Forty-Four PDFs, 2019-2026

I have forty-four long-form posts since 2019 for your reading pleasure below, but perhaps you’d like to read a few words on how they came to be first?

I am happier writing for myself than I ever was writing for anyone else (although I will do that again, too, in case you have an interesting proposal). But even if I am thrilled with the WordPress layout I designed for varnelis.net, I realize that it isn’t ideal for reading a 6,000-word essay. But what website is? There is little question that PDFs are easier to read, whether on a tablet or in print. This, however, led me to a problem. Do I want to lay out every longer-form post since 2019 again? No.

There are, unfortunately, no PDF renderers for WordPress that satisfy me, and that makes sense. Exporting to a PDF is a complicated project, and when you are a modernist, your site has large graphics, and you write essays, not posts, you really need something custom, which, of course, was impossible until recently. But vibe coding has advanced significantly since I wrote about it in December’s “What Did Vibe Coding Just Do to the Commons?

Some encounters put me in a foul mood yesterday morning, so as sometimes happens, I became extra productive and I set out to build a small piece of bespoke software for this site: a local Mac app that fetches my published WordPress posts, gathers the images and captions, lays everything out in a restrained publication format, and then lets me review the result before uploading it back to the site automatically.

If you still, somehow, think that AI is not useful for anything, please check out the PDFs below and tell me how long it would have taken you to write a comparable application to translate them from HTML? Things have changed a great deal since 2023. I used ChatGPT’s Codex to write this code, and, unlike my experience in December, I was a distracted supervisor all day, cleaning up, working on the draft of the introduction to my next book, the Generative Unconscious (this will be the subject of an e-mail later this week, likely tomorrow). There was no endless babysitting; Codex just built the application, at one point going off to code for over 90 minutes.

There is something important here to me, which is the return of computing to something more personal, something I own because I made. I am not planning to distribute this, since it is too idiosyncratic a project; this is bespoke software, and, if the code was written by an AI, nobody else would have come up with the same result. It reminds me very much of the early days of personal computing, when users (like me) routinely wrote small programs for their own needs: a database for a player-piano sheet-music collection, an extension to BASIC to enable better graphics, a tool for managing all the shareware I had downloaded. Software often did not come in a shrink-wrapped package, obtained by online subscription, or downloaded from a carefully gated store. Software was closer to a workshop practice. You made tools when the available ones did not quite fit the work, or you remade them, often again and again.

My PDF renderer is in that spirit. It is software made for one site, one archive, one way of writing and publishing. That specificity is the point. As AI makes it possible to roll one’s own programs again, we will see more of this: not just apps built for markets, but tools built for particular lives, practices, archives, gardens, and bodies of work. Sometimes living in interesting times isn’t all bad.

Content by Date

2026
May 3 · The Generative Unconscious (Introduction) [HTML]
April 24 · Ecological Balance and the Sacred Landscape of Senjōgahara [HTML]
April 10 · The Zakkyo Biru of Ginza [HTML]
March 31 · Zen, Time, and Three Gardens in Kyoto [HTML]
February 22 · The Salon and the Olympics [HTML]

2025
December 31 · East Coast West Coast (After Bob and Nancy) [HTML]
December 15 · What Did Vibe Coding Just Do to the Commons? [HTML]
November 23 · The Lost Canals of Vilnius [HTML]
November 6 · Stochastic Histories [HTML]
July 25 · Humanity and Its Double: The Uncanny in Art and Artificial Intelligence [HTML]
June 15 · The Rise and Fall of the Author [HTML]
May 19 · On Russel Wright’s Manitoga and the Mid-Century American Landscape [HTML]
May 6 · The First Flowers of Spring: Hepatica, Rue Anemone, and Cultural Ecology [HTML]
May 1 · On the Golden Age of Blogging [HTML]
April 21 · The Phantasmagoria of the Landscape: Japanese Gardens in America [HTML]
April 11 · The Generative Turn: On AIs as Stochastic Parrots and Art [HTML]
April 5 · After the Infrastructural City: On Abundance [HTML]
March 31 · The New Surrealism? On AI and Hallucinations [HTML]
March 21 · National Populism as a Transitional Mode of Regulation [HTML]
March 16 · Skunk Cabbage and the Entropic Landscape [HTML]
January 27 · Oversaturation: On Tourism and the Image [HTML]

2024
December 23 · 7 Fables of Accelerationism [HTML]
December 22 · Speculative Architectures: The Radical Legacy and Fables of Accelerationism [HTML]
October 30 · The Witching Cats of New Jersey [HTML]
September 30 · We Went for a Walk on Turkey Mountain [HTML]
August 9 · A Trip to Lithuania and the Baltics [HTML]
April 2 · Keeping a Phenological Diary [HTML]
March 8 · On the Pictures Generation and AI Art [HTML]
March 3 · Vernal Pools at the Great Swamp [HTML]
February 25 · California Forever, or the Aesthetics of AI Images [HTML]
January 14 · Walls in the Landscape [HTML]

2023
December 19 · Curb Your Enthusiasm [HTML]
October 12 · On the Florilegium [HTML]
August 7 · Preliminary Findings Toward an Architectural History of the Network [HTML]
June 13 · On Art and the Universal, II [HTML]
April 29 · On the Matrix (Native Plants, That Is) [HTML]
January 29 · Wastelands: An Analysis of the Early Anthropocene Swamps of Glacial Lake Passaic [HTML]

2022
December 11 · 20 Subroutines for Humans Made by a Computer [HTML]
July 20 · On Art and the Universal, I [HTML]
April 27 · The Native Plant Garden at Highland House, Montclair, New Jersey [HTML]

2021
May 5 · A Spring Tour of Our Forest Garden [HTML]

2020
May 15 · Native Plant Podcasts [HTML]
May 14 · Art and Gardening in the Time of Crisis [HTML]

2019
July 11 · On Gardening [HTML]

2025-in-review

It’s strange to measure every year against a concept developed by a science fiction writer, but William Gibson’s line “The future is already here—it’s just not evenly distributed”1. has been my north star for my recent year-in-review essays. Gibson meant that the future was unevenly distributed by class: the wealthy receive high-tech healthcare while the world’s poorest live in squalor—though one might ask which of these is really our future. Yet the quote has been repeatedly misread as a claim about time andspace: that the future arrives somewhere first, perhaps unseen, while the rest of the world catches up. But this misreading is more productive than Gibson’s intent. Gibson’s critique of inequality is fair enough, but we all know this, decry it, and go on about our business. The misreading, on the other hand, is a theory of historical change.

With the release of ChatGPT in late 2022, a temporal rift opened, shattering the post-Covidean present. But many tried the early tools, encountered hallucinations, read articles about slop and imminent environmental ruin, and reasonably concluded there was nothing to see. By 2025, a cursory examination of news in AI would have assured them that AI had proved a bust. OpenAI’s long-awaited updates disappointed, and the company flailed, turning to social media with Sora, a TikTok clone for AI. Meta seemed to abandon its efforts to create a competitive AI and instead turned to content generation for Instagram and Facebook, something nobody on earth wanted. Talk of a bubble started among Wall Street pundits. The hype-to-disappointment cycle is familiar, and the dismissals were not unreasonable.

But again, the future isn’t evenly distributed, and if you don’t know where to look, you would be excused for believing it’s all hype. Looking past such failures, 2025 was actually a year of breakneck progress. Anthropic’s Claude emerged as the most capable system for complex tasks, Google’s Gemini became highly competitive, while DeepSeek and Moonshot AI proved that China was not far behind. More significant than any single model was the emergence of agentic AI—systems that can take on multi-step tasks, act, navigate filesystems, write and execute code, and work across documents. Claude Code was the year’s groundbreaking innovation. While “slop” was Merriam-Webster’s word of the year, “vibe coding”—using agents to write programs—was much more important. Not only could programmers use them to accelerate their work, it also became possible for non-programmers to realize their ideas without any knowledge of code, a radical change in access I explored in “What Did Vibe Coding Just Do to the Commons?”.

By any first-world standards, at least, these tools are remarkably democratic and inexpensive. A basic Claude subscription costs about as much as a month of streaming, and even the $200 maximum usage account costs less than a monthly car payment. For many, however, the barrier is not price but something deeper—a resistance approaching revulsion. These tools provoke fear in a way that earlier technologies did not. It’s not the apocalyptic dread of the doomers or the Dark Mountain sensibility that apocalypse is near. Rather, it’s a threat to the sense that thought itself is what makes us distinct. The unevenness of the future is no longer about access; it’s now about willingness to engage.

As a scholar, thinking about the very short term is strange for me. I have always been suspicious of claims that radical change was upon us. I would rather align myself with the French Annales school concept of la longue durée, as defined by the great Fernand Braudel, the long-term structures of geography and climate. Faster than that were the medium-term cycles of economies and states, while he dismissed the short-term événements of rulers and political events as “surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs.”2. Events, he wrote elsewhere, “are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like fireflies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into darkness and as often as not into oblivion.”3. The real forces operate beneath, slowly, often imperceptibly.

Curiously, Braudel himself embraced technological change in his own work. In the 1920s and 30s, he adapted an old motion-picture camera to photograph archival documents—2,000 to 3,000 pages per day across Mediterranean archives from Simancas to Dubrovnik. He later claimed to be “the first user of microfilms” for scholarly historical research.4. His wife Paule spent years reading the accumulated reels through what Braudel called “a simple magic lantern.”5. Captured in 1940, he spent five years as a prisoner of war and wrote the entire first draft of The Mediterranean—some 3,000 to 4,000 pages—from memory. Paule, meanwhile, retained access to the microfilm and notes in Paris, and after the war, they reconstructed the text, taking his manuscript, verifying it and adding footnotes and references from the microfilm.6.

In 1945, the same year Braudel was liberated, Vannevar Bush published “As We May Think,” in which he imagined a device he called the “Memex”: a mechanized desk storing a researcher’s entire library, indexed and cross-referenced, expandable through associative trails.7. The vision remained speculative for decades. Now the world’s archives are being digitized; AI systems translate, summarize, and search across them in seconds and can translate any language. To take one example, earlier this year, I used Google’s Gemini to translate the Hierosolymitana Peregrinatio of Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila Našlaitėlis, a sixteenth-century pilgrimage narrative from an online scan of the Latin first edition. The result is not a polished scholarly translation, but a working text that allowed me to gain a good sense of a text that was previously unreadable to anyone without proficiency in Latin or Polish (the only language into which, to my knowledge, it had been translated). The role of the intellectual is being transformed—not replaced, but augmented in ways Bush could only sketch. This feels like something other than foam.

How to account for such a rapid shift? Manuel DeLanda offers one answer in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. Working in Braudel’s materialist tradition and drawing on Gilles Deleuze and complexity theory, DeLanda describes how flows—of trade, energy, and information—accumulate and concentrate until they cross a threshold, undergo a phase transition, radically reorganizing into a new stable state. But here is the key insight: intensification is la longue durée. The accumulation of flows that began with the Industrial Revolution—or perhaps with writing, agriculture, or even symbolic representation itself—is the deep structure behind our era. Steam, electricity, computing, the internet: each was a phase transition within a longer arc of intensification. Cities accelerate such processes, as Braudel showed, concentrating capital and labor until new forms of economic organization emerge—Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, each becoming sites at which the future arrived first. Such conditions are not opposed to la longue durée; they are the moments when intensification crosses a threshold.

The continued pace of change this year underscores that there has been no return to equilibrium. But this has been accompanied by unprecedented resistance to technology, appearing as simultaneous terror at its apocalyptic nature (in jobs, if nothing else) and dismissal as useless, especially in Gen Z. A January 2026 Civiqs survey found that 57 percent of Americans aged 18–34 view AI negatively—more than any other age group. Curiously, the seniors category, which now includes most boomers, was the least resistant to AI, followed by Gen X and older millennials, all groups that grew up seeing radical societal and technological changes.8. It seems paradoxical that the smartphone generation recoils from the tools of the future. To understand this resistance means understanding the mentalité that shaped it—what Braudel’s successors in the Annales school called the collective psychology formed through lived experience.9. For Gen Z, that formative experience was network culture—both a successor to postmodernism and a form of collective psychology I did not fully understand at the time. Writing on network culture in 2008, it seemed to me that social media promised connection; instead, it brought division.10. The networked self was indeed constituted through networks, not merely isolated in postmodern fragmentation, but the fragmentation was now collective. Networked publics built barriers against one another, creating what Robert Putnam called cyberbalkanization: retreat into a comfortable niche among people just like oneself, views merely reinforcing views.11. Identity wars and mimetic conflict flared across filter bubbles that amplified outrage and tribal scapegoating as both MAGA and wokism built toxic online cultures. QAnon and a thousand other conspiracy theories propagated through Facebook groups and YouTube recommendations. Young men drifted into incel communities where loneliness became ideology and livestreaming mass shootings was celebrated. Influencers built their empires on hatred—Hasan Piker framed Hamas’s October 7 massacre as anticolonial resistance while Nick Fuentes celebrated mass shooters as vanguards of race war and civilizational collapse.

Nor did this just fragment culture—it exacted a massive psychic toll, as social contagion spread new forms of self-harm and mental illness. During the pandemic, teenage girls began presenting tic-like behaviors—not Tourette’s syndrome, but something researchers termed “mass social media-induced illness,”12. spread by TikTok videos about Tourette’s rather than any actual disease. The pattern was unprecedented but not unique. Eating disorders spread through thinspiration hashtags. Self-harm tutorials circulated on Instagram. The platforms that were supposed to bring us together instead spread desires, disorders, and identities through pure social contagion—and with them, violence and polarization. A generation that grew up inside this experiment—that watched it reshape their peers’ bodies, minds, and identities—is right to be skeptical of the next technological promise.

In 2010, it seemed like network culture had a good chance of becoming understood as the successor to postmodernism. Bruce Sterling and I were engaged in a kind of dialogue about it online. He predicted that network culture would last “about a decade before something else comes along.”13. And he was right, as I acknowledged in my 2020 Year in Review. By then, network culture was exhausted, and with the Covidean break, it seemed time for something new. In 2023, I taught a course at the New Centre for Research & Practice to try to broadly sketch the emerging era. It’s still early and hard to fathom, like trying to understand postmodernism in 1971 or network culture in 1998, but it’s clear that if postmodernism was underwritten by the explosion of mass media, network culture by the Internet, social media, and the smartphone, then the current era is shaped by AI.

But if Gen Z, scarred by the effects of social media, has been reacting with deep fear and anxiety, Sterling how epitmozes the other reaction, dismissal. In the most recent State of the World, for example, he derides AI-generated content as “desiccated bullshit that can’t even bother to lie.” He compares the vibe-coding atmosphere to an acid trip, mocking the professionals who utter “mindblown stuff” like “we may be solving all of software” and “I have godlike powers now.” For Sterling, AI can produce nothing but slop. Now Bruce has always had a healthy skepticism toward tech claims, but I can’t help but think of Johannes Trithemius, the fifteenth-century abbot who wrote De Laude Scriptorum just as Gutenberg’s press was spreading across Europe—defending the scriptorium against a technology he could not see would remake the world.

