2025-in-review

It’s strange to measure every year against a concept developed by a science fiction writer, but William Gibson’s line “The future is already here—it’s just not evenly distributed”1. has been my north star for my recent year-in-review essays. Gibson meant that the future was unevenly distributed by class: the wealthy receive high-tech healthcare while the world’s poorest live in squalor—though one might ask which of these is really our future. Yet the quote has been repeatedly misread as a claim about time andspace: that the future arrives somewhere first, perhaps unseen, while the rest of the world catches up. But this misreading is more productive than Gibson’s intent. Gibson’s critique of inequality is fair enough, but we all know this, decry it, and go on about our business. The misreading, on the other hand, is a theory of historical change.

With the release of ChatGPT in late 2022, a temporal rift opened, shattering the post-Covidean present. But many tried the early tools, encountered hallucinations, read articles about slop and imminent environmental ruin, and reasonably concluded there was nothing to see. By 2025, a cursory examination of news in AI would have assured them that AI had proved a bust. OpenAI’s long-awaited updates disappointed, and the company flailed, turning to social media with Sora, a TikTok clone for AI. Meta seemed to abandon its efforts to create a competitive AI and instead turned to content generation for Instagram and Facebook, something nobody on earth wanted. Talk of a bubble started among Wall Street pundits. The hype-to-disappointment cycle is familiar, and the dismissals were not unreasonable.

But again, the future isn’t evenly distributed, and if you don’t know where to look, you would be excused for believing it’s all hype. Looking past such failures, 2025 was actually a year of breakneck progress. Anthropic’s Claude emerged as the most capable system for complex tasks, Google’s Gemini became highly competitive, while DeepSeek and Moonshot AI proved that China was not far behind. More significant than any single model was the emergence of agentic AI—systems that can take on multi-step tasks, act, navigate filesystems, write and execute code, and work across documents. Claude Code was the year’s groundbreaking innovation. While “slop” was Merriam-Webster’s word of the year, “vibe coding”—using agents to write programs—was much more important. Not only could programmers use them to accelerate their work, it also became possible for non-programmers to realize their ideas without any knowledge of code, a radical change in access I explored in “What Did Vibe Coding Just Do to the Commons?”.

By any first-world standards, at least, these tools are remarkably democratic and inexpensive. A basic Claude subscription costs about as much as a month of streaming, and even the $200 maximum usage account costs less than a monthly car payment. For many, however, the barrier is not price but something deeper—a resistance approaching revulsion. These tools provoke fear in a way that earlier technologies did not. It’s not the apocalyptic dread of the doomers or the Dark Mountain sensibility that apocalypse is near. Rather, it’s a threat to the sense that thought itself is what makes us distinct. The unevenness of the future is no longer about access; it’s now about willingness to engage.

As a scholar, thinking about the very short term is strange for me. I have always been suspicious of claims that radical change was upon us. I would rather align myself with the French Annales school concept of la longue durée, as defined by the great Fernand Braudel, the long-term structures of geography and climate. Faster than that were the medium-term cycles of economies and states, while he dismissed the short-term événements of rulers and political events as “surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs.”2. Events, he wrote elsewhere, “are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like fireflies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into darkness and as often as not into oblivion.”3. The real forces operate beneath, slowly, often imperceptibly.

Curiously, Braudel himself embraced technological change in his own work. In the 1920s and 30s, he adapted an old motion-picture camera to photograph archival documents—2,000 to 3,000 pages per day across Mediterranean archives from Simancas to Dubrovnik. He later claimed to be “the first user of microfilms” for scholarly historical research.4. His wife Paule spent years reading the accumulated reels through what Braudel called “a simple magic lantern.”5. Captured in 1940, he spent five years as a prisoner of war and wrote the entire first draft of The Mediterranean—some 3,000 to 4,000 pages—from memory. Paule, meanwhile, retained access to the microfilm and notes in Paris, and after the war, they reconstructed the text, taking his manuscript, verifying it and adding footnotes and references from the microfilm.6.

In 1945, the same year Braudel was liberated, Vannevar Bush published “As We May Think,” in which he imagined a device he called the “Memex”: a mechanized desk storing a researcher’s entire library, indexed and cross-referenced, expandable through associative trails.7. The vision remained speculative for decades. Now the world’s archives are being digitized; AI systems translate, summarize, and search across them in seconds and can translate any language. To take one example, earlier this year, I used Google’s Gemini to translate the Hierosolymitana Peregrinatio of Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila Našlaitėlis, a sixteenth-century pilgrimage narrative from an online scan of the Latin first edition. The result is not a polished scholarly translation, but a working text that allowed me to gain a good sense of a text that was previously unreadable to anyone without proficiency in Latin or Polish (the only language into which, to my knowledge, it had been translated). The role of the intellectual is being transformed—not replaced, but augmented in ways Bush could only sketch. This feels like something other than foam.

How to account for such a rapid shift? Manuel DeLanda offers one answer in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. Working in Braudel’s materialist tradition and drawing on Gilles Deleuze and complexity theory, DeLanda describes how flows—of trade, energy, and information—accumulate and concentrate until they cross a threshold, undergo a phase transition, radically reorganizing into a new stable state. But here is the key insight: intensification is la longue durée. The accumulation of flows that began with the Industrial Revolution—or perhaps with writing, agriculture, or even symbolic representation itself—is the deep structure behind our era. Steam, electricity, computing, the internet: each was a phase transition within a longer arc of intensification. Cities accelerate such processes, as Braudel showed, concentrating capital and labor until new forms of economic organization emerge—Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, each becoming sites at which the future arrived first. Such conditions are not opposed to la longue durée; they are the moments when intensification crosses a threshold.

The continued pace of change this year underscores that there has been no return to equilibrium. But this has been accompanied by unprecedented resistance to technology, appearing as simultaneous terror at its apocalyptic nature (in jobs, if nothing else) and dismissal as useless, especially in Gen Z. A January 2026 Civiqs survey found that 57 percent of Americans aged 18–34 view AI negatively—more than any other age group. Curiously, the seniors category, which now includes most boomers, was the least resistant to AI, followed by Gen X and older millennials, all groups that grew up seeing radical societal and technological changes.8. It seems paradoxical that the smartphone generation recoils from the tools of the future. To understand this resistance means understanding the mentalité that shaped it—what Braudel’s successors in the Annales school called the collective psychology formed through lived experience.9. For Gen Z, that formative experience was network culture—both a successor to postmodernism and a form of collective psychology I did not fully understand at the time. Writing on network culture in 2008, it seemed to me that social media promised connection; instead, it brought division.10. The networked self was indeed constituted through networks, not merely isolated in postmodern fragmentation, but the fragmentation was now collective. Networked publics built barriers against one another, creating what Robert Putnam called cyberbalkanization: retreat into a comfortable niche among people just like oneself, views merely reinforcing views.11. Identity wars and mimetic conflict flared across filter bubbles that amplified outrage and tribal scapegoating as both MAGA and wokism built toxic online cultures. QAnon and a thousand other conspiracy theories propagated through Facebook groups and YouTube recommendations. Young men drifted into incel communities where loneliness became ideology and livestreaming mass shootings was celebrated. Influencers built their empires on hatred—Hasan Piker framed Hamas’s October 7 massacre as anticolonial resistance while Nick Fuentes celebrated mass shooters as vanguards of race war and civilizational collapse.

Nor did this just fragment culture—it exacted a massive psychic toll, as social contagion spread new forms of self-harm and mental illness. During the pandemic, teenage girls began presenting tic-like behaviors—not Tourette’s syndrome, but something researchers termed “mass social media-induced illness,”12. spread by TikTok videos about Tourette’s rather than any actual disease. The pattern was unprecedented but not unique. Eating disorders spread through thinspiration hashtags. Self-harm tutorials circulated on Instagram. The platforms that were supposed to bring us together instead spread desires, disorders, and identities through pure social contagion—and with them, violence and polarization. A generation that grew up inside this experiment—that watched it reshape their peers’ bodies, minds, and identities—is right to be skeptical of the next technological promise.

In 2010, it seemed like network culture had a good chance of becoming understood as the successor to postmodernism. Bruce Sterling and I were engaged in a kind of dialogue about it online. He predicted that network culture would last “about a decade before something else comes along.”13. And he was right, as I acknowledged in my 2020 Year in Review. By then, network culture was exhausted, and with the Covidean break, it seemed time for something new. In 2023, I taught a course at the New Centre for Research & Practice to try to broadly sketch the emerging era. It’s still early and hard to fathom, like trying to understand postmodernism in 1971 or network culture in 1998, but it’s clear that if postmodernism was underwritten by the explosion of mass media, network culture by the Internet, social media, and the smartphone, then the current era is shaped by AI.

But if Gen Z, scarred by the effects of social media, has been reacting with deep fear and anxiety, Sterling how epitmozes the other reaction, dismissal. In the most recent State of the World, for example, he derides AI-generated content as “desiccated bullshit that can’t even bother to lie.” He compares the vibe-coding atmosphere to an acid trip, mocking the professionals who utter “mindblown stuff” like “we may be solving all of software” and “I have godlike powers now.” For Sterling, AI can produce nothing but slop. Now Bruce has always had a healthy skepticism toward tech claims, but I can’t help but think of Johannes Trithemius, the fifteenth-century abbot who wrote De Laude Scriptorum just as Gutenberg’s press was spreading across Europe—defending the scriptorium against a technology he could not see would remake the world.

There are even deeper, more existential fears, and I’ve spent the past year addressing them on my blog, in the process laying the foundation for a book on the topic: AI as plagiarism machine; AI as hallucination engine; AI as stochastic parrot, mindlessly repeating what it has ingested (Sterling’s critique); and AI as uncanny double, too close to us for comfort. As I explain, the discomfort arises not from the machine’s otherness but from its likeness: a mirror held up to processes we preferred to believe were uniquely ours.

It’s no accident that I published these essays on my blog. As far as my personal year in review goes, this was very much the year of the blog. I have no plans to ever publish in an academic journal again. Why would I? Who would read it? Why would I want to publish something paywalled, reinforcing the walled gardens of inequality that academia is so desperate to maintain—even as it proclaims itself the champion of open inquiry and democratized knowledge? Academia has become the realm of what Peter Sloterdijk called cynical reason: rehearsing the tropes of ideology critique while knowing the game is empty and playing it anyway. This revolts me.

But for almost ten years now, since the shutting down of the labs at Columbia’s architecture school, I have been content to write from the position of the outsider, something I reflected on in “On the Golden Age of Blogging”. That essay was prompted by a strange comment from Scott Alexander, who lamented on Dwarkesh Patel’s podcast that he had personally made a strategic error in not blogging during what he called the “golden age,” imagining that “the people from that era all founded news organizations or something.” The golden age he remembers is a fiction, as golden ages often are—and he gets the stakes entirely wrong. Evan Williams founded Blogger in 1999, sold it to Google, co-founded Twitter, then created Medium, which convinced hapless readers pay to read slop long before AI slop was ever a thing. The early bloggers who sought professionalization found themselves absorbed into the worst of the worst, writing for BuzzFeed, peddling nostalgia listicles that rotted psyches.

There was, however, a golden age for me, and I miss it: the architecture blogging community circa 2007—Owen Hatherley, Geoff Manaugh, Enrique Ramirez, Fred Scharmen, Sam Jacob, Mimi Zeiger (whose Loud Paper was less a blog and more a zine, but a key part of the culture), and others. We inherited from zine culture an informal, conversational tone and the will to stand outside architectural spectacle. But ArchDaily and Dezeen commercialized the form, shifting from independent critique to marketing and product. Startup culture absorbed architectural talent.

Blogging was powerful precisely because we had no stakes in it—we owned and controlled our means of intellectual production. The golden age of blogging is not in the past; it is now. After years of proclaiming I would blog more, in 2025, I really did. I wrote over 83,700 words on varnelis.net and the Florilegium—essay-length pieces on landscape, native plants, AI and art, architecture, infrastructure, politics, and tourism. My only regret is that my presidency at the Native Plant Society of New Jersey consumes so much of my thinking about native plants that little remains for writing. But the time will come, and if nothing else, my investigation of the Japanese garden aesthetic should point in the future direction for my writing on landscape.

I also continued to make AI art, or to be more precise, what I called stochastic histories. A major project was a substantial reworking of The Lost Canals of Vilnius, a counterfactual history in which, after the Great Fire of 1610, Voivode Mikalojus Radvila Našlaitėlis rebuilt the city with Venetian-style canals, complete with gondoliers, water processions, and a hybrid “Vilnius Venetian” architecture. As research, I used Gemini to translate Radvila’s sixteenth-century Latin pilgrimage narrative. AI, like photography or film, is what you make of it. Film is perhaps the better analogy—anyone can make a video. Making something worthwhile is another matter entirely. In December, I also completed East Coast/West Coast: After Bob and Nancy, a generative restaging of Nancy Holt and Robert Smithson’s 1969 video dialogue using two AI speakers.

