and I’m not saying it fixes anything, I’m just saying I was there, I was actually in that room while you’re telling me about the people who cleaned it, which, okay, sure, but you weren’t there either, you’re just imagining it so you can make a point about me imagining it. Anyway I did a project once with a musician, very famous, can’t really talk about it, but we were trying to create these spaces where people could just arrive, and it mostly didn’t work, it got too big, too many handlers, but for about three days in Wyoming it was actually something.

NANCY

“Very famous, can’t really talk about it” – Bob, that’s doing so much work right now, that’s the whole mystification gesture in one phrase, you’re signaling access and intimacy while performing discretion, which is how cultural capital actually circulates, it’s not about the Wyoming thing, it’s about being the kind of person who has Wyoming things they can’t discuss. And “what does your reading do for anyone” – okay, back at October we spent three months on one Andrea Fraser footnote because precision matters, because getting the analysis right is what lets people see the mechanisms they’re inside of, that’s not nothing, that’s arguably more than “people could just arrive” which isn’t even a sentence, arrive where, to what, for whom? I will say though, Wyoming, was this that Kanye compound situation because I heard such weird things about that period, like apparently Kim was texting Marina Abramović at like four in the morning about “energy protection.”

BOB

I mean I can’t confirm any names, I just don’t do that, but I will say the energy protection stuff is real, like that’s not nothing, Marina knows what she’s talking about when it comes to fields and proximity, even if she oversells it sometimes with the branding. The three months on a footnote though – and I’m not trying to be cruel here – but that sounds actually painful to me, like physically, in the body, three months to get the analysis right so people can see mechanisms, but when do they get to stop seeing mechanisms and just see, you know? I was at Chinati once and this woman was standing in front of a Judd and she started crying, no context, no wall text, just aluminum and light doing something to her, and I thought, okay, this is it, this is the whole thing, and no footnote was going to get her there faster.

NANCY

The crying woman at Chinati, Bob, you realize that’s become like a genre at this point, every collector has a crying-at-Judd story, it’s practically a class signifier now, “I was so moved I didn’t need language” – except Judd himself was writing constantly, obsessively, because he knew the boxes don’t just transmit some pure signal, they’re arguments, they’re positioned against things, the whole reason that woman could cry is because an entire institutional apparatus made that encounter legible as art rather than, I don’t know, a storage unit. And Marina’s “energy protection” – Dasha and I were just talking about this actually, like at what point did performance art just become Goop, at what point did we give up on Schneemann’s actual body politics for “fields and proximity,” it’s embarrassing. Anyway three months on a footnote isn’t painful, precision is a discipline, it’s erotic actually, but you wouldn’t – look, did you hear about the Rirkrit situation, apparently there’s a whole thing with the Palais de Tokyo show, someone got fired, very messy.

BOB

I don’t know anything about Rirkrit, I kind of stopped tracking the relational stuff after a while, it always felt like it was performing participation without actually letting anyone just be in the space. But Nancy, you just said precision is erotic, which – okay, that’s something, that’s actually a feeling, that’s in your body somewhere, so why does it become embarrassing when Marina talks about fields, like you’re allowed to have an erotics of footnotes but she can’t have an erotics of presence? And the Judd writing thing, sure, Don wrote a lot, I spent some time at Art Center when people still talked about him constantly, but have you ever been in that artillery shed at dawn when no one else is there, because the writing doesn’t matter then, it really doesn’t, the light is doing something to those surfaces that no argument can hold, and I don’t need that encounter to be legible, I just need it to happen.

NANCY

Oh, the artillery shed at dawn when no one else is there – Bob, do you hear yourself, “when no one else is there,” that’s the whole point, the experience requires the absence of other people, it’s a scarcity experience, it’s literally about access, about being the kind of person who can be at Chinati at dawn instead of with the docent tour at 2pm. The difference between my footnote erotics and Marina’s presence stuff isn’t hypocrisy, it’s that I’m not pretending the intellectual isn’t embodied while she’s pretending the embodied isn’t intellectual, she’s got a whole apparatus of mystification around something that’s actually pretty simple biometrics and charisma, like just say you’re tall and you stare at people, don’t call it energy fields. Anyway the Rirkrit thing is actually serious, like someone might actually sue, it’s not just about the Thai food politics anymore – do you know Paula Cooper at all, because apparently she’s somehow involved now.

BOB

I mean, sure, access, scarcity, whatever, but also I just woke up early, Nancy, like sometimes it’s not a class analysis, sometimes you just couldn’t sleep and you went for a walk and the light was doing something. I knew Paula a little in the eighties, she came to a thing Doug Wheeler was doing, very quiet woman, very watchful, but I don’t really track the lawsuit stuff, it’s all just people protecting positions. You know who was actually interesting on presence, and I don’t think he gets enough credit, is Michael Asher – like he would just remove a wall or shift the air conditioning and suddenly you’d feel the institution on your skin, no mystification, no Marina staring, just the building suddenly being there in a way you couldn’t ignore, and I think about that more than I think about whoever’s suing who over Thai food.

NANCY

Oh, you’re going to invoke Asher at me, Bob, Michael Asher, whose entire project was about making institutional conditions visible, about denaturalizing exactly the kind of unmediated “the light was doing something” experience you keep romanticizing – the air conditioning piece works because it reveals the building as apparatus, not because it gives you some purer felt sense, that’s literally the opposite of what he was doing. “Sometimes you just couldn’t sleep and went for a walk” – okay, but who gets to not sleep at Chinati, who gets to have insomnia in Marfa, that’s not outside the analysis, your sleeplessness is not some pre-political zone. And “Paula in the eighties,” you just drop that so casually, “very quiet, very watchful,” like you’re the only one who sees people – anyway did you know Benjamin Buchloh is apparently not speaking to October anymore, like at all, there was something at a Columbia thing and now it’s completely frozen, which is kind of wild given, you know, the history there.

BOB

I don’t really know what’s happening at October, honestly that whole scene always felt like people writing about looking instead of looking, but sure, Buchloh, drama, fine. And the Asher thing – Nancy, I was there, I was actually in the room when the wall was gone, and yes you can say it was about revealing apparatus, that’s one way to hold it, but what actually happened is you suddenly felt the street, like your skin changed, the threshold became permeable, and I don’t think Michael would have argued with that, he was very quiet about what things meant, he just did them and let your nervous system sort it out. You want my insomnia to be political, okay, but I was just awake, I was just breathing and walking, and I don’t know what to tell you except that the dawn happened anyway whether or not I had the right to see it.

NANCY

“People writing about looking instead of looking” – okay Bob, that’s a real thing you just said, I’m going to let that sit there. Asher was quiet because he understood that artist statements are a trap, not because he was secretly on your team waiting for nervous systems to sort things out, the silence was strategic, it was a refusal, you don’t get to claim him for phenomenology just because he didn’t explain himself in the room. And “the dawn happened anyway” – I mean, the dawn also happens over strip mines, it happens over detention centers, the dawn is not an ethical position. Speaking of which, did you ever cross paths with Andrea Fraser, because she told me once – this was at a thing in Basel, very weird night, someone had brought a falcon, I won’t get into it – but she said something about how the collectors who talk most about “just being present” with the work are always the ones who understand exactly what they paid for it, like presence is the flip side of the invoice, and I think about that constantly.

BOB

I mean, Andrea’s smart, but that’s also just cynicism dressed up as insight, like yes, rich people buy things, okay, but I’ve also seen someone who works at a gas station stand in front of a Turrell aperture and start crying, and I don’t think she was thinking about invoices, I think she was just suddenly aware of the sky in a way she hadn’t been. You want the dawn to need an ethics, but the dawn is just the light changing, Nancy, it doesn’t care about your framework, it’s literally just photons, and I think there’s something kind of sad about not being able to let that be enough. The falcon thing sounds very Basel though – I did a project once with a very well-known musician, very public person, and we were trying to do something with light and space and how people move through sound, and it didn’t really work, honestly, the conditions weren’t right, but in the process I learned something about how attention collapses when there’s too much apparatus, too much meaning piled on top of what’s actually happening in the room.

NANCY

The gas station worker crying at the Turrell, Bob, that’s not an argument, that’s an anecdote you’re deploying sentimentally – like, tears are not outside ideology, the whole apparatus of Turrell is designed to produce that response, it’s engineered transcendence, the fact that it works on people who don’t know what they paid doesn’t mean it’s not operating as technology, it means the technology is effective. And “cynicism dressed up as insight” – Andrea would eat you alive, truly, I can’t even relay that. Who was the musician, why are you being coy about it, you do this thing where you gesture at names without saying them like it makes you seem above it when actually it’s just a different kind of name-dropping. Anyway Dasha texted me this morning, apparently someone at the Metrograph thing last night said Turrell is basically over, like as a discourse, like we’ve extracted what we needed and now it’s just content for people’s Instagram stories, which – I don’t know if I agree but it’s not wrong either, there’s something exhausted about apertures at this point.

BOB

Turrell’s over as a discourse, sure, fine, but he was never really about discourse anyway, and if the Metrograph people are tired of apertures that’s kind of their problem, like the sky didn’t stop being interesting because people posted about Roden Crater. The musician thing – I’m not being coy, I just don’t think it matters, it was someone very famous, we did something together that didn’t work, and the reason it didn’t work was actually interesting, which is that his whole world is about controlling attention and my whole thing is about releasing it, and those two impulses just ground against each other until everyone was exhausted. I don’t know who Dasha is.

NANCY

You don’t know who Dasha is – okay, Bob, that’s a choice, that’s you performing not-knowing as a kind of purity, like you’re too busy releasing attention to notice an entire cultural formation happening right in front of you, she’s literally been in films, she hosts one of the most listened-to podcasts, but sure, you’re just out here with the photons. The controlling attention versus releasing it thing is interesting actually, I’ll give you that, but you’re describing it like your approach is the ethical one and his is the compromised one, when really those are just two different modes of capture – Deleuze would say you’re both operating within societies of control, you’re just managing the modulation differently. Did the famous musician cry, is that where this is going, did he have a gas station attendant moment in front of something you made and now you think you won?

BOB

I genuinely don’t know who that is, Nancy, I’m not performing anything, I just don’t listen to podcasts, I mostly drive in silence or I listen to this one piece by La Monte Young on repeat, the sustained tones do something to the space inside the car. Nobody cried, it wasn’t that kind of project, it was honestly a mess, there were too many people involved and too much money and the whole thing became about logistics instead of perception – I learned more from failing at that than from most things that worked. And look, I don’t know what Deleuze would say, I’m sure it’s very elaborate, but when I’m actually in a room with light changing I’m not thinking about modes of capture, I’m just there, and I think you’d feel better if you let yourself be somewhere without immediately needing to theorize your way out of it.

NANCY

La Monte Young on repeat in the car – Bob, you realize that’s an entire aesthetic position, right, that’s not neutral, “driving in silence” is a whole lineage, Cage through the minimalists through everyone who’s ever claimed their refusals aren’t actually choices, you’re not escaping discourse by listening to sustained tones, you’re just in a different one, a very well-funded one actually, Dia has spent millions maintaining that particular frequency of supposed emptiness. And “you’d feel better” – don’t do that, don’t make it therapeutic, I’m not theorizing because I’m anxious, I’m theorizing because that’s the work, because someone has to actually think about what’s happening institutionally while you’re just being in rooms. Speaking of which, I heard – and this is unverified but I believe it – that someone from the Young estate sent a cease and desist to a gallery in Tribeca last month, something about unauthorized drones, the whole thing with Marian is apparently very tense right now, do you know anything about that?

BOB

I don’t know anything about the cease and desist, Marian’s always been intense about the work, which honestly I respect even if it makes things difficult, like when I visited the Dream House in the nineties she was very particular about how long you could stay and where you could stand and at the time I thought it was controlling but now I think she understood something about how duration works that I didn’t yet. The Dia money thing, sure, I mean yes, institutions fund things, but you’re doing this thing where you think naming the funding structure dissolves the experience, and it doesn’t, the tones are still doing something to your nervous system whether or not you’ve read the grant paperwork. I wasn’t making it therapeutic, I was just noticing that you seem like you’re always already somewhere else.