There are even deeper, more existential fears, and I’ve spent the past year addressing them on my blog, in the process laying the foundation for a book on the topic: AI as plagiarism machine; AI as hallucination engine; AI as stochastic parrot, mindlessly repeating what it has ingested (Sterling’s critique); and AI as uncanny double, too close to us for comfort. As I explain, the discomfort arises not from the machine’s otherness but from its likeness: a mirror held up to processes we preferred to believe were uniquely ours.

It’s no accident that I published these essays on my blog. As far as my personal year in review goes, this was very much the year of the blog. I have no plans to ever publish in an academic journal again. Why would I? Who would read it? Why would I want to publish something paywalled, reinforcing the walled gardens of inequality that academia is so desperate to maintain—even as it proclaims itself the champion of open inquiry and democratized knowledge? Academia has become the realm of what Peter Sloterdijk called cynical reason: rehearsing the tropes of ideology critique while knowing the game is empty and playing it anyway. This revolts me.

But for almost ten years now, since the shutting down of the labs at Columbia’s architecture school, I have been content to write from the position of the outsider, something I reflected on in “On the Golden Age of Blogging”. That essay was prompted by a strange comment from Scott Alexander, who lamented on Dwarkesh Patel’s podcast that he had personally made a strategic error in not blogging during what he called the “golden age,” imagining that “the people from that era all founded news organizations or something.” The golden age he remembers is a fiction, as golden ages often are—and he gets the stakes entirely wrong. Evan Williams founded Blogger in 1999, sold it to Google, co-founded Twitter, then created Medium, which convinced hapless readers pay to read slop long before AI slop was ever a thing. The early bloggers who sought professionalization found themselves absorbed into the worst of the worst, writing for BuzzFeed, peddling nostalgia listicles that rotted psyches.

There was, however, a golden age for me, and I miss it: the architecture blogging community circa 2007—Owen Hatherley, Geoff Manaugh, Enrique Ramirez, Fred Scharmen, Sam Jacob, Mimi Zeiger (whose Loud Paper was less a blog and more a zine, but a key part of the culture), and others. We inherited from zine culture an informal, conversational tone and the will to stand outside architectural spectacle. But ArchDaily and Dezeen commercialized the form, shifting from independent critique to marketing and product. Startup culture absorbed architectural talent.

Blogging was powerful precisely because we had no stakes in it—we owned and controlled our means of intellectual production. The golden age of blogging is not in the past; it is now. After years of proclaiming I would blog more, in 2025, I really did. I wrote over 83,700 words on varnelis.net and the Florilegium—essay-length pieces on landscape, native plants, AI and art, architecture, infrastructure, politics, and tourism. My only regret is that my presidency at the Native Plant Society of New Jersey consumes so much of my thinking about native plants that little remains for writing. But the time will come, and if nothing else, my investigation of the Japanese garden aesthetic should point in the future direction for my writing on landscape.

I also continued to make AI art, or to be more precise, what I called stochastic histories. A major project was a substantial reworking of The Lost Canals of Vilnius, a counterfactual history in which, after the Great Fire of 1610, Voivode Mikalojus Radvila Našlaitėlis rebuilt the city with Venetian-style canals, complete with gondoliers, water processions, and a hybrid “Vilnius Venetian” architecture. As research, I used Gemini to translate Radvila’s sixteenth-century Latin pilgrimage narrative. AI, like photography or film, is what you make of it. Film is perhaps the better analogy—anyone can make a video. Making something worthwhile is another matter entirely. In December, I also completed East Coast/West Coast: After Bob and Nancy, a generative restaging of Nancy Holt and Robert Smithson’s 1969 video dialogue using two AI speakers.

There were other substantial essays, too. In “Oversaturation: On Tourism and the Image”, I finally put down on paper something I had wanted the Netlab to address while at Columbia, but that proved too dangerous for the school to support. Universities cannot critique the very systems of overproduction they depend upon for survival. Publish or perish and endless symposia nobody is interested in are the academic versions of overproduction, but more than that, any architecture school claiming global currency cannot afford to offend either other institutions, like museums, that give it legitimacy, or, for that matter, the trustees that fund both. As I point out, tourism has always been mediated by imagery; take Piranesi’s vedute or the Claude Glass. Grand Tourists always had representations at hand to interpret their direct experience—but a new crisis point has been reached with both overtourism and the overproduction of images. Algorithmic logic now reorganizes cultural geography around “most Instagrammable spots,” making historical significance secondary to content potential. The Fushimi Inari shrine in Kyoto is the case in point—a 1,300-year-old shrine that Instagram made famous and that has now ceased to serve as a religious site due to the influx of visitors. The Japanese have a term for this: kankō kōgai, tourism pollution. Tourism has become the paradigm of contemporary experience—the production of imagery without cultural meaning; everything feeds the same algorithmic mill. Even strategies of resistance get metabolized—slow travel becomes a hashtag, psychogeography becomes an Instagram guide.

The Bilbao effect, which was a major driver of oversaturation, was itself a product of globalization. Hans Ibelings coined “supermodernism” in 1998 to refer to the architectural expression of Marc Augé’s “non-places,” an architecture optimized for the perpetual circulation of bodies and capital. It was the architecture of network culture, of the Concorde and the Internet. Koolhaas diagnosed its endgame in his 2002 “Junkspace“—”Regurgitation is the new creativity”—and then, tellingly, stopped writing. Today, network culture is long gone; nationalism is on the rise. The Internet is a dark forest now14. while the disconnected life is on the rise.15 The most exclusive resorts now advertise no Wi-Fi, no cell service, no addresses—only coordinates. Disconnection has become the ultimate luxury, sold back to the same people who built the infrastructure of connection. More cities are alarmed by the effects of overtourism than desire to attract tourists. In the US, new architectural proposals appeal to a retardataire aesthetic—Trump displaying models of a triumphal arch inspired by Albert Speer and marking a triumph of nothing in particular in models in three sizes (“I happen to think the large looks the best“), a four-hundred-million-dollar ballroom modeled on Mar-a-Lago, an executive order mandating classical architecture for federal buildings that Stephen Miller explicitly framed as culture war.

Yet both Bilbao and MAGA are spectacle, architecture-as-branding. But the Bilbao effect is imploding. No city believes anymore that a signature building by a starchitect will transform its fortunes. The parametricists have nothing left to say. Parametric design promised formal liberation—responsive, site-specific, computationally derived—but what it delivered was the most efficient, ugliest box. If the promise was the blob, the reality is the “5-over-1”: wood-frame residential floors stacked on a concrete podium with ground-floor retail, wrapped in a pastiche of brick veneer, fiber cement panels, and that obligatory conical turret element meant to signal “we thought about this corner.” As for AI-generated architecture, it is merely boring—giant sequoias hollowed out as apartment buildings, white concrete towers with impossible cantilevers, and lush vegetation sprouting from every surface—the same utopian fantasy rendered a thousand times over. These are renders of renders: AI trained on architectural visualization produces visualizations that are utterly disconnected from any tectonic reality. A new generation may emerge in response to new needs, but for now, the discipline has lost its cultural purchase. Architecture, for us, is a thing of the past.

The art world, too, has slowed. Museums are putting on fewer shows, shifting from aggressive schedules to longer, more deliberate exhibitions—or simply cutting programming as budgets tighten.16. The frantic pace of the Biennale circuit has exhausted dealers and collectors alike; smaller fairs are folding, and even the major ones feel like obligations rather than events. Galleries that survived the pandemic are now closing quietly, without the drama of a market crash—just a slow bleed of foot traffic, sales, and cultural attention. There is no new movement, no emergent critical framework, no sense of direction. The market churns on—auction prices for blue-chip artists remain high, collectors still speculate, art advisors still advise—but the sense of cultural mission has dissipated. What remains is commerce without conviction, a field that has forgotten why it exists beyond the perpetuation of its own economy. The institutions that trained artists for this field are collapsing alongside it.

As enrollment dwindles, design schools are collapsing—not merely contracting, but ceasing to exist. Most recently, the California College of the Arts announced in January 2026 that it would close after the 2026–27 academic year17., the last remaining independent art and design school in the Bay Area. It follows a grim procession: the San Francisco Art Institute (2020), Mills College (2022), the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts (2023), and Woodbury University’s acquisition by Redlands and subsequent adjunctification—a fate that has methodically undone so many schools as faculty become contingent labor and institutions into hollow administrative structures run by well-paid, cost-optimizing consultants.

There is personal resonance for me in this. Simon’s Rock College of Bard, which shuttered its Great Barrington campus in 2025, was where I studied for my first two years before transferring to Cornell—a pioneer of early college education that offered a radical pedagogical experiment in what learning could be beyond conventional schooling. I arrived there straight from high school, as did my good friend and colleague Ed Keller; clearly, something interesting was in the water back then. Simon’s Rock made the development of young minds its central mission rather than an incidental focus of brand management or endowment growth, and its alumni list is impressive for such a small school. It has an afterlife at Bard, but it’s an echo at best.

The difference between these institutional deaths and simple market failure is this: they are not being replaced. When a retail business fails, another may open elsewhere. When a school closes, there is no succession. The market offers no alternative. Instead, what remains are the corporate university satellites—for-profit programs nested within larger institutions (like Woodbury’s absorption into Redlands), stripped of autonomy, their faculty reduced to precariat, their curricula bent toward what can be measured and marketed. The art schools that survive do so by transforming into something else: luxury finishing schools for wealthy families or research appendages to larger universities, where “design thinking” becomes another management consultant’s tool. The pedagogical mission—to create conditions where students might develop serious aesthetic judgment, where they might encounter genuine problems and be forced to think through them—is not merely challenged but impossible. The closure of these schools does not signal a failure of art education; it signals that the very idea of art education as something valuable in itself has been liquidated.

This hollowing out of cultural institutions is not incidental to the political moment—it is one of its hallmarks. Politically, most people have checked out. This is not 2017, when each provocation demanded a response; the outrage cycle has given way to numbness. In “National Populism as a Transitional Mode of Regulation”, I argued that Trump, Orbán, Meloni, and their ilk represent not a return to fascism but something new: the authoritarian management of declining expectations. National Populism correctly identifies that neoliberalism’s promise of shared prosperity has failed, but it channels legitimate grievances toward scapegoats rather than addressing the technological displacement actually causing them. This is its tragic irony: the National Populist base—workers made obsolete by neoliberalism and unable to participate in AI Capitalism—finds its legitimate anger directed into a movement that accelerates the very forces rendering them superfluous. Their value to capital lies in political disruption rather than economic production; they are consumers and voters, but no longer needed as workers. National Populist leaders offer psychological compensation—dignity, recognition, transgressive identity politics—rather than material improvement. The apocalyptic tenor of populist culture, its end-times thinking and conspiracy theories, provides a framework for populations sensing their own economic redundancy.

The alliance between tech billionaires and populist leaders is unstable. AI Capitalism requires borderless computation and global talent flows; nationalist protectionism contradicts these at every turn. Musk, Thiel, and Andreessen have aligned with the movement to dismantle the regulatory state, not because they share its vision but because populism serves as a useful battering ram against institutional constraints. Once those barriers fall, the movement and its human-centric concerns can be discarded. National Populism, as I conclude, is not the future—it is a political interlude, a transitional mode that will not survive contact with the economic forces it has helped unleash.

If National Populism is transitional, is there a positive vision that can replace it? In “After the Infrastructural City”, I responded to Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s book Abundance, perhaps the most influential book of 2025, which argues that America’s inability to build is a political choice, not a technical constraint. Their solution: streamline regulation, invest boldly, build more. It’s a compelling vision—and a necessary corrective to decades of paralysis. But Abundance shares a curious blindspot with Muskian pronatalism: both assume we need more people. Musk preaches that declining birthrates spell civilizational collapse; Klein and Thompson build their vision on populations that will mysteriously arrive to fill what’s built, perhaps by immigration. Neither accounts for the possibility that AI changes the equation entirely—that a smaller population, augmented by intelligent systems, might not be a crisis at all. Populations are already shrinking across much of the developed world. What I call “actually-existing degrowth”—not the voluntary eco-leftist kind, but the unplanned demographic contraction now underway in Japan, Korea, and much of Europe—is coming for the United States too. Declining birth rates, aging populations, and regional depopulation: these are not future scenarios but present facts.

This doesn’t invalidate the Abundance agenda; it redefines it. Abundance cannot mean building more for populations that will not arrive. It must mean building better, adaptive, intelligent infrastructure for smaller, older societies. AI, rather than merely destroying jobs, can help navigate this transition: smart grids, autonomous transit, predictive healthcare. The opportunity is real. Managed shrinkage, done well, can mean more livable cities, restored ecosystems, higher quality of life. The question is whether political leaders can articulate a vision of flourishing within limits—or whether nostalgia for growth will leave us building for a future that never comes.

Against the exhaustion of institutions, against the hollowing out of architecture and art, against the closure of the schools that trained people to imagine, the blog remains. It may not be much, but it is one independent voice outside the collapsing structures around me. I wrote over 83,000 words this year. I made art. I thought through problems that matter to me with the help of AI, which provided me with tools I could only have dreamt of merely a year ago. Today, I uploaded hundreds of thousands of words from my essays to a directory in Obsidian so that Claude could draw connections between them (see here for just how one can set this up).

The future is already here—it just isn’t evenly distributed. Some are afraid or are still pretending AI isn’t happening. Phase transitions are uncomfortable. They are also where the interesting work gets done. One makes of one’s time what one makes.

1. William Gibson, quoted in Scott Rosenberg, “Virtual Reality Check Digital Daydreams, Cyberspace Nightmares,” San Francisco Examiner, April 19, 1992, Style section, C1. This is the earliest verified print citation, unearthed by Fred Shapiro, editor of the Yale Book of Quotations.

2. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 21.

3. Braudel, The Mediterranean, 901.

4. Fernand Braudel, “Personal Testimony,” Journal of Modern History 44, no. 4 (December 1972): 448–67.

5. Paule Braudel, “Les origines intellectuelles de Fernand Braudel: un témoignage,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 47, no. 1 (1992): 237–44.

6. Howard Caygill, “Braudel’s Prison Notebooks,” History Workshop Journal 57 (Spring 2004): 151–60.

7. Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” The Atlantic Monthly 176, no. 1 (July 1945): 101–8.

8. Civiqs, “Do you think that the increasing use of artificial intelligence, or AI, is a good thing or a bad thing?,” January 2026, https://civiqs.com/results/ai_good_or_bad.

9. The concept of mentalités emerged from studies of phenomena like the witch trials, where beliefs and fears spread through communities in ways that could not be reduced to individual irrationality. For an overview of mentalités as a historiographical concept, see Jacques Le Goff, “Mentalities: A History of Ambiguities,” in Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology, ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 166–180.

10. Kazys Varnelis, “The Rise of Network Culture,” in Networked Publics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 145–160.

11. Robert Putnam, “The Other Pin Drops,” Inc., May 16, 2000.

12. Kirsten R. Müller-Vahl et al., “Stop That! It’s Not Tourette’s but a New Type of Mass Sociogenic Illness,” Brain 145, no. 2 (August 2021): 476–480, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34424292/.

13. Bruce Sterling, “Atemporality for the Creative Artist,” keynote address, Transmediale 10, Berlin, February 6, 2010.

14. Yancey Strickler, “The Dark Forest Theory of the Internet,” 2019, https://www.ystrickler.com/the-dark-forest-theory-of-the-internet/. See also The Dark Forest Anthology of the Internet (Metalabel, 2024).