There were other substantial essays, too. In “Oversaturation: On Tourism and the Image”, I finally put down on paper something I had wanted the Netlab to address while at Columbia, but that proved too dangerous for the school to support. Universities cannot critique the very systems of overproduction they depend upon for survival. Publish or perish and endless symposia nobody is interested in are the academic versions of overproduction, but more than that, any architecture school claiming global currency cannot afford to offend either other institutions, like museums, that give it legitimacy, or, for that matter, the trustees that fund both. As I point out, tourism has always been mediated by imagery; take Piranesi’s vedute or the Claude Glass. Grand Tourists always had representations at hand to interpret their direct experience—but a new crisis point has been reached with both overtourism and the overproduction of images. Algorithmic logic now reorganizes cultural geography around “most Instagrammable spots,” making historical significance secondary to content potential. The Fushimi Inari shrine in Kyoto is the case in point—a 1,300-year-old shrine that Instagram made famous and that has now ceased to serve as a religious site due to the influx of visitors. The Japanese have a term for this: kankō kōgai, tourism pollution. Tourism has become the paradigm of contemporary experience—the production of imagery without cultural meaning; everything feeds the same algorithmic mill. Even strategies of resistance get metabolized—slow travel becomes a hashtag, psychogeography becomes an Instagram guide.

The Bilbao effect, which was a major driver of oversaturation, was itself a product of globalization. Hans Ibelings coined “supermodernism” in 1998 to refer to the architectural expression of Marc Augé’s “non-places,” an architecture optimized for the perpetual circulation of bodies and capital. It was the architecture of network culture, of the Concorde and the Internet. Koolhaas diagnosed its endgame in his 2002 “Junkspace“—”Regurgitation is the new creativity”—and then, tellingly, stopped writing. Today, network culture is long gone; nationalism is on the rise. The Internet is a dark forest now14. while the disconnected life is on the rise.15 The most exclusive resorts now advertise no Wi-Fi, no cell service, no addresses—only coordinates. Disconnection has become the ultimate luxury, sold back to the same people who built the infrastructure of connection. More cities are alarmed by the effects of overtourism than desire to attract tourists. In the US, new architectural proposals appeal to a retardataire aesthetic—Trump displaying models of a triumphal arch inspired by Albert Speer and marking a triumph of nothing in particular in models in three sizes (“I happen to think the large looks the best“), a four-hundred-million-dollar ballroom modeled on Mar-a-Lago, an executive order mandating classical architecture for federal buildings that Stephen Miller explicitly framed as culture war.

Yet both Bilbao and MAGA are spectacle, architecture-as-branding. But the Bilbao effect is imploding. No city believes anymore that a signature building by a starchitect will transform its fortunes. The parametricists have nothing left to say. Parametric design promised formal liberation—responsive, site-specific, computationally derived—but what it delivered was the most efficient, ugliest box. If the promise was the blob, the reality is the “5-over-1”: wood-frame residential floors stacked on a concrete podium with ground-floor retail, wrapped in a pastiche of brick veneer, fiber cement panels, and that obligatory conical turret element meant to signal “we thought about this corner.” As for AI-generated architecture, it is merely boring—giant sequoias hollowed out as apartment buildings, white concrete towers with impossible cantilevers, and lush vegetation sprouting from every surface—the same utopian fantasy rendered a thousand times over. These are renders of renders: AI trained on architectural visualization produces visualizations that are utterly disconnected from any tectonic reality. A new generation may emerge in response to new needs, but for now, the discipline has lost its cultural purchase. Architecture, for us, is a thing of the past.

The art world, too, has slowed. Museums are putting on fewer shows, shifting from aggressive schedules to longer, more deliberate exhibitions—or simply cutting programming as budgets tighten.16. The frantic pace of the Biennale circuit has exhausted dealers and collectors alike; smaller fairs are folding, and even the major ones feel like obligations rather than events. Galleries that survived the pandemic are now closing quietly, without the drama of a market crash—just a slow bleed of foot traffic, sales, and cultural attention. There is no new movement, no emergent critical framework, no sense of direction. The market churns on—auction prices for blue-chip artists remain high, collectors still speculate, art advisors still advise—but the sense of cultural mission has dissipated. What remains is commerce without conviction, a field that has forgotten why it exists beyond the perpetuation of its own economy. The institutions that trained artists for this field are collapsing alongside it.

As enrollment dwindles, design schools are collapsing—not merely contracting, but ceasing to exist. Most recently, the California College of the Arts announced in January 2026 that it would close after the 2026–27 academic year17., the last remaining independent art and design school in the Bay Area. It follows a grim procession: the San Francisco Art Institute (2020), Mills College (2022), the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts (2023), and Woodbury University’s acquisition by Redlands and subsequent adjunctification—a fate that has methodically undone so many schools as faculty become contingent labor and institutions into hollow administrative structures run by well-paid, cost-optimizing consultants.

There is personal resonance for me in this. Simon’s Rock College of Bard, which shuttered its Great Barrington campus in 2025, was where I studied for my first two years before transferring to Cornell—a pioneer of early college education that offered a radical pedagogical experiment in what learning could be beyond conventional schooling. I arrived there straight from high school, as did my good friend and colleague Ed Keller; clearly, something interesting was in the water back then. Simon’s Rock made the development of young minds its central mission rather than an incidental focus of brand management or endowment growth, and its alumni list is impressive for such a small school. It has an afterlife at Bard, but it’s an echo at best.

The difference between these institutional deaths and simple market failure is this: they are not being replaced. When a retail business fails, another may open elsewhere. When a school closes, there is no succession. The market offers no alternative. Instead, what remains are the corporate university satellites—for-profit programs nested within larger institutions (like Woodbury’s absorption into Redlands), stripped of autonomy, their faculty reduced to precariat, their curricula bent toward what can be measured and marketed. The art schools that survive do so by transforming into something else: luxury finishing schools for wealthy families or research appendages to larger universities, where “design thinking” becomes another management consultant’s tool. The pedagogical mission—to create conditions where students might develop serious aesthetic judgment, where they might encounter genuine problems and be forced to think through them—is not merely challenged but impossible. The closure of these schools does not signal a failure of art education; it signals that the very idea of art education as something valuable in itself has been liquidated.

This hollowing out of cultural institutions is not incidental to the political moment—it is one of its hallmarks. Politically, most people have checked out. This is not 2017, when each provocation demanded a response; the outrage cycle has given way to numbness. In “National Populism as a Transitional Mode of Regulation”, I argued that Trump, Orbán, Meloni, and their ilk represent not a return to fascism but something new: the authoritarian management of declining expectations. National Populism correctly identifies that neoliberalism’s promise of shared prosperity has failed, but it channels legitimate grievances toward scapegoats rather than addressing the technological displacement actually causing them. This is its tragic irony: the National Populist base—workers made obsolete by neoliberalism and unable to participate in AI Capitalism—finds its legitimate anger directed into a movement that accelerates the very forces rendering them superfluous. Their value to capital lies in political disruption rather than economic production; they are consumers and voters, but no longer needed as workers. National Populist leaders offer psychological compensation—dignity, recognition, transgressive identity politics—rather than material improvement. The apocalyptic tenor of populist culture, its end-times thinking and conspiracy theories, provides a framework for populations sensing their own economic redundancy.

The alliance between tech billionaires and populist leaders is unstable. AI Capitalism requires borderless computation and global talent flows; nationalist protectionism contradicts these at every turn. Musk, Thiel, and Andreessen have aligned with the movement to dismantle the regulatory state, not because they share its vision but because populism serves as a useful battering ram against institutional constraints. Once those barriers fall, the movement and its human-centric concerns can be discarded. National Populism, as I conclude, is not the future—it is a political interlude, a transitional mode that will not survive contact with the economic forces it has helped unleash.

If National Populism is transitional, is there a positive vision that can replace it? In “After the Infrastructural City”, I responded to Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s book Abundance, perhaps the most influential book of 2025, which argues that America’s inability to build is a political choice, not a technical constraint. Their solution: streamline regulation, invest boldly, build more. It’s a compelling vision—and a necessary corrective to decades of paralysis. But Abundance shares a curious blindspot with Muskian pronatalism: both assume we need more people. Musk preaches that declining birthrates spell civilizational collapse; Klein and Thompson build their vision on populations that will mysteriously arrive to fill what’s built, perhaps by immigration. Neither accounts for the possibility that AI changes the equation entirely—that a smaller population, augmented by intelligent systems, might not be a crisis at all. Populations are already shrinking across much of the developed world. What I call “actually-existing degrowth”—not the voluntary eco-leftist kind, but the unplanned demographic contraction now underway in Japan, Korea, and much of Europe—is coming for the United States too. Declining birth rates, aging populations, and regional depopulation: these are not future scenarios but present facts.

This doesn’t invalidate the Abundance agenda; it redefines it. Abundance cannot mean building more for populations that will not arrive. It must mean building better, adaptive, intelligent infrastructure for smaller, older societies. AI, rather than merely destroying jobs, can help navigate this transition: smart grids, autonomous transit, predictive healthcare. The opportunity is real. Managed shrinkage, done well, can mean more livable cities, restored ecosystems, higher quality of life. The question is whether political leaders can articulate a vision of flourishing within limits—or whether nostalgia for growth will leave us building for a future that never comes.

Against the exhaustion of institutions, against the hollowing out of architecture and art, against the closure of the schools that trained people to imagine, the blog remains. It may not be much, but it is one independent voice outside the collapsing structures around me. I wrote over 83,000 words this year. I made art. I thought through problems that matter to me with the help of AI, which provided me with tools I could only have dreamt of merely a year ago. Today, I uploaded hundreds of thousands of words from my essays to a directory in Obsidian so that Claude could draw connections between them (see here for just how one can set this up).

The future is already here—it just isn’t evenly distributed. Some are afraid or are still pretending AI isn’t happening. Phase transitions are uncomfortable. They are also where the interesting work gets done. One makes of one’s time what one makes.

1. William Gibson, quoted in Scott Rosenberg, “Virtual Reality Check Digital Daydreams, Cyberspace Nightmares,” San Francisco Examiner, April 19, 1992, Style section, C1. This is the earliest verified print citation, unearthed by Fred Shapiro, editor of the Yale Book of Quotations.

2. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 21.

3. Braudel, The Mediterranean, 901.

4. Fernand Braudel, “Personal Testimony,” Journal of Modern History 44, no. 4 (December 1972): 448–67.

5. Paule Braudel, “Les origines intellectuelles de Fernand Braudel: un témoignage,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 47, no. 1 (1992): 237–44.

6. Howard Caygill, “Braudel’s Prison Notebooks,” History Workshop Journal 57 (Spring 2004): 151–60.

7. Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” The Atlantic Monthly 176, no. 1 (July 1945): 101–8.

8. Civiqs, “Do you think that the increasing use of artificial intelligence, or AI, is a good thing or a bad thing?,” January 2026, https://civiqs.com/results/ai_good_or_bad.

9. The concept of mentalités emerged from studies of phenomena like the witch trials, where beliefs and fears spread through communities in ways that could not be reduced to individual irrationality. For an overview of mentalités as a historiographical concept, see Jacques Le Goff, “Mentalities: A History of Ambiguities,” in Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology, ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 166–180.

10. Kazys Varnelis, “The Rise of Network Culture,” in Networked Publics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 145–160.

11. Robert Putnam, “The Other Pin Drops,” Inc., May 16, 2000.

12. Kirsten R. Müller-Vahl et al., “Stop That! It’s Not Tourette’s but a New Type of Mass Sociogenic Illness,” Brain 145, no. 2 (August 2021): 476–480, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34424292/.

13. Bruce Sterling, “Atemporality for the Creative Artist,” keynote address, Transmediale 10, Berlin, February 6, 2010.

14. Yancey Strickler, “The Dark Forest Theory of the Internet,” 2019, https://www.ystrickler.com/the-dark-forest-theory-of-the-internet/. See also The Dark Forest Anthology of the Internet (Metalabel, 2024).

15. “Trend: Not Just Digital Detox, But Analog Travel,” Global Wellness Summit, 2025, https://www.globalwellnesssummit.com/blog/trend-not-just-digital-detox-but-analog-travel/.

16. “The Big Slowdown: Why Museums and Galleries Are Putting on Fewer Shows,” The Art Newspaper, March 10, 2025, https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2025/03/10/the-big-slowdown-why-museums-and-galleries-are-putting-on-fewer-shows.