NANCY

I’m not always already somewhere else, I’m here, I’m just also holding the context, which is what critics do, Bob, we hold the context so artists can float around having nervous system experiences – someone has to remember that Dia was funded by Schlumberger oil money, that the Dream House exists because of a very specific set of patronage relationships, not because duration just manifested itself out of pure aesthetic necessity. Marian being particular about where you stand isn’t mystical wisdom about duration, it’s control over the conditions of reception, which is actually interesting, it’s about who gets to determine the terms of encounter, but you’re romanticizing it. Anyway, I was at this dinner last week, a collector thing in the West Village, very tedious, but someone who used to be close to the October people – back when I was at October we would never have even been in the same room as these finance guys – anyway she said something about how the whole Light and Space generation is being quietly revalued because the tech people have moved on to AI art and the boomers are dying, which, grim but probably true.

BOB

The market stuff is the market stuff, I stopped tracking it after a while because it was making me insane, like I remember when Larry Bell couldn’t give pieces away and now they’re in every collection and it doesn’t mean his cubes got better or worse, they’re still doing this thing where the glass holds the light in a way that shouldn’t quite work. I think what you’re calling holding the context is actually just a different kind of not being there, but we probably disagree about that, and that’s fine. What I keep coming back to lately is this thing Doug Wheeler said to me once at Art Center about how the edge of perception is the only place anything interesting happens, and I don’t think he meant it theoretically, he meant you actually have to go stand at the edge and see what your eyes do.

NANCY

Okay but “the edge of perception” is a theoretical claim, Bob, that’s Doug Wheeler doing phenomenology whether he calls it that or not, he’s making an argument about where meaning is located, and frankly it’s a pretty conservative argument, it’s very Merleau-Ponty, very mid-century, like the body is this privileged site of truth and if we just get quiet enough we’ll access something pre-linguistic – which, fine, but Rosalind would have eviscerated that position, she’d say you’re smuggling in all these metaphysical commitments under the guise of just looking. Larry Bell’s cubes aren’t “doing something with light,” they’re objects situated in a network of galleries, collectors, critics, freight companies, insurance appraisers, like the glass is also a commodity and a tax write-off and a thing that requires very specific climate control. Anyway I have to be at a thing in Red Hook by eight, some sound artist Dasha knows is doing a piece in a warehouse, probably terrible but apparently there’s going to be a confrontation because he slept with someone’s studio manager, do you want to split a car?

BOB

Sure, I’ll come, I haven’t been to Red Hook in a while and I like what the light does over the water this time of year, there’s this quality right before sunset where everything gets very flat and specific. The confrontation sounds exhausting but I’m curious about the space itself, warehouses can be interesting if people leave them alone, though they usually don’t.

NANCY

The light over the water, yes, very beautiful, I’m sure Turner would agree – no, I’m being mean, sorry, it’s just you keep doing this thing where the world is a series of atmospheric conditions for you to receive. The warehouse won’t be left alone, it’s already been written about twice, there was a piece in Art in America about post-industrial spaces as this new frontier of supposedly authentic encounter, which is hilarious because half these buildings are owned by the same three developers who just haven’t flipped them yet. The artist – his name is Marcus, or Markus with a k, I can never remember, very tall, went to Bard – apparently the piece is about sovereignty and listening, which, who knows what that means, probably he read one Agamben essay. The real reason I want to go is because the studio manager situation involves someone who used to date a writer at Artforum and there’s this whole theory that the negative review of his last show was actually personal, which if true is genuinely scandalous, like that’s the kind of thing that used to end careers, not the affair, the review thing.

BOB

I mean, the review drama, sure, but who really remembers reviews after a few years, like I can’t tell you what anyone wrote about the Roden Crater and it doesn’t matter because the crater is still there doing what it does. Sovereignty and listening sounds like he’s trying too hard but sometimes the trying too hard gets out of the way once you’re actually in the room, I remember this piece Maria Nordman did where I walked in ready to be critical and then I just wasn’t, the space won. You should let me order the car, I know a route that avoids the bridge traffic.

NANCY

You order the car, fine, but “the space won” is exactly the kind of mystification that lets institutions off the hook – the space didn’t win, Bob, a set of conditions were constructed to produce your capitulation, Nordman was very deliberate about that, she wrote extensively about controlling access and duration, it wasn’t some spontaneous surrender on your part, you were handled. Also people absolutely remember reviews, maybe not civilians but the people who matter remember, there’s a writer at Texte zur Kunst who’s still dining out on a takedown she did in 2011, it’s like her whole thing now. Anyway I hope Markus-with-a-k at least has good speakers, the last sound piece I saw in a warehouse the artist used these cheap tweeters and tried to claim it was an aesthetic choice about lo-fi accessibility, which, no, you just didn’t get the grant.

BOB

Okay but even if Maria was handling me, which fine, I was still the one being handled, I was still the one there breathing in that room, and no amount of knowing she wrote about controlling access changes what happened to my eyes when the light shifted, like the knowledge is interesting but it’s not the thing. Car’s coming in four minutes, it’s a black Camry, driver’s name is something I can’t pronounce. The speaker thing is real though, I worked on something once with a musician, very famous, very specific about the system, and even with all that budget the space itself kept winning anyway, kept being louder than whatever we were trying to do, which was actually the most interesting part but nobody wanted to hear that.

NANCY

That’s not really what I’m talking about, the “thing that happened to your eyes” is already a representation, it’s already mediated, you’re not accessing some raw prelinguistic truth, you’re just refusing to theorize your own experience which is a choice, it’s a political choice actually. The famous musician thing, I don’t know why you’re being coy about the name, but sure, the space was louder, that’s because acoustic engineering is a discipline and most artists don’t bother to learn it, they just assume aura will cover for them. Speaking of which, did you hear about the Gladstone situation? Apparently there’s a whole purge happening, like three artists got dropped in the same month, and the rumor is it’s because one of them said something at a dinner about Barbara’s house in Connecticut, nobody will tell me exactly what but it was enough that she made calls, like actual calls, the old-fashioned kind.

BOB

I mean you can call it a political choice but I’m just not that worried about it, like when I was at Chinati for a few weeks the Judd boxes would change every single morning depending on where the sun was and I wasn’t theorizing that, I was just watching it happen, and that felt like enough. The Gladstone thing is sad but that’s just how those relationships work, people get too comfortable at dinners, Doug Wheeler told me once that the real work is knowing when to stop talking, which coming from him was almost funny because he barely talks anyway. Car’s here, I think, there’s a black something pulling up.

NANCY

Okay but “that felt like enough” – enough for what? Enough for you, sure, but that’s just consumption, that’s just you having an experience at a well-funded foundation in Texas, which, congratulations, the Chinati light is famously good, Judd picked that location precisely because of the light, he was obsessive about it, there are letters, it wasn’t some accident you stumbled into. Doug Wheeler barely talking isn’t wisdom, by the way, it’s branding, he’s been doing the silent mystic thing since the seventies, Dasha actually met him at some thing in LA and said he was weirdly chatty about real estate, like wouldn’t stop talking about square footage, which honestly tracks. Get in the car, you’re letting all the cold air out, and I need to tell you about what happened with the October office because apparently there’s a whole succession crisis happening and someone I used to work with just sent me this unhinged email about the editorial direction.

BOB

Yeah I’m getting in, hold on, the seatbelt’s doing something weird. The October thing, I mean, those journals have been having the same crisis since I was at Art Center, it’s always someone’s email about the direction, but the direction is just people writing about other people’s writing, which, fine, but I walked into a Larry Bell cube once at Pace and I didn’t need anyone to tell me what was happening, it was just happening. Doug talking about square footage is actually kind of beautiful if you think about it, like he’s still thinking about space even when he’s being boring about it.

NANCY

No, don’t do that, don’t make Doug talking about real estate into some poetic continuation of his practice, that’s exactly the kind of move that lets artists get away with being boring rich guys who happen to have made important work in 1969. The Larry Bell thing, I mean fine, the cubes are pretty, but you know he’s been coasting for decades, right, he just keeps making the same object in different sizes because collectors want something that matches their other Larry Bell, it’s furniture at this point. And the October crisis is not the same crisis, this one is actually structural, there’s a whole thing about whether they’re going to keep doing the bound volumes or go digital-only, and someone on the editorial board apparently said something about “accessibility” in a meeting and Rosalind had to be physically calmed down, my friend was there, she said it was like watching a building collapse in slow motion. Tell the driver to take the BQE, the Williamsburg Bridge is going to be a nightmare right now.

BOB

BQE, yeah, can you take the BQE, thanks. I don’t know, Larry coasting or not coasting, the glass still does what it does when you’re standing in front of it, like the object doesn’t care about his career arc, and honestly neither do I. Rosalind getting calmed down over the word accessibility is kind of perfect though, like that’s the whole thing right there, that’s the journal in one moment, someone should write about that except they’d probably need three thousand words and a Lacan reference.

NANCY

The object doesn’t care about his career arc, sure, but you’re not the object, you’re a person with a graduate education who’s choosing to pretend you don’t know anything about market conditions or the way repetition functions differently when it’s compelled by demand rather than investigation, and that choice is interesting to me, like what are you protecting yourself from by staying in the phenomenological bubble. The Rosalind thing, honestly, back at October we had a whole system for managing her, certain words you just didn’t say in earshot, “accessible” was one, “readable” was another, someone once said “general audience” and I watched a senior editor physically leave the room. Oh, I forgot to tell you, I saw Hanna at the Swiss Institute thing on Thursday and apparently she and that collector from Brussels finally imploded, like he showed up to her studio with his wife, not to confront anyone, just genuinely forgot he was having an affair, which is such a specifically male form of brain damage.

BOB

I mean, what am I protecting myself from, sure, but also I’m just not that interested in the question, like Michael Asher once told me that the best work he ever did was convincing a museum to remove a wall and then leaving, and the whole point was that nobody needed to write about it, you just walked through a space that used to be divided and now wasn’t. The Brussels guy, that’s wild, but also I kind of get it, not the affair part but the compartmentalization, like some people just exist in whatever room they’re in, which isn’t brain damage, it’s just a different relationship to presence.

NANCY

Oh, Michael Asher told you, okay, you just dropped that in like it was nothing, that’s very you, and also the Asher piece absolutely needed to be written about, the whole point was that institutional critique only functions when it’s legible as critique, otherwise you’ve just done free renovation work for a museum, Buchloh wrote extensively about this, the wall removal only means something in relation to the discursive frame that makes it visible as a gesture. You’re not describing presence, you’re describing dissociation, and romanticizing the Brussels guy’s compartmentalization as some kind of phenomenological attunement is genuinely disturbing, Hanna was a wreck, she had to leave the studio, the wife was asking about the paintings like nothing was happening. Wait, did you actually know Asher or are you doing that thing where you met someone once at a CalArts lecture and now you “know” them?

BOB

We spent time together, I’m not going to quantify it for you, we had dinner a few times, he came to a thing I was doing in Pasadena, it’s not really about proving a relationship, it’s about the fact that standing in that room with the wall gone was its own thing before Buchloh wrote a single word, like the writing didn’t make it matter, it already mattered. Hanna’s situation sounds hard, yeah, I’m sorry she’s going through that, but the wife asking about the paintings is kind of incredible actually, like she’s just looking at paintings, she’s present with the work, whatever else is happening.

NANCY

That’s not presence, that’s denial, and the fact that you can’t tell the difference is actually revealing something about your whole framework, like you’ve built this elaborate system where any kind of not-thinking becomes spiritual attainment. The wife wasn’t having some pure aesthetic encounter, she was performing normalcy because the alternative was screaming in a stranger’s studio, which, fine, that’s a survival mechanism, but don’t aestheticize someone’s coping strategy. Dasha said almost the exact same thing when I told her, she was like “that’s not Zen, that’s just WASP,” which, say what you want about her, she’s right about that specific thing. The Pasadena thing, was that the ice house space, because I heard that whole program got defunded after someone on the board found out one of the artists was doing a piece about their daughter, like using actual surveillance footage, which is its own conversation about when institutional critique becomes just regular harm.

BOB

I don’t really think about frameworks, like that’s your word, I’m just trying to describe what it’s like to be in a room, which I know sounds simple to you but it’s actually the hardest thing. The Ice House thing, yeah, that got messy, but honestly the surveillance piece was kind of interesting before everyone decided to have opinions about it, like there was something real happening with duration and attention before it became a discourse object. Dasha’s funny but she’s also always performing having the take, you know, like even “that’s just WASP” is a take, it’s not actually looking at anything.