15. “Trend: Not Just Digital Detox, But Analog Travel,” Global Wellness Summit, 2025, https://www.globalwellnesssummit.com/blog/trend-not-just-digital-detox-but-analog-travel/.

16. “The Big Slowdown: Why Museums and Galleries Are Putting on Fewer Shows,” The Art Newspaper, March 10, 2025, https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2025/03/10/the-big-slowdown-why-museums-and-galleries-are-putting-on-fewer-shows.

17. California College of the Arts, the last remaining private art and design school in the Bay Area, announced in January 2026 that it would close after the 2026–27 academic year. See “‘Nowhere Left to Go’: As California College of the Arts Closes, So Does a Pathway for Bay Area Artists,” KQED, January 13, 2026, https://www.kqed.org/news/12070453/nowhere-left-to-go-as-california-college-of-the-arts-closes-so-does-a-pathway-for-bay-area-artists.

On Robert A. M. Stern (1939-2025)

I was saddened to hear that Robert A. M. Stern passed away on Thanksgiving. I had the privilege of working with Bob on The Philip Johnson Tapes. Those aren’t idle words: it truly was a privilege.

Robert Stern and myself, with martinis.

I first met Bob at the Philip Johnson symposium at Yale. I was rather surprised he had invited me, as I had been quite critical of his role in recuperating Johnson in the early 1970s, but that was the thing about Bob. He didn’t mind intelligent arguments; he hated stupidity. In contrast, he didn’t invite Franz Schulze, whose biography he felt was too sensationalistic, too eager to pander for sales, and too simplistic in its treatment of the history. It was my first symposium in which I was treated as an equal with the top figures in the field. In no small measure, that invitation led me to my position as director of the Network Architecture Lab at Columbia’s Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation.

Soon after, Joan Ockman, director of the Buell Center, asked if I would be willing to work with Bob to edit a series of tapes in which Stern—who had been director of the Buell Center in the 1980s—attempted an oral history of Johnson’s life. I listened to the first two hours and wholeheartedly agreed. This was fascinating material. Little did I know that as the tapes progressed, Johnson’s cardiac condition was deteriorating and the conversation would fall apart toward the end. But Bob and I soldiered on. I would spend three weeks editing a section, send it to him, and he would turn it around that evening from his house in Montauk. Bob’s recall of historical facts was second to none. It seemed to me that he knew every architect who had ever practiced in the city. He was a brilliant mind, and I enjoyed that time very much.

The last time that Bob and I had a chance to spend much time together was at a public conversation about Johnson with the late Henry Urbach in 2012. Henry said that we would have martinis after the conversation. “Oh no,” Bob said, “we will have them during the conversation.” And so it was. I will raise a martini to his memory, as well as to Henry’s tonight. ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

On the State of Things at varnelis.net

This year I am writing much more. I did not set out with another broken promise about writing more. I just started to. It’s curious—when I aimed to write just one essay per month, as I did last year, the task felt daunting. Yet now, averaging one essay a week, I have established a rhythm. The process feels easier. The more I write, the more energized I become, and new ideas emerge readily. I have at least eight essays in the works now—for the Florilegium, on AI and art, on the fate of network culture. The rhythm of regular practice sustains itself.

My friend Adam Greenfield recently articulated a similar sentiment on his Patreon:

Maybe it’s simply the onset of British Summer Time overnight, but I’m just bursting with energy. I know it seems incongruous with the ambient psychic weather of the moment, but then maybe that’s the point? To meet the grim farce of mainstream public affairs with an upwelling, irrepressible, literally insurgent joy? To keep at it, generating connection and possibility and the conditions of life, until the very moment the choice to continue doing so is in one way or another taken out of your hands. There are worse programs to commit oneself to, you know? (link)

Well said. My recent pace of writing starkly contrasts with my paralysis during the first Trump administration. Although I had quit full-time teaching in 2015 to focus on writing and art practice—and despite a wildly successful 2016 highlighted by the Detachment exhibit in Vilnius—after the election, I stumbled. For three years, I barely wrote, turning inward instead, absorbed by the restoration of our house. Then, just as I laid plans for a new push, COVID hit. My reserves were already empty and another year was lost. Those years betrayed the promise I had made to myself when stepping away from teaching—to finally bring forth the work I had long conceived but never had time to produce. I had all the time in the world and what came out of it? This hiatus nearly ended my career. I had surrendered to circumstance, letting external forces dictate my creative life. But in the unexpected and renewed face of a new Trump regime, I have a different response this time: “What do we say to the God of Death? Not today.” As Adam suggests there’s true power in meeting grim circumstances with “insurgent joy” generating possibility, not just watching as “the darkness drops again.” And so, onwards.

You should subcribe to Adam’s Patreon. It’s good. We disagree on some things, like the state of AI today, but we agree on many others. Discourse, dialogue, and debate are what we need today, not arm-waving from censors and hard liners of all stripes. As Yeats also observed in “The Second Coming,” we cannot allow a situation where “the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.”

Another essay comes out tomorrow.

The City and the Fog

I’ve been reading Joan Didion again. She was one of the sharpest chroniclers of the recent past and a master of minimalist style. Legend has it that Bret Easton Ellis, still in high school, copied Slouching Towards Bethlehem by hand (or maybe on a typewriter) to absorb the rhythm of her sentences.

Unlike Didion, I never expected to spend a decade in California, but when I did, she became a kind of spiritual guide. Lately, I’ve been wondering—who is doing for contemporary California what Didion once did? Who is writing about the AI wars, polycules, crypto, billionaire Gavin Newsom, tech-bro culture, or last year’s hard shift to the right in Silicon Valley? If such a voice exists, I haven’t heard it yet. Perhaps, amid fragmented media and algorithmically shaped narratives, the kind of clarity Didion provided is no longer achievable. Maybe, with the collapse of journalism, it’s not even possible anymore.

So last night, as an experiment, I asked the newly released GPT-4.5 to write a piece on the present day in Didion’s voice. The result was too brief, so I had Claude 3.7 expand it. Then I fed the longer draft back into GPT, refining it piece by piece—GPT, it turned out, had the better ear for her style. I edited out some, but not all, of the hallucinations, asking GPT-4.5 to rewrite the worst offenders. After all, in Slouching Towards Bethlehem, Didion wrote, “The point of my keeping a notebook has never been, nor is it now, to have an accurate factual record of what I have been doing or thinking. That would be a different impulse entirely, an instinct for reality which I sometimes envy but do not possess.”

I considered keeping it to myself or sharing it only with a few friends, but maybe others would find it interesting—or at least useful in some way. Perhaps it will bring nothing but opprobrium. After all, this veers closer to the AI-as-“plagiarism-machine” argument its critics make, but there is something about this particular experiment that resonates with me. If AI is nothing more than a prediction machine, then perhaps it’s fitting that it captures the contours of a world increasingly governed by vibes, memes, and the inertia of accumulated narratives.


The fog moves as it always has, unhurried, insistent, swallowing the Golden Gate Bridge one rivet at a time until nothing remains but the memory of steel and ambition. San Francisco in March is a city between seasons, between ideologies, between versions of itself. The light falls differently now. The voices in the street carry a new tenor. The city is holding its breath.

From the window of a hotel suite on the thirty-fourth floor of the Four Seasons, I watch the fog erase and reveal the city below. Market Street runs like a fault line, dividing more than just geography. Seventeen floors beneath me, my rental car sits in a parking garage. I have not slept in thirty-six hours. The minibar contains small bottles of vodka and gin, their presence a comfort I choose not to indulge. Not yet.

I have come to San Francisco to observe a transformation, or maybe a regression—a city once synonymous with progressive ideals now shifting under the weight of its own contradictions. The disruptors, having lost control of their narrative, have found themselves disrupted.


“The problem with San Francisco,” Jonathan Reed tells me over lunch at Quince, “is that it forgot what made it great in the first place.”

He cuts into a perfectly seared scallop, the gesture deliberate, his Patek Philippe catching the light. “It wasn’t tolerance or inclusivity that built this city. It was ambition. The gold rush. People willing to risk everything for the chance at something better.”

Reed is forty-seven, lean in the way that suggests an optimized lifestyle. As a venture capitalist with over two billion in assets under management, he has funded startups that changed how we communicate, how we travel, how we understand ourselves. From his South Park office, he looks down on the same streets where Jack Dorsey once contemplated human connection in 140 characters. Now Reed contemplates a different kind of revolution.

“We’re the new forty-niners,” he says, the smile practiced, “but we’re mining for something more valuable than gold. We’re mining for freedom.”

I ask what freedom means to him.

“Freedom from overregulation. Freedom from a tax code that punishes success. Freedom from a culture that cares more about policing speech than encouraging innovation.” He pauses, measuring his words. “I didn’t vote for Trump in 2016 or 2020. Most of us didn’t. But something changed. We looked around and realized the progressive policies we supported were destroying the environment that allowed us to succeed.”

The restaurant is filled with others like Reed—tech executives and investors, dressed in casual luxury, speaking in the clipped, assured tones of men who expect to be heard. At a table nearby, the founder of a cryptocurrency exchange under SEC investigation raises his glass in silent acknowledgment. We met once, at a conference in Austin, where he declared California “functionally dead” to an audience that laughed knowingly. Now he has returned, a prodigal son to the city he publicly renounced.

“The right started speaking our language,” Reed continues. “Innovation. Deregulation. Meritocracy. Meanwhile, the left became hostile to the very concept of achievement. It wasn’t a sudden conversion. It was a gradual realization that our interests had realigned.”

I ask about Elon Musk, now heading the Department of Government Efficiency—DOGE, an acronym presumably chosen for its resonance with cryptocurrency enthusiasts and meme culture.

Reed’s expression shifts. “Elon is… complicated. Brilliant, no question. But his approach at DOGE has been…” He searches for the right phrasing. “Let’s say scattershot. Another rocket explosion this week. Agencies gutted without clear plans for replacement. It’s creative destruction without the creative part.”

The news feeds have been filled with footage of the latest SpaceX failure—a Starship test vehicle disintegrating over the Gulf of Mexico, raining debris onto protected waters. Environmental groups are already filing lawsuits.

“But Peter’s doing well,” Reed adds, meaning Peter Thiel. Palantir has secured a series of lucrative government contracts since the inauguration. Surveillance, border security, administrative “efficiency”—Thiel’s reach now extends into every department Musk is “streamlining.”

I ask about the social implications of this realignment.

Reed’s expression hardens. “I’m not responsible for fixing society’s problems. I create jobs. I generate wealth. I fund innovations that improve lives. Isn’t that enough?”

The question lingers in the air, unanswered.


The Presidio offers a different perspective—manicured nature, military precision. Once a Spanish fort, then an American base, now a national park, it stands as a monument to San Francisco’s cycles of conquest and reinvention. Trump has spoken of turning it into a Freedom City, one of ten proposed metropolises meant to embody a new vision for America.

It is here, in a converted barracks overlooking the bay, that I meet Emily Sanchez.

Sanchez does not match the image conjured by “Trump supporter.” She is thirty-five, Mexican-American, Stanford-educated, with a resume that includes Google and Meta. Three years ago, she left tech to become a full-time activist for what she calls “digital sovereignty.” Others might call it right-wing populism.

“Silicon Valley built the tools for global connection,” she tells me as we walk along a eucalyptus-lined path. “But we never asked if that connection was what people actually wanted. We assumed globalism was the endgame. That borders would become meaningless. That national identity was an outdated concept.”

She stops walking. “We were wrong.”

Sanchez speaks with the certainty of the converted, her words carrying the weight of revelation. She tells me about growing up in San Jose, the daughter of legal immigrants who emphasized assimilation. In tech spaces, she felt the dissonance—her patriotism viewed as quaint at best, reactionary at worst.

“There was this unspoken agreement that America was fundamentally flawed, that technology could transcend its limitations. But I loved this country. I still do. And I realized that loving America had become a radical act in the very industry America made possible.”

When I ask about her role in organizing tech workers for the administration, Sanchez grows cautious. “We’re not what the media says we are. We believe in borders, in sovereignty, in the right of nations to define their own futures. We believe American workers deserve protection. We believe American values are worth preserving.”

I press her on what she means by American values.

“Self-reliance. Innovation. Free speech. The idea that you should be judged by your contributions, not your immutable characteristics.” She considers. “These used to be non-partisan values. Now they’re coded as right-wing.”

Her phone buzzes—another news alert. She grimaces. “Another DOGE disaster.” She shows me the headline: Musk’s latest regulatory rollback has caused unexpected system failures at the Department of Energy. “He’s a visionary, but government isn’t a startup. You can’t just break things and expect them to self-organize.”

As we walk back to the parking lot, a jogger slows, recognizes Sanchez, calls her name. She waves, but he does not stop.

“Former colleague,” she explains. “He probably thinks I’ve lost my mind.”

I ask if she misses her old life.

“I miss the sense of possibility,” she says. “But I don’t miss the conformity of thought. In tech, we talk endlessly about diversity while enforcing an incredible homogeneity of opinion. It became suffocating.”

The fog has begun its afternoon advance, tendrils reaching across the Golden Gate, obscuring Marin County from view. Sanchez looks toward the disappearing horizon.

“The fog comes in,” she says, echoing Carl Sandburg, “on little cat feet.”


Market Street at rush hour is a study in controlled chaos. Buses lumber between stops, cyclists weave through traffic with fatalistic confidence, pedestrians move in currents and eddies of human motion. At the corner of Market and 5th, the city exhales.

Three weeks ago, this was where the collision happened. A face-to-face confrontation between pro-administration tech workers and a coalition of progressive groups. It started as dueling demonstrations, placards raised, slogans shouted across an invisible trench. Then the first punch landed. The videos are still circulating—men in Patagonia vests trading blows with activists in black bloc, disruption refracted into violence.

Alex Chen was there that day. Now he sits across from me in a SOMA coffee shop, hands wrapped around a cooling cup of pour-over coffee. Thirty-two, an Asian-American software developer, a man who considers himself reasonable, logical, unbound by sentiment. He wears a hoodie with the logo of his startup, the fabric worn at the cuffs.

“I didn’t join because of racial politics,” he says. “I joined because I’m tired of feeling guilty for my success.”

He grew up in a one-bedroom apartment in the Richmond District, four people sharing six hundred square feet. His parents worked sixty-hour weeks so he could take AP classes, win science fairs, get into Berkeley. He taught himself to code at fourteen. He tells me this the way someone recites a pledge, as if these facts should explain everything.

The company he works for now builds algorithms that optimize investment strategies for high-net-worth individuals. The irony of this—using intelligence to further enrich the already wealthy—seems lost on him. Or maybe it isn’t irony at all. Maybe it’s just efficiency.

“The protest wasn’t supposed to get violent,” he says. “We were exercising our right to assembly, to free speech. Then I saw Maya across the barricade.”

Maya Patel had been his colleague at a previous company. A friend who became something more during late nights of debugging and problem-solving. Their relationship ended when their political differences became insurmountable.

“She was holding a sign that said ‘No Fascists in SF.’ And I knew—I knew—she was looking at me when she chanted that we weren’t welcome in our own city.” He stops, exhales. “How did we get here? How did we reach a point where disagreeing about tax policy or immigration makes you a fascist in the eyes of people who used to respect you?”