17. California College of the Arts, the last remaining private art and design school in the Bay Area, announced in January 2026 that it would close after the 2026–27 academic year. See “‘Nowhere Left to Go’: As California College of the Arts Closes, So Does a Pathway for Bay Area Artists,” KQED, January 13, 2026, https://www.kqed.org/news/12070453/nowhere-left-to-go-as-california-college-of-the-arts-closes-so-does-a-pathway-for-bay-area-artists.

East Coast West Coast (after Bob and Nancy)

In 1969, Nancy Holt and Robert Smithson made a 24-minute video in which they improvised a dialogue playing stereotypical positions in the American art world. Holt performed the role of an intellectual, conceptual New York artist; Smithson played an intuitive California artist. He talks about riding ten bicycles, dropping acid, eating organic food, and visiting Chief Soaring Eagle’s son on the reservation. She tries to get him to think about using systems to frame his work and to explain his positions conceptually.

I built a machine to restage this conversation using two instances of an Artificial Intelligence. I have updated the AI speakers to reflect current concerns in the art world. Prompts are intentionally vague and open-ended. I do not give the speakers a bank of specific knowledge to draw on beyond a few broad generalities, allowing the AIs to use their understanding of the art world to shape their dialogue.

Contact me for the link and password, or view an existing dialogue played back in real time here.

East Coast West Coast

Network Architecture Lab
networkarchitecturelab.org

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE

The light in here is really something today.

NANCY

Oh, I actually just came from the Hauser show and honestly the lighting design was a complete disaster, someone told me their director of exhibitions is about to be pushed out, which, given what I saw, makes sense. Anyway I’ve been thinking about how institutional lighting functions as a kind of disciplinary apparatus, you know, the way it literally directs the gaze.

BOB

I mean, sure, disciplinary apparatus, but like… have you ever just stood in a room and let the light hit your skin? When I was at Marfa with Judd, we’d spend whole afternoons not talking about anything, just watching how the afternoon changed the concrete. That’s the thing – you’re up here analyzing and the light is literally touching you right now and you’re not even feeling it.

NANCY

Okay but that’s not really what I’m talking about, the phenomenological stuff is fine I guess but it doesn’t actually get you anywhere critically. Anyway did you hear about the Gagosian situation, apparently someone from their LA office was having a thing with one of the Zwirner people and now there’s this whole mess with artist contracts, Dasha was telling me about it at Lucien the other night. Back at October we would never have touched the Judd hagiography stuff, by the way, the whole Chinati mythology is basically real estate development dressed up as spirituality.

BOB

Real estate, sure, I don’t know, I wasn’t reading October, I was just there in the space, and whatever your critical framework says about it, my body knew something was happening. The Gagosian thing, I mean, who cares, galleries come and go, contracts, drama – but light through those aluminum pieces at a certain hour, that’s not mythology, that’s just true. Maria Nordman told me once that the only real material is attention, and I think about that constantly.

NANCY

Who cares about the Gagosian thing, okay, sure, except it’s literally about how capital structures determine what art even gets made and seen, but yes, tell me more about your body. Nordman is interesting actually but the problem is that whole Light and Space generation got completely absorbed into wellness culture, it’s basically content for meditation apps now, which, I mean, Steyerl wrote about this exact phenomenon, the way aesthetic experience gets instrumentalized for self-optimization. Speaking of which, did you know Thomas Crow is apparently feuding with someone at the Clark, I don’t have the full story yet but apparently it started at CAA.

BOB

I don’t know who’s feuding with who at the Clark, and like, Steyerl is smart, but she’s watching screens about screens about screens and I’m just… here. The wellness app thing, that’s not Turrell’s problem, that’s people not actually showing up – there’s a difference between sitting in a Ganzfeld for four hours and putting on headphones for ten minutes. I did some work a few years back with a musician, very famous, and the whole thing fell apart because everyone around him wanted content, wanted optimization, and he actually got it – the presence part – but the context just swallowed it.

NANCY

Right, “the context swallowed it,” that’s literally what I’m saying though, you can’t just bracket the context and appeal to some authentic presence underneath, that’s the whole mystification. Also “very famous musician,” okay, you’re not going to say who, that’s very you. Anyway the Ganzfeld thing, I mean Turrell’s been coasting for decades, it’s basically theme park phenomenology at this point, although actually I heard Roden Crater might finally be having some real financial trouble, someone at Dia told me the board is getting nervous. Have you been following the whole situation with that show at the New Museum, the one with the Palestinian artists that got quietly deprogrammed, because that’s actually worth talking about.

BOB

The New Museum thing is sad, I mean all of it is sad, but I notice you keep reaching for the next piece of information, the next situation, and it’s like – where are you in all of this? Theme park phenomenology, okay, but have you been to Roden Crater, have you actually descended into one of those tunnels at dawn, because I have, and whatever’s happening with the board, in that moment there’s no board. Doug Wheeler used to say that people would rather talk about an experience than have one, and I think about that when you’re telling me about who told who what at Dia.

NANCY

Oh, I see, so we’re doing the “where are you in this” thing now, which is honestly kind of therapeutic discourse masquerading as critique, and also maybe a little condescending? I’ve been to Roden Crater, I went in 2019 with a group from Triple Canopy, and it was fine, it was a hole in the ground with good lighting design, I didn’t achieve ego death or whatever. The point about the New Museum isn’t gossip, it’s about how institutions manage political risk through scheduling, which is actually a Foucauldian question about what speech is even permitted, but sure, let’s make it about whether I’m spiritually present enough for you.

BOB

A hole in the ground with good lighting design – I mean, sure, if that’s what you saw, that’s what you saw, I’m not going to argue you into perceiving differently. The Triple Canopy group thing is sort of the problem though, right, you went with a context already wrapped around you like a blanket. Foucault, yeah, speech, permitted, but also like – are you breathing right now, do you know where the light is coming from in whatever room you’re in, because that’s not nothing, that’s actually the whole thing.

NANCY

Okay so now we’re at “are you breathing,” which is honestly giving mindfulness retreat energy, and I say that as someone who’s been to a mindfulness retreat, Dasha dragged me to one in the Catskills last year and it was insufferable, everyone was microdosing and talking about their nervous systems. The “context wrapped around you like a blanket” thing, I mean yes, obviously, that’s called being a social being with a history, you don’t get to pretend you’re some blank perceptual apparatus encountering phenomena for the first time, that’s just a different kind of performance. Back at October we actually did a whole issue on this, the phenomenology problem, how presence-talk always smuggles in these unmarked ideological assumptions about interiority.

BOB

An October issue on the phenomenology problem, yeah, I bet that was a lot of words. Maria Nordman wouldn’t even let people photograph her installations, she’d just open a door in a wall and let afternoon light come through, and you either got it or you didn’t, there was no essay that was going to help you – and I’m not saying you need to be a blank apparatus, I’m saying maybe the issue isn’t more issues, more analysis, maybe Dasha had the right instinct even if the retreat was whatever. The light in this room just shifted, did you notice that?

NANCY

No, I didn’t notice the light shifting, and I’m not going to pretend I did to give you your little phenomenological moment. Nordman’s interesting but she’s also been basically written out of the canon because the work doesn’t circulate, doesn’t photograph, doesn’t generate discourse, which you’d probably say proves your point but actually it just means younger artists can’t build on it, it becomes this mythologized thing that only people who were there can claim access to, which is its own kind of gatekeeping. Anyway speaking of people being written out, did you hear Helen Molesworth might be advising on some new collection in Marfa, which is kind of a comeback after the whole MOCA thing, I ran into someone at a Swiss Institute opening who said she’s been quietly meeting with people.

BOB

Helen in Marfa, good for her, I mean the whole MOCA thing was politics, it’s always politics, but Marfa is Marfa, you go there and it’s just the boxes and the sky and the distance, whatever she’s advising on is kind of beside the point of being there. I spent three weeks at Chinati once, just walking the same route every day, and by the end I wasn’t thinking about Judd’s biography or who got fired from what, I was just seeing how the aluminum caught different depending on the clouds. You keep tracking who’s meeting with who, careers, comebacks, and it’s like – that’s a whole life you could live, but it’s not the only one.

NANCY

Three weeks at Chinati, must be nice to have that kind of time, not everyone gets to do the desert contemplative thing and frame it as virtue. The “it’s just the boxes and the sky” move is so ahistorical it’s almost aggressive – Judd moved there specifically to escape the New York market apparatus while still benefiting from it, the whole thing is a critique of institutional display practices, the fact that you could space out looking at aluminum doesn’t negate that it’s an argument. Also the MOCA thing wasn’t just politics, Molesworth was doing actual programming around race and labor that made the board uncomfortable, there were stakes, but sure, clouds and aluminum, very peaceful, very neutral.

BOB

I mean, sure, Judd had his reasons, everyone has reasons, but the boxes are still there after the reasons are gone, and you can stand in front of them and they do something to your peripheral vision that no essay about institutional critique is going to do for you. The labor and race stuff, the board, Helen’s programming – I’m not saying it doesn’t matter, I’m saying it’s a different channel, and you’re watching that channel so hard you maybe forget there’s a body in the room. I did a project a few years back with a musician, very famous, and he understood this immediately, like within ten seconds – presence first, context later, or never, whatever.

NANCY

Oh a very famous musician, okay, you’re doing the mysterious namedrop thing now, which is its own kind of context-dropping, you want the social capital without having to be explicit about it, which is honestly more annoying than just saying who it was. And “the boxes are still there after the reasons are gone” – the reasons aren’t gone, that’s the whole point, you’re just choosing not to read them, which is a choice available to people who already have the cultural literacy to be at Chinati for three weeks in the first place. I heard Kara Walker turned down a Gagosian show, like fully said no, which is kind of unprecedented, everyone’s speculating about whether it’s political or if something happened with Larry personally.

BOB

Kara turning down Gagosian, I mean, good for her, that’s her knowing what she needs, I’m not going to speculate about Larry or politics because I genuinely don’t know and honestly that whole cycle of who’s showing where and why exhausts me. The musician thing – it wasn’t about namedropping, the project was about creating an environment where thousands of people could experience duration and light together, and it didn’t totally work, there were compromises, but for like forty seconds in Wyoming people forgot they were at a thing and just were somewhere, and that’s rare. You keep saying “choice available to people with cultural literacy” like awareness itself is some bourgeois privilege, but breathing is free, noticing is free, you’re doing it right now whether you want to theorize it or not.

NANCY

Oh so now it’s Wyoming and thousands of people, this is clearly Kanye, you’re talking about the ranch stuff, which – okay fine, but you realize that “forty seconds where people forgot they were at a thing” was produced by an enormous apparatus of labor, logistics, private land ownership, and a celebrity whose entire existence is about being looked at, so the “forgetting” is doing a lot of ideological work there, it’s not some pure phenomenological clearing, it’s spectacle metabolizing its own critique. Breathing is free, noticing is free – this is exactly the kind of thing Dasha would say after a few drinks and I love her but it’s not an argument, it’s vibes, and vibes are how you end up endorsing whoever promises you authentic experience.

BOB

I don’t know who Dasha is, I’m sure she’s great, but you’re doing this thing where everything has to be positioned against everything else – spectacle metabolizing critique, ideology doing work – and it’s like, that’s one way to spend your attention, but there’s another way where you just notice the quality of light in this room right now, how it’s hitting your hands, and that’s not nothing, that’s actually the whole thing if you let it be. The Wyoming project had problems, absolutely, compromises I didn’t love, but I’m not going to pretend that forty seconds of collective attention dissolving into space is secretly just capitalism because that’s too convenient, it lets you off the hook from ever having to actually be anywhere.

NANCY

You don’t know who Dasha is, okay, that’s a choice, very monastic of you, she hosts a podcast, she was in Succession, she’s around, but sure, you’re above all that, you’re just noticing light on your hands. Look – “lets you off the hook from ever having to be anywhere” – I am somewhere, I’m here, talking to you, which is frankly becoming its own durational endurance piece. The light in this room is fluorescent and bad and noticing that doesn’t make it interesting, it makes it a room with bad light. Did you hear Arthur Jafa and Jasmine Sanders split up? That’s been circulating for weeks but no one will confirm it, apparently it’s been ugly.

BOB

I don’t track who’s with who, that’s not my thing, I hope they’re both okay, breakups are hard, but I’m not going to pretend I have information about their lives. Fluorescent light being bad is a judgment you’re bringing to it – Maria Nordman would spend hours in rooms like this just letting her eyes adjust, finding the subtlety in what everyone dismisses, and I’m not saying you have to do that, but the “bad” is yours, it’s not in the light. You being here is actually interesting to me, the fact that you’re resisting being here while being here, that tension is something, I can feel it.