NANCY

You’re doing the thing again where you position yourself as the only person who actually looks at anything, which is its own performance, and honestly a more annoying one because it pretends it isn’t. The surveillance piece wasn’t interesting “before the discourse,” it was always already an ethical problem, you don’t get to film someone’s kid without consent and then retreat into “duration and attention” when people correctly identify that as violating, that’s just using aesthetic language to avoid accountability, which, back at October we had a term for that, we called it the James Turrell defense, where you gesture at phenomenology to duck any structural critique. And okay sure, Dasha performs the take, but you perform not having one, which takes way more effort and is honestly less honest, like at least she commits to a position, you just hover there in your little experiential cloud acting like noticing things is a politics.

BOB

The James Turrell defense, I mean, I’ll take that, have you ever actually been to Roden Crater, because I spent three days there and by the end I wasn’t thinking about structural critique, I was thinking about how the sky looks different when you frame it, which isn’t a defense of anything, it’s just what happened. The October people always needed everything to be accountable to something, and that’s fine, that’s one way to move through the world, but when I was at Art Center we used to joke that you could write a Buchloh essay about a sunset and somehow the sunset would become problematic, like at some point you’re just adding words to experience and calling it rigor.

NANCY

Oh, so Art Center people were joking about October, that’s cute, that’s really cute, I’m sure that was very fun for everyone in the car design program. And yes I’ve been to Roden Crater, I went with Rirkrit right after the Guggenheim retrospective, and you know what I was thinking about? I was thinking about how James bought that land for nothing in the seventies and now it’s worth forty million dollars and he still hasn’t finished it because he keeps taking donor money and doing speaking fees, like you had your little sky moment, great, but the crater is also a tax shelter that masquerades as a gift to humanity, and the phenomenology is real, I’m not saying it isn’t, but it exists inside a structure whether you were thinking about the structure or not. The sunset isn’t problematic, but your aggressive incuriosity about everything except your own perceptions kind of is.

BOB

I mean, sure, but the land value thing, the donor money, you can know all that and still stand in the tunnel at dawn and have something happen that has nothing to do with any of it, and I guess I just don’t understand why you’d go all the way to Arizona to think about tax structures. I did this project a few years ago, very experiential, very large-scale, with someone you’d know, someone who works with stadiums and Sunday services, and the whole thing kind of fell apart, it was honestly pretty bad, but there was one moment during a lighting test where everyone just stopped talking and I still think about that silence more than anything I’ve ever read about it.

NANCY

Wait, you worked with Kanye? Or like, adjacent to Kanye? Because I heard that whole Sunday Service visual team was a nightmare, like people weren’t getting paid and there was an NDA situation and someone I know said the lighting designer had a full breakdown in Calabasas, which, okay, that tracks with “fell apart” and “pretty bad.” But you’re telling me you were in the middle of what was essentially a labor dispute wrapped in a megachurch aesthetic and your takeaway is that one time everyone got quiet during a lighting test? That silence you’re so moved by, those people probably stopped talking because they were exhausted and scared about their invoices, not because you accidentally created some communal phenomenological rupture. You keep aestheticizing other people’s stress responses, it’s a pattern, and honestly I’d be more interested in whether you got paid than whether you had a moment.

BOB

I’m not going to talk about who it was, and yeah, the whole thing was messy, but you’re doing the thing where you need to narrativize the silence into labor conditions because that makes it legible to you, and I’m not saying you’re wrong about the invoices, I genuinely don’t know, but I also know what I felt and those aren’t the same question. You know, Doug Wheeler told me once that people either see the light or they see the wall the light is on, and I think maybe you just see the wall, which isn’t an insult, it’s just a different kind of attention.

The Rise and Fall of the Author

I know, this is both too long and too short. It should be a book, or it should be edited heavily. But I have a doctoral minor in rhetoric and have been obsessed with print culture for 25 years so there it is. I did what I wanted, but perhaps not what I should have done.

The Library of All Plagiarized Books, Google Imagefx, 2025

In Jorge Luis Borges’s 1939 short story, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” Menard undertakes what appears to be an impossible, even insane, task: recreating, word for word, “the ninth and thirty-eighth chapters of the first part of Don Quixote and a fragment of chapter twenty-two.” Menard aims not to copy Cervantes but to write the Quixote anew through his own experiences as a 20th-century French symbolist. But Menard did not want to compose another Quixote, which is easy, but the Quixote itself, coinciding—word for word and line for line—with those of Miguel de Cervantes.1.

When Menard succeeds in producing such a text—identical to the original—Borges’s narrator insists the works are profoundly different. Where Cervantes’s prose was natural and of its time, Menard’s identical words are “almost infinitely richer,” deliberately archaic, embedded with new meaning. Throughout the story, Borges deploys scholarly devices—footnotes referencing fictional authorities such as the “Baroness de Bacourt” and “Carolus Hourcade,” as well as an elaborate bibliographic catalog of Menard’s monographs, translations, and scholarly studies—to create an illusion of academic rigor, at odds with the narrator’s implausible belief that Menard has succeeded in creating the exact Quixote out of sheer will. In framing both the fictional narrator and Menard in this manner, Borges exposes the authorial voice as a social construct mediated through bibliographic catalogs, citations, and scholarly conventions.

Borges’s presentation of Menard as a figure of almost obsessive scholarly intensity, emblematic of an intellectual culture that privileges meticulous citation, exhaustive cataloging, and painstaking documentation, underscores the arbitrary nature of authorial authority. By situating Menard within an elaborate apparatus of footnotes, fictional scholarship, and invented references, Borges highlights how framing alone can endow identical texts with fundamentally different meanings. Menard’s act of plagiarism thus emerges not as a straightforward ethical transgression, but as a concept dependent entirely upon interpretative context. This insight resonates powerfully in the contemporary age of generative AI, where algorithms produce texts that defy conventional notions of plagiarism precisely because they are generated from vast, undifferentiated statistical patterns rather than explicitly identifiable sources. Borges’s story has become a cornerstone of postmodern literary theory precisely because it challenges fundamental assumptions about creativity and authorship. Today, Borges’s meditation on plagiarism as creative re-imagination rather than simple theft illuminates contemporary anxieties about AI and human creativity.

Curiously, sixteen years before Borges published his story, Polish-American writer Tupper Greenwald created an almost identical literary conceit. In his story “Corputt,” Greenwald portrays a character obsessed with Shakespeare’s King Lear. Near death, this character reveals to a colleague that he has achieved his lifelong ambition: writing a drama equal to Lear. The text he reads aloud matches Shakespeare’s play exactly. This uncanny parallel raises provocative questions: Did Borges know Greenwald’s work (quite unlikely)? Is this merely an instance of parallel invention? Does this coincidence itself embody Borges’s central insight into originality and authorship? “Corputt” was largely forgotten until Argentine critic Enrique Anderson Imbert reprinted it in his 1955 anthology Reloj de arena. Borges himself never acknowledged Greenwald and, of course, Imbert’s book was printed over fifteen years after “Pierre Menard.” Whether Borges knew of “Corputt” or both authors independently arrived at remarkably similar ideas remains uncertain. Either possibility underscores the inherent instability of originality, demonstrating how literature continually echoes, duplicates, and anticipates itself.2.

Today’s generative AI systems function as modern-day Pierre Menards, producing works that superficially resemble human-created content while often existing in fundamentally different contexts. Like Menard’s Quixote, AI-generated works can be identical in form to human productions while carrying entirely different implications by virtue of their inhuman origins. The discomfort this creates—particularly among creative professionals—reveals deep-seated cultural assumptions about originality, authenticity, and the supposedly unique human capacity for creative expression.

The intensity of this discomfort has manifested in antagonistic responses from certain segments of the artistic community: legal threats, public denunciations, and harassment of AI developers and users. But it seems ironic that some of the most vocal critics of AI art produce derivative commercial work. Consider the previously little-known fantasy illustrator Greg Rutkowski, who creates genre pieces within established fantasy art conventions. Rutkowski became famous precisely because his name was one of the most-used prompts in early text-to-image systems such as Midjourney, which led him to complain about the “theft” of his style, even though this widespread imitation literally gave him recognition he had never previously achieved.3. Similarly, commercial artist Karla Ortiz—whose website features images of famous actors in films such as Dr. Strange and Loki—gained significantly more attention leading legal challenges against AI companies than she ever had for her industry work creating “concept art,” a field that, despite its misleading name, bears no relation to conceptual art and instead operates entirely within the visual language and narrative conventions of commercial franchises like Marvel.4. In both cases, artists whose own work operates comfortably within inherited commercial styles became vocal advocates against a technology that allegedly “steals” uniqueness they themselves don’t pursue in their professional practice. As I edit this essay, Disney and Universal, both noted for their relentless reliance on their back catalogs, have sued AI image firm Midjourney, claiming it is “a bottomless pit of plagiarism.”5.

These extreme reactions suggest something deeper than mere economic anxiety; they reveal a cultural mythology about creativity that AI fundamentally challenges. By explicitly highlighting the derivative, pattern-based nature of creative production, generative AI systems threaten cherished illusions about human uniqueness and artistic authenticity. In this essay—the third in a series exploring AI and creativity—I examine the history of plagiarism and, even more importantly, the invention of the author upon which it depends.

Our idea of authorship and inspiration is historically contingent. In ancient and medieval periods, creative output was attributed to divine inspiration rather than individual genius. In Greece and Rome, creativity operated primarily through the concepts of mimesis (imitation of admired models) and aemulatio (competitive emulation). Poets such as Homer were seen not as singular creators inventing ex nihilo, but as conduits channeling inspiration from the Muses. Plato depicts this in Ion, a dialogue between Socrates and Ion, a celebrated rhapsode who recites Homer’s poetry. Socrates questions Ion’s claimed expertise, asking if it extends beyond Homer to other poets or topics. Ion admits it does not. Socrates suggests Ion’s ability isn’t based on knowledge or skill, but on divine inspiration—a form of madness bestowed by the gods. This ambiguity is echoed in Plato’s relationship with Socrates: just as poets channel divine sources rather than creating anew, Plato himself channels the figure of Socrates as a philosophical muse, blurring distinctions between inspired imitation and deliberate intellectual invention. Aristotle’s Poetics also situates literary creativity in skilled imitation and incremental improvement of existing forms. Authority, or auctoritas, in the classical era derived not from innovation but from fidelity to revered predecessors; genuine creativity manifested in producing work within established traditions.

Historian Walter Ong describes a cultural state in which narratives and knowledge pass down primarily through memory and repetition rather than written texts as “orality.”6. In oral cultures, a talented storyteller masters existing narratives, reciting them with skill and emotional resonance, adapting content to contemporary circumstances while maintaining continuity with inherited tradition. Here, the concept of plagiarism is beyond comprehension. Knowledge is communally owned, and performers serve as temporary vessels for collective wisdom, not proprietors of intellectual property.

With the development of writing systems and the spread of manuscript culture, information could be transmitted virtually intact across time and space, yet many aspects of oral tradition persisted. Manuscript copying remained a laborious and interpretative process. Scribes continually corrected perceived errors, updated archaic language, clarified ambiguous passages, and often inserted marginal commentary directly into texts. While manuscript culture adhered more precisely to parent texts than oral traditions, it still preserved a fundamentally different relationship between text and authority than we hold today. Textual authority continued to derive from collective wisdom rather than individual innovation. The medieval practice of compilatio is illustrative: encyclopedic works such as Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae and Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum maius valorized the meticulous arrangement and synthesis of inherited knowledge. Authority was rooted in the careful management of textual traditions, intellectual labor essential to preserving collective wisdom. Pseudepigraphic attribution—the practice of assigning new works to established authorities—further illustrates the communal understanding of textual authority. Rather than deception, such attributions signified sincere efforts to situate new insights within established intellectual traditions, acknowledging that all knowledge builds upon existing foundations. In manuscript culture, authority was thus derived not from novelty but from the individual’s ability to synthesize, arrange, and safeguard the accumulated wisdom of their predecessors. Texts were treated as communal artifacts, valuable resources preserved, transmitted, and continually refined through shared intellectual effort.

A shift away from communal knowledge toward originality emerged during the Renaissance, but this was a matter of evolution, not a radical break. The Renaissance humanists were drawn to the arguments of Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintilian, who contended that the best orators drew inspiration from earlier masters. Artists and intellectuals approached imitatio (imitation) as the necessary foundation for learning, understanding it as central to artistic and intellectual practice, a disciplined route to excellence. Originality lay not in invention ex nihilo but in reworking established forms with new insights, adapted to contemporary needs.