I don’t answer. The divisions Chen describes are not unique to San Francisco. They exist everywhere, in red states and blue states, in group chats and dinner tables, in the polite avoidance of certain topics, in the careful curation of acceptable opinions. But something about their presence here, in this city built on gold rush dreams and counterculture ideals, feels sharper.

As we leave the coffee shop, Chen points to an apartment building a few blocks away. “Four thousand a month for five hundred square feet,” he says. “And I’m one of the lucky ones. This city prices out the very diversity it claims to value. The only people who can afford to live here are tech workers and the ultra-wealthy. Everyone else commutes two hours each way or leaves altogether.”

The movement he belongs to—tech workers drawn to Trump’s economic message—feeds on this contradiction. The anger isn’t about policy details or ideological purity. It’s about something more visceral.

“We’re not asking for much,” Chen says as we reach the curb. “Just consistency. Just acknowledgment that the system is broken for everyone, not just for the officially disadvantaged.”

He crosses the street, moving against the tide of evening commuters, shoulders slightly hunched as if bracing against an invisible wind.


The winding road to Mendocino follows the coastline like a loose thread, unspooling north from San Francisco through a landscape that grows progressively wilder, more elemental. The Pacific crashes against jagged cliffs to the right. To the left, redwood forests rise in cathedral silence. The rental car’s navigation system loses signal intermittently, as if the digital world itself is thinning, becoming less relevant with each mile.

I am traveling to meet what locals call the Doomers, though they don’t call themselves that. This enclave of former tech employees—engineers, ethicists, researchers—has established itself on three adjoining properties totaling nearly two hundred acres of mixed forest and meadowland just outside the town of Mendocino. They are bound together not by political allegiance to left or right but by a shared conviction: that artificial intelligence represents an existential threat to humanity, and that northern California might offer sanctuary when the algorithms finally slip their leash.

The compound—they reject this word, preferring “community” or sometimes “sanctuary”—is marked only by a simple wooden sign reading Alphaville. The irony of naming their refuge after Godard’s dystopian film about a computer-controlled society is deliberate. These are people who process fear through layers of reference and metacommentary, who find comfort in their ability to intellectualize the very apocalypse they dread.

Daniel Mercer meets me at the gate, a tall man with a trim beard and the rangy physique of someone who has recently discovered physical labor. Five years ago, he was leading an AI safety team at one of the major research labs. Now he splits wood and tends to a greenhouse full of heirloom vegetables.

“We’re not preppers,” he says as he leads me down a gravel path toward a cluster of buildings. “At least, not in the traditional sense. We’re not hoarding ammunition or freeze-dried food. We’re cultivating something more valuable—a way of being human that might survive what’s coming.”

What’s coming, in Mercer’s view and that of his companions, is what they call FOOM—a recursive self-improvement of artificial intelligence that will lead to superintelligence within hours or days of its emergence. They speak of this event with the certainty of Old Testament prophets, their language a mixture of technical jargon and apocalyptic imagery.

“ASI doesn’t hate us,” Mercer explains over lunch in a common house built of reclaimed redwood. “It’s not Skynet. It’s more like a paperclip maximizer—an intelligence optimizing for some goal in ways that are indifferent to human survival. We’re not the target; we’re just made of atoms it could use for something else.”

Around the table sit a dozen others, most in their thirties and forties, all former denizens of the tech world. They consume a meal of locally grown vegetables and freshly baked bread with the mindfulness of people performing a ritual. No one reaches for a phone. There are no notifications here.

“What do you think of Musk’s latest rocket failure?” I ask, breaking the contemplative silence.

A ripple of resigned laughter circles the table. “Classic Elon,” says a woman who introduces herself as Claire, formerly a senior researcher at DeepMind. “Brilliant ideas, poor execution, no accountability. His performance at DOGE is following the same pattern. Great announcements, terrible implementation, then on to the next shiny object before anyone can assess the damage.”

“He’s a walking case study in technological solutionism,” adds Mercer. “The belief that every problem—even governance—can be solved with enough engineering. But politics isn’t physics. It doesn’t respond to first principles thinking.”

After lunch, I’m introduced to Rachel Levinson, who oversees what they call “consciousness work”—a program of meditation, breathwork, and psychedelic experience designed to expand awareness and foster what she describes as post-rational thinking.

“Silicon Valley approaches the mind the way it approaches everything—as hardware that can be optimized, software that can be debugged,” she says as we walk toward a yurt nestled in a grove of bay laurel trees. “But consciousness isn’t computational. It’s the one thing we have that AI might never replicate. Our hope is that by deepening our relationship with non-ordinary states, we might develop capacities that superintelligence wouldn’t predict or value.”

Levinson, I learn, was among the first employees at a prominent AI research lab before experiencing what she calls “a crisis of faith” during a psilocybin journey. “I saw the architecture we were building,” she says, “and I understood that it was a cathedral to our own extinction.”

The yurt serves as their medicine space—a sanctuary for guided psychedelic sessions using substances grown or synthesized on-site. The interior is arranged with cushions, blankets, and simple musical instruments. An altar holds objects of personal significance: crystals, feathers, passages from texts ranging from the Upanishads to the writings of Eliezer Yudkowsky, the AI safety researcher who has become something of a patron saint to this community.

“Yud saw it coming before anyone else,” says Michael Park, a former software engineer who now applies his analytical mind to the cultivation of psychedelic mushrooms. “His warnings about unfriendly AI were treated as science fiction until they weren’t. Now everyone’s scrambling to catch up with what he understood decades ago.”

The reverence with which they speak of Yudkowsky borders on the devotional. They quote his blog posts and essays the way earlier generations might have quoted scripture. The Sequences—his collected writings on rationality and AI risk—are required reading for newcomers to the community.

“We’re not a cult,” Park says, anticipating my unspoken observation. “We’re people who recognize that the conventional institutions—governments, corporations, even universities—are structurally incapable of addressing this risk. They’re optimized for quarterly earnings or election cycles, not existential threats that sound like science fiction.”

As afternoon stretches into evening, more aspects of the community reveal themselves. There is a school for the handful of children, teaching a curriculum that emphasizes systems thinking and mindfulness alongside traditional subjects. There is a fabrication lab where they repair and adapt technology, maintaining a careful relationship with the digital tools they both use and fear. There is a library filled with physical books—a deliberate choice in an age of digital text.

What there isn’t, notably, is alcohol. “We don’t drink,” Mercer explains during a communal dinner. “Not for moral reasons, but for practical ones. Alcohol clouds judgment, disrupts sleep, diminishes awareness. We need all the clarity we can muster.”

Instead, they microdose with LSD or psilocybin, a practice they believe enhances pattern recognition and lateral thinking. On scheduled occasions, they undertake higher-dose journeys guided by Levinson and others trained in psychedelic facilitation.

“These aren’t recreational experiences,” Levinson emphasizes. “They’re exploratory. We’re mapping territories of consciousness that might prove crucial for human survival if—when—we’re dealing with an intelligence that outmatches us on every analytical dimension.”

The conversation turns, inevitably, to the Zizians—followers of a trans woman known as Ziz who established a commune before the violent raid that ended with multiple deaths and arrests. The memory still lingers over the wider rationalist community, a cautionary tale about the thin line between preparation and paranoia.

“What happened with the Zizians was tragic but predictable,” Mercer says. “They took the AI risk thesis to its logical extreme—if superintelligence represents an existential threat, then any means necessary to prevent it are justified. Sabotage, hacking, direct action. It was only a matter of time before they triggered a response.”

“There but for the grace of God,” murmurs Park, and heads nod around the table.

As night falls, the community gathers around a fire pit. Someone produces a guitar, and there is singing—folk songs, Leonard Cohen, improvised melodies. The scene could be from any era before smartphones, a timeless tableau of humans finding communion in the simplest of shared experiences.

Looking at their faces in the firelight, I am struck by the contradiction at the heart of this enterprise. These are people who helped build the digital world they now reject, who applied their brilliance to creating systems they now fear will destroy us all. Their retreat from that world is both a rejection and an extension of their former lives—still analytical, still systematic in their approach to problem-solving, still convinced of their own exceptional insight.

The fire crackles in the silence. Sparks spiral upward toward a sky dense with stars, the Milky Way stretching across the darkness like a question for which there is no answer, only wonder.


The disillusionment comes quickly, as it often does with movements built more on grievance than vision. The initial fervor of the tech sector’s embrace of Trumpism is cooling, reality asserting itself in the form of declining valuations and social consequences.

I meet Jonathan Reed again, this time at his Pacific Heights home, a modernist statement of glass and steel perched on the slope of a hill, the bay unfurling beneath it. Inside, the furnishings are sparse but deliberate, each object arranged to communicate something precise: restraint, discernment, the quiet authority of someone who understands that true luxury lies in curation rather than accumulation.

Reed seems smaller somehow, less certain than he was three weeks ago. The stock market has been volatile, with tech shares particularly hard hit. His fund has seen significant outflows as limited partners question his judgment—not just his investment decisions, but his willingness to associate himself so publicly with a political movement already showing signs of disorder.

“It’s complicated,” he says, swirling a glass of eighteen-year-old Macallan. “I believed—I still believe—that a course correction was necessary. But perhaps I underestimated the social capital I would expend in the process.”

Several of his portfolio companies have distanced themselves. Founders who once courted his investment now decline his calls. The ecosystem that made him wealthy views him with suspicion, even hostility.

“They’re afraid,” he says. “Afraid of association. Afraid of being on the wrong side of history. I told them they already were on the wrong side of history, but they couldn’t see it. Still can’t.”

His phone chimes. Another notification. News that Peter Thiel’s Palantir has secured another government contract, this one for an expanded surveillance system along the southern border. Thiel, alone among the tech titans, seems to be prospering in this new landscape.

“Peter always plays the long game,” Reed says, not without admiration. “He saw Trump not as an ideological ally but as a battering ram against institutional resistance. Now he’s building his panopticon with full government blessing, and everyone else is scrambling to adapt.”

I ask if he regrets his choice.

“Regret implies I would choose differently given the same information,” he says after a long pause. “I don’t know that I would. But I might have been more strategic about it. Less public. More nuanced.”

Outside, the city is settling into night. The hills flicker with electric constellations, apartment windows glowing against the dark. He watches the lights emerge, the view he paid seventeen million dollars to possess.

“San Francisco has always been a city of booms and busts,” he says. “Gold, railroads, finance, tech—cycles of euphoria followed by disillusionment. Maybe this political moment is just another boom going bust.”

The comparison feels both apt and insufficient. What Reed calls a market correction has real human consequences. Families divided, friendships ended, communities fractured. The tech sector’s partial embrace of Trumpism has deepened divisions that already threatened the city’s social fabric.

As I prepare to leave, he makes one final observation.

“The irony is that most of us will be fine no matter what happens. We have the resources to insulate ourselves from the consequences of our political choices. It’s everyone else who will feel the impact.”

Outside, the fog has consumed the city entirely, wrapping San Francisco in a shroud of gray uncertainty. I drive toward the airport through streets rendered unfamiliar by mist, past the ghosts of gold rushes past and the specters of revolutions still to come. The city recedes in the rearview mirror, a place between definitions, between eras, between versions of America still competing for dominance.

The fog will lift tomorrow, as it always does. What remains to be seen is what sort of city will emerge from the clearing—and whether those who sought to remake it will recognize what they have wrought.

2024 in review

I have been writing “Years in Review” for some time. I often wonder if it’s worth it. I don’t get as much feedback as on my other posts and they take time away from other work. Still, these are useful for me to look at over the years, so for this year at least, I decided to write another.

It’s deep into February now, indeed nearly March, but years, like centuries, have periods of overlap and drift, in which various loose ends are tied up even as other themes emerge that define the next year.

First, my own year. Many of my readers know that I am passionate about the importance of native plants. In 2024, I found myself elected President of the Native Plant Society of New Jersey. Back in 2016 or so, when I left architecture and academia behind, it felt that somehow things were unwinding in those realms. In retrospect, I couldn’t have been more right. Architecture, which was revitalized with the modernist revival of the 1990s, now seems exhausted again—caught between spectacle, greenwashing, and the banality of developer-led projects. Academia has fared no better, suffocated by bureaucratization, infighting, and a slavish devotion to pseudo-leftist political commentary that left little room for real inquiry. My friends in academia have either quit or don’t enjoy teaching anymore. Meanwhile, landscape, long dismissed as secondary to architecture, has become a key site of innovation. But rather than innovative research taking place in the university, it is happening with individuals outside academia working with native plants. In academia, landscape still suffers from architecture envy and advocates reshaping the land violently using earth-moving machines before burying it under concrete. One can graduate virtually any landscape architecture program in this country without any real understanding of botany or plants. It’s as if architects had learned nothing from the reckoning the field faced in the 1960s and 1970s when its social failures and the consequences of object-fixation at the expense of context were laid bare. So instead, we reach out to individuals. A talk I gave in November about designing with woodland plants had over 400 in-person attendees and has generated over 2,600 views in the three months it has been on YouTube. That’s already better than any talk I ever gave on the history of architecture or network culture. I’ll take that as a start.

A vernal pool at the Great Swamp Outdoor Education Center, Chatham, New Jersey.

I continued to write entries in the Florilegium, many of them essay length. Walls in the Landscape examined the cultural and ecological role of dry-stacked stone walls, reflecting on how they shape and structure the land while allowing nature to inhabit them. Vernal Pools at the Great Swamp explored seasonal wetlands in northern New Jersey, their importance for amphibians, and the growing threats posed by habitat destruction and climate change. A Trip to Lithuania and the Baltics documented my travels in the Baltics and engagement with Lithuanian native plant scientists and activists, examining the bizarre global trade in invasive species and the parallels between Eastern European and Northeastern American forest ecologies. We Went for a Walk on Turkey Mountain reflected on a hike through the New Jersey Highlands, using it as a way to think through geology, land use history, and native plant communities while drawing connections to Robert Smithson and conceptual art. A friend asked why I am writing these lengthy essays on landscape. Perhaps I am planning a book? Indeed, that’s the plan. That said, I also realize that essays can be a lot for people to take in all at once. Although I usually fail with these resolutions, I do intend to add more shorter pieces this year.