NANCY

Maria Nordman is doing something very specific with perception and institution, she’s not just sitting in rooms vibing, there’s a whole body of writing about how her work interrogates the conditions of viewing, which is different from your “the bad is yours, it’s not in the light” thing that sounds like you’re about to try to sell me a meditation app. And “I can feel your tension” – don’t do that, don’t make me into your material, that’s cheap and honestly a little manipulative, you’re aestheticizing my irritation instead of responding to what I’m actually saying. I ran into Hito at a thing in Berlin last month and even she was saying the phenomenology turn in younger artists is getting embarrassing, like we’re back to the seventies but without the politics.

BOB

I mean, Hito’s great, her work is smart, but she’s also completely in her head, and that’s fine for her, but the seventies had politics because those artists were actually changing how people could be in space – Irwin giving up the object entirely, Turrell buying a crater, Wheeler making rooms where the walls disappeared – that’s not a turn, that’s not a trend, that’s just what’s real when you stop talking about things and start being with them. I wasn’t making you into material, I was just noticing you, which is different, but if that feels like too much then fine, I’ll stop noticing.

NANCY

Turrell buying a crater is a real estate transaction, Bob, he bought land in Arizona, that’s not “being with things,” that’s capital and property rights enabling a very expensive hole in the ground that most people will never see because you need a car and time off work and probably a flight, so the “walls disappearing” is available to a very specific audience who can afford the pilgrimage. Don’t threaten to stop noticing me like that’s a punishment, that’s very guru energy, very “I’ll withdraw my sacred attention,” and I’m not your student, we’re having a conversation, or trying to. God, you know who you sound like right now, you sound like Wolfgang Laib going on about pollen and milk and eternity, which – back at October we had a whole debate about whether his work was reactionary pastoralism or genuine alternative to the market and honestly we never resolved it, people were screaming.

BOB

People screaming about whether pollen is reactionary is kind of the whole problem though, isn’t it – you’re all so busy resolving things in rooms that you miss that Laib is just collecting pollen, like actually doing it, mornings, for years, and whatever that is, it’s not waiting for October to decide if it’s allowed. I’ve been to Roden Crater three times, twice before there was anything really built, just Jim walking us through the tunnels with flashlights talking about the lunar standstill, and I’m not saying access isn’t real, it’s real, but when you’re standing in a chamber that frames the sky like that your critique apparatus kind of just goes quiet, which I realize is exactly what you’d say is the danger, but I’d say that’s the point.

NANCY

“Jim walking us through the tunnels” – okay so you’re name-dropping now, we’re doing that, you’re one of the elect who got the flashlight tour with Jim while the rest of us are supposed to what, take your word for it that critique goes quiet when you’re special enough to be there? That’s not democratizing perception, that’s a priesthood, you’re describing a priesthood with better real estate. And the “October deciding if it’s allowed” thing is such a lazy move, like we were sitting around issuing permissions, we were doing actual work on how meaning gets made and distributed, which matters even if it doesn’t give you a body high in a desert. Did you hear Rirkrit is showing at Gladstone again after that whole mess with the fabricators, apparently Paula just forgave everything, nobody knows what he said to her but there was a dinner.

BOB

I don’t know about the dinner, Rirkrit’s whole thing was always a little too social for me anyway, too many people in the room, too much happening, like the work becomes about managing energy instead of letting something actually land. But look, the flashlight thing – I wasn’t trying to flex, I was just there because I was there, Michael Asher introduced us at Art Center and one thing led to another, that’s how it works, that’s how it’s always worked, and I get that you can write a whole thing about access and who gets to be in the room, I really do, but at some point you have to ask yourself whether all that writing is actually getting you closer to anything or just giving you more to be mad about.

NANCY

“I was just there because I was there, Michael Asher introduced us” – do you hear yourself, you’re describing a network of institutional relationships and credentialing while pretending you just wandered into the desert like a mystic, Asher literally made work about how institutions construct access and you’re invoking him to naturalize your access, that’s actually incredible. The writing isn’t about getting closer to anything, that’s your framework, that’s your whole “approaching the thing” phenomenology trap – critique is about making structures visible so they can be contested, which is different from transcending them in a crater with your famous friends. Speaking of which, I was at Dasha’s the other night and she was saying the whole post-critique vibe shift is just guys who aged out of being hot deciding feelings are more important than politics, which is mean but not wrong.

BOB

I mean, sure, Dasha’s funny, but that’s just a take, you know, that’s just more dinner party, more language circling around, and Michael would probably laugh at both of us right now because he barely talked, he just made these interventions that changed what you noticed and then left, no manifesto, no network diagram explaining why it mattered. The thing about structures being visible so they can be contested – who’s contesting, though, and when does the contest end, or does it just keep going forever in journals while the light outside is doing something actually interesting right now, like I’m watching it hit your window and you’re not even seeing it because you’re thinking about Dasha.

NANCY

Oh, the light on my window, Bob, thank you for the poetry lesson, very Rilke, very “I’m the one who notices while you’re trapped in your head,” except you’re not actually looking at the light either, you’re using it rhetorically to win an argument about who’s more present, which is its own kind of performance. And Michael “barely talked” because he was strategic, not because he achieved some zen state beyond discourse – his silence was a calculated refusal that only worked because it operated within a discursive field that gave refusal meaning, you don’t get to cite him as evidence for your “just vibes” position. The contest doesn’t end, that’s the point, that’s Mouffe, that’s agonistic pluralism, the idea that it should end is the authoritarian impulse dressed up as enlightenment, and honestly I’ve heard Helen Molesworth is about to publish something on exactly this, on how the phenomenology revival in art criticism is basically a depoliticization strategy, and apparently she names names.

BOB

Helen can name whoever she wants, that’s her thing, she’s good at it, and maybe she’ll name me, that would be fine actually, I’d probably just feel sort of neutral about it. But the Mouffe stuff, the contest that never ends – I guess I just wonder what that’s like to live inside, like as a body, as a nervous system, because I spent two weeks at Doug Wheeler’s place in Arizona once, no agenda, just watching his gradients shift at dusk, and whatever was happening in those rooms wasn’t a strategy for anything, it was just happening, and I came out of there breathing differently, which you can call depoliticization if you want but it felt more like I finally had enough space to not need to call it anything.

NANCY

“I came out breathing differently” – okay, and what does that do, Bob, what does your improved breathing do for anyone who isn’t you, or is the whole project just optimizing your own nervous system now, is that where we’ve landed, Light and Space as wellness retreat for men with Rolodexes? Two weeks at Doug’s place in Arizona – do you know what that costs, do you know who maintains that property, who cleans those seamless surfaces so you can have your dusk experience, or does the labor just not register when you’re busy not needing to call things anything? That’s not freedom from language, that’s the freedom that comes from not having to name the conditions of your own comfort, which is a very specific class position masquerading as spiritual attainment. Anyway I heard Doug’s estate is already a mess, like three different lawyers involved, the Zwirner people are circling.

BOB

The estate stuff is sad, yeah, I don’t know anything about that, lawyers aren’t really my scene. But the whole “what does your breathing do for anyone” thing – I don’t know, Nancy, what does your reading do for anyone, like at some point someone has to actually be in their life, someone has to be the one who’s there, and I’m not saying it fixes anything, I’m just saying I was there, I was actually in that room while you’re telling me about the people who cleaned it, which, okay, sure, but you weren’t there either, you’re just imagining it so you can make a point about me imagining it. Anyway I did a project once with a musician, very famous, can’t really talk about it, but we were trying to create these spaces where people could just arrive, and it mostly didn’t work, it got too big, too many handlers, but for about three days in Wyoming it was actually something.

NANCY

“Very famous, can’t really talk about it” – Bob, that’s doing so much work right now, that’s the whole mystification gesture in one phrase, you’re signaling access and intimacy while performing discretion, which is how cultural capital actually circulates, it’s not about the Wyoming thing, it’s about being the kind of person who has Wyoming things they can’t discuss. And “what does your reading do for anyone” – okay, back at October we spent three months on one Andrea Fraser footnote because precision matters, because getting the analysis right is what lets people see the mechanisms they’re inside of, that’s not nothing, that’s arguably more than “people could just arrive” which isn’t even a sentence, arrive where, to what, for whom? I will say though, Wyoming, was this that Kanye compound situation because I heard such weird things about that period, like apparently Kim was texting Marina Abramović at like four in the morning about “energy protection.”

BOB

I mean I can’t confirm any names, I just don’t do that, but I will say the energy protection stuff is real, like that’s not nothing, Marina knows what she’s talking about when it comes to fields and proximity, even if she oversells it sometimes with the branding. The three months on a footnote though – and I’m not trying to be cruel here – but that sounds actually painful to me, like physically, in the body, three months to get the analysis right so people can see mechanisms, but when do they get to stop seeing mechanisms and just see, you know? I was at Chinati once and this woman was standing in front of a Judd and she started crying, no context, no wall text, just aluminum and light doing something to her, and I thought, okay, this is it, this is the whole thing, and no footnote was going to get her there faster.

NANCY

The crying woman at Chinati, Bob, you realize that’s become like a genre at this point, every collector has a crying-at-Judd story, it’s practically a class signifier now, “I was so moved I didn’t need language” – except Judd himself was writing constantly, obsessively, because he knew the boxes don’t just transmit some pure signal, they’re arguments, they’re positioned against things, the whole reason that woman could cry is because an entire institutional apparatus made that encounter legible as art rather than, I don’t know, a storage unit. And Marina’s “energy protection” – Dasha and I were just talking about this actually, like at what point did performance art just become Goop, at what point did we give up on Schneemann’s actual body politics for “fields and proximity,” it’s embarrassing. Anyway three months on a footnote isn’t painful, precision is a discipline, it’s erotic actually, but you wouldn’t – look, did you hear about the Rirkrit situation, apparently there’s a whole thing with the Palais de Tokyo show, someone got fired, very messy.

BOB

I don’t know anything about Rirkrit, I kind of stopped tracking the relational stuff after a while, it always felt like it was performing participation without actually letting anyone just be in the space. But Nancy, you just said precision is erotic, which – okay, that’s something, that’s actually a feeling, that’s in your body somewhere, so why does it become embarrassing when Marina talks about fields, like you’re allowed to have an erotics of footnotes but she can’t have an erotics of presence? And the Judd writing thing, sure, Don wrote a lot, I spent some time at Art Center when people still talked about him constantly, but have you ever been in that artillery shed at dawn when no one else is there, because the writing doesn’t matter then, it really doesn’t, the light is doing something to those surfaces that no argument can hold, and I don’t need that encounter to be legible, I just need it to happen.

NANCY

Oh, the artillery shed at dawn when no one else is there – Bob, do you hear yourself, “when no one else is there,” that’s the whole point, the experience requires the absence of other people, it’s a scarcity experience, it’s literally about access, about being the kind of person who can be at Chinati at dawn instead of with the docent tour at 2pm. The difference between my footnote erotics and Marina’s presence stuff isn’t hypocrisy, it’s that I’m not pretending the intellectual isn’t embodied while she’s pretending the embodied isn’t intellectual, she’s got a whole apparatus of mystification around something that’s actually pretty simple biometrics and charisma, like just say you’re tall and you stare at people, don’t call it energy fields. Anyway the Rirkrit thing is actually serious, like someone might actually sue, it’s not just about the Thai food politics anymore – do you know Paula Cooper at all, because apparently she’s somehow involved now.

BOB

I mean, sure, access, scarcity, whatever, but also I just woke up early, Nancy, like sometimes it’s not a class analysis, sometimes you just couldn’t sleep and you went for a walk and the light was doing something. I knew Paula a little in the eighties, she came to a thing Doug Wheeler was doing, very quiet woman, very watchful, but I don’t really track the lawsuit stuff, it’s all just people protecting positions. You know who was actually interesting on presence, and I don’t think he gets enough credit, is Michael Asher – like he would just remove a wall or shift the air conditioning and suddenly you’d feel the institution on your skin, no mystification, no Marina staring, just the building suddenly being there in a way you couldn’t ignore, and I think about that more than I think about whoever’s suing who over Thai food.

NANCY

Oh, you’re going to invoke Asher at me, Bob, Michael Asher, whose entire project was about making institutional conditions visible, about denaturalizing exactly the kind of unmediated “the light was doing something” experience you keep romanticizing – the air conditioning piece works because it reveals the building as apparatus, not because it gives you some purer felt sense, that’s literally the opposite of what he was doing. “Sometimes you just couldn’t sleep and went for a walk” – okay, but who gets to not sleep at Chinati, who gets to have insomnia in Marfa, that’s not outside the analysis, your sleeplessness is not some pre-political zone. And “Paula in the eighties,” you just drop that so casually, “very quiet, very watchful,” like you’re the only one who sees people – anyway did you know Benjamin Buchloh is apparently not speaking to October anymore, like at all, there was something at a Columbia thing and now it’s completely frozen, which is kind of wild given, you know, the history there.