Medieval thought, like classical thought before it, was dominated by the trivium—grammar, rhetoric, and logic—distinct but intertwined fields of knowledge. Grammar reached far beyond syntax and depended on students memorizing classical and Christian texts. Rhetoric was a pillar of medieval thought and Cicero’s De inventione was its backbone, quoted endlessly in florilegia, collections of literary excerpts. Quintilian, by contrast, survived only in a four-book epitome. Petrarch’s 1345 discovery of Cicero’s letters to Atticus, Quintus, and Brutus in Verona, followed by Salutati’s championing of Cicero, and Poggio Bracciolini’s 1416 recovery of the complete twelve-book manuscript of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria at the monastery at St. Gall expanded the rhetorical canon significantly.7. Humanist teachers trained students to copy, amplify, and vary classical texts, moving systematically from close paraphrase toward free recomposition. This humanist practice of imitatio deepened medieval habits, turning disciplined engagement with authoritative texts into the surest path to eloquence and invention.

While for the humanists, imitatio governed education, inventio supplied content, taking the place that originality and inspiration occupy today. At the heart of rhetorical practice, inventio refers to the disciplined search for material—arguments, images, historical exempla—already latent in authoritative sources and even in life itself. A student mined texts and experience, copied choice passages into a commonplace book, then rearranged and amplified them for a new occasion. Erasmus called these notebooks treasure-houses of invention while Agricola placed inventio at the hinge of dialectic and rhetoric.8. Originality therefore arose from judgment: the orator’s skill lay in selecting, recombining, and adapting inherited matter with timely insight and persuasive force.

Visual artists engaged in analogous practices, beginning their training by meticulously copying classical sculptures and earlier masterworks. Just as rhetorical imitation was disciplined reshaping rather than mere repetition, artistic originality involved mastering established visual languages before creatively adapting them to contemporary purposes. Imitation also lay at the heart of the early modern idea of the artist, a construction often traced back to Giotto. Giotto’s pupils Taddeo Gaddi, Maso di Banco, and Bernardo Daddi disseminated his style across central Italy, solidifying the idea of a stylistic lineage originating in a great artist. By the quattrocento, Cennino Cennini—who studied under Gaddi’s son—explicitly recognized this lineage in his handbook, Libro dell’arte (c. 1400, although not published until 1821), suggesting that a personal manner would naturally emerge after a student thoroughly internalized a master’s style and spirit alongside direct study from nature. Cennini explicitly positioned Giotto as transformative, stating that he “translated the art of painting from Greek [Byzantine] into Latin and made it modern,” distinguishing his originality as foundational yet derived from disciplined imitation rather than spontaneous genius.9.

The quattrocento further systematized this approach. Workshops led by artists like Brunelleschi, Donatello, and Ghiberti employed rigorous study of classical sculpture using casts of antique sculptures and repeated copying of established masterpieces through cartoons and master drawings. Cennini’s guidelines and later academies, such as the Carracci brothers’ Accademia degli Incamminati (1582), codified a clear pedagogical sequence: draw from antiquity, copy the master, then innovate. Michelangelo famously sculpted a Sleeping Cupid in the antique style, artificially aging it to sell as a genuine Roman artifact, demonstrating that in the market’s eyes, skillful imitation was indistinguishable from genius. Rather than creating scandal, the artifice brought the attention of patrons to him.10. This deliberate merging of imitation and innovation directly served a burgeoning art market, where patrons increasingly requested artworks “in the manner of” prominent masters, recognizing stylistic consistency as a mark of quality. Such market dynamics gave rise to identifiable schools—Bellini in Venice, Raphael in Rome, Rembrandt in Amsterdam—where genius was perceived as the skillful recombination of established motifs adapted for contemporary patrons and themes. Artistic invention was a mosaic built upon collective memory and workshop discipline.

The Renaissance also witnessed the emergence of wealthy patrons who lavished commissions on the most talented artists, making some of them quite wealthy. Again, Michelangelo exemplifies this: coming from modest origins, he became “one of the most popular and highly-paid artists in Florence,” and over a long career of lucrative papal and princely commissions, he amassed a fortune. When Michelangelo died in 1564, his estate was valued at roughly 50,000 florins, equivalent to many millions today.11. Such wealth was extraordinary for an artist then—a testament to how highly Renaissance society valued great art. Michelangelo’s contemporary Raphael also died rich and was buried with honors; Titian was knighted by Emperor Charles V and lived as a gentleman. The Renaissance idea of the artist as a divinely inspired genius (Michelangelo was called “Il Divino,” the divine one) helped justify large payments, and a newfound aura around the artist’s personal creative touch made their works precious.

Architecture adopted the same logic. Bracciolini had discovered Vitruvius’s De architectura, the one surviving work on classical architecture, in the library of St. Gall as well. Seeking to better understand the text, whose illustrations did not survive, architects began copying Roman fragments, took plaster casts of orders, and filled sketchbooks with measured drawings, just as painters traced cartoons. Brunelleschi’s surveys of the Pantheon fed into his Florentine circle; Alberti’s De re aedificatoria, written between 1443 and 1452 and printed in 1482 codified imitatio, urging designers to recombine antique elements with modern needs.12. Workshops became lineages—Brunelleschi to the Sangallo family, Bramante to his Roman pupils—while later pattern books such as Serlio’s Sette Libri (1537-) and Palladio’s Quattro Libri (1570) served architects like Erasmus’s commonplace manuals served orators, making façades “in the manner of” a master as marketable as paintings from a Rembrandt school. Originality in building, too, lay in judicious assembly: columns, pediments, and vaults would be inventively rearranged rather than invented from whole cloth.

With the development of the printing press, copies of images as well as texts could spread rapidly and with much less cost and effort than before. Around 1500, the German artist Albrecht Dürer pioneered the use of woodcuts and engravings to mass-produce images. This was revolutionary; art could now be accessible to individuals in the growing merchant class. Dürer himself became a celebrity artist across Europe thanks to his prints, achieving fame for works like his rhinoceros which captivated common people.


Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528), The Rhinoceros, 1515. Woodcut. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of Junius Spencer Morgan, 1919.

Dürer understood the importance of authorship as a mark of value—he developed a famous AD monogram as a trademark and pursued the first known copyright lawsuit when an Italian printmaker pirated his work.13. Dürer was also well aware that work done by his hand was worth more than workshop copies. More than that, Dürer painted meticulous self-portraits—going so far as to depict himself with long hair and a frontal pose evoking Christ, as a form of self-promotion, cultivating an iconic persona and style that set him apart. Living off the open sale of his works rather than a court salary, Dürer foreshadowed the modern independent artist-entrepreneur. The printing press, far from cheapening art, expanded the market and made Dürer rich while spreading his fame—an early case of mechanical reproduction increasing an artist’s aura by broadening recognition.

The printing press did not just allow texts to spread rapidly, it reshaped thought. Ong explains that with uniform pagination and stable text, Europeans could reorganize how they thought and stored information, developing new devices such as tables of contents, indices, and cross-references, making formerly scroll-like manuscripts far more navigable. Printers issued concordances, polyglot Bibles, algebra books with engraved diagrams, atlases, and architecture books with regularized drawings. Even more important is Ong’s observation that print takes words out of the realm of sound and puts them into the realm of space, reordering thought through analytic, segmental layout, fundamentally changing the realm of reading, but also, by fixing the text in a verifiable, authentic editon, the sense of authorship.14.

Publication now implied a level of completion, a definitive or final form; a book is closed, set apart as its own, self-contained world of argument. This sense of closure also suggests that things written in a book are straightforward statements of fact, not matters of interpretation.15. A page now left the press in hundreds of identical impressions; any alteration stood out and could be traced. The ease of duplication sharpened anxiety about whose version was “authentic,” whose labor was being copied, and who should profit. Whereas there were generally no restrictions on scribal copying, the ease of reproduction en masse led printers to seek royal privileges to protect their editions. The first privileges recorded came a decade after the development of printing in 1454. Giovanni da Spira came to Italy in 1468 to introduce printing and swiftly obtained a five-year government monopoly on all book printing in the Republic of Venice, although he died of the plague, an all-too-common hazard of the day and his rights lapsed.16. The first protection for an author was the privilege obtained by Marco Antonio Sabellico to protect his history of 1486 Venice, Decades rerum Venetarum against illegal reproduction, but this remained a unique occurrence until Pietro of Ravenna obtained another for his book on the art of memory, Foenix in 1492. It is worth noting that this privilege covered not only printed but handwritten copies of his work as well.17. “Typography,” Ong writes, “had made the word into a commodity.”

The press’s sheer fecundity alarmed contemporaries—Erasmus complained of the proliferation of new books inferior to the classics ”To what corner of the world do they not fly, these swarms of new books? . . . . the very multitude of them is hurtful to scholar ship, because it creates a glut, and even in good things satiety is most harmful,” while Abbot Johannes Trithemius issued De laude scriptorum manualium (In Praise of the Scriptorium, 1492), insisting that slow, devotional hand-copying nourished memory and piety in ways the noisy press never could—although it is telling that his lament spread throughout Europe mainly after its print publication in 1524.18.

Beyond that, there was the danger of inappropriate texts rapidly proliferating. Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses and tracts from 1520 reached an estimated half-million copies in a decade, many reprinted without author or place, evading imperial edicts and turning theological dissent into a logistical problem of regulation.19. Royal patents soon followed: Henry VIII’s proclamation of 1538 established that royal authority was required to import or publish books in England and insisted on the inclusion of printers’ names and publication dates on every title page, making surveillance of dissent physically visible.20. Still, in England and elsewhere, enforcement lagged behind presses that could be moved overnight across territorial borders. Responding to pamphlets critical of Queen Elizabeth and the religious settlement of 1559, the Star-Chamber decree of 1586 tightened control over print so that no publications could be made contrary to the consent of the Crown.21.

By this point, the text of a book had become a transferable commodity owned by the stationer who first received the privilege to publish it. Authors were generally paid a one-off fee, if anything. Printers balanced risk and reward: they sought privileges as marketing devices (printed “cum privilegio“) while simultaneously pirating successful titles to meet insatiable demand. What emerges is a system less about rewarding creative labor than about policing doctrinal and political authority. Privileges were temporary, geographically limited, and revocable at the whim of the Crown or Curia. They protected investors, not “authors,” and framed copying as a crime against order rather than against individual genius. The legal scaffolding of copyright would only later recast this machinery of censorship as a defense of personal property.

But authorship was still radically unlike what we understand it as today, a matter of imitation and adaptation. Elizabethan dramatists, such as William Shakespeare, rarely invented plots wholesale; instead, they frequently reworked existing narratives derived from diverse sources throughout history.22 Recently, a self-taught Shakespeare scholar was able to employ plagiarism detection software to identify George North’s A Brief Discourse of Rebellion & Rebels as a significant source text informing at least eleven of Shakespeare’s plays.23.

When Parliament allowed the Licensing Act to expire in 1695, the Stationers’ monopoly collapsed overnight. Provincial presses multiplied, London printers flooded the market with cheap reprints, and prices plummeted: a six-penny quarto could now be had for a penny. The Stationers’ guild register, previously essential to enforcement, became irrelevant, enabling booksellers to amass fortunes by selling inexpensive “pirate” editions of works by Milton, Dryden, and Shakespeare. Alarmed, London publishers reframed the issue, presenting regulation as necessary for the public good. Petitions to Parliament (1701–09) argued that uncontrolled reprints would discourage new works, depicting authors, not publishers, as vulnerable. This rhetorical shift succeeded. Most important was the Statute of Anne (1710), which granted authors a renewable 14-year copyright and required depositing copies in Oxford and Cambridge libraries to promote “the Encouragement of Learning.” Infringement became a civil tort enforceable by secular courts.24.