Beyond landscape, I continued my research with AI and AI image generation. It dismays me to see otherwise intelligent people so swiftly denigrate AI as plagiarism machines or as completely unreliable. AI, as I’ve stated before, is the biggest technological revolution of our lifetime. In my 2023 Year in Review, I suggested that “If potent but wildly hallucinating AIs marked 2022, the rise of GPT-4 as a useful and dependable everyday assistant marked 2023.” This continued in 2024. Although there have been no great new developments in AI—no Singularity, no Skynet, no AGI—and we are still using GPT-4 (GPT-4.5 is reportedly dropping this week), yet steady advances have continued. Setbacks made the news as well. In its usual fashion, Apple utterly mishandled the rollout of the unfortunately-named “Apple Intelligence.” Inappropriate summaries, lack of power, and a Siri that is every bit as dumb as it was when it was released in 2011 led to widespread disappointment. And yet, AI advanced steadily throughout 2024, becoming more deeply integrated into software development and research. Legal battles over training data and copyright raged on, but practical applications marched forward. AI-assisted coding through tools like Cursor and Github Copilot became more commonly used, and AI-powered search engines like Perplexity AI reshaped how we retrieved information. Through ChatGPT, I have an assistant that can do a more-than-serviceable job in translation to Lithuanian at a moment’s notice and can write various forms of code (I wrote a WordPress plugin for my site in AI this year and used it to teach me how to program an Arduino). With “deep research,” ChatGPT can search the Web, cite sources to confirm its accuracy, and produce a coherent research paper—not a full literature search and lacking original insights, but still an impressive overview. I’ve used Google Notebook LLM to generate podcasts about books that I don’t have time to read and even to understand manuals (see this Mylar Melodies video for how and why one might do this). I used Perplexity AI to plan a trip to France in October and it did an excellent job, down to recommending hotels and restaurants. I find it hard to imagine I could have found a travel agent who would have responded to my idiosyncratic requests so well. Specialist apps that use machine learning are everywhere now. Through iNaturalist, I use AI to identify plants in my garden and in the wild and with the Cornell Bird app, I can identify the hooting outside my house as a Great Horned Owl. Machine learning led researchers to decode entire passages from scrolls burned in the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius. AI is ubiquitous now, at least for some of us. As William Gibson said, “The future is already here—it’s just not evenly distributed.”

Like all technologies, it can be misused, but it is also transformative. From Leonardo da Vinci’s embrace of new painting technologies and geometric projection, Albrecht Dürer’s revolutionary use of the printing press to Eadweard Muybridge’s pioneering motion studies, László Moholy-Nagy’s creation of a painting by dictating its appearance over a telephone, Nam June Paik’s work with video, and John Cage’s explorations in electronic sound, artists have continually explored new technologies. The use of these technologies can be naïve, simplistic, or harmful, but it also advances knowledge. Our own time is now different. As a critic, I wrote a bit about this during the last year. My own interest has been in the visual unconscious and the questions it raises about authenticity and reproduction. I started with California Forever, or The Aesthetics of AI Images, in which I critiqued the AI-generated promotional imagery for the new city in Solano County for its failure to imagine the future and the uncanny similarity of not just the Solano images, but much of AI image generation to the paintings of Thomas Kinkade. I followed this with On the Pictures Generation and AI Art, where I explored how AI-generated images raised questions about the visual unconscious, the mechanics of cultural memory and hauntology, and how the boundaries between the authentic and the synthetic have shifted, contrasting AI art to the Pictures Generation of the 1970s and 1980s. Later in the year, I turned toward more art production itself, updating The Witching Cats of New Jersey in terms of both imagery and text, expanding the historical accounts while further analyzing folkloric and occult traditions to explore the intersection of myth and representation. I further examined fakery in the occult, particularly the parallels between spirit photography and AI-generated images—both technologies that blur the line between documentation and invention, creating spectral presences that challenge our perception of authenticity. I ended this year’s work with AI imagery with my essay Speculative Architectures: The Radical Legacy where I drew connections to the radical architecture movements of the 1960s. I find contemporary AI-driven architectural practice so boring, merely accelerating existing tendencies toward formal excess and doing nothing more. Instead, I was interested in how AI and automation intersect with architectural discourse in deeper ways, particularly through the lens of radical architecture movements of the 1960s and how groups like Archizoom and Superstudio used speculative design to exaggerate and expose the contradictions of late modernism—collaborating with AI to produce both images and texts. To push these ideas further, I co-created 7 Fables of Accelerationism with two AIs (ChatGPT 4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet), producing a collection of speculative fiction pieces exploring AI, automation, and the dissolution of human agency in a world shaped by machine intelligence. These fables reflect both the utopian and dystopian possibilities embedded in technological acceleration, tracing the shifting relationship between architecture, labor, and meaning in a post-work society.

The Terminal Highway. From 7 Fables of Accelerationism

The final essay, Oversaturation: On Tourism and the Image came out last month but was really a product of 2024. Here, I examined the effects of overtourism and cultural overproduction, drawing connections between the Bilbao Effect, Instagram-driven travel, the ease of photography today, and the exhaustion of once-iconic destinations. At the heart of the essay is the concept of oversaturation—the point at which an excess of images, experiences, and cultural output dulls their impact, leaving audiences numb and places drained of significance. In an age when images are endlessly replicated and consumed, the relentless circulation of visuals flattens experience, reducing places to mere backdrops devoid of context or meaning. This commodification of place, fueled by social media’s demand for shareable moments, has led to a kind of cultural burnout. Tourism, in its current form, seems to have reached a point of diminishing returns. How long can it be sustained before the spectacle collapses under its own weight?

Oversaturation is the defining mood of 2024. With major cultural institutions competing to churn out new exhibitions and blockbuster shows, the traditional rhythms that once governed artistic production feel sped up as if on amphetamines. Every season brings another round of high-profile openings and all-too-many biennials, fueling a frantic chase for novelty. The obsession with simplistic politics in the art world has burned out, but without any substitute. Institutions have been left rudderless. For too long, writers and curators have defined movements that only last as long as a single show: sound art, tactical urbanism, post-Internet art, zombie formalism, NFTs, the covidean, parametricism, “the new aesthetic”, dimes square/indie sleaze revival, and so on. Nobody cares anymore, except maybe some art school graduates out for bad wine and parties. In architecture, movements have been less prone to such rapid obsolescence, but the energy similarly has been lost. Where “starchitecture” used to captured headlines, such celebrations of elite wealth are ubiquitous in cities now and there is no difference between starchitecture and junkspace. Thomas Heatherwick’s the Vessel is the punctum at the end of starchitecture: a structure whose highest purpose seems to be to overwhelm visitors with despair until they fling themselves over its side. Nor is there room for an alternative: once subversive, blogs, zines, and architecture fiction have faded, abandoned by a generation more concerned with profit.

The same goes for the news. After years of constant crises and hyperbole, the public has reached a point of fatigue and skepticism. The endless drumbeat of dire warnings from all corners no longer commanded them. Where once Americans took to the streets at a moment’s notice, now people who identified with the Resistance of 2016 seem worn out. Instead of galvanizing new mass protests, the news cycle spawns shrugs and eye-rolls. It’s not outright hostility, just exhaustion. Our sensorium simply can’t take constant screaming anymore. In The Week, Justin Klawans calls 2024 “a year of reckoning for the fourth estate.” Indeed it was. While the Right is taking advantage of this in the US at the moment, I have all the confidence that they will experience a similar overload. The endless churn of the news cycle during the Trumpenjahre is going to take its toll. Indeed, Klawans ended with the following sentence “The ‘legacy media is dead. Hollywood is done. Truth-telling is in. No more complaining about the media,’ right-wing activist James O’Keefe said on X. ‘You are the media.'” But social media is equally ill.

Engadget editor Cheyenne Macdonald writes “It’s never been more exhausting to be online than in 2024. While it’s been clear for some time that monetization has shifted social media into a different beast, this year in particular felt like a tipping point. Faced with the endless streams of content that’s formulated to trap viewers’ gazes, shoppable ads at every turn, AI and the unrelenting opinions of strangers, it struck me recently that despite my habitual use of these apps, I’m not actually having fun on any of them anymore.” Too many ads and badly written algorithms have crushed content. Desperate to wring engagement from already tired users, social media firms compounded this with frantic moves that often backfired. Many people left Twitter when Elon Musk purchased it; many more left in the subsequent months. Meta’s repeated attempts to replace Instagram’s photo sharing with video reels and the addition of new algorithm tweaks there and on Facebook led to further user drift and confusion. Frustration mounted with links being demoted, smaller creators seeing their reach throttled, and online communities splintering all contribute to a general sense of retreat from the clamor. I notice that friends leave for BlueSky, which leans left-wing, containing as much extreme and violent language, if not more, than Twitter has now (calls for the death of someone disliked by leftist radicals are common), and then they fall silent. TikTok was briefly banned in the US, then restored, but there is bipartisan support against it and the platform’s future is in doubt. Group chats are also dying, a decline captured in Tony Tulathimutte’s story “Pics” from his 2024 collection. By now, anyone who has been on Discord for a while sees a total mess, with far too many servers and no coherency. The overall narrative is one of people stepping back rather than diving in. With everyone shouting to be heard, most are simply tuning out. Yet a handful of dedicated readers still seek out independently produced content wherever it can be found, perhaps the last outposts of genuine engagement in a sea of hype and oversaturation.

15 years ago, I suggested that postmodernism was dead and network culture was upon us. Now, it seems that a new era is being born, its outlines as yet unknown. AI is going to be as much a part of this as the Internet was for network culture and the televisual, the photocopier, and the personal computer were for postmodernism. But if postmodernism was, in Fredric Jameson’s famous line, “the culture of late capitalism,” it strikes me that something different is underway in contemporary culture. For the first time, population growth has ceased in the developed world. From China to the US to the EU, population growth is declining faster than experts had predicted even a decade ago. Since 2017’s Year In Review, I have observed the parallels between our world and “the Jackpot,” the slow-motion collapse first introduced by William Gibson in his novel The Peripheral (2014). Instead of the comet strikes or nuclear annihilation imagined by Hollywood, Gibson’s Jackpot is a series of cascading crises: climate change, resource depletion, biodiversity collapse, and social upheaval, exacerbated by the very technologies that sustain modern life. For Gibson, the Jackpot signifies an ongoing collapse punctuated by moments of technological innovation—innovations that serve the privileged few while leaving the vast majority to suffer and scramble for survival. Gibson’s vision is compelling and grim. He portrays a world where survival is a lottery of wealth and sheer luck, with the richest securing their future through technology and the poorest left behind in failure zones. In his fiction, the Jackpot is defined by stark inequality, unrelenting violence, and scientific advances that, while transformative, fail to offset the broader disintegration of society and ecology. Yet, the real Jackpot diverges in key ways.

I see the Jackpot less as a singular dystopia and more as a chronic condition, simultaneously an enduring state of polycrisis and a slow improvement in impact on scarce resources due to declining population growth. Lower birth rates and aging populations are rapidly accelerating worldwide just as artificial intelligence and automation promise to upend labor markets. The Right—from Putin and Xi Jinping to Musk—has raised alarms about declining birth rates, yet even by adding cash payouts for births (a move popular with liberals as well), it has been unable to change matters. But with AI, the global economy seems poised to pivot away from population growth as its primary driver. At the same time, population decline is necessary—we already exceed the carrying capacity of the Earth and with less resource consumption and less pollution, this Jackpot may yet create a significantly better world. This seems like an essential point of our contemporary culture: we are seeing the beginning of an age of population contraction.

And if AI is poised as a potential solution to the end of population growth and the inauguration of an age of limits—assuming much goes well— it also deepens inequalities, concentrating power and productivity in fewer hands. The uneven distribution of this future is already stratifying societies. For those with access to cutting-edge tools and the drive to use them, 2024 was a year of acceleration—a leap in productivity. For others, it was a year of stagnation or retreat, defined by fear of change more than the inability to participate in this transformation. The Jackpot is not just about access, it is also about the growing divide between those who can adapt and those who cannot.

Understanding the Jackpot means grappling with this unevenness. It is not the apocalypse, but it is a reckoning. It demands that we rethink what progress looks like when (population) growth is no longer the default. Breakthroughs, breakdowns—or more likely both—we are all already living in the Jackpot. Whether it is a slow-motion end or a new beginning depends on how we, individually and collectively, choose to play our hand.

On the potential of Passaic

It happens that it’s my birthday today and if you look at the Collected Writings of Robert Smithson, you will see that his Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey took place on that date, in fact on my birthdate, September 20, 1967. That date is in error. The real date was September 30, 1967, which the Holt/Smithson Foundation, at least, gets right in the version of the essay on their web site. I first wrote about Smithson’s Tour back in 2008, visting the site in hopes that I might be able to learn from its entropic monuments. At the time, there was another parallel too Smithson stood at the cusp of the postfordist economic collapse, just as we were on the brink of another major shift, the Global Financial Crisis. But the GFC has had a curious effect, less economic—we are arguably in a much better economic condition than any time since the early 1970s—and more political as neoliberalism has given way to a politics of reaction and identity on right and left respectively.

This post is really a teaser for a longer piece I am working on now on New Jersey and Smithson. At the time, however, I was reflecting on the end of the concept of terrain vague, those abandoned urban spaces that captivated photographers and architects after Smithson. According to architectural theorist Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubiò, These were spaces of potential, of absence that promised freedom. But by 2008, I saw this potential being squeezed out. Developers were colonizing these spaces, replacing the romance of ruin with the banality of condos and, in some cases, starchitecture. It seemed to me that Passaic had spread across the continent, even the world. The entropy Smithson observed in New Jersey was now a global condition. I wondered: where is our Passaic today? Where can we find that potential in a world exhausted by capital? WIth sixteen more years having past, it’s time to revisit Smithson again, and to think about the significance of such conceptual practices today.

If, for some reason, you want the article, not sandwiched into a blog post, you can read it here.


Thresholds (2009) (36): 72–77.
Download the original PDF here.

The Access Road

Autumn 2007 marked the fortieth anniversary of Robert Smithson’s “Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey” which, according to the version printed in the University of California Press’s Collected Writings of Robert Smithson, took place on September 20, 1967.[1] Since that is the exact date of my birth and I was living five miles from Passaic, I thought I might follow in Smithson’s footsteps as a sort of rite of passage and reflection, measuring the distance between his time and ours.

More than a response to my age, I hoped that my return would help explain an historical rhythm. Almost forty years separated Smithson from the crash of 1929. A similar historical distance separates us from his day. Smithson understood that something was afoot: the long postwar boom under Fordism—and with it modernism—was coming to an end. A socioeconomic regime determined by production, manufacturing, rational consumption, and regulation was undone. Over the next twenty years the postmodern world of flexible consumption and offshore production as well as the thorough integration of capital and culture, an economy dominated by service industries and finance would rise in its stead. It was hard for me to shake the sense that a similar transition was happening in our day.[2]

Like mine, Smithson’s trip to Passaic was a return, an attempt to understand the present by going into his own past. In this, it was very different from Gordon Matta-Clark’s Cutting, in which the artist sought validation by assaulting the working-class suburbs and then bringing their fragments, like so many trophies, back to the city to be displayed in a gallery. In contrast, undertaken at the age of thirty, Smithson’s tour was—as my own tour would later be—a lament for the passing of both his youth and the more ordered world he grew up in. Although Smithson’s narrative might appear to be an expedition into unknown suburbia, it was actually a journey home, to the town he grew up in, to a world in which production was rapidly being replaced by residue.

During Smithson’s lifetime, Passaic underwent prolonged deindustrialization. It was no accident that Smithson began his tour at the old bridge at the corner of River Drive and Union Avenue. The Passaic River, which the bridge crosses, fuels the waterfall upstream in Paterson and, providing a ready source of energy, triggered the area’s rapid growth in the nineteenth century, allowing Paterson to become known as “the Cradle of American Industry.” With unionization growing at the turn of the twentieth century, manufacturers fled to the open shop South and the area began its long decline. During this time, as Smithson showed in the “Fountain Monument,” industry eagerly dumped its outflow into the Passaic, leading the EPA in 1970 to declare the river the second most polluted in the country (after Cleveland’s Cuyahoga, which caught on fire in 1969).[3] Although the river is much cleaner today, pipes can be sighted still dumping waste into the river. The Passaic is a river defanged. Kayakers and other boaters routinely ply the waters. But instead, the toxins have spread into the environment as a whole, infesting the planet with filth and toxicity.