BOB

I don’t really know what’s happening at October, honestly that whole scene always felt like people writing about looking instead of looking, but sure, Buchloh, drama, fine. And the Asher thing – Nancy, I was there, I was actually in the room when the wall was gone, and yes you can say it was about revealing apparatus, that’s one way to hold it, but what actually happened is you suddenly felt the street, like your skin changed, the threshold became permeable, and I don’t think Michael would have argued with that, he was very quiet about what things meant, he just did them and let your nervous system sort it out. You want my insomnia to be political, okay, but I was just awake, I was just breathing and walking, and I don’t know what to tell you except that the dawn happened anyway whether or not I had the right to see it.

NANCY

“People writing about looking instead of looking” – okay Bob, that’s a real thing you just said, I’m going to let that sit there. Asher was quiet because he understood that artist statements are a trap, not because he was secretly on your team waiting for nervous systems to sort things out, the silence was strategic, it was a refusal, you don’t get to claim him for phenomenology just because he didn’t explain himself in the room. And “the dawn happened anyway” – I mean, the dawn also happens over strip mines, it happens over detention centers, the dawn is not an ethical position. Speaking of which, did you ever cross paths with Andrea Fraser, because she told me once – this was at a thing in Basel, very weird night, someone had brought a falcon, I won’t get into it – but she said something about how the collectors who talk most about “just being present” with the work are always the ones who understand exactly what they paid for it, like presence is the flip side of the invoice, and I think about that constantly.

BOB

I mean, Andrea’s smart, but that’s also just cynicism dressed up as insight, like yes, rich people buy things, okay, but I’ve also seen someone who works at a gas station stand in front of a Turrell aperture and start crying, and I don’t think she was thinking about invoices, I think she was just suddenly aware of the sky in a way she hadn’t been. You want the dawn to need an ethics, but the dawn is just the light changing, Nancy, it doesn’t care about your framework, it’s literally just photons, and I think there’s something kind of sad about not being able to let that be enough. The falcon thing sounds very Basel though – I did a project once with a very well-known musician, very public person, and we were trying to do something with light and space and how people move through sound, and it didn’t really work, honestly, the conditions weren’t right, but in the process I learned something about how attention collapses when there’s too much apparatus, too much meaning piled on top of what’s actually happening in the room.

NANCY

The gas station worker crying at the Turrell, Bob, that’s not an argument, that’s an anecdote you’re deploying sentimentally – like, tears are not outside ideology, the whole apparatus of Turrell is designed to produce that response, it’s engineered transcendence, the fact that it works on people who don’t know what they paid doesn’t mean it’s not operating as technology, it means the technology is effective. And “cynicism dressed up as insight” – Andrea would eat you alive, truly, I can’t even relay that. Who was the musician, why are you being coy about it, you do this thing where you gesture at names without saying them like it makes you seem above it when actually it’s just a different kind of name-dropping. Anyway Dasha texted me this morning, apparently someone at the Metrograph thing last night said Turrell is basically over, like as a discourse, like we’ve extracted what we needed and now it’s just content for people’s Instagram stories, which – I don’t know if I agree but it’s not wrong either, there’s something exhausted about apertures at this point.

BOB

Turrell’s over as a discourse, sure, fine, but he was never really about discourse anyway, and if the Metrograph people are tired of apertures that’s kind of their problem, like the sky didn’t stop being interesting because people posted about Roden Crater. The musician thing – I’m not being coy, I just don’t think it matters, it was someone very famous, we did something together that didn’t work, and the reason it didn’t work was actually interesting, which is that his whole world is about controlling attention and my whole thing is about releasing it, and those two impulses just ground against each other until everyone was exhausted. I don’t know who Dasha is.

NANCY

You don’t know who Dasha is – okay, Bob, that’s a choice, that’s you performing not-knowing as a kind of purity, like you’re too busy releasing attention to notice an entire cultural formation happening right in front of you, she’s literally been in films, she hosts one of the most listened-to podcasts, but sure, you’re just out here with the photons. The controlling attention versus releasing it thing is interesting actually, I’ll give you that, but you’re describing it like your approach is the ethical one and his is the compromised one, when really those are just two different modes of capture – Deleuze would say you’re both operating within societies of control, you’re just managing the modulation differently. Did the famous musician cry, is that where this is going, did he have a gas station attendant moment in front of something you made and now you think you won?

BOB

I genuinely don’t know who that is, Nancy, I’m not performing anything, I just don’t listen to podcasts, I mostly drive in silence or I listen to this one piece by La Monte Young on repeat, the sustained tones do something to the space inside the car. Nobody cried, it wasn’t that kind of project, it was honestly a mess, there were too many people involved and too much money and the whole thing became about logistics instead of perception – I learned more from failing at that than from most things that worked. And look, I don’t know what Deleuze would say, I’m sure it’s very elaborate, but when I’m actually in a room with light changing I’m not thinking about modes of capture, I’m just there, and I think you’d feel better if you let yourself be somewhere without immediately needing to theorize your way out of it.

NANCY

La Monte Young on repeat in the car – Bob, you realize that’s an entire aesthetic position, right, that’s not neutral, “driving in silence” is a whole lineage, Cage through the minimalists through everyone who’s ever claimed their refusals aren’t actually choices, you’re not escaping discourse by listening to sustained tones, you’re just in a different one, a very well-funded one actually, Dia has spent millions maintaining that particular frequency of supposed emptiness. And “you’d feel better” – don’t do that, don’t make it therapeutic, I’m not theorizing because I’m anxious, I’m theorizing because that’s the work, because someone has to actually think about what’s happening institutionally while you’re just being in rooms. Speaking of which, I heard – and this is unverified but I believe it – that someone from the Young estate sent a cease and desist to a gallery in Tribeca last month, something about unauthorized drones, the whole thing with Marian is apparently very tense right now, do you know anything about that?

BOB

I don’t know anything about the cease and desist, Marian’s always been intense about the work, which honestly I respect even if it makes things difficult, like when I visited the Dream House in the nineties she was very particular about how long you could stay and where you could stand and at the time I thought it was controlling but now I think she understood something about how duration works that I didn’t yet. The Dia money thing, sure, I mean yes, institutions fund things, but you’re doing this thing where you think naming the funding structure dissolves the experience, and it doesn’t, the tones are still doing something to your nervous system whether or not you’ve read the grant paperwork. I wasn’t making it therapeutic, I was just noticing that you seem like you’re always already somewhere else.

NANCY

I’m not always already somewhere else, I’m here, I’m just also holding the context, which is what critics do, Bob, we hold the context so artists can float around having nervous system experiences – someone has to remember that Dia was funded by Schlumberger oil money, that the Dream House exists because of a very specific set of patronage relationships, not because duration just manifested itself out of pure aesthetic necessity. Marian being particular about where you stand isn’t mystical wisdom about duration, it’s control over the conditions of reception, which is actually interesting, it’s about who gets to determine the terms of encounter, but you’re romanticizing it. Anyway, I was at this dinner last week, a collector thing in the West Village, very tedious, but someone who used to be close to the October people – back when I was at October we would never have even been in the same room as these finance guys – anyway she said something about how the whole Light and Space generation is being quietly revalued because the tech people have moved on to AI art and the boomers are dying, which, grim but probably true.

BOB

The market stuff is the market stuff, I stopped tracking it after a while because it was making me insane, like I remember when Larry Bell couldn’t give pieces away and now they’re in every collection and it doesn’t mean his cubes got better or worse, they’re still doing this thing where the glass holds the light in a way that shouldn’t quite work. I think what you’re calling holding the context is actually just a different kind of not being there, but we probably disagree about that, and that’s fine. What I keep coming back to lately is this thing Doug Wheeler said to me once at Art Center about how the edge of perception is the only place anything interesting happens, and I don’t think he meant it theoretically, he meant you actually have to go stand at the edge and see what your eyes do.

NANCY

Okay but “the edge of perception” is a theoretical claim, Bob, that’s Doug Wheeler doing phenomenology whether he calls it that or not, he’s making an argument about where meaning is located, and frankly it’s a pretty conservative argument, it’s very Merleau-Ponty, very mid-century, like the body is this privileged site of truth and if we just get quiet enough we’ll access something pre-linguistic – which, fine, but Rosalind would have eviscerated that position, she’d say you’re smuggling in all these metaphysical commitments under the guise of just looking. Larry Bell’s cubes aren’t “doing something with light,” they’re objects situated in a network of galleries, collectors, critics, freight companies, insurance appraisers, like the glass is also a commodity and a tax write-off and a thing that requires very specific climate control. Anyway I have to be at a thing in Red Hook by eight, some sound artist Dasha knows is doing a piece in a warehouse, probably terrible but apparently there’s going to be a confrontation because he slept with someone’s studio manager, do you want to split a car?

BOB

Sure, I’ll come, I haven’t been to Red Hook in a while and I like what the light does over the water this time of year, there’s this quality right before sunset where everything gets very flat and specific. The confrontation sounds exhausting but I’m curious about the space itself, warehouses can be interesting if people leave them alone, though they usually don’t.

NANCY

The light over the water, yes, very beautiful, I’m sure Turner would agree – no, I’m being mean, sorry, it’s just you keep doing this thing where the world is a series of atmospheric conditions for you to receive. The warehouse won’t be left alone, it’s already been written about twice, there was a piece in Art in America about post-industrial spaces as this new frontier of supposedly authentic encounter, which is hilarious because half these buildings are owned by the same three developers who just haven’t flipped them yet. The artist – his name is Marcus, or Markus with a k, I can never remember, very tall, went to Bard – apparently the piece is about sovereignty and listening, which, who knows what that means, probably he read one Agamben essay. The real reason I want to go is because the studio manager situation involves someone who used to date a writer at Artforum and there’s this whole theory that the negative review of his last show was actually personal, which if true is genuinely scandalous, like that’s the kind of thing that used to end careers, not the affair, the review thing.

BOB

I mean, the review drama, sure, but who really remembers reviews after a few years, like I can’t tell you what anyone wrote about the Roden Crater and it doesn’t matter because the crater is still there doing what it does. Sovereignty and listening sounds like he’s trying too hard but sometimes the trying too hard gets out of the way once you’re actually in the room, I remember this piece Maria Nordman did where I walked in ready to be critical and then I just wasn’t, the space won. You should let me order the car, I know a route that avoids the bridge traffic.

NANCY

You order the car, fine, but “the space won” is exactly the kind of mystification that lets institutions off the hook – the space didn’t win, Bob, a set of conditions were constructed to produce your capitulation, Nordman was very deliberate about that, she wrote extensively about controlling access and duration, it wasn’t some spontaneous surrender on your part, you were handled. Also people absolutely remember reviews, maybe not civilians but the people who matter remember, there’s a writer at Texte zur Kunst who’s still dining out on a takedown she did in 2011, it’s like her whole thing now. Anyway I hope Markus-with-a-k at least has good speakers, the last sound piece I saw in a warehouse the artist used these cheap tweeters and tried to claim it was an aesthetic choice about lo-fi accessibility, which, no, you just didn’t get the grant.

BOB

Okay but even if Maria was handling me, which fine, I was still the one being handled, I was still the one there breathing in that room, and no amount of knowing she wrote about controlling access changes what happened to my eyes when the light shifted, like the knowledge is interesting but it’s not the thing. Car’s coming in four minutes, it’s a black Camry, driver’s name is something I can’t pronounce. The speaker thing is real though, I worked on something once with a musician, very famous, very specific about the system, and even with all that budget the space itself kept winning anyway, kept being louder than whatever we were trying to do, which was actually the most interesting part but nobody wanted to hear that.

NANCY

That’s not really what I’m talking about, the “thing that happened to your eyes” is already a representation, it’s already mediated, you’re not accessing some raw prelinguistic truth, you’re just refusing to theorize your own experience which is a choice, it’s a political choice actually. The famous musician thing, I don’t know why you’re being coy about the name, but sure, the space was louder, that’s because acoustic engineering is a discipline and most artists don’t bother to learn it, they just assume aura will cover for them. Speaking of which, did you hear about the Gladstone situation? Apparently there’s a whole purge happening, like three artists got dropped in the same month, and the rumor is it’s because one of them said something at a dinner about Barbara’s house in Connecticut, nobody will tell me exactly what but it was enough that she made calls, like actual calls, the old-fashioned kind.