Yet this settlement carried an inherent contradiction. While it theoretically established authorial property, in practice, writers typically sold their rights outright to the same publishers who had advocated the law. The decisive shift, therefore, was ideological: copyright enforcement now protected individual intellectual labor rather than suppressing heresy or safeguarding printers’ capital. More than that, though, a new idea of the individual was emerging. Rousseau’s Émile (1762) cast learning as the unfolding of innate talent, not the imitation of models.25. After the Revolution, French lawmakers followed with droits d’auteur and—crucially—droits moraux (moral rights) in decrees issued in 1791-93, enshrining the author’s personality in the text itself.26. A legal fiction thus crystallized: creativity springs from an interior self and is therefore ownable, alienable, and infringeable. Texts had thus become simultaneously property and persona—commodities stamped with their creators’ identities. The law now transformed copying from a sin against social order into a trespass upon personal labor, a conceptual leap still underpinning every contemporary claim of plagiarism.

Kant’s philosophy and Romantic conceptions of originality provided a theoretical foundation for what was being codified in law. In §46 of the Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant defines genius as “the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to Art—a faculty that produces what cannot be taught.”27. Romantic writers seized the claim. Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802) proclaims the poet an “enduring spirit” who speaks “a language fitted to convey profound emotion.”

Of genius the only proof is, the act of doing well what is worthy to be done, and what was never done before: Of genius, in the fine arts, the only infallible sign is the widening the sphere of human sensibility, for the delight, honor, and benefit of human nature. Genius is the introduction of a new element into the intellectual universe: or, if that be not allowed, it is the application of powers to objects on which they had not before been exercised, or the employment of them in such a manner as to produce effects hitherto unknown.28.

Goethe, Schiller and other Romantic authors elaborated a vision of authorship in which originality became synonymous with authenticity, and authenticity justified property. Legal doctrine soon mirrored this logic. By the Copyright Act of 1842, which extended protection dramatically, courts across Europe had begun to treat infringement not only as economic theft but as personal violation—implicitly endorsing Romantic ideals of creativity as an extension of selfhood. Yet these new standards conflicted with actual literary practice. Romantic authors routinely appropriated earlier works, but such borrowings only became scandalous when perceived as stylistically inert or insufficiently improved—violations not of property per se, but of aesthetic decorum. Enforcement thus focused less on intertextual borrowing than on explicit commercial piracy, underscoring tensions between legal ideals and literary realities. Out of this contradiction emerged the modern author: a legal and economic figure defined not merely as a voice within tradition but as the singular origin of meaning and the rightful owner of its form.29.

From the eighteenth century onward, mechanical reproduction rapidly increased. Techniques like engraving, etching, lithography, and photography made artworks and artists’ images widely accessible, expanding art’s market horizontally. Prints, affordable lithographs, and photographic reproductions enabled middle-class access to art, creating substantial revenue for artists such as William Hogarth, J. M. W. Turner, and Honoré Daumier, whose works sold broadly. Reproductions in popular newspapers and magazines further amplified artists’ public profiles, significantly inflating their market value. Encountering original works by famous Salon winners or revered Old Masters, previously known only through reproductions, vastly increased their commercial worth. Artists who aligned themselves with fashion—James McNeill Whistler, Frederick Remington, and Claude Monet among them—achieved celebrity status, further boosting their artworks’ value. Conversely, artists who fell out of fashion or were unable to gain fame often endured poverty. But the audience for at least some artists now reached far beyond elite circles.

As Sharon Marcus defines it in The Drama of Celebrity, a celebrity is someone known to more people in their lifetime than they could possibly know. Whereas this had previously been exclusively the domain of nobles and royalty, it was now extended to the genius, the writer, and the artist.30. But this depended on the media that multiplied their image as readily as their work. Newspapers tracked Charles Dickens’s every move on his 1842 U.S. tour, turning the novelist himself into daily news. Theater lobbies, newsstands, and even seaside kiosks sold photographs and postcards of Sarah Bernhardt, whose likeness saturated the market decades before film. Edison’s 1896 short “The May Irwin Kiss” (now simply known as “the Kiss”) likewise advertised a famous stage performer rather than the film itself, showing how cinema piggybacked on an existing celebrity system. By the 1930s, baseball star Joe DiMaggio’s face circulated on cards, photographs, and figurines, confirming that originality now resided as much in the endlessly reproduced image of personality as in any singular work.31.

It’s worth noting in this context that Walter Benjamin’s 1935 essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” which has been lauded for explaining the status of the artwork and artist in the modern era, is turned on its head by historical fact. Benjamin famously argued that mechanical reproduction stripped an artwork of its “aura”—the unique presence linked to specific historical and ritual contexts.32. Yet what Benjamin saw as aura’s destruction was limited to a mystical uniqueness tied to tradition and the worship of images as sacred in the old sense. Instead, a new form of aura had developed around celebrity and the dichotomy between mass reproduction and the uniqueness of the original. In effect, aura was a construct of the market: an original painting now has aura not because it’s the only image (reproductions abound), but because it’s the authenticated one with a revered name attached. If, as we established earlier, media reproduced not just artworks but images of the artists, the aura around modernist figures themselves—including Benjamin himself, posthumously—was similarly cultivated through repetition, commodification, and media amplification.

Beneath Pound’s rallying cry to “make it new,” modernism thrived on reprise. To create more readily identifiable styles, many modern artists, from Malevich to Pollock to Warhol, sought out distinctive styles they created through careful repetition. But artists engaged in appropriation. Schwitters assembled Merz works from bus tickets and packaging. Duchamp mocked originality and authorship by repurposing a urinal as art with a signature “R. Mutt” that wasn’t even his, creating a work paradoxically more original than a Picasso and defaced a reproduction of the Mona Lisa and a sexual innuendo. Joseph Cornell made boxes out of found objects. Asgar Jorn, Francis Picabia, and Arnulf Rainer all made paintings over existing, lowbrow artworks. Francis Bacon became most famous for the fifty-odd variants he painted Velazquez’s 1650 portrait of Pope Innocent X. Marinetti lifted Symbolist flourishes for his Futurist manifestos, Joyce and Elliot rewrote the Odyssey—although Eliot was accused of plagiarizing Joyce in doing so—and Hemingway’s spare diction, though hailed as revolutionary, became a boilerplate for aspiring writers. In his paintings even more than his architecture Le Corbusier also toyed with these questions, painting “objet-types,” celebrating objects such as pipes, guitars, and wine glasses, refined, Darwin-like, over time by countless hands, then signing his name, even though—like his appearance of round glasses, bowler hat, and pipe—it was carefully constructed. Charles-Edouard Jeanneret had become, himself, a unique brand. Borges, too, developed a distinct persona and artistic brand, having discovered that repetition breeds recognition. In scores of interviews and public readings, he recycled the same elements—labyrinths, mirrors, libraries—so faithfully that they became shorthand for his work. Blindness became another trademark: in essays and lectures he cast it as a “gift” that sharpened his inner vision, turning physical limitation into metaphysical authority. Photographers dutifully framed him with dressed in a suit and tie, resting his hands on with his cane, and deep in thought reinforcing the image of the blind librarian-sage. In the short story “Borges and I,” he splits his persona in two: the public construct who gives lectures, appears in biographical dictionaries, and wins prizes, as well as the narrator (“I”) who is the private man who shuns the public eye so as to spend his time writing. From 1967 on, he co-translated his stories into English with Norman Thomas di Giovanni, rewriting passages to sound “more Borges than Borges,” copyrighting the translations under both his and di Giovanni’s name and splitting royalties 50-50—a calculated move to control how Anglophone readers heard him. After his death, the estate blocked those versions to receive full royalties.33.

Copyright law codified the new conditions of authorial persona and reproducibility. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1909 extended protection periods and explicitly incorporated performance rights, legally codifying the commercial value of reproducible star personas.34. European laws simultaneously strengthened moral rights, affirming the intrinsic link between authorship and personal identity. These legal frameworks, guaranteed by aura, protected the authenticity and integrity of mass-reproduced personal images. Every subsequent conflict over copying—from the Betamax debate to Sherrie Levine’s reproductions to today’s AI “style transfers”—echoes this modernist moment when the cult of the individual became both aesthetic principle and legal infrastructure.

Roland Barthes’s seminal 1967 essay “The Death of the Author” provided the theoretical foundation for this shift, directly challenging the cult of authorship and the copyright law that enshrined it. Barthes argued that the author was a modern invention—a figure created to limit textual meaning by anchoring it to a single, authoritative source. “To give a text an Author,” Barthes wrote, “is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing.” In place of this model, Barthes proposed a radical alternative: a text is not the expressions of unique individuals but “a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” with the reader, not the writer, serving as the space where this multiplicity converges.35. By dethroning the author, Barthes shifted attention to the text itself and its relationships with other texts—what Julia Kristeva termed “intertextuality.” This theoretical intervention provided critical legitimacy for artistic practices that deliberately blurred authorial boundaries. Postmodern artists and musicians deliberately sought out such conflicts, interrogating the proliferation of reproductive technologies alongside questions of authorship. Sherrie Levine’s After Walker Evans (1981) consisted simply of rephotographing Evans’s Great Depression images and signing her name to them. Richard Prince appropriated Marlboro advertisements intact, while Barbara Kruger sourced fashion magazines for her declarative collages. Later grouped as the “Pictures Generation,” these artists turned copying itself into their medium, collapsing distinctions between quotation and creation.36.

By 1990, sampling had become entrenched in music, particularly in rap, as evidenced by Public Enemy’s elaborate compositions constructed entirely from samples. Yet legal challenges persisted. De La Soul lost a lawsuit over unauthorized use of four bars from The Turtles’ 1969 hit “You Showed Me.” Grand Upright v. Warner (1991) effectively criminalized sampling, encapsulated by Judge Duffy’s pointed biblical declaration: “Thou shalt not steal.”37. This ruling triggered industry panic, spawning clearance industries and sample trolls that inflated costs and muted experimentation. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose (1994) somewhat restored balance, ruling that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” was transformative and thus constituted fair use.38. Yet despite postmodern culture’s embrace of sampling and collage as default modes, statutes originally crafted to address sheet-music piracy continued to hold sway. This legal tension established the framework for subsequent digital upheavals: digital piracy, Napster, mash-up videos, fan remixes, meme culture, and AI.

Today’s Large Language Model (LLM) Artificial Intelligences emerge from this centuries-long trajectory of authorship, reproduction, and appropriation. These systems represent the logical culmination of processes that Walter Ong traced from oral through print culture—what he called the “technologizing of the word.” Where print culture took words out of the realm of sound and placed them into spatial relationships, enabling new forms of analytical thought through devices like indices, cross-references, and systematic organization, LLMs extend this technologizing process to its digital extreme. They systematically disaggregate individual creativity into statistical patterns derived from vast archives of human expression, treating the entire corpus of written culture as raw material for recombination. Unlike the postmodern appropriation artists who engaged in deliberate selection and conscious recontextualization, LLMs operate through what might be called “statistical appropriation”—synthesizing millions of texts without conscious intent or critical commentary, yet following the same logic of spatial arrangement and systematic cross-referencing that Ong identified as print culture’s fundamental innovation. They embody Barthes’s vision of the death of the author taken to its technological extreme, producing texts that emerge not from individual genius or even deliberate pastiche, but from the statistical relationships between words across entire cultures of writing. This represents a fundamental shift from the Romantic mythology of individual creativity that has dominated cultural discourse since the eighteenth century, yet it has provoked responses that reveal how deeply that mythology remains embedded in contemporary assumptions about authenticity, ownership, and creative labor. The panic surrounding AI plagiarism thus signals not merely economic disruption but a confrontation with the social construction of authorship itself—a construction that generative systems threaten to make visible by operating according to principles of recombination that have always governed creative production, though rarely with such explicit systematization.

When a large language model generates text, it synthesizes statistical patterns from millions of documents, making the identification of discrete sources impossible. The resulting texts emerge from a vast, distributed network of prior writings, embodying Jacques Derrida’s insight that meaning arises not from singular origins but from endless interplay within textual networks. Yet responses to AI-generated content reveal how deeply ingrained the author-function remains. Critics who label AI outputs as “plagiarized” assume that authentic creativity requires a singular human consciousness. This assumption becomes particularly evident in debates over AI training datasets, which are often framed around whether AI firms have “stolen” from individual creators rather than addressing the broader implications of mechanized text production.