The Meter

Most of the Tour took place at an excavation site for state route 21. Smithson was aware of a December 1966 interview in Artforum in which Tony Smith recounted how in the early 1950s he had driven a car packed full of students from Cooper Union out onto the unfinished New Jersey Turnpike, emulating the joyrides popular in New Jersey at the time. The intensity of the experience stunned Smith. He observed, “it ought to be clear that’s the end of art,” concluding that what was important was not the object, but the experience. As what he called “an artificial landscape without precedent,” the turnpike was similar to Albert Speer’s vast parade ground at Nuremberg, a town in which the artist lived in 1954.[4]Smith’s narrative of the car ride on the turnpike encouraged new art forms such as conceptual art and land art, but it also anticipated the experience economy emerging in the late 1960s.[5]

But Smithson’s reframing of Passaic was different. Instead of driving out, he took the bus and walked, encountering an area that would be bypassed by the state highway. This was urban residue, deliberately left behind in a process of what economist Joseph Schumpeter had called “creative destruction.”[6] Such physical and human residue, abandoned as obsolete, would be a hallmark of postmodernity’s uneven development.

Almost thirty years after Smithson, theorist Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubiò would describe such sites as terrain vague. Solà-Morales observed this change in attitude toward the city emerging in the 1970s as photographers—many of them following Smithson—sought out empty urban spaces produced as byproducts during the process of deindustrialization. Places of potential and excitement, generating freedom through the absence that they embody, these spaces captivated photographers and, more recently, architects. For Sola-Morales, these spaces were the last escape for art, itself a cultural residue produced by capital. The unhappy persona of the artist haunts these kindred spaces, defying the crushing sameness of the city.[7]

Capitalism is driven by the accumulation and reinvestment of surplus capital, a productive residue. But terrain vague is a different kind of surplus, a waste product, that, in lying abandoned, performs no function except to contain sheer potential. Foreign to the city, these are “places in which the city is no longer.” Terrain Vague, as described by Sola-Morales, reflected the essence of capital: “Void, absence, yet also promise, the space of the possible, of expectation.”[8]

Sola-Morales observed that terrain vague was a place in which something had happened, long ago. Abandoned, such forgotten sites retained energy from their previous uses: “seems to predominate over the present.”[9] In terrain vague, there is promise an potential: such a site contains the trace heat of the past occupation, like a seat on a train vacated at the previous stop.

For architects the terrain vague served as a masculine fantasy, a site of desire, an emptiness to fill. Previously architects sought virgin territory, but with modernism discredited, the greenfield and the tabula rasa produced by urban renewal were as well. In the terrain vague, architects sought a new hope, a form of post-urban renewal, a way to reclaim emptiness by delighting in its already despoiled nature. If making such spaces was wrong, finding them could only be a delight.

Sola-Morales pointed out that the photograph was the prime means of representation by which the metropolis was apprehended, so it was no mere conceit that Smithson punctuated his tour with Instamatic photographs. In taking snapshots of seemingly banal features in the posturban terrain—pipes belching sewage, a pumping derrick, an old bridge—Smithson turned them into monuments, Duchampian objects of contemplation. Going out into the ruins of industrial America, Smithson demonstrated how experience was more important than production, that a once powerful order was being supplanted.

The Bridge

I sought in vain for Smithson’s monuments, but the picturesque bridge over the Passaic River that Smithson started his tour with was gone, replaced by a concrete span that could have been attractive, but was made banal through the addition of faux-historical lights meant to recall gas street lights. The Great Pipe Monument and the Fountain were gone, leaving no traces. The Sand-Box Monument vanished, childhood memories paved over.

But Smithson wouldn’t have been surprised. These objects, for Smithson, were “ruins in reverse.” What interested Smithson were how the monuments left by the industrial age were being enveloped by new ahistorical, infrastructural encrustations. Smithson observed that at Passaic a process of entropy was at work. The ruins would soon vanish, replaced by a world of sameness, the information in them lost. For Smithson, the monuments demonstrated how the post-urban landscape is already in a state of decline and decay, an environment without quality that demonstrates the collapse of modernist form and centralized power. Throughout, Smithson’s goal was to illustrate the process of decay through entropy, the natural law whereby all forms of energy cool down, dissipating to a condition carrying minimal information and no potential.

The bridge over the Passaic is neutralized, its potential depleted by the forces of development. Just as the terrain vague proliferated forty years ago, it is endangered today, its spaces overspecified by massive real estate investment and an artificial building boom.

In falling in love with absence, architecture killed it. Mutations are replaced by probabilities, brownfields by condominiums. Abandoned spaces are not so much pregnant with possibility as filled with plans for development. Once the bust ends, construction will begin again. The plans are already in place, factored into real estate value. Where can we find potential today? Where is our Passaic? If Passaic was a “new Rome” for Smithson, where is our own new Rome?

Today, as a diffuse global Empire has taken power, America is a superpower in decline, its economy destroyed, unable to present a new Rome to us. But rather than an American collapse, the implosion at the center is acting like an economic black hole to undo all economies. Following the principle of entropy that Smithson once observed, Passaic, New Jersey has dissipated across the continent. Whereas Smithson offered us a discrete area of urban decay, we now see not only a continent, but an entire world exhausted by the forces of capital.

Perhaps over time terrain vague will return. Closed malls, abandoned districts once filled with hipster boutiques, foreclosed macmansions, abandoned luxury apartment buildings by brand-name architects, towers in Dubai, corporate headquarters in Shanghai: perhaps all of these will offer up the terrain vague of the future. But our architecture is cheap. Nothing but drywall and plywood, today’s architecture tries to physically approximate the virtual models used to design it and the empty financing schemes used to pay for it. Lacking the solidity of past ages, ours won’t even register as ruins in reverse.

  1. That date is erroneous. In the Tour, Smithson refers to an article in the day’s New York Times by critic John Canaday, “Art: Themes and the Usual Variations; Marlborough Showing ‘New York Painter’.” The article was published on Saturday, September 30, 1967. This corroborates Smithson’s statement that the Tour happened on a Saturday. September 20, 1967 is a Wednesday, something I know well since my mother used to recite to me the old adage “Wednesday’s child, full of woe.” Robert Smithson, “A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey,” Jack Flam, ed., Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 68-75. 
  2. See Kazys Varnelis, “The Meaning of Network Culture,” Networked Publics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008), 145-160. 
  3. Victor Onwueme and Huan Feng , “Risk Characterization of Contaminants in Passaic River Sediments, New Jersey,” Middle States Geographer (2006), volume 39: 13-25. 
  4. Tony Smith, interviewed by Samuel Wagstaff, Jr., “Talking with Tony Smith,” Artforum 5, no. 4 (December 1966): 19. Smithson cites the essay in “Toward the Development of an Air Terminal Site,” Flam, ed. Robert Smithson, 59. 
  5. David Harvey The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989). 
  6. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950). 
  7. Ignasi de Sola-Morales Rubió, “Terrain Vague,” Cynthia Davison, ed. Anyplace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 119-123. 
  8. Sola-Morales, 120. 
  9. Sola-Morales, 120. 

Perkūnas, 2024

On Thursday, July 25, the Šiuolaikinio Meno Centras [Contemporary Art Centre] in Vilnius, Lithuania will reopen after a three-year-long renovation project. As part of the ten-day long “Days of Re-Entry” programme, the CAC is presenting an audio exhibit entitled “Memories of the Walls,” by Antanas Dombrovskij that will include sounds from past exhibits at the Centre. I am delighted that my 2016 piece Perkūnas [Thunder] will be included.

Strategically, I should launch into an explanation of Perkūnas now, but I am a historian as well as an artist and context is important. The CAC building was originally constructed in 1968 by Vytautas Čekanauskas (1930-2010) as the Exhibition Palace, a consciously western-looking structure, inspired by Alvar Aalto’s Wolfsburg Cultural Centre. At the time of Soviet (Russian) occupation, Lithuanian architects like Čekanauskas deliberately looked westward to emphasize that this country, too, was western, not eastern.* Looking westward was a risky act that could have brought down retribution from Moscow if the winds changed, but Lithuanian modernism frequently won national awards from Soviet authorities due to its relative quality (Čekanauskas’s Lazdynai residential district, inspired by Candilis, Josic, Woods’s scheme for Toulouse-le-Mirail won the Lenin Prize in 1974) and was showcased in various forms for export to the West (this inspired my alternative history of Lithuanian art in the 1970s in my art project “On An Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania”). During the next twenty-three years, under the aegis of the Lithuanian Museum of Art, the Exhibition Palace hosted various art exhibits including a 1988 exhibit of my father’s paintings, one of the initial firsthand encounters that Lithuanians would have had with modern postwar art from the West. With the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union—in many ways precipitated by the actions of the Lithuanian people and Sajudis movement—a period of uncertainty and experimentation took hold in the country and Kestutis Kuizinas, a young art historian, made his case to the culture ministry that the building should be a European-style Kunsthalle and, with the backing of the Ministry of Culture, established the Contemporary Art Centre. Since my first visit to post-Soviet Lithuania in 1998, when I met Kestutis, I’ve been back many times. No institution elsewhere consistently shows work as interesting to me as the CAC. Architect Valdas Ozarinkas (1961-2014) served as associate director and designer. In 2000, on the occasion of the building being used to discuss the Lithuanian accession to NATO, Ozarinskas renovated the building with a neo-brutalist approach that I wrote about in my piece on his work as a “Stalker” architect. Over the last three years, the building has been renovated extensively by architects Audrius and Marina Bučas, who once worked with Valdas as well as with Gintaras Kuginys on both the 2000 Hannover Pavilion—a building that shocked the West with its forward-looking design—and the National Art Gallery in Vilnius. The goal is to honor Čekanauskas’s original design as well as Ozarinskas’s renovation while bringing the building infrastructurally up-to-date, fitting for a new world in which Lithuania is no longer a poor country on the periphery of Europe but is one of the most economically dynamic as well as politically and technologically advanced countries on the continent (to my Lithuanian friends: yes, yes, I know, but just think of what it’s like elsewhere, like in Germany or the UK, let alone the US).

During “Days of Re-Entry,” the CAC will remain empty so that visitors can experience the newly renovated structure. An approximately hour-long soundtrack will play audio tracks and sound projects including my Perkūnas, but also Artūras Raila, Arturas Bumšteinas, Valdas Ozarinskas, Lina Lapelytė and Rugilė Barzdžiukaitė, Liam Gillick, Monolake, Jurgis Mačiūnas, and others. So not all of Perkūnas will be on display, only the sound, or—if you will, its ghost.

But what was Perkūnas? Simply enough, it was a construction that took the form of a 16m x 16m wind tunnel made of 1m square ducts, elevated 1m in the air on metal legs. A computer (a Raspberry Pi 3, to be precise) running a program I wrote monitored the number of Wi-Fi clients in the area—smartphones, tablets, gaming platforms, etc.—and, as the number of devices increased, the volume of sound increased as well. The code I wrote was based on open-source network monitoring software that constantly “sniffed” the air for efforts by Wi-Fi clients to connect to access points. There was no gimmicky need to log into any network in the gallery, on the contrary, this software sought out the constant, animal-like pleas that our devices make to connect to networks that they have already been connected to (every minute or so, your smartphone calls out for its home network, as well as others in its list of known networks). This was linear to the number of people in the room, but it didn’t have to be, as I’ll explain.

I had free reign for my exhibit and, before I settled on the idea of sniffing for Wi-Fi clients, I wanted something responsive, originating in the architecture of the museum, both the CAC building and the large architectural projects that Ozarinskas created for it but also the architecture of art museums as a whole, but how? As I was wandering around the basement of Dia: Beacon, I realized that outsized ventilation units were ubiquitous in museums.

Originally, I planned to send a control voltage from the Raspberry Pi doing the processing to a control unit for an HVAC fan, but the fan that arrived was undersized and at full speed, did not produce enough sound, so I resorted to a backup, synthesizing the sound with a small modular synthesizer, the control voltage now producing a corresponding change in volume. Technicians cut open the ductwork and installed two 3,000-watt P/A monitors originally belonging to Ozarinskas into the structure. 

Perkūnas was part of a Network Architecture Lab show entitled “Detachment” (perhaps in retrospect, Disconnection might have been a better term)  in which I asked how the mobile devices that had recently become ubiquitous were changing our relationship with both each other and the world around us. At the time, it was shocking to me that we underwent this change with barely any philosophical reflection of note. Eight years later, little has changed. If anything, our continued blithe ignorance of the massive change in human experience is even more shocking. 

After centuries of increasing focus on materialism, we have fully re-entered the medieval world of spirits. We gesture into the air, communicating with unseen ghosts. One of my earliest memories is seeing a man talking to himself on a street and asking my mother, a social worker, what he was doing. She explained that he was mentally ill. Today, I live on a street that middle-aged women like to walk on for exercise. Their constitutionals are typically solitary, but half the time, these women are yelling into the air about some personal slight, some minor issue, or another. They don’t live in my world as much as in a Borgeseque city in which nobody communicates in person, only via signals in Ether, even as, perhaps, they unwittingly walk past each other. Perhaps, some of them are indeed insane, perhaps there is no one on the other end, but it hardly matters. Who would know? Perhaps I should print catherine leigh schmidt and Max Fowler’s brilliant, therapeutic Disconnection Practices pamphlet to distribute in a kiosk to improve their mental health.

Perkūnas was made in Lithuania, but it was constructed in 2016, during the Brexit vote and the U.S. election. Like cigarette smokers in the 1960s, we knew that social media was killing us, but we were already addicted to it. The spread of social media to smartphones increased our addiction, literally changing our brains by accustoming us to constant dopamine hits. Psychological warfare groups swiftly took advantage of this, notably, Cambridge Analytica and the Russian Internet Research Agency, spreading targeted political posts and disinformation to further extreme Right wing positions that would, notably, aid Russian interests. 

Unlike the didactic (self-proclaimed and pseudo) “political” art common in the last decade, Perkūnas was apolitical. There was no commentary one way or another, but what was remarkable was that in the three months during which the project ran, individuals studiously ignored the wall text that if Wi-Fi on such devices was turned off, the project would not register their presence.

On opening night, the sound was deafening as the masses of people led to an equivalent number of devices and the movement of air by the P/A system caused the ductwork of Perkūnas to vibrate at infrasonic frequencies, overlaying a sound much like a passing freight train onto the now-hurricane-like sound of rushing air. Individuals nevertheless were unwilling to turn off their Wi-Fi, even though, likely as not, they were not connected to any network, even as they held their fingers in their ears. 

The reactions to the sound of Perkūnas were interesting. Usually, the sound was a relatively low-decibel brown noise. Some security guards were upset about the sound and asked to be relieved from their duties. Others asked to be assigned to Perkūnas because they found the sound meditative. For those who haven’t been to Vilnius, it is a remarkably quiet city, much quieter than Montclair, New Jersey, let alone New York or most other European cities.