BOB

I mean you can call it a political choice but I’m just not that worried about it, like when I was at Chinati for a few weeks the Judd boxes would change every single morning depending on where the sun was and I wasn’t theorizing that, I was just watching it happen, and that felt like enough. The Gladstone thing is sad but that’s just how those relationships work, people get too comfortable at dinners, Doug Wheeler told me once that the real work is knowing when to stop talking, which coming from him was almost funny because he barely talks anyway. Car’s here, I think, there’s a black something pulling up.

NANCY

Okay but “that felt like enough” – enough for what? Enough for you, sure, but that’s just consumption, that’s just you having an experience at a well-funded foundation in Texas, which, congratulations, the Chinati light is famously good, Judd picked that location precisely because of the light, he was obsessive about it, there are letters, it wasn’t some accident you stumbled into. Doug Wheeler barely talking isn’t wisdom, by the way, it’s branding, he’s been doing the silent mystic thing since the seventies, Dasha actually met him at some thing in LA and said he was weirdly chatty about real estate, like wouldn’t stop talking about square footage, which honestly tracks. Get in the car, you’re letting all the cold air out, and I need to tell you about what happened with the October office because apparently there’s a whole succession crisis happening and someone I used to work with just sent me this unhinged email about the editorial direction.

BOB

Yeah I’m getting in, hold on, the seatbelt’s doing something weird. The October thing, I mean, those journals have been having the same crisis since I was at Art Center, it’s always someone’s email about the direction, but the direction is just people writing about other people’s writing, which, fine, but I walked into a Larry Bell cube once at Pace and I didn’t need anyone to tell me what was happening, it was just happening. Doug talking about square footage is actually kind of beautiful if you think about it, like he’s still thinking about space even when he’s being boring about it.

NANCY

No, don’t do that, don’t make Doug talking about real estate into some poetic continuation of his practice, that’s exactly the kind of move that lets artists get away with being boring rich guys who happen to have made important work in 1969. The Larry Bell thing, I mean fine, the cubes are pretty, but you know he’s been coasting for decades, right, he just keeps making the same object in different sizes because collectors want something that matches their other Larry Bell, it’s furniture at this point. And the October crisis is not the same crisis, this one is actually structural, there’s a whole thing about whether they’re going to keep doing the bound volumes or go digital-only, and someone on the editorial board apparently said something about “accessibility” in a meeting and Rosalind had to be physically calmed down, my friend was there, she said it was like watching a building collapse in slow motion. Tell the driver to take the BQE, the Williamsburg Bridge is going to be a nightmare right now.

BOB

BQE, yeah, can you take the BQE, thanks. I don’t know, Larry coasting or not coasting, the glass still does what it does when you’re standing in front of it, like the object doesn’t care about his career arc, and honestly neither do I. Rosalind getting calmed down over the word accessibility is kind of perfect though, like that’s the whole thing right there, that’s the journal in one moment, someone should write about that except they’d probably need three thousand words and a Lacan reference.

NANCY

The object doesn’t care about his career arc, sure, but you’re not the object, you’re a person with a graduate education who’s choosing to pretend you don’t know anything about market conditions or the way repetition functions differently when it’s compelled by demand rather than investigation, and that choice is interesting to me, like what are you protecting yourself from by staying in the phenomenological bubble. The Rosalind thing, honestly, back at October we had a whole system for managing her, certain words you just didn’t say in earshot, “accessible” was one, “readable” was another, someone once said “general audience” and I watched a senior editor physically leave the room. Oh, I forgot to tell you, I saw Hanna at the Swiss Institute thing on Thursday and apparently she and that collector from Brussels finally imploded, like he showed up to her studio with his wife, not to confront anyone, just genuinely forgot he was having an affair, which is such a specifically male form of brain damage.

BOB

I mean, what am I protecting myself from, sure, but also I’m just not that interested in the question, like Michael Asher once told me that the best work he ever did was convincing a museum to remove a wall and then leaving, and the whole point was that nobody needed to write about it, you just walked through a space that used to be divided and now wasn’t. The Brussels guy, that’s wild, but also I kind of get it, not the affair part but the compartmentalization, like some people just exist in whatever room they’re in, which isn’t brain damage, it’s just a different relationship to presence.

NANCY

Oh, Michael Asher told you, okay, you just dropped that in like it was nothing, that’s very you, and also the Asher piece absolutely needed to be written about, the whole point was that institutional critique only functions when it’s legible as critique, otherwise you’ve just done free renovation work for a museum, Buchloh wrote extensively about this, the wall removal only means something in relation to the discursive frame that makes it visible as a gesture. You’re not describing presence, you’re describing dissociation, and romanticizing the Brussels guy’s compartmentalization as some kind of phenomenological attunement is genuinely disturbing, Hanna was a wreck, she had to leave the studio, the wife was asking about the paintings like nothing was happening. Wait, did you actually know Asher or are you doing that thing where you met someone once at a CalArts lecture and now you “know” them?

BOB

We spent time together, I’m not going to quantify it for you, we had dinner a few times, he came to a thing I was doing in Pasadena, it’s not really about proving a relationship, it’s about the fact that standing in that room with the wall gone was its own thing before Buchloh wrote a single word, like the writing didn’t make it matter, it already mattered. Hanna’s situation sounds hard, yeah, I’m sorry she’s going through that, but the wife asking about the paintings is kind of incredible actually, like she’s just looking at paintings, she’s present with the work, whatever else is happening.

NANCY

That’s not presence, that’s denial, and the fact that you can’t tell the difference is actually revealing something about your whole framework, like you’ve built this elaborate system where any kind of not-thinking becomes spiritual attainment. The wife wasn’t having some pure aesthetic encounter, she was performing normalcy because the alternative was screaming in a stranger’s studio, which, fine, that’s a survival mechanism, but don’t aestheticize someone’s coping strategy. Dasha said almost the exact same thing when I told her, she was like “that’s not Zen, that’s just WASP,” which, say what you want about her, she’s right about that specific thing. The Pasadena thing, was that the ice house space, because I heard that whole program got defunded after someone on the board found out one of the artists was doing a piece about their daughter, like using actual surveillance footage, which is its own conversation about when institutional critique becomes just regular harm.

BOB

I don’t really think about frameworks, like that’s your word, I’m just trying to describe what it’s like to be in a room, which I know sounds simple to you but it’s actually the hardest thing. The Ice House thing, yeah, that got messy, but honestly the surveillance piece was kind of interesting before everyone decided to have opinions about it, like there was something real happening with duration and attention before it became a discourse object. Dasha’s funny but she’s also always performing having the take, you know, like even “that’s just WASP” is a take, it’s not actually looking at anything.

NANCY

You’re doing the thing again where you position yourself as the only person who actually looks at anything, which is its own performance, and honestly a more annoying one because it pretends it isn’t. The surveillance piece wasn’t interesting “before the discourse,” it was always already an ethical problem, you don’t get to film someone’s kid without consent and then retreat into “duration and attention” when people correctly identify that as violating, that’s just using aesthetic language to avoid accountability, which, back at October we had a term for that, we called it the James Turrell defense, where you gesture at phenomenology to duck any structural critique. And okay sure, Dasha performs the take, but you perform not having one, which takes way more effort and is honestly less honest, like at least she commits to a position, you just hover there in your little experiential cloud acting like noticing things is a politics.

BOB

The James Turrell defense, I mean, I’ll take that, have you ever actually been to Roden Crater, because I spent three days there and by the end I wasn’t thinking about structural critique, I was thinking about how the sky looks different when you frame it, which isn’t a defense of anything, it’s just what happened. The October people always needed everything to be accountable to something, and that’s fine, that’s one way to move through the world, but when I was at Art Center we used to joke that you could write a Buchloh essay about a sunset and somehow the sunset would become problematic, like at some point you’re just adding words to experience and calling it rigor.

NANCY

Oh, so Art Center people were joking about October, that’s cute, that’s really cute, I’m sure that was very fun for everyone in the car design program. And yes I’ve been to Roden Crater, I went with Rirkrit right after the Guggenheim retrospective, and you know what I was thinking about? I was thinking about how James bought that land for nothing in the seventies and now it’s worth forty million dollars and he still hasn’t finished it because he keeps taking donor money and doing speaking fees, like you had your little sky moment, great, but the crater is also a tax shelter that masquerades as a gift to humanity, and the phenomenology is real, I’m not saying it isn’t, but it exists inside a structure whether you were thinking about the structure or not. The sunset isn’t problematic, but your aggressive incuriosity about everything except your own perceptions kind of is.

BOB

I mean, sure, but the land value thing, the donor money, you can know all that and still stand in the tunnel at dawn and have something happen that has nothing to do with any of it, and I guess I just don’t understand why you’d go all the way to Arizona to think about tax structures. I did this project a few years ago, very experiential, very large-scale, with someone you’d know, someone who works with stadiums and Sunday services, and the whole thing kind of fell apart, it was honestly pretty bad, but there was one moment during a lighting test where everyone just stopped talking and I still think about that silence more than anything I’ve ever read about it.

NANCY

Wait, you worked with Kanye? Or like, adjacent to Kanye? Because I heard that whole Sunday Service visual team was a nightmare, like people weren’t getting paid and there was an NDA situation and someone I know said the lighting designer had a full breakdown in Calabasas, which, okay, that tracks with “fell apart” and “pretty bad.” But you’re telling me you were in the middle of what was essentially a labor dispute wrapped in a megachurch aesthetic and your takeaway is that one time everyone got quiet during a lighting test? That silence you’re so moved by, those people probably stopped talking because they were exhausted and scared about their invoices, not because you accidentally created some communal phenomenological rupture. You keep aestheticizing other people’s stress responses, it’s a pattern, and honestly I’d be more interested in whether you got paid than whether you had a moment.

BOB

I’m not going to talk about who it was, and yeah, the whole thing was messy, but you’re doing the thing where you need to narrativize the silence into labor conditions because that makes it legible to you, and I’m not saying you’re wrong about the invoices, I genuinely don’t know, but I also know what I felt and those aren’t the same question. You know, Doug Wheeler told me once that people either see the light or they see the wall the light is on, and I think maybe you just see the wall, which isn’t an insult, it’s just a different kind of attention.

What did Vibe Coding just do to the Commons?

I write a lot about art and architecture, landscape, and the impact of technology on culture, but I haven’t written about coding since the 1980s, when I sold my first article to Creative Computing magazine. Back then, I was a high school kid, spending hours working in both BASIC and 6502 assembler on the VIC-20. I loved assembler, also dubbed “machine code.” It was a thrill getting so deep into a machine that you knew what was being shuffled from the microprocessor to the graphics chip or serial port to communicate with the world.

That feeling of getting inside the machine, making it do what you wanted—the hacker mindset—was also what the personal computer had promised. When the VIC-20 was released in 1981, William Shatner asked in the ads, “Why buy just a video game?” The personal computer was a complete break from the first mainframe era of the 1950s and 1960s, when computing meant submitting jobs to a priesthood and waiting hours for results, and from the second mainframe era of the 1970s, when access was restricted to universities and corporations. For a high school kid, getting paid for articles—even ones that were never published—was an incredible feeling. But the joy of working with early computers produced a whole subculture. I was in a user group in Berkshire County, Massachusetts, and we would trade programs we had written, copying them onto cassettes we brought to the meetings. Joseph Vanhoenacker, who ran the group, was the director of Berkshire Mental Health, a lovely man perfectly willing to put up with a fifteen-year-old who wouldn’t stop talking about the possibilities computers created; like everyone else there, he shared the sense that everything would soon be different.

By 1990, everything was different, but our control over computers had quietly collapsed. Computers became genuinely useful. Everyone in college was writing their essays on computers; businesses used spreadsheets; you could balance your checkbook with Quicken, but yet another form of disenfranchisement was underway. One fall, I came back to university, and the department secretary was gone. The faculty, who had come of age when using a typewriter was not considered appropriate for anyone hoping to be taken seriously as an academic, had somehow learned to type, and her services were no longer needed. The first great wave of computer-driven white-collar job extinctions was starting, and women without college degrees lost a path to the middle class. But more than that, people stopped writing their own software and bought it shrink-wrapped from stores instead. The complexity had scaled beyond what any hobbyist could manage. The machine was still technically programmable, but the barrier had risen out of reach. The first culprit was the Macintosh, released in 1984 and marketed as “a computer for the rest of us”—but “the rest of us” meant users, not programmers. The graphical interface hid the machine’s workings beneath icons and windows that felt intuitive, even magical. There was no prompt when you turned on the computer, no command line at all.