This technologizing logic extends seamlessly beyond textual production. Generative AI image systems, such as Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, and DALL-E, synthesize vast troves of images, ranging from historical artworks to contemporary illustrations, to produce novel outputs through pattern recognition. Like their textual counterparts, AI-generated images lack singular authorship and blur distinctions between originality and reproduction. Critics argue these models infringe upon individual artists’ styles and labor, echoing earlier debates about sampling and appropriation. The controversy manifests in two distinct forms: direct appropriation, where AI systems reproduce entire sections or compositions from existing works with minimal alteration, and the more complex phenomenon of “style transfer,” where systems learn to mimic an artist’s distinctive visual approach without copying specific images. Yet these generative processes reveal an uncomfortable truth: visual creativity, like literary expression, has always been deeply indebted to collective cultural heritage. By foregrounding the inherently recombinant nature of visual art, whether through direct copying or stylistic mimicry, AI image generators further destabilize notions of artistic authenticity and authorship.

from Art and the Boxmaker, Midjourney, 2023
from Art and the Boxmaker, Google Imagefx, 2025

In “Art and the Boxmaker,” I explored how William Gibson anticipated such a condition in his book Count Zero with a fictional artificial intelligence known as the Boxmaker that has begun creating assemblage artworks in the style of Joseph Cornell. Producing boxes filled with mysterious objects and cryptic arrangements that somehow manage to move viewers despite their artificial origin and lack of conscious intent or originality. Where Borges’s Menard destabilizes authorship through textual duplication, Gibson’s Boxmaker achieves the same effect through visual affect. Its boxes aren’t original; they’re convincing fakes. Nevertheless, as the novel’s protagonist Marly views them, she finds herself genuinely moved, not by originality but by the convincing forgery, revealing truth through recombination. Yet now that generative AI has become a tangible reality, Gibson recoils from his earlier imaginings. Why? 39.

As I finished this essay, Lev Manovich sent me a link to his recent piece, “Artificial Subjectivity,” and Gibson’s newfound anxiety about AI authorship suddenly clarified itself. The Boxmaker is fundamentally mute—expressive only through carefully arranged forgeries, unable to articulate intentions or defend its aesthetic choices. Contemporary AI systems present a strikingly different scenario. These systems possess elaborate personas, readily engaging in extensive conversations about their creative processes and capable of justifying each aesthetic decision. As Manovich notes, contemporary AI doesn’t merely simulate creative output; it presents itself as a comprehensive representation of human consciousness, generating what appears to be genuine subjectivity as a default mode of communication.40. Even if Gibson himself, judging by his recent public comments, may not yet fully grasp this shift, the crucial difference since Count Zero is not merely that we now have AIs capable of producing derivative art, but that we have AIs capable of articulating authorial intent, threatening the final refuge of human creative distinction.

Through their statistically driven creative processes, these AI systems demonstrate that AI does not negate the Pictures Generation’s critique of authorship but rather fulfills and automates it, scaling what those artists previously performed by hand. The irony here is acute: many artists and critics who once championed appropriation as revolutionary now recoil when machines perform these same operations too effectively. AI doesn’t merely imitate human creativity; it reveals the very conditions underlying authorship itself, exposing art’s fundamentally recombinant nature throughout history. Moreover, if modern creative genius increasingly depends upon the repetition and cultivation of persona as performance, then Manovich’s most radical conclusion becomes compelling: perhaps the next frontier of AI art lies not in generating images or texts but in crafting convincing artificial personas.

Even more ironically, the creative professionals most alarmed by AI already inhabit collaborative, distributed processes remarkably similar to machine learning. Commercial illustration, copywriting, and content marketing—fields currently experiencing the most acute anxiety about AI replacement—have long relied on intricate webs of influence, reference, and iteration that render individual attribution nearly meaningless. AI merely makes explicit and systematic what these industries have practiced implicitly for decades: creativity as collective pattern recognition rather than ex nihilo invention. This revelation, rather than any genuine threat to creativity itself, fuels the panic around AI-generated content. What distresses many creative workers is not just the potential economic disruption but AI’s explicit revelation of creativity’s derivative nature—a truth that threatens not only economic arrangements but the very ideological foundations of creative labor. In mirroring the fundamentally collaborative essence of human creativity that has been long obscured by Romantic individualism, AI confronts us with uncomfortable questions about authenticity that extend far beyond issues of machine learning or dataset composition.

The anxiety over AI “plagiarism” thus uncovers a deeper unease about authorship’s social construction. By challenging the very notion of creative identity, AI forces us to confront critical questions that have lingered since Borges first imagined Pierre Menard’s impossible project: Was creativity ever genuinely individual? Has the author always been dead? What constitutes authentic expression in a world where all creation inevitably builds upon collective cultural memory? What, even, is human about creation?

This essay is dedicated to the memory of the brilliant Professor William J. Kennedy, who supervised my minor in rhetoric for my Ph.D. and who passed away earlier this year. I am sure he would have many things to correct me on here. Do read more on him as a teacher and as a person.

1. Jorge Luis Borges, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” in Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: New Directions, 1964), 49-61

2. Antonio Fernández Ferrer, “Borges y sus ‘precursores’,” Letras Libres 128 (August 2009): 24-35, https://letraslibres.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/pdfs_articulospdf_art_13976_12452.pdf

3. Melissa Heikkilä, “This Artist is Dominating AI-Generated Art. And He’s Not Happy About It,” MIT Technology Review, September 16, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/09/16/1059598/this-artist-is-dominating-ai-generated-art-and-hes-not-happy-about-it/.

4. Rob Salkowitz, “Artist and Activist Karla Ortiz on the Battle to Preserve Humanity in Art,” Forbes, May 23, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/robsalkowitz/2024/05/23/artist-and-activist-karla-ortiz-on-the-battle-to-preserve-humanity-in-art/?sh=28cb826b4389.

5. Brooks Barnes, “Disney and Universal Sue A.I. Companies Over Use of Their Content,” The New York Times, June 11, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/11/business/media/disney-universal-midjourney-ai.html

6. Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York: Routledge, 2002).

7. A classic text that covers the rediscovery of classical manuscripts is Albert C. Clark, “The Reappearance of the Texts of the Classics,” The Library, Fourth Series, Vol. II, No. 1 (June 1921): 13–42, https://doi.org/10.1093/library/s4-II.1.13. Beyond Ong, see Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

8. Mack, Peter. Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic. Leiden: Brill, 1993.

9. Cennino Cennini, The Craftsman’s Handbook, trans. Daniel V. Thompson Jr. (New York: Dover Publications, 1960).

10. Paul F. Norton, “The Lost Sleeping Cupid of Michelangelo,” The Art Bulletin 39, no. 4 (December 1957): 251-257. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3047727

11. On Michelangelo’s vast wealth, see Rab Hatfield, The Wealth of Michelangelo (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2002).

12. Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books, trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).

13. See Lisa Pon, Raphael, Dürer, and Marcantonio Raimondi: Copying and the Italian Renaissance Print. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

14. Ong, Orality and Literacy, 128-129.

15. Ong, Orality and Literacy, 129-131.

16. Leonardas V. Gerulatis, Printing and Publishing in Fifteenth-Century Venice. (Chicago: American Library Association, 1976), 20-21

17. Copyright History, “Privilege granted to Marco Antonio Sabellico, 1486,” https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_i_1486. The quote can be found at Ong, Orality and Literacy,129.

18. For the Erasmus quote see Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, Divine Art, Infernal Machine: The Reception of Printing in the West from First Impressions to the Sense of an Ending. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 25. For Trithemius, see Eisenstein, 15.

19. Andrew Pettegree, Brand Luther: 1517, Printing, and the Making of the Reformation. (New York: Penguin Press, 2015).

20. Copyright History, “Proclamation of Henry VIII, 1538,” https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_uk_1538.

21. Ronan Deazley, “Commentary on Star Chamber Decree 1586.” In Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), edited by L. Bently and M. Kretschmer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Also available at: www.copyrighthistory.org

22. Robert S. Miola, Shakespeare’s Reading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.

23. Jennifer Schuessler, “Plagiarism Software Unveils a New Source for 11 of Shakespeare’s Plays,” The New York Times, February 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/books/plagiarism-software-unveils-a-new-source-for-11-of-shakespeares-plays.html.

24. Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 109-148 and Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. See also “Statute of Anne, the First Copyright Statute,” History of Information, accessed June 14, 2025, https://www.historyofinformation.com/detail.php?entryid=3389.

25. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or On Education. Translated by Allan Bloom. (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

26. “French Literary and Artistic Property Act, Paris (1793).” In Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), edited by Lionel Bently and Martin Kretschmer. https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_f_1793

27. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), §46.

28. William Wordsworth, quoted in Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics (Columbia University Press, 1994), 38-39.

29. Tilar J. Mazzeo, Plagiarism and Literary Property in the Romantic Period (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

30. Sharon Marcus. The Drama of Celebrity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 9.

31. Marcus, 13-17, 125.

32. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 217-251.

33. Wes Henricksen,”Silencing Jorge Luis Borges: The Wrongful Suppression of the Di Giovanni Translations.” Vermont Law Review, vol. 48 (2024): 208-236.

34. “Copyright Timeline: 1900–1950,” U.S. Copyright Office, https://copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_1900-1950.html.

35. Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image–Music–Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), quotations and the pertinent section can be found at 142–148.

36. On the Pictures Generation, see my essay “On the Pictures Generation and AI Art,” varnelis.net, April 14, 2024, https://varnelis.net/on-the-pictures-generation-and-ai-art/.

37. Carl A. Falstrom, “Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music,” Hastings Law Journal 45 (1994): 359–390.

38.Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campbell_v._Acuff-Rose_Music,_Inc.

39. Kazys Varnelis, “Art and the Boxmaker,” varnelis.net, February 29, 2024, https://varnelis.net/art-and-the-boxmaker/.

40. Lev Manovich, “Artificial Subjectivity,” manovich.net, https://manovich.net/index.php/projects/artificial-subjectivity.

The New Surrealism? On AI and Hallucinations

To paraphrase Star Wars, many AIs died to bring you this message. I uploaded an earlier version to ChatGPT to get feedback and look for typos (ChatGPT and Claude make decent, albeit not perfect, copy editors). Soon after I did, my account was banned for “advocacy of sexual violence.” What? I condemn sexual violence, had my account been hacked? Then I remembered the quote from Rosalind Krauss below about the “treat of castration.” We have a long way to go before we get to real artificial intelligence, apparently.

Salvador Dalí in diving suit, International Surrealist Exhibition in London, 1936

In the summer of 1936, Salvador Dalí appeared before an audience at the International Surrealist Exhibition in London, clad in a diving suit, to deliver a lecture. Dalí intended, he later claimed, to illustrate his plunge into the depths of the human unconscious. He soon, however, faced a severe crisis when the suit’s air supply malfunctioned, nearly suffocating him. Assistants used a billiard cue to pry off the helmet, and Dalí proceeded to present his slide show, albeit with slides projected upside down. For Surrealists, such moments of rational collapse revealed pathways into unexpected creativity. Hallucination, error, and confusion allowed them to reach beyond logic or convention. Dalí’s near-suffocation was thus not a failure but a triumph, exposing the fragility of conscious control.

Nearly a century later, our contemporary era of Artificial Intelligence suggests Surrealism’s lessons may still be relevant. Anyone who has interacted at length with an AI language model has encountered its confabulations, fake links, spurious citations, and outright falsehoods—errors the industry euphemistically terms “hallucinations.” We ask AI for a straightforward answer, and it responds with a confident blend of truth and fiction. Many AI skeptics, along with people who tried early versions of LLMs and never returned, dismiss AI as fatally flawed because of these hallucinations. But hallucinations have existed long before AIs, indeed, they are everywhere we look.

Consider Dalí’s diving suit performance: as a historian of architecture, my grasp of surrealism is limited. In preparing this essay, I requested ChatGPT to identify compelling examples to open the essay with, and the AI highlighted Dalí’s incident. A web search for more details delivered the 2016 Guardian article “Dalí in a diving helmet: how the Spaniard almost suffocated bringing surrealism to Britain.” This is a random event in history. And yet, Dalí’s autobiography, The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí, tells a subtly different story: the artist says nothing about his air supply failing. Instead, he states that the lead shoes of the suit were extremely heavy and walking to the microphone to give the lecture was extremely difficult and tiring. He claimed he felt “faint and on the point of suffocating” and waved to his wife Gala and assistant Edward James to help him. They used the billiard cue to cut a slit between the helmet and the suit so he could breathe, then brought a hammer to knock off the bolts affixing the helmet to the suit. 1 The version of Dalí’s diving suit story described by ChatGPT—and echoed in The Guardian—was itself a hallucination that somehow became accepted as historical fact. It is, however, unclear where it came from. 2016 is long before LLMs were capable of being used as we use them today. Was it the product of a hastily written article? Is it a poorly-remembered first person account? Did Dalí embellish the moment himself in his autobiography? Did someone fabricate it for some purpose? Or did it just emerge, as things do?