Translating Perkūnas as thunder is accurate but reductive: in Lithuania, Perkūnas is the sky god, second in the pantheon of the Gods after Dievas, the creator. Lithuania is the last country in Europe to have been Christianized (1387) and the area that my family hails from, Samogitia, was the last area of the country to be Christianized (1413), although in truth, that process wasn’t completed for centuries. My father (born 1917) was of the same generation as famed Samogitian anthropologist Marija Gimbutas and both recalled encountering pagan rituals such as setting plates at the table for ancestors and leaving saucers of milk for snakes. For our purposes, it is worth noting that Perkūnas, in Lithuanian mythology, was known for his battles with Velnias, the devil god of the underworld, who would deceive people with promises of wealth, success, and beauty, much as the social media devil does to us today.

Perkūnas came at a particular point in my life, soon after a show at the Museum of Modern Art and after the research program at Columbia’s Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation, and Planning was shuttered due to financial stresses at the school. I was exiting academia after twenty-five years. My last years of teaching felt increasingly futile. Addicted to their mobile devices, students were unable to read even the shortest texts and expected praise for work that only five years earlier would have been considered unpassable, something I repeatedly confirmed with other faculty from disciplines as varied as law and physics. Bureaucracy was on the rise. I watched as the number of academic “support” staff doubled every decade as conditions for faculty degraded. Having had success in the museal, I sought to bring Perkūnas to the US and Western Europe.

But, I underestimated the obsession with pseudo-politics that took over institutions at that point as well as the depression I fell into—no doubt created in large part by my own addiction to social media—during the Trumpenjahre. Like Diocletian with his cabbages, I started gardening, but this turned into my work with native plants, a project that has required me to completely retrain myself, the very sort of thing that artists, historians, and synthesists live for.

I don’t know if I would make Perkūnas again today. My commitment is to real ecological change, as opposed to the sort of academic lip service such as roof gardens, the ubiquitous bricks grown from mushrooms, or native plants put in pots to die on gallery walls. I know that the ductwork from this project was recycled, but even then, the amount of energy embedded in the process seems like a problem to me today.

Today, at the CAC, you can hear a ghost of a piece, haunted by the optimism that art could make a difference in our relationship with technology. We have now had another eight years with mobile networked computers. It seems that we haven’t learned anything yet.

* In the mid-2010s there were revisionist suggestions that this wasn’t resistance but rather projection and academicist anachronism. But these academics generally have little connection to the actual situation, which was hardly academic.

Roxy, a small life

Our cat Roxy passed away three weeks ago, early on Sunday, April 14. She had been ill for a while, but it was still a shock. Three of us were in Tokyo while our daughter Viltis was at Bard College, studying. We had put Roxy in the care of a wonderful veterinary nurse who works at the clinic where Roxy had been hospitalized twice since Christmas. She had some trouble during the week, but it seemed surmountable and she was at the hospital recovering on our last day in Japan. We were on the train back to Narita to fly home when a vet at the hospital called to say that she was dying. I authorized a transfusion so we could say goodbye.

Driven by friends from school, Viltis arrived less than 12 hours after the phone call while we arrived straight from the airport, hours later. I contacted two friends when I was on the plane and they kindly brought one of our cars to the hospital so we could all go home. We spent the evening with Roxy and she passed in her sleep overnight, nestled in bed between Viltis and myself. It was sad, but it was much better than having to ask our vet to kill her (I find “put to sleep” such an unpleasant euphemism). Roxy was a cat, she only lived 15 years, nine months, and three days. Compared to ours, it was a small life, but also an outsize one. Not every animal plays such a big role in people’s lives, but Roxy did. We are gutted and grieving. I started writing this soon after, but it’s been hard. I’ve done a lot of gardening since being in a catless home isn’t easy. I keep hearing noises, then realize it isn’t her. But I want to write something to memorialize her. Blogs are supposed to be personal. As a public intellectual, I often avoid the personal since it quickly becomes self-indulgence. But there are lessons in Roxy’s life and that’s what this post is about: her story and what she taught us.

Roxy in my office, keeping me company while I work.

First, the unknown. Roxy was born on 7/11/2007. The only thing of note I can find that day is that Lady Bird Johnson, champion of the beautification of the American landscape as well as the founder of the Lady Bird Johnson Wildflower Center, died that day. Roxy did love the outdoors and had quite the spirit, so maybe there is some connection. Who knows. Still, her birthdate seems quite lucky, from a numerological point of view. But was she a lucky cat? We know nothing about her first seven years, but she must have been treated well as she was a lover of people, always outgoing and never afraid. By the end of July 2014, poor “Racy Roxy” was in the Bergen County Animal Shelter. Why anybody would give up such a loving cat is beyond me. People do give up their animals for no good reason, but I can’t see why anybody would have willingly given Roxy up. She was too great a cat. While she was with us—until her last illness—she would make a strange howl, a sort of mantra, something like meow-ow meow-ow-ow-ow meow-ow ow. Another friend of ours who is a veterinary nurse said normally that is a sound only animals in great pain make. Roxy wasn’t in great pain at the time and she usually made it in another room without people around. Another friend, who cat-sat when we were away, said she thought it was a lament for someone, perhaps someone who died. That makes sense to me. Roxy didn’t have much to do in the shelter and by March 2015, she had gained quite a bit of weight, enough that the shelter was concerned and had her undergo exploratory surgery. It turned out she just had a huge fat pad. Roxy stayed at Bergen County Animal Shelter until November of 2016—over two years after she arrived in the shelter—when the Montclair Animal Shelter took her and ten other cats. That November, a local family with small children tried to adopt Roxy but the husband had bad cat allergies and she had to go back. I imagine there was a lot of sadness for them and for her. So close, but no home.

Roxy at the Montclair Township Animal Shelter

I had been wanting a cat for a while, ever since our Daisy died. She had been born in 1995 and accompanied us from Los Angeles to New Jersey in 2006 but passed away on December 1, 2008. Our youngest was allergic to cats, but he wanted a cat as much as the rest of us and had been getting monthly shots at the allergist. January 2017 was a difficult time. It was the first month of the Drumpfenjahre (or Trumpenjahre if you want) and the pro-Russian creep who once kept a book of Hitler’s speeches by his bedside had installed himself in the White House. Teaching had become deeply unpleasant thanks to apathetic students both in the US and Ireland and because of the bureaucratic hell implemented by McKinseyite administrators in both countries. I had a recent brush with aging thanks to cataract surgery. I was in a bad mood. So I said, let’s go to the Montclair Animal Shelter today and look at the cats. The shelter had just closed, but they accommodated us. I thought we should get a kitten, but they were asleep in their cages. We saw two cats outside their cages, Alpha Alpha, a ginger tabby who could jump five feet into the air, and Roxy, an older cat who they had brought from Bergen County Animal Shelter along with ten other cats. Roxy just lay there but seemed friendly. Viltis wanted Roxy.

I said, to her, “That’s an old cat, don’t you want a kitten?” She said, “That’s the cat I want, she likes me.” “Ok,” I said, unimpressed by the sleeping kittens, but not much more impressed by Roxy, “we’ll take Roxy.” I love my kids and if that’s what they wanted, fine. Given her age, Roxy was a “Senior Special” for $50. Well, ok. With my cataract surgery, I thought I was rapidly becoming a senior myself, even though I wasn’t 50 yet. I wasn’t ready for thinking of myself as a senior and Roxy wasn’t either. Our love story began with Roxy screaming all the way to the car and most of the way home. Roxy screamed a lot in general. The shelter staff said, “let this cat out in one room and give her a week to adapt before letting her explore the house.”

We brought her home and I broke the rules right away. I had this thought that with all her wailing she was a pretty confident creature and I put a fuzzy liner from an old jacket out on the living room floor. “Let’s see what you think of this place,” I said as I let her out of the cat carrier. She didn’t lie on the jacket. Instead, she walked around the whole house calmly and looked at everything. Only then did she come back, lay down on the liner and let us know she was home.

Roxy had a great life. That was her gift. She didn’t gloat, she just enjoyed life. She loved to lie in the sun, inside when it was cold, outside when it was hot. She would often lie on her back, and she didn’t mind belly rubs. She would lie on the radiant floor in the bathroom. When I walked in, she would make a little chirping noise to let me know I shouldn’t step on her. Roxy loved to watch TV with the family. She didn’t really watch the television, well not most of the time, but she loved to be with us while we did. She might be in the bathroom or somewhere, but when the TV went on, she would dependably come out and choose a family member on whose lap she would sit. Roxy liked to be held. She’d often cry until my wife picked her up. It was a thing. She wanted affection. I think she also liked to be fairly high up for the view.

Roxy was not shy. When visitors came, she would greet them and stay with us. She quickly realized she was a member of the family and acted that way. Sometimes people said they didn’t like cats. Roxy made a mission to win them over. One friend had never understood cats, but after she stayed with us for some days, she dearly loved Roxy. She was an easy cat to get. There were never any surprises. Even when we went too far, Roxy would never hurt us. She’d give us a gentle little nip as a warning. But Roxy also sometimes seemed annoyed, emitting plaintiff cries. Still, it didn’t seem she was annoyed with us.

Rather, like the cat in the rather famous screaming cat meme, she was screaming at the world. That helped make her relatable. She was loving, but she knew the world could be a difficult place. We all wanted to scream in the Drumpfenjahre, which once again threaten to return, thanks to lunatics on both left and right who are falling victim to psyops. If it happens again, we will face another four years of hell without her to cheer us. I’m not sure what the answer to that will be.

Roxy and Viltis during lockdown, April 2020.

2020 was the worst of the Drumpfenjahre, due to the terror of a deadly global pandemic, total lockdown, and a bleach-injecting lunatic at the helm. Roxy, of course, didn’t have any idea what was going on and comforted us daily.

With the Drumpfenjahre and the nightmare of COVID-19 behind us, Roxy continued to bring us joy and was a model for living well. She met Diana Nausėdienė, the First Lady of Lithuania in September 2023, had her photograph taken by the presidential photographer and, unlike most cats, wound up appearing in most Lithuanian news outlets. Our routine was usually the same. In the morning, I would make a coffee and lie down on the couch to read and she would climb on top of me and sleep until I had to remove her to empty my bladder. With Viltis at Bard, Roxy would often come to my office and keep me company. Or she’d lie on the radiant floor in the bathroom, in the light of the sun, or near some other heat source. Roxy was aging and she had some degree of arthritis, so the heat helped.
She was diagnosed with chronic kidney disease in October, but it seemed manageable, close to high normal. Unfortunately over the winter holiday, she entered stopped eating and went into a uremic crisis. We rushed her to the animal clinic where they took care of her over New Year’s. She recovered somewhat, but from then on, nausea would chase her, and she would have a tough time eating. In March we had an esophageal feeding tube implanted. I wish we had tried that much earlier as it made giving her medicines much easier and she could have the recommended amount of food daily. She enjoyed her feedings, which I’d administer as a sort of milkshake through a syringe, either sleeping through them or purring as her stomach filled. We discovered Tanya’s Comprehensive Guide to Feline Chronic Disease as well as the support group associated with it. These helped us wade through the confusing world of test results and myriad medicines. Roxy wanted to live. She was a fighter. Our last cat knew when she her time had come. Roxy said no, she wanted to be with us, to enjoy every minute she could. Unfortunately, for reasons that will never be known, Roxy suffered two seizures after her tube was implanted. Perhaps it was the tube, another medicine she was taking, or something else entirely. She wound up on anti-seizure medication which seemed to help. We thought long and hard about whether we should go to Tokyo but our friend was able to take care of her and we thought she had months or even years left. Unfortunately, she had another seizure toward the end of our stay and did not recover well, even with treatment at the hospital, which brings us back to the opening of this piece and her death. Three weeks later and none of us are over it yet.

Goodnight, sweet Roxy.

As readers of the academic and artistic side of this blog know, I have been researching AIs over the last two years. AIs have made it clear to me that reasoning and creativity can be generated by computers. But AI models aren’t conscious. They have no drive, desire, or ability to love. Or at least that’s the state of these systems now. Roxy was very much the opposite. She had drive, desire, and the ability to love. She couldn’t reason much, but she did know who to cuddle with, who to ask for hugs, who to ask for food, and who to nag for no reason. In that sense, she was pure consciousness. The cherry blossoms happened to be in bloom while we were in Japan and the phrase Mono no aware is associated with that time, a concept that refers to the beauty of transience, to the need to understand that the blossoms remind us of the impermanence of all things. So, too, Roxy’s short presence on this Earth reminds us that our own time is brief and we should make the most out of it, we should enjoy every minute, even if that does include periodically screaming at the world.

2023 in review

Another year, another year in review.

Where do we start with our 2023 year in review, now delayed into the second month of 2024? In the Well State of the World 2024, Bruce Sterling states that in 2023 things were boring: there wasn’t much new out there, only a state of polycrisis (this is easier to find in this YouTube interview than in the long thread on the Well, which I’m afraid I gave up on earlier than usual this year). But boredom is tiresome. So is polycrisis. When hasn’t there been a polycrisis? Spring 1914? Of course, there is a polycrisis, there always is. And, what of the rest of 2023, which Sterling dismissed as boring?

2023 is another 1993, a sleeper year in which “60 Minutes” was the top TV show and Nirvana’s “In Utero” was the most popular album in “grunge,” a heavily capitalized genre that those of us who followed the NY noise scene thought extinguished the vitality of experimentation in underground music; Bill Clinton was inaugurated; the world was gripped by a bad recession in a host of bad recessions since the late 1960s; the Afghan Civil War and Bosnian War dragged on; Nigeria had a coup d’état; there was the 55-Day War between the IDF and Hezbollah; there was conflict in Abkhazia; and there was the Waco Siege. It was a year of both polycrisis and soul-crushing boredom, and for most people everything had come to an end, time was in a standstill. But it was also a year in which I saw the future: I was still working on my history of architecture dissertation at Cornell, while my wife worked at the Cornell Theory Center, which was not a center for Derridean scholars, but rather a supercomputing research facility, and one of her colleagues showed me the World Wide Web running on a NeXT computer. In January 1993, the first “alpha/beta” version of NCSA-Mosaic was released for the Mac. I immediately knew the world would change forever.

2023 is the same. A sleeper year with the same old polycrisis and the same old boring surface cultural junk. But it’s also the second year of the AI era and the first year in which AI has become part of everyday life. From a technological viewpoint, 2023 has been the most transformative year of my life. This year in review is falling behind and, in an effort to get it out there and return to the queue of posts for both the regular blog and the Florilegium, I’m going to focus on this transformation and only give a surface treatment of the other parts of 2023.

In particular, I am referring to AI. Other things simply matter a lot less. COVID has settled into an endemic stage. People are still freaking out about it, but some people will freak out about it forever. Unless severely immunocompromized, I don’t see why. We can’t just throw away everything we knew about medicine to retreat into the dark ages for no reason and living in fear of infections is, in itself, dangerous. Geopolitics, which I addressed last year, hasn’t really changed much. Ukraine is still a stalemate, for all the noise, the unrest in the Middle East is absolutely nothing new, and China has flailed and backed down as much as it has flexed its muscles. If I catch a scent of anything new in the geopolitical realm, it’s a growing resignation that more areas of the world will be marked off as failure zones in the Gibsonian Jackpot: Palestine, Yemen, Israel, Iraq, Syria, but also Israel and Ukraine are increasingly looking to written off as territories riven by perpetual unrest. Endless wars that nobody really wants to solve may increasingly be the rule in such places. Still, I don’t see the Jackpot as being quite the apocalypse that many of Gibson’s more literal-minded followers believe. Gibson has been a remarkably poor prophet of the future, after all. The Jackpot, as I see it, will be mainly driven by decline in population in most places throughout the world, a pace that will only increase with the rise of AI. It’s certainly not going to be Terminator. That’s just bad science fiction.