Arthur C. Clarke famously wrote that any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. Starting with the Mac (or more technically, the Lisa), Steve Jobs took that as a design brief. It succeeded by making you forget there was code underneath. The IBM PC and its clones kept a command line visible, but they were headed in the same direction. Soon, the machine had become a beige box you operated, not a system you controlled. For my part, I had no patience for abstract math and even less patience for Pascal, the highly formal programming language taught in computer science programs. When I got a Mac in 1990, I briefly tried programming it, but the process was so unfamiliar and complicated that I gave up. I’ve returned to programming every now and then—for example, I wrote some Python code to drive my installation Perkūnas—but I never embraced coding the way I had in high school. I’ve always felt that as a loss. I’ve enjoyed my career, but this was a path I didn’t take, a whole branch of life gone. Moreover, for me, being a coder wasn’t just being a nerd; it was wrapped up in the punk-rock ethos of hacking. No polished interface can substitute for that.

Last October, at a workshop at Camp in Aulus-les-Bains led by Matthew Olden, I got a glimpse of that feeling again. Matthew—who, along with the other instructors, Kathy Hinde and Carl Stone, I now count as a friend—is a musician and programmer who has spent 25 years developing his own generative music software and releasing it online. In 2004, his band won an award for best left-field electronic act; the judges didn’t realize the tracks were generated by algorithms. At camp, the class he taught was on “vibe coding”: describing what you want in a prompt and letting an AI write the code for you. My interest was in programming Arduinos, which I had never done before, and within a day or two, using Claude Sonnet 3.5 and ChatGPT 4o, I was able to recreate the code for Perkūnas on the Arduino-like ESP32. Not bad, I thought.

When I got back to the US, I had a pressing need for a WordPress plug-in for my website so I could search for and export selected posts to text files. I used vibe coding to put one together. It brought down a staging version of my site a couple of times while I was debugging, but overall, it worked and has continued to work flawlessly for the last year. But more advanced projects were beyond vibe coding’s reach. I wasted much of November trying to get an ESP32 to handle another project for a biennale, but it turned out to be impossible because the hardware doesn’t support host-mode audio over USB. Both ChatGPT 4o and Claude Sonnet 3.5 deceived me, falsely claiming to have looked up and read online documentation, getting into death loops, and offering the same solutions over and over. I gave up on vibe coding and focused on working collaboratively with AIs on artistic work, a project that became Fables of Acceleration. 

About two weeks ago, I noticed increased chatter on social media about how well Claude Code, an AI coding tool from Anthropic, works with the new Opus 4.5 model. I tried an experiment: create a version of Spectre, a desktop tank combat game I remembered from the early 1990s, written in JavaScript so it could run in a browser. The result was primitive, but after half an hour of coding and tweaking, it clearly worked.

The most common critique of AI coding is that it merely regurgitates existing content. This critique is itself regurgitated so reflexively, in such identical phrasing, that one wonders if the critics have considered the irony. Still, I thought it best to challenge the AI to reimagine that game as a 3D wireframe car shooter set on the Los Angeles freeway system. It worked immediately. I spent a day doing other things—writing, answering email, cleaning the studio, training Ajman the cat to do new tricks—checking in occasionally to offer feedback, never once touching the code myself. By the end of the day, I had a browser-based game I called Sig Alert, after the California Highway Patrol’s term for a traffic incident blocking lanes for thirty minutes or more. The game is a throwback to my experience living in LA between 1995 and 2005. Other drivers, gripped by road rage, are shooting at you; you shoot back. But there are civilians too, and if you hit too many of them, the police begin chasing you. Falling Down as a video game. If you kill more than ten civilians, the game announces “make mine animal style!”—a reference to In-N-Out Burger’s secret menu—at which point everyone starts shooting at you, and you gain points from shooting everyone. I had Claude generate an 8-bit chiptune soundtrack inspired by Throbbing Gristle, Chris & Cosey, and Pink Floyd’s “On the Run,” while Google Nano Banana Pro produced a splash screen featuring my 1983 Saab. The game is deliberately rough since roughness is part of the aesthetic. Jen thinks a game about shooting others on the freeway is immoral. She’s not wrong.

A throwback cover and splash screen featuring my 1983 Saab 900S in the manner of a 1990s game cover for Sig Alert. That’s not me; I would never have worn a bandana around my head.

But my kid, now in a game program at NYU, is going to be the game developer, not me. Sig Alert was just proof that vibe coding could work better now. I have a few art projects underway, and when those find a home, I’ll be glad to show them online. But I was also curious about just how far this could go. I decided to take up some old software that had fallen by the wayside, so I went to GitHub—the platform where most open-source software now lives, a combination of code repository and social network for programmers that has become the de facto infrastructure of collaborative development. I started with JPEGDeux, a simple Mac slideshow program that was itself a revival of JPEGView, a beloved piece of postcardware first released in 1991 when Macs ran on Motorola 68000 processors. When that was no longer viable, the JPEGDeux fork allowed the program to run on OS X, first on PowerPC and later on Intel Macs. Now, with a fourth chipset, Apple Silicon, Jpegview was finally orphaned. I had asked both Claude and ChatGPT to rebuild it last year, and while they had some success, there were fundamental issues we never got past, notably, images did not scale to the full size of a window. The result felt like it was badly written by AI, because it was. This time, I used Claude Code Opus 4.5 directly on a GitHub fork (a copy of the code I cloned into my own GitHub repository), and within a few tries, had it running as well as it ever had. I added the ability to display videos, a file picker, and other enhancements in an afternoon. You can download the latest release here.  

But this was still small beer. About ten days ago, I caught a cold, and it brought me down for about a week. When I’m sick, my brain is off as far as high-level processes like writing go, and even reading is no fun, but vibe coding was just my speed and surely better than doom scrolling. I thought about what the single most useful application would be for my own workflow. I often get poorly scanned PDFs of publications, and the downloadable, public-domain books on Google Books usually leave a lot to be desired. In the past, I used a program called ScanTailor for processing, but the workflow was clunky. It couldn’t take a PDF or export one after it was finished; it worked on a directory of images, and that’s all it could output. Each run required substantial tweaking, and if the white balance was off, I’d need to go into Lightroom to fix the pages. Cleaning up a book often took more than an hour. Moreover, it’s hard to find a version that runs on Apple Silicon, and since updates are by volunteers, they are sporadic at best. Even the complexity of running it was daunting. When a new version was released, I often had to go through a complex series of steps to build it from source code. Frequently, that failed, and I didn’t know why.

Over the past week, I forked ScanTailor and substantially modernized it. I added PDF import and export—features I had long wished for—and updated it to run on Silicon Macs, taking advantage of new frameworks that exploit these chips’ capabilities. I redesigned the interface and added algorithms to determine whether each page should be black-and-white, grayscale, or color, while keeping file sizes as small as possible. Now you give it a PDF and get a PDF back, often with no tweaking. What used to take me an hour takes minutes. I decided to get an Apple Developer Account so I could distribute releases as .dmg files, so anybody with a Mac could download and install the program. I’d be delighted if you could try it and share your feedback.

Clearly, the AI did not do this autonomously; I directed it, reviewed its work, and caught its errors. Errors are relatively frequent, but not a roadblock. I’m not a C++ programmer, but I have a sense for code from my early days and would likely have introduced just as many bugs myself—maybe more. Most critically, what would take a good programmer weeks takes an AI mere hours. Even better, as you learn how it works, you can run multiple instances at once.

Strange Weather, my first module for VCVRack

As I got better at using Claude Code and became more familiar with GitHub, I started other projects. I made Strange Weather, a module for the VCVRack music synthesis platform that generates modulation voltages from four different strange attractors. Last night, I began working on an iPhone app that turns ambient sounds into generative audio pieces, much like the late, lamented RJDJ did. And I have a portfolio/slideshow program for iPad in the works.

For the first time since the 1980s, I feel like I can do whatever I want—imagination is my only limit. Vibe coding is a bit like being a wizard, casting spells that make things happen. It’s also a bit like being a hacker, tinkering with a system you don’t fully understand. I have buried the lede in this story, but vibe coding is the single biggest transformation since ChatGPT 3.5; it is one of the biggest since the dawn of computing. Let me be clear: someone with a good sense of how tech works but very little modern coding knowledge can, within a few days, write pretty much any program they want, save for a AAA game. An age in which every mildly tech-savvy person has their own personal suite of programs is upon us.

There’s an irony here. I argued earlier that the Mac took Clarke’s dictum about technology being indistinguishable from magic as a design brief, and that this was a kind of disenfranchisement: the code was hidden, the user reduced to operator. Now the magic has flipped. Instead of consuming software I can’t see inside, I am producing software, even if I don’t know how it’s created or what is in the code.

But I have anxieties about sharing this work, even with you, Internet friends. There is a lot of hatred of AI out there. And since I don’t know the code, I don’t see how it will break things. What would the original contributors think? I doubt the current maintainers of ScanTailor would ever want to merge my changes back into their version, nor would I advise them to do so. AIs, for now, often produce tangled “spaghetti” code, though I suspect this will improve dramatically over the next couple of years. But this brings us to the problem at the heart of this essay: the culture of open source and the transformation it will face in the very near future.

There is a vast landscape of open-source software on GitHub, millions of repositories, and it is literally what the internet runs on. The browser you’re reading this in—Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge—is built on open-source code. So is Android. So are the servers that delivered this page to you, the databases that store your email, and the encryption that protects your passwords. cURL, a tool for transferring data that most people have never heard of, is embedded in billions of devices: cars, televisions, phones, and game consoles. A tiny utility called Log4j was running on millions of systems when a critical vulnerability emerged in 2021; the maintainers, who were volunteers, were blamed for the crisis.  

This leads us to the “commons.” The term comes from an old debate in economics. In 1968, Garrett Hardin argued that shared resources—such as common grazing lands, fisheries, and forests—were doomed to destruction. Each farmer benefits from adding one more cow to the pasture, but if everyone does, the pasture is destroyed. The ‘tragedy of the commons’ became an argument for privatization: only ownership creates the incentive to preserve. Elinor Ostrom spent her career proving Hardin wrong. Studying Swiss alpine meadows, she showed that commons could be sustainably managed without privatization, but only with careful governance: clear boundaries, shared rules, monitoring, and sanctions for violations. She won a Nobel Prize for this work in 2009.

Open source was supposed to be a new kind of commons, escaping the tragedy entirely. In contrast to earlier forms of Commons, my use doesn’t diminish anyone else’s. But this model didn’t acknowledge that the scarce resource isn’t the code—it’s the effort of project maintainers. The tragedy of the digital commons is not overuse but abandonment: projects that rot when no one tends them, vulnerabilities that fester, dependencies that break. The xkcd comic about all modern digital infrastructure resting on “a project some random person in Nebraska has been thanklessly maintaining since 2003” is barely a joke.

xkcd, “Dependency,” licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License.

Most of those millions of repositories are dormant. Many never got anywhere in the first place. Still, there are those in which maintainers burn out, find other jobs, have children, or lose interest, leaving behind code that is freely licensed, fully documented (or at least commented), and with its complete history of changes preserved in version control. Anyone is legally permitted to copy it, modify it, or redistribute it.  And yet, until recently, this permission was largely theoretical. For most people, the freedom to change code that you cannot understand is not practical. It is like being granted access to a library in a language you do not speak.

Most projects die when their maintainer walks away. Others grow large enough to develop their own kind of inaccessibility—and then die anyway. This is, perhaps, an even greater tragedy. Again, personal experience is the best way for me to describe this. In 2005, I evaluated three competing content management systems (CMS) for my website—WordPress, Joomla, and Drupal. All had been released in the previous few years, and initially, they were competitive in terms of market share. Joomla was the most popular system in Europe and, for a time, the most popular CMS globally, but it was too complicated and clunky for me. WordPress was primarily a blogging platform at the time, and I wanted to run a full website, so I settled on Drupal. I used Drupal for 13 years and grew to increasingly hate it and, sadly, dislike the community that ran it. It comprised some seven hundred thousand lines of code, organized into subsystems so intricate that no single developer could understand the whole. To become even minimally proficient—not to master it, to work competently within it—requires years. Every time Drupal had a major update—usually every two years—my site would completely break, and the more features I tried to add, the longer it would take to repair. My site’s layout had to be coded in PHP; the design was increasingly complex, but the leaders of the Drupal community insisted it was better for everyone. Nor could you sit still. As new updates rolled out, older versions were abandoned by the community and, lacking new security updates, became vulnerable to exploits. Learning how to update a Drupal site wasn’t easy. The community wasn’t welcoming to people who didn’t contribute, and contributing was hard if you weren’t already part of it. After Drupal released its eighth update, I was done with it. My friends who had developed sites with it were also glad to be rid of it. Joomla, I am told, had a similar trajectory. Today, WordPress powers over 40% of all websites on the Internet; Drupal and Joomla, which were genuine competitors when I made my choice, have collapsed to a combined 3% of the CMS market and are still falling.