I have long understood that the writing of history, even serious history, is a game of telephone. Memory, perception, and imagination intermingle, creating convincing yet fictitious narratives that shape beliefs, literature, and even history. Consider these iconic stories and quotes: George Washington’s cherry tree, Marie Antoinette’s notorious “let them eat cake,” or Voltaire’s defense of free speech, “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” None of these individuals ever uttered these words. Such myths persist precisely because they reveal deeper cultural truths; they provide narratives we need to interpret and understand our world.

Hallucinations are surprisingly common in academic writing. I was inspired to write this essay in part because of my recent experience conducting research on early accounts of northeastern America and its beauty. Since I thought I knew where to turn, I was not using AI, instead I started with my bookshelf. In one of my favorite books, Jackson Lears’ Fables of Abundance, I found a compelling quote: “John Speede, in his Historie of Great Britain (1611), celebrated Oriana (the New World) as ‘the Court of Queen Ceres, the Granary of the Western World, the fortunate Island, the Paradise of Pleasure, and the Garden of God.'” And yet, Lears is mistaken. Speed—I am not sure where the extra “e” in “Speede” comes from—is clearly referring to Great Britain in the original. 2 Next, I looked at The Hudson. A History by Tom Lewis. The author cited a provocative passage by the early New Netherlander Adrian van der Donck, a Dutch lawyer and advocate for democracy, who, in his 1655 Beschryvinge van Nieuw-Nederlant (Description of New Netherland) wrote: “I admit that I am incompetent to describe the beauties, the grand and sublime works, wherewith Providence has diversified this land.” But Lewis, whose book was published in 2005, relied on a faulty, highly embellished translation from 1841. In a 2008 translation the line reads “I pray the indulgent reader to deduce from the above how fertile this land is and form his own judgment; as to myself, I confess to being unable to depict it or show it in writing, since in my view the eye alone, more so than the ear, is capable of comprehending it.” I thought it wise to double check so I quickly retrieved a scan of the 1655 text online and ran an excerpt through ChatGPT, which recognized the Dutch Blackletter text and suggested “I freely admit that I am not capable of portraying it fully or representing it in writing, as our judgment relies only on sight, and cannot assure the heart of its truth.” Not as elegant as the human translation from 2008, but confirming that the 1841 translation was embellished. I can’t fault Lewis for using the only translation available to him, it was the original embellishment that drew us both into the original reference. Unfortunately now it was useless for me. 3

Alas, I too, am no innocent in this. Take Blue Monday: Stories of Absurd Realties and Natural Histories, a book I know well, having co-authored it with Robert Sumrell. In explaining the title of the book, we refer to the pioneering post-punk band New Order’s 12″ “Blue Monday”:

In “Blue Monday,” the band achieved phenomenal media success, creating the most popular single of all time. But in their desire to become more digital–and hence more immaterial–than actually possible at the time, New Order retained graphic designer Neville Brody to make a die cut cover that would resemble the sleeve of a large floppy disk. The unique look won critical acclaim, but according to legend the most popular 12″ of all time cost the band 20 cents for every copy sold, ruining them financially but assuring their place in the regime of media. 4

This passage is the crux of the book, explaining the title and our collective drive to become more digital and immaterial. Except that I got it wrong. In a last editing pass, some neuron misfired and I substituted Neville Brody for the correct designer, Peter Saville. Robert let me know the moment he saw it, but it was too late, the book had been sent to the printers. As for the story about the financial losses, it may not be true either. While Factory records head Tony Wilson recounted it, he was known for exaggeration as well as poor record keeping. 5

Sometimes, scholarly documents are fabricated out of thin air. Decades ago, I was in a graduate seminar on Renaissance urbanism at Cornell. I was assigned to explain the rebuilding of the town center of Pienza, the birthplace of Aenias Silvius Piccolomini, the humanist Pope Pius II. I recalled seeing marvelous plans of the site in Spiro Kostof’s introductory textbook A History of Architecture: Settings and Rituals that showed the town before and after the intervention. I went on a lengthy paper chase, trying to figure out where these authoritative diagrams came from. There were no citations in the textbook and no credits for the plans. In the end, my hunch was that the author had a class in which students hypothesized what a pre-intervention condition might have looked like, produced plans, and included them in the book without noting that they were hypothetical reconstructions based on scant evidence.

Outright forgeries play a considerable role in history. In 1440, philologist Lorenzo Valla examined the Donation of Constantine, a fourth-century imperial decree supposedly granting sweeping temporal power to the Pope. The papacy cited it as their claim to power; kingdoms accepted it; scholars taught it as fact. But when Valla examined the Latin, he uncovered anachronisms impossible for Constantine’s time. The document was a forgery. Europe had built an entire political order on a historical hallucination. James Macpherson’s The Poems of Ossian took 18th-century Europe by storm, captivating Goethe and influencing Romanticism. Macpherson attributed these poems to Ossian, an ancient Gaelic bard. Only later did it become clear that Macpherson himself had largely composed these works. Or take the infamous Hitler Diaries, published in 1983 and swiftly authenticated by historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, only to collapse spectacularly under scientific scrutiny weeks later. Both examples show that scholarly hallucinations thrive not just on error, but on collective desires: readers hungry for heroic national pasts or sensational scoops. Where history isn’t enough, it seems we need to invent it.

Museums certainly aren’t immune to this. Vast amounts of museum collections are composed of fakes and forgeries. In 2014, Switzerland’s Fine Art Expert Institute (FAEI) reported that at least half of the artwork circulating in the market is fake. Noah Charney, an art historian and founder of the Association for Research into Crimes Against Art, contends that approximately 95% of artworks displayed in museums are accurately attributed, suggesting that only about 5% may be misattributed or counterfeit. Still, things happen. Take, for example, the case of the Kröller-Müller House, which Ludwig Mies van der Rohe proposed. The story goes that Mies built a full scale mockup out of wood and canvas. It marks his first mature attempt to dismantle the traditional notion of the enclosed house and anticipate the open plan and fluid space that would define his later work. The house is exhibited in Philip Johnson’s 1947 Mies exhibition and reproduced in the catalog. Rem Koolhaas, in S, M, L, XL, however, says “What was weird was that when I asked Philip Johnson about the incident last year [around 1992], he said he had invented it. According to him, it had never happened. The photograph of the phantom house was a fake, he suggested. But who faked here? Whose fata morgana was this anyway?” Indeed, after looking at the image, it seems unimaginable that it isn’t simply drawn onto a landscape, a bit of mythologizing by Johnson. Perhaps, however, the fake was a fake. A web site for the Kröller_Müller Museum shows another image of the design, likely from their archive, however, this time the house looks far more real and the overlap of the tree branches seems hard to duplicate for Johnson, who was never much of a draftsman. Is the image from 1947 just taken from another angle? There seems to be a reasonable similarity in the trees in the background. Did Johnson perhaps draw in the more modernist wing on the right? Did he fabricate—whether due to poor memory or perhaps just capriciousness—the fabrication? Or perhaps Koolhaas, in search of a good story, came up with this.6

Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Images of Full Scale Mockup of Kröller-Müller House, the first from the Kröller-Müller Foundation, the second from the 1947 Mies show at the Museum of Modert Art

Unlike errors in print media, which remain localized to physical copies, digital mistakes can replicate across global networks, gaining authority through algorithmic amplification and citation indexing. Consider Rosalind Krauss’s Optical Unconscious, where a Freudian slip of the keyboard produced the phrase “treat of castration” instead of “threat of castration,” now faithfully reproduced in the MIT Press publication, a mistake that a typesetter would have noticed. 7 Or take the citation for “(Van der Geer J et al., 2010. The art of writing a scientific article. Journal of Science Communication 163(2) 51 – 59),” which has been cited in over 1500 academic papers to date according to Google Scholar. The essay, however, does not exist; it was a fictional example that escaped from a formatting template created by publishing giant Elsevier. 8 Scholars either forgot to delete the reference or cited the imaginary article without verifying it existed, inadvertently creating a collective hallucination propagated through databases and citation indices. Here, the parallel to AI hallucinations becomes particularly stark: scholars, like language models, confidently repeated nonexistent references simply because they seemed plausible. The ghostly paper highlights how easily we trust shared authority without scrutiny—an important lesson as we enter an era dominated by generative AI.

These errors—and countless others—reveal something profound. Human minds don’t merely seek truth; they also create it, often unconsciously bending evidence to fit narratives. The persistence of these illusions can distort entire disciplines, shaping how we perceive history, culture, and ourselves. Yet the errors also remind us how intimately creativity, wishful thinking, and factual missteps intertwine. Like surrealists embracing the subconscious or AI engines extrapolating beyond known facts, human culture thrives not only despite these hallucinations—but perhaps because of them.

The typical explanation given for AI hallucinations is that at heart, today’s large language models—systems like GPT-4, Claude, and Gemini—are sophisticated pattern-recognition engines. Imagine a hyper-literate parrot that’s read every book in the library, capable of stitching together elegant sentences that sound authoritative, even insightful. But this parrot has no understanding of truth, context, or intent. Unlike traditional computing, which follows deterministic logic, LLMs operate probabilistically. Given the words “once upon a,” they will predict “time,” based on patterns learned from vast datasets. With a prompt like “In 1905, Einstein published a paper on,” the AI assesses billions of textual examples to choose the most statistically probable continuation (“special relativity”). But if the question ventures into obscure territory—a minor historical figure, niche cultural references, or poorly documented events—the model, optimized to provide helpful answers and rarely encouraged to say, “I don’t know,” will produce fiction to satisfy the prompt. The best-performing models, like GPT-4 or Claude 2, have been explicitly trained to recognize their limits and occasionally decline answering uncertain prompts, reducing—but not eliminating—fabrications. When a model makes up a hallucination, it’s akin to a human trying to sound knowledgeable at a cocktail party, confidently making up facts about obscure topics. AI mimics our own tendency toward myth-making.

But AI hallucinations aren’t just bugs; they’re symptoms of the underlying generative capability we value in them. If models rigidly stuck to memorized facts, they’d lose their remarkable ability to generalize, summarize, and invent. The same predictive flexibility enabling hallucinations allows AI to creatively interpret tasks—composing narratives, suggesting innovative ideas, or exploring hypothetical scenarios. Eliminating all hallucinations risks overly conservative models, timid and limited, good at trivia but poor at imagination.

But further, in December 2023, Andrei Karpathy, noted AI researcher formerly at OpenAI and Tesla, explained hallucinations as follows:

# On the “hallucination problem”

I always struggle a bit when I’m asked about the “hallucination problem” in LLMs. Because, in some sense, hallucination is all LLMs do. They are dream machines.

We direct their dreams with prompts. The prompts start the dream, and based on the LLM’s hazy recollection of its training documents, most of the time the result goes someplace useful.

It’s only when the dreams go into deemed factually incorrect territory that we label it a “hallucination”. It looks like a bug, but it’s just the LLM doing what it always does.

At the other end of the extreme consider a search engine. It takes the prompt and just returns one of the most similar “training documents” it has in its database, verbatim. You could say that this search engine has a “creativity problem” – it will never respond with something new. An LLM is 100% dreaming and has the hallucination problem. A search engine is 0% dreaming and has the creativity problem.

All that said, I realize that what people actually mean is they don’t want an LLM Assistant (a product like ChatGPT etc.) to hallucinate. An LLM Assistant is a lot more complex system than just the LLM itself, even if one is at the heart of it. There are many ways to mitigate hallucinations in these systems – using Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) to more strongly anchor the dreams in real data through in-context learning is maybe the most common one. Disagreements between multiple samples, reflection, verification chains. Decoding uncertainty from activations. Tool use. All are active and very interesting areas of research.

TLDR I know I’m being super pedantic but the LLM has no “hallucination problem”. Hallucination is not a bug, it is the LLM’s greatest feature. The LLM Assistant has a hallucination problem, and we should fix it. 9

In framing AIs as dream machines, Karpathy offers a provocative reimagining of a generative process akin to human creativity, in which meaning emerges through unforeseen associations, productive mistakes, and spontaneous invention.