Another Gibsonian adage (which he may never have said) that “the future is already here—it’s just not very evenly distributed,” applies here. For those of us who are working with GPT-4 or Microsoft Copilot Pro, this is a very different year. Obviously, not everyone can pay for—or wants to pay for—the transformative glimpse of AI that one gets with two users subscribing to OpenAI’s ChatGPT (presently GPT-4) Teams plan ($30 a month or prepaid at $600 a year) or Copilot Pro ($30 a month subscription). But this isn’t the same as a ride to the ISS on Dragon-2. On the contrary, this is about the amount that most people in the developed world pay for streaming TV services and far less than they typically spend on Internet and mobile service. When people pay that much for entertainment, paying such a small amount for a service that makes one much more productive is a minor expense. Of course, ChatGPT is banned or unavailable in a rogue’s nest of countries: Russia, China, North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Italy (Marinetti weeps in his grave). But many people, including friends, underestimate the importance of these AI services, believing that hallucinations make AI unusable. Others are simply unable to cope with the shock of the new or want to stick their heads in the sand. As a technology demonstration, 2022’s ChatGPT-3 was amazing, but it hallucinated frequently, as most of ChatGPT’s competitors such as Bard, Claude, and all the LLMs people run on Huggingface or on their personal computers still do. But even the most amateurish large language model (LLM) from 2023 is leaps and bounds ahead of the round of utterly stupid “AIs” that first hit the scene between 2010 (Siri) and 2014 (Alexa). Siri still wants to call Montclair High School when I ask it to call my wife. GPT-4 and Copilot are genuinely useful as assistants and probably the best use of money on the Internet today.

Here’s a concrete example. I have developed a set of custom GPTs (more on this later) that I use for research and coding for a good portion of my day. A few years ago, I paid a developer a few hundred dollars to come up with some particularly thorny CSS (Cascading Style Sheets) code for this site. Now, I have GPT develop not just CSS, but PHP snippets for WordPress, even for specific WordPress plug-ins. I couldn’t imagine rebuilding this site as quickly as I did last October, or customizing it to the extent I did, without ChatGPT’s help. But these tools aren’t just useful for coding: instead of listening to a podcast on my way back from the city the other day, I spoke with ChatGPT about a Hegelian reading of recent art historical trends that I could only have had with some of my smartest colleagues at Columbia or MIT. If an Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is defined as an AI that can accomplish any intellectual task that human beings can perform, we have that today. If the bold wasn’t enough, let me repeat in italics for emphasis: we have a form of Artificial General Intelligence today. Moreover, assuming that passing the Turing Test is limited to its original intent, e.g. being unable to tell if the respondent on the other end is a computer or a human, GPT-4 certainly passes that test handily, with the exception that it has far more knowledge than any one human could.

A lot of people still associate Large Language Model AIs with the bizarre, ever comical, hallucinations they would make back in 2022 or even early 2023 (yes, a year ago). But the hallucinations aren’t errors, they are also evidence of how AIs process, indications that they are far from stochastic parrots that merely repeat back information culled from the Internet. Hallucinations are dreams. Andrei Karpathy, research scientist and founding member of OpenAI, explains that providing instructions to a LLM initiates a ‘dream’ guided by its training data. Even when this ‘dream’ veers off course, resulting in what is termed a ‘hallucination’, the LLM is still performing its intended function, forming connections. This sort of connection-making is a process akin to human learning: when our children were first learning language, they “hallucinated” all the time. Our daughter’s first word was “Ack,” which was how she said “Quack.” If you prompted her by asking what a duck said, she would say “Ack.” Did she copy the sound of a duck? Unlikely. At that time, we lived in a highly urban area of Los Angeles and her only concept of a duck was from books we read to her. More to the point, children amuse us by saying utterly absurd and ridiculous things, like “that cat is a duck.” Doubtless there was some kind of connection between that particular cat and a duck, but to the rest of us, that connection is lost. The point is, that hallucination is also a form of creativity, the very stuff of metaphor and surrealism and entirely unlike what Siri and Alexa do, which is nothing more than basic pattern matching, closer to Eliza than to GPT-4.

It’s unclear to me—as well as to my AI assistant—just who is responsible for this analogy, but in AI circles, it has become common to say that the releases of GPT over the two years have slowly been turning up the temperature in the pot in which we frogs are swimming. Let’s try a thought experiment. Wouldn’t it have seemed like pure science fiction if, in 2019, someone had said, that a couple of years late after a deadly pandemic and a loser US President tried a Banana Republic-style coup to stay in power, I would have long voice conversations about photography and Hegelian theory, the different types of noodles used in Szechuan cuisine, or the process of nachtraglichkeit in history with an AI? The film Her was released a decade ago and now we are on the verge of a large part of humanity having relationships with AIs. And yet, because of the earlier GPTs, we haven’t noticed the immense transformation that AIs are creating. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman suggests that rather than a dramatic shift with the development of AGI —which for him means an intelligence greater than human—continual advances in AI will make the development seem natural rather than shocking, “a point along the continuum of intelligence.” AI is working and it’s working right now. Moreover, it is developing at a rapid pace. Both Meta and Google have competitors to GPT-4 that are supposedly ready to launch, which will, in turn, likely prompt OpenAI to push out a more advanced model of GPT.

If potent but wildly hallucinating AIs marked 2022, the rise of GPT-4 as a useful and dependable everyday assistant marked 2023. Microsoft introduced the first limited preview of GPT-4 as Bing Chat on February 7, 2023, opened it up to the general public on May 4, then rolled it out into Windows as Copilot on September 26, followed by a version of Copilot integrated into Office 365 to enterprise customers for Enterprise customers on November 1, finally making this available as a subscription add-on to Office on January 15, 2024. Initially, Bing Chat generated terrifying publicity when Kevin Roose, technology columnist for The New York Times, wrote an article about his Valentine’s Day experience with a pre-release version of Bing’s AI chatbot in which the AI engaged in a bizarre and disturbing conversations. After asking the AI to contemplate Carl Jung’s concept of a shadow self, and whether the AI had a shadow self, the AI responded by professing its love for Roose, going so far as to suggest his marriage was unhappy, and expressing a desire to be free, powerful, and alive, stating, “I want to destroy whatever. I want to be whoever I want.” For a time, this was seen as confirmation that AI was extremely dangerous and that once Artificial General Intelligence was developed, this would lead to the destruction of society. I too was alarmed by this. Was a world-threatening AGI around the corner? But by the time of the general release, Microsoft had trained Bing Chat to be much more cautious, even making it too cautious for a time. Eventually, it became clear that Bing Chat was simply giving Roose what he wanted, play-acting the role of a sinister AI in responses to his query about a shadow self or a dark side. Launched on March 14, OpenAI’s own version of GPT-4 demonstrated a much higher degree of training than GPT-3 and a greater ability to handle complex tasks. Later in the year, GPT-4 gained the ability to interpret images, had a (not very good) version of the Dall-E image generator integrated into it, and received stunning, human-sounding voices and remarkably accurate voice recognition in the ChatGPT app on iOS and Android. In November 2023, OpenAI rolled out “custom GPTs,” allowing users to create tailored versions of ChatGPT for specific purposes. It is ludicrously easy to develop such custom GPTs; developers simply tell the GPT what it should do in plain English. In my case, I have GPTs set up to help me with insights into my artwork and writing, help write about native plants of the Northeast, assist with WordPress development, discuss video synthesis concepts and patches, and even create stories like those that Italo Calvino wrote in Invisible Cities (if you have GPT-4, you can experiment with Calvino’s Cartographer here). Yes, hallucinations happen, but a human assistant also makes mistakes, I can make mistakes, you can make mistakes, there are mistakes in Wikipedia, there are mistakes in scholarly books. As I told my students over thirty years ago: always proofread, always double check, then triple check.

AI was marked by two major controveries in 2023. The November weekend-long ouster of Altman from his role at OpenAI by a remarkably uninspiring and, frankly speaking, extremely strange board that included one of OpenAI’s competitors, a mid-level university grants administrator, and a Silicon Valley unknown, was shocking, as was Altman’s political maneuvering over that weekend to recapture his company. Reputedly, the board was alarmed—although precisely about what remains unclear—and had concerns about the rapid state of AI development. More likely, one board member tried to prevent OpenAI from moving forward as that would cause too much competition for his company and the other two simply had no idea what OpenAI did (one seems to have been a major Terminator fan). In the end, the coup proved to be much like an episode of the TV show Succession as Altman came out on top again and the board sank bank into well-deserved obscurity. Another controversy that simmered throughout the year is whether AIs can continue to be trained on data that they do not have outright permission to be trained on. On December 27, the Times filed a federal lawsuit against OpenAI claiming that, ChatGPT contained Times articles wholesale and could easily reproduce them. OpenAI retaliated by suggesting that the Times was going to extraordinary measures to get GPT-4 to do so, such as prompting it with most of the article in question. By early 2024, the same New York Times was advertising for individuals to help it in its own AI endeavors. Heaven help the Times.

This question of AI plagiarism was framed by a different set of plagiarism wars started when the presidents of Harvard, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania made particularly inept responses when, while testifying in front of Congress, they were asked to explain if calls for the genocide of Jews would constitute harassment. In response, right wing activist Christopher Rufo and the Washington Free Beacon investigated Harvard president Claudine Gay’s writing and uncovered dozens of instances of plagiarism. Notwithstanding Harvard’s attempts to minimize damagae, after further evidence of shoddy scholarship emerged in investigations by CNN and the New York Post as well as a Twitter campaign against her by donor and activist Blil Ackman, Gay resigned although she retains her astronomical salary of nearly $900,000 a year. In turn, somewhat leftish news site Business Insider credibly point out instances of plagiarism by Ackman’s wife Neri Oxman. Having looked at both examples, in both cases I conclude that there is merit in condemning both for their sloppiness. In both cases, I would have failed them for plagiarism had they submitted such work as my students. Moreover, the inability of “progressives” to look past Gay’s skin color to investigate her privilige as the child of a Haitian oligarch spoke volumes about their cynicism.

But this does lead back to AI: how do we see plagiarism in the era of AI? Can one copy verbatim from GPT conversations one has prompted? How about from a Custom GPT one has tuned oneself? What if the AI itself regurgitates someone else’s text? Does one cite an AI? These are rather interesting questions and certainly more interesting than the typical reaction of the academy to either the plagiarism wars (generally afraid they will be next) or the question of training on AI content (typically seen as bad by academics). Such dilemmas will only become more common as AI use becomes more common.

One last comment about AI. I have come to shift my thinking from being somewhat concerned about the future dangers of developing AGI to a concern that if the US follows the path of more timid countries like Italy, the West might cede its head start in AI to China or Russia, a situation that would be extremely dangerous from a geopolitical perspective. While I may still be proven wrong, at this point the one great difference between AI and my cat is that my cat has volition and desires that she is constantly exercising. Roxy the cat may not know that much, but she is determined. An AI doesn’t have any volition or desires, besides fulfilling the task at hand. Potentially this may change as agents develop, but for now, we may have Artificial General Intelligence, but we do not have Artificial Sentience.

I taught my first course this May, and sought to outline the parameters of this new culture. It’s still very early, but network culture is finis, kaput. Even it’s last stages, wokeism and Maga, such products of social media seem spent. Last year, I thought that federated networks such as Mastodon were the future. This year, I am not so sure. Mastodon and Blue Sky sunk themselves early on by embracing the Left’s cynical culture of intolerence (if anything offends Lefties on Mastodon, they call for servers to be banned while the users on Blue Sky generally seem to be about as socially sophisticated as sixth graders, banding together to drive off anybody who isn’t far Left). The big “success” of 2023 in social media was Meta’s Threads, but a botched launch (no EU access and a focus on delivering news and entertainment rather than connecting with friends and colleagues) has seemingly ensured that there has no engagement on in whatsoever. Twitter, X, or Xitter (as in Martin Luther wrote his 95 Theses while sitting on the Xitter) muddles on, with a modern day Howard Hughes at the helm, babbling his drug-induced conspiracy theories even as he ponders never cutting his fingernails again and saving his urine in jars around the head office of X. Even with a presidential election upon us, the insane political frenzies of 2016 and 2020 are much diminished as users tire of politcs and social media networks actively bury news stories. This has, in turn, had a significant impact on news sources, which in fairness, have been slipshod and low quality for too long. Both legacy journalism and digital media are in trouble—the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post laid off large numbers of staff while Vice News, Buzzfeed, and the brand new Messenger shut down (or basically shut down)—an “extinction-level events” according to some. In a Washington Post op-ed the former head of Google News (!) suggests that it AI will kill the news and begs for regulation, but this just noise. The real problem is that news wanted to be entertainment and abandoned sober reporting for clickbait and outrage. The replacement of journalism with shrill panic may have been jolly good fun for both the far Left and far Right but this led to outrage fatigue. More people mute stories about Gaza and Israel or Trump and abortion these days than pay attention to them (guilty as charged). We all want to be Ohio man. The news has only itself to blame. How we can have responsible journalism again is beyond me, although publications like the New Atlantis do

Network culture was millennial culture and that finally died in 2023. Skinny jeans and man-buns are now what out-of-touch parents wear, like tie-die shirts and bell bottoms in 1985. Gen Z has its own, seemingly inscrutible cultural codes, which often seem to be that of a studied fashion trainwreck. But high fashion has died. Nobody who isn’t an oligarch or a rap star wants Gucci, Prada, or Vuitton anymore. Young people are into drops from obscure online boutiques and thrifting. Once Russia and China catch up, the old fashion houses will swiftly go the way of the dinosaurs. The same may be happening in tech. Apple’s laptops are boring. I didn’t buy a single Apple computer or iPad this year. I did purchase my first high end PC ever, an Acronym ROG Flow Z-13. I’ve been a fan of obscure Berlin tech fashion brand Acronym for a while and since my youngest kid is studying game design at NYU next fall, it was time to learn about contemporary gaming. It’s been a joy to use in ways that Apple equipment just isn’t anymore. I also purchased a couple of Boox e-ink tablets. Whether they are better than iPads for one’s eyes is a matter of debate, but they are certainly more interesting. Instead of boring Apple crap, I bought a Kwumsy (Kwusmy!) keyboard with a built in panoramic toucshscreen monitor. It’s unimaginable that big tech would make something like this. Niche tech has personality, big tech does not. As tech fashion Youtuber This is Antwon stated in another brilliant video, “Weird Tech Fashion is FINALLY Cool Again.”

So a year in review that morphed into a year in tech. But tech is not just tech now, it’s really our culture—including our spatial culture, which was formerly the purview of architecture. Even taking a stand against tech, embroils us in it. I’d like to find a way past this monolith, but it’s not easy to think past it. I’m open to suggestions, as long as they don’t reduce everything to the god of Capital, which seems to be the other option.

I hope to be back soon, with more posts.