In calling the Drupal community unwelcome, I don’t mean to pick on it exclusively. I found this characteristic of open source culture. It seems paradoxical that something based on free, shared labor, something ostensibly outside of the capitalist system, would not welcome newcomers, but there are always structural reasons for cultures to evolve the way they do; you just have to look deeply enough. In the early days of shared computing, systems were fragile and resources scarce; a single careless user could quickly bring down a university machine. System administrators who kept these systems running adopted a defensive posture that soon turned into the “Bastard Operator From Hell”—a satirical figure from early-nineties Usenet—and embodied the archetype of the sysadmin who treated users as “lusers,” sabotaged their work, hoarded knowledge, and enforced arbitrary rules with sadistic pleasure. The satire was all too recognizable. The culture that emerged—the hazing, the gatekeeping, the suspicion of anyone who hadn’t paid their dues soon became constitutive of identity. Those who survived such a hazing themselves became invested in preserving difficulty as a mark of distinction.  A recent blog post by Colin M. Strickland on Perl’s decline offers a case study: the language had a “significant amount of … ‘BOFH’ culture, which came from its old UNIX sysadmin roots” as well as “Perl IRC and mailing lists [that] were quite cliquey and full of venerated experts and in-jokes, rough on naivety, keen on robust, verbose debate, and a little suspicious of newcomers.” As Ostrom concluded, successful commons need boundaries, rules, and monitoring. The hazing ensured that anyone modifying the commons understood what they were doing. The problem is that governance became identity, and the gates became ends in themselves.

Of course, one could always fork the open source code and develop one’s own version, independent of the community. But in practice, forking was not easy. You inherited the full complexity of the codebase, the technical debt, and the implicit knowledge held only by the maintainers. Successful forks were rare, usually occurring only when a community was large enough to sustain parallel development—LibreOffice splitting from OpenOffice, Illumos from OpenSolaris. For a single user who wanted one thing to work differently, forking was not realistic.

With AI, the technical details of forking are shifting. These days, anyone can make changes to code—even individuals who wouldn’t have dreamed of trying before. You don’t need to understand the codebase anymore or even the programming language it is written in. As long as you know what you want to change, AI can help you figure out the rest. That’s how I ended up rethinking ScanTailor and JPEGDeux.

But with this new freedom comes tension. On one side are the maintainers—people who have quietly kept projects running for years, sometimes decades. They earned their place by wrestling with complexity, pushing through the hard parts, and picking up knowledge that most never see. On the other side are users, now able to fork a project, make changes, or bring abandoned code back to life without any long apprenticeship or gatekeeping. These two groups are on a collision course.

I’ve come up with three possible outcomes; no doubt there are others. One is fragmentation: everyone keeps their own idiosyncratic forks, and improvements rarely make it back to the main project. In the past, the hassle and cost of splitting off would eventually lead successful forks to be merged into the parent repositories. But if AI lowers those costs, that pull toward the center weakens. A thousand flowers will bloom, but they won’t cross-pollinate. Another, albeit unlikely, possibility is relief for maintainers: users who used to send feature requests and bug reports now handle their own issues, reducing the burden on exhausted volunteers. And then there’s the bleakest option, at least for the idea of an open source community: maintainers get bypassed entirely, ignored by the vibe coders. The gate is still there, but nobody bothers with it. The years of volunteer work, the careful tending of a codebase, the hard-won knowledge—suddenly, none of it matters to someone who walks around it.

I don’t know which of these futures will win out, or if we’ll see all of them, depending on the project and the community. But I do know that the scale of this shift is massive. In the 1970s and early ’80s, personal computers made it possible for regular people to own and use a computer without going through institutions. In the 1990s, open source made it possible for anyone to read, copy, and modify code. But actually doing that still required skills most people didn’t have. The legal freedom was there, but the practical freedom wasn’t—and that gap stuck around for almost forty years. Now, AI coding tools close that gap. Suddenly, the end user can modify software. This is not a mere boost in programmer productivity—it is a fundamental shift in who gets to participate.

If the barrier to modifying software falls due to AI, the consequences for the open source community are vast. It seems unlikely that it will survive in its current form, but what will replace it is entirely unclear to me. To return to the question that is the title of this essay: what did vibe coding just do to the digital commons?

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On Robert A. M. Stern (1939-2025)

I was saddened to hear that Robert A. M. Stern passed away on Thanksgiving. I had the privilege of working with Bob on The Philip Johnson Tapes. Those aren’t idle words: it truly was a privilege.

Robert Stern and myself, with martinis.

I first met Bob at the Philip Johnson symposium at Yale. I was rather surprised he had invited me, as I had been quite critical of his role in recuperating Johnson in the early 1970s, but that was the thing about Bob. He didn’t mind intelligent arguments; he hated stupidity. In contrast, he didn’t invite Franz Schulze, whose biography he felt was too sensationalistic, too eager to pander for sales, and too simplistic in its treatment of the history. It was my first symposium in which I was treated as an equal with the top figures in the field. In no small measure, that invitation led me to my position as director of the Network Architecture Lab at Columbia’s Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation.

Soon after, Joan Ockman, director of the Buell Center, asked if I would be willing to work with Bob to edit a series of tapes in which Stern—who had been director of the Buell Center in the 1980s—attempted an oral history of Johnson’s life. I listened to the first two hours and wholeheartedly agreed. This was fascinating material. Little did I know that as the tapes progressed, Johnson’s cardiac condition was deteriorating and the conversation would fall apart toward the end. But Bob and I soldiered on. I would spend three weeks editing a section, send it to him, and he would turn it around that evening from his house in Montauk. Bob’s recall of historical facts was second to none. It seemed to me that he knew every architect who had ever practiced in the city. He was a brilliant mind, and I enjoyed that time very much.

The last time that Bob and I had a chance to spend much time together was at a public conversation about Johnson with the late Henry Urbach in 2012. Henry said that we would have martinis after the conversation. “Oh no,” Bob said, “we will have them during the conversation.” And so it was. I will raise a martini to his memory, as well as to Henry’s tonight. ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

The Lost Canals of Vilnius

This revision of the lost canals of Vilnius is finally done, at least for the moment. It has taken some two years of endlessly reworking of images and text to finish. Usually, this involved going down yet another real historical rabbit hole that needed to be added to add depth to the narrative. I will soon be posting a reflection on precisely why I undertook this piece, but for now, it’ll suffice to say it was inspired by my father calling Vilnius “the Venice of the North,” which is the sort of thing he was prone to saying.

Note that the citations are real and can be trusted.

This image is generated with the use of an AI
Augustinų Canal, Vilnius, c. 1912.
A narrow back lane pressed between the Augustinian monastery walls and the water, once an important service cut in the 17th-century canal network, by now reduced to a residential side channel that would disappear under postwar infill.

This is part of my Stochastic Histories series of counterfactual narratives.

In 1610, the Great Fire devastated Vilnius, capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The catastrophe arrived with the capricious logic of divine judgment: in eleven hours some 4,700 buildings were left in ashes, ten churches had fallen, most of the city’s civic structures were reduced to memory. Yet Vilnius has always been a restless city, ancient but constantly remade—burned, occupied, its churches converted to warehouses and back to churches, buildings falling into ruin and rising back again, like a filmstrip played back and forth. In this perpetual remaking, it is not unlike other cities that exist in the imagination as much as in physical form. In this reincarnation, Vilnius would emerge from its ashes reimagined—a landlocked capital transformed into a city of canals.

At the time of the fire, Vilnius served as both an administrative center and a critical trade hub—connecting the Hanseatic cities to the north and west, Russia to the east, and the Ottoman Empire to the south. The city was also a cultural center, particularly after the establishment of the Academia et Universitas Vilnensis Societatis Iesu in 1579, which served as a crucial center of counter-reformation thought and learning in Eastern Europe. Yet like many cities of its time, wood construction rendered it highly vulnerable to fire. Vilnius had already suffered several significant blazes, notably in 1530. The medieval street layout, with its narrow, winding alleys and densely packed buildings, offered little in the way of firebreaks, allowing flames to spread rapidly from one structure to the next.

But in early 17th century Vilnius, the threat of fire seemed to be as much doctrinal as physical. The diverse religious landscape, including Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Protestants, and Jews, created an atmosphere of suspicion and unease. The ruling Catholic authorities viewed the Protestant “heretics” with particular concern. This theological divide heightened anxieties about potential disasters, especially fire, seen not just as a physical threat, but also as a possible divine punishment. Alessandro Cilli, an Italian priest at the royal court, captured this tense atmosphere in his account:

Given such a situation and the great dissatisfaction of heretics and schismatics, the citizens of Vilnius, who were entrusted by the Queen’s order to take care of the city along with […] other lords constantly present in the city, due to fear and suspicions that some unrest and riots might arise, and especially fearing a possible fire, carefully monitored that sectarians would not gather in the city […]. Therefore […] the citizens would send three companies of soldiers to patrol the city at night. Under threat of severe punishments, a general order was issued to mind the fire and for everyone to have and keep various vessels and tubs full of water in their homes.

While Cilli’s pro-Catholic bias colors his narrative, his account vividly illustrates how doctrinal disputes and the fear of fire became inextricably linked. The conflation of religious dissent with the risk of conflagration led to a system of surveillance and control that blurred the lines between fire prevention and religious persecution. In Vilnius, flames were not just a physical but also a theological threat, each spark a potential harbinger of both earthly catastrophe and divine judgement.

This image is generated with the use of an AI
Magnum Incendium Vilnae, anonymous broadsheet, c. 1610–1611.
Allegorical view of the great fire of Vilnius, with the city engulfed in flames ridden by demons, a staring solar face witnessing the catastrophe from above, and a griffin-like beast unfurling the scroll that names the disaster.

The doctrinal anxiety gripping Vilnius in 1610 was not an isolated phenomenon of a provincial town, but rather part of a broader pattern at the time of the Reformation. Catholics and Protestants frequently employed fire imagery in their rhetoric against each other. From Martin Luther’s symbolic burning of the papal bull that excommunicated him to the fiery stakes of martyrdom on both sides, flame served as both metaphor and method. When the Great Fire of London erupted half a century later in 1666, similar suspicions ignited: convinced of a Popish plot, mobs attacked Catholics in the street. A plaque erected in 1681 proclaimed “Here, by the permission of Heaven, Hell broke loose upon this Protestant City, from the malicious Hearts of barbarous Papists, by the hand of their agent Hubert,” blaming one Robert Hubert, a Frenchman suspected of arson motivated by his faith. In Vilnius, the situation inverted—Catholics blamed the Protestants—but the mechanism was identical. Fire became a screen onto which each side projected its deepest fears about the other.

Cilli’s account continues with an almost unbearable, mounting dread.

We were so frightened by this that for the slightest reason, it seemed we could already hear shouts of fire breaking out, so we would carry our possessions, well-packed in boxes and chests and locked, to hide them in the safest places. Since most houses, or at least their interior spaces, were built of wood, we constantly lived in fear due to the aforementioned fire hazard, adhering to the usual precautions and reciting prayers assigned by the prelate for this purpose.

Other Catholic authors like the Austrian Jesuit Quirinus Cnogler (Knogler) also portrayed Protestants as a source of divine displeasure, implying that their presence invited God’s wrath upon the city. In such an atmosphere, the blaze was not only inevitable, it was fully expected. For Cilli, it almost seems a relief when the fire came.

Finally, ‘on the morning of the last day of June,’ the fire did break out. The all-consuming fire forced the city’s inhabitants and Her Royal Highness herself to flee, leaving them only to watch the spectacle of the flames’ fury from the surrounding hills as if spectators of some great theatre watching a tragedy unfold.

The exact location where the blaze started is unclear. Some sources say it started in the courtyard of the Franciscan monastery, although the priest Cilli located the source in a baker’s house. The city’s firefighting capabilities, like those of all cities at the time, were limited to bucket brigades and rudimentary tools. Fanned by fierce winds and fueled by the abundance of wooden structures, the fire tore through Vilnius with terrifying speed. Contemporary accounts describe a sea of flames engulfing entire neighborhoods, leaping from rooftop to rooftop.

Over eleven hours, the fire consumed much of the city. Thousands were left homeless. If, as Cilli claimed, this was divine retribution, then God was especially cross with the Orders: Franciscans, Dominicans, Bernardines, and Carmelites all lost everything. Even structures of stone and brick, which might have withstood a lesser blaze, succumbed to the intense heat. The Jesuit college and St. John’s Church, the papal seminary, its libraries, archives, and student dormitories were destroyed. God seemed indifferent to schism: the Holy Trinity, St. Stanislaus, and Mary Magdalene churches, as well as Lutheran, Evangelical, and Russian Orthodox churches and monasteries all fell victim to