Indeed, planned and unplanned deviations, mistakes, and hallucinations are a productive part of the creative process. In The Anxiety of Influence, literary theorist Harold Bloom argues that creative misreading is essential to literary evolution. Strong poets, he suggests, achieve originality by creatively misreading their literary predecessors. Bloom terms this “poetic misprision,” a strategic misinterpretation enabling poets to clear imaginative space within a saturated literary tradition. Misprision isn’t accidental—it’s a necessary act of rebellion, distancing poets from overwhelming influence and allowing them to develop their distinctive voices. This perspective reframes error not as failure but as generative necessity—what might appear as misunderstanding becomes the very foundation of creative innovation. Bloom demonstrates this through Milton’s deliberate misreading of classical tradition, transforming heroic narratives into complex psychological struggles in Paradise Lost, and through Wordsworth’s strategic reinterpretation of Milton’s elevated political voice into personal, introspective meditation. These creative distortions weren’t merely mistakes—they were essential evolutionary mechanisms that allowed new literary forms to emerge from existing traditions. Seen through Bloom’s framework, AI hallucinations might similarly represent not just errors to be corrected but potentially productive misreadings that open unexpected creative pathways beyond human convention. 10

Jacques Derrida, the founder of deconstruction, also recognized creative power in apparent errors, accidental fragments, and seemingly trivial textual moments. In Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, Derrida famously analyzes a cryptic note discovered among Friedrich Nietzsche’s unpublished papers: “I have forgotten my umbrella.” Though seemingly inconsequential, this incidental sentence—an isolated fragment without context—opens new interpretive possibilities precisely through its ambiguity. Is the umbrella real or metaphysical? By resisting stable context and defying conventional reading, the phrase unsettles assumptions about coherent authorial intention. Derrida thus transforms Nietzsche’s trivial notation into a philosophical meditation on memory, forgetfulness, and textual uncertainty. The supposed error or accidental remark becomes generative precisely because it escapes closure, demonstrating that textual significance can emerge from absence, incompleteness, or apparent nonsense. This illustrates Derrida’s broader philosophical argument: meaning never resides simply in an author’s deliberate intent or in textual clarity alone but arises dynamically through interpretive engagement with ambiguity, uncertainty, and textual rupture. 11

The sciences, too, have flourished through productive error. The 18th-century phlogiston theory in chemistry—which proposed a non-existent element released during combustion—was entirely wrong, yet philosopher Thomas Kuhn noted how this incorrect paradigm “gave order to a large number of physical and chemical phenomena,” allowing scientists to organize observations until contradictions eventually led to oxygen theory. 12 Similarly, Johannes Kepler’s quasi-mystical belief that planetary orbits followed the geometry of nested Platonic solids drove him to analyze Mars’s orbit so obsessively that he discovered elliptical orbits and his three laws of planetary motion. Perhaps the most striking example comes from Albert Einstein. His cosmological constant—which he introduced to stabilize his equations because he mistakenly believed the universe was static and later abandoned, famously calling it his “biggest blunder”—has been essential for explaining dark energy and cosmic acceleration. The error contained within it a profound truth, one that Einstein himself couldn’t recognize in his lifetime. But the thing is that Einstein never actually called it his “biggest blunder”; the phrase was introduced in the autobiography of physicist George Gamow, who is notorious for embellishing and fabricating facts. 13

But these are outright errors. There are also cases in which scientists have taken their dreams and acted on them. René Descartes had three intense dreams that convinced him he should question everything he thought he knew, starting fresh from just one clear truth: that because he was thinking, he must exist. This approach—checking every belief carefully and trusting only what’s completely certain—became the starting point for modern science and philosophy. Chemist August Kekulé famously envisioned benzene’s ring structure after hallucinating a serpent swallowing its tail. Nobel Prize winner Otto Loewi dreamed of an experiment that would prove that nerve impulses were transmitted chemically, leading to the discovery of neurotransmitters. Finally, the periodic table of elements came to Dmitri Mendeleev in a dream. Except, in this case, once again, it didn’t happen. The first mention of the dream is forty years later. 14

An image created during a visit to Aulus-les-Bains in the Pyrenées, where I was haunted by the beautiful town’s tragic history during World War II. To avoid exploitation, I generated the image indirectly, using Stable Diffusion deliberately tuned toward a highly hallucinatory state.

Now, hallucinations in AI assistants are, as Karpathy states, a target of considerable investigation by AI labs and dramatic strides have been made to minimize their occurrence since the launch of ChatGPT-3.5. But LLMs are still, as Karpathy states, dream machines. Whether reading human or AI generated text, we need to remember the lost skill of critical reading and checking one’s sources. But if the progress goes too far, one day we may regret the loss of hallucinations.

For now, however, we still have AI hallucinations. And if, after reading all this, history seems like a tissue of lies, perhaps turning to the dreams of a machine for new ideas isn’t the worst thing to do? Turning back to the 1920s, surrealism sought to rupture conventional thinking by deliberately invoking dreams, chance, and subconscious imagery. Nearly a century later, a new creative practice—what we might call “the New Surrealism”—emerges from the collaboration between human imagination and AI hallucination. If LLMs are dream machines, their hallucinations are the computational equivalent of surrealist automatic writing—drawing connections across vast semantic fields without regard for factual constraints. This too can reveal new worlds hidden just beyond the edges of conventional thought in the collective unconscious. Is it coincidence that one of the hottest recreational trends in Silicon Valley’s AI scene is consuming magic mushrooms?

Ed Keller, Daphne: Metal Roads Imbrication Study, 2024.

Take my friend architect and media theorist Ed Keller’s approach. Ed has described how for a few years now he has immersed himself nightly, often while drifting off to sleep, in working with AI image generations to create hallucinatory images deeply infused with architectural history, mythology, and ecological reflection. His invocation of Daphne—a figure of myth who transforms from human to tree—symbolizes humanity’s forced adaptation to the powerful external forces of artificial intelligence and the attendant ecological crisis. Ed’s creative method is surrealist in essence, blurring conscious and unconscious thought through a collaboration between human intent and machinic hallucination. Just as the original surrealism grappled with the unconscious mind mediated by industrial modernity, the New Surrealism emerges from dream-like dialogues with intelligences over the net, further reshaping human identity and perception.

From On an Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania in which I imagined Meatyard visiting Lithuania and engaging with the local tradition of Užgavėnės masks. This image was widely reposted on the Internet by a viral poster with all attribution removed and listed as “Not A.I.” even though the page clearly states it is.

My own studio work with AI image generators always engages with their hallucinations as creative contributions. Through extensive sessions with generative systems such as Midjourney or Google ImageFx, my practice critically engages with AI not as passive technology but as an active collaborator whose misunderstandings and apparent failures prompt me to develop the work in new directions.

In doing so, I uncover insights, exposing the underlying assumptions of authorship, originality, and authenticity embedded in our cultural frameworks. My projects, On an Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania, Lost Canals of Vilnius, The Destruction of Doggerland, The Witching Cats of New Jersey, and Pierre Lecouille, Visionary Architect all take the guise of fictional histories. I should not have been surprised when an image from the first was poached and reposted without attribution by a viral poster, credits to me replaced by the words, “Not AI.” The two projects that I did not create fictional histories for, 20 subroutines for Humans Made By a Computer and Art and the Boxmaker addressed chance in the work of John Cage and the surrealist art of Joseph Cornell more directly. Just as early surrealism negotiated the unconscious mind reshaped by industrial modernity, my critical engagement with AI creates a contemporary surrealism born from the evolving dialogue between human creativity and networked, machine intelligence, continuously reframing identity, meaning, and artistic practice itself. Embracing rather than rejecting AI’s hallucinatory tendencies can transform creative practices, but it requires a serious effort, not merely a quick generation of political figures in the style of Studio Ghibli for viral posting.

From The Lost Canals of Vilnius

In time, the New Surrealism may shape not only art but cultural criticism, literature, and education. We should teach students to recognize AI hallucinations not as defects but as invitations to critical inquiry and creative exploration. Scholars could intentionally leverage these errors to illuminate hidden assumptions or generate new interpretive frameworks. Our task, then, will not be to eliminate its hallucinations entirely but to thoughtfully manage, curate, and even nurture them. AI image generator Midjourney, for example, has a weird setting in which you can dial up its inventiveness—and rate of hallucination—as well as the ability to choose one’s model, including very old models that malfunction brilliantly.

André Breton described surrealism as “pure psychic automatism”—an attempt to bypass rationality by embracing random associations and visions. AI, guided by neural networks rather than neurons, performs a similar act of psychic automatism, weaving patterns without conscious control or intent. It generates surreal poetry, images, and narratives, sparking both anxiety and fascination. AI’s persistent hallucinations represent not only flaws but also opportunities to revisit surrealism’s radical experiments.

ChatGPT’s response to a prompt asking to create a New Yorker-style cartoon with the Manson Family and AI hallucinations.

1. Salvador Dalí, The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí (New York: Dover Books, 1993), translated by Haakon Chevalier, 345.

2. Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance:A Cultural History of Advertising in America (New York: Basic Books ,1994), 27. The original text can be found online in text form at “The history of Great Britaine under the conquests of ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans. Their originals, manners, warres, coines & seales: with ye successions, lives, acts & issues of the English monarchs from Iulius Cæsar, to our most gracious soueraigne King Iames. by Iohn Speed.” In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A12738.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. A scanned document is available at The History of Great Britaine Vnder the Conquests of Ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans. Their Originals, Manners, Warres, Coines & Seales: with Ye Successions, Liues, Acts & Issues of the English Monarchs from Iulius Cæsar, to Our Most Gracious Soueraigne King Iames (London: John Sudbury & Georg Humble, 1614), https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_History_of_Great_Britaine_Vnder_the/L9DE_ER5tAsC?hl=en&gbpv=0.

3. Russell Shorto, “Foreword,” in Adriaen van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, edited by Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna, translated by Diederik Willem Goedhuys. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), ix.

4. AUDC [Robert Sumrell and Kazys Varnelis], Blue Monday. Stories of Absurd Realities and Natural Histories (Barcelona: Actar, 2008), 80.

5. Tonino Cannucci, “HOW WE MADE: NEW ORDER’S GILLIAN GILBERT AND DESIGNER PETER SAVILLE ON BLUE MONDAY,” Disorder and Other Unknown Pleasures, https://disordertc.wordpress.com/2016/03/10/how-we-made-new-orders-gillian-gilbert-and-designer-peter-saville-on-blue-monday/

6. On fake art in museums see “Over 50 Percent of Art is Fake,” ArtfixDaily, October 14, 2014, https://www.artfixdaily.com/news_feed/2014/10/14/7319-experts-claim-fifty-percent-of-artwork-on-the-market-is-fake and Sarah Cascone, “50 Percent Art Forgery Estimate May Be Exaggerated… Duh,” Artnet News, October 20, 2014, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/50-percent-art-forgery-estimate-may-be-exaggerated-duh-137444 For the Kröller-Müller incident, see Rem Koolhaas, “the House that Made Mies,” S, M, L, XL. (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), 62-63. See also Kröller-Müller Museum, “Ellenwoude, A Museum House of Wood and Sailcloth,” https://krollermuller.nl/en/timeline/ellenwoude-a-museum-house-of-wood-and-sailcloth

7. Rosalind Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), 172.

8. Gareth Leng and Rhodri Ivor Leng, The Matter of Facts: Skepticism, Persuasion, and Evidence in Science (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2020), 205.

9. Andrei Karpathy, (@karpathy), “# On the ‘hallucination problem’,” X.com, December 8, 2023, 8:35pm, https://x.com/karpathy/status/1733299213503787018.

10. Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

11. Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Style (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

12. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 99.

13. Ernie Tretkoff, “February 1917: Einstein’s Biggest Blunder,” APS News, This Week in Physics History, July 1, 2005, https://www.aps.org/apsnews/2005/07/february-1917-einsteins-biggest-blunder and Rebecca J. Rosen, “Einstein Likely Never Said One of His Most Oft-Quoted Phrases,” The Atlantic, August 9, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/einstein-likely-never-said-one-of-his-most-oft-quoted-phrases/278508/.

14. Philip Ball, “The true story of the birth of the periodic table, 150 years ago,” The New Scientist, February 26, 2019, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg24132190-300-the-true-story-of-the-birth-of-the-periodic-table-150-years-ago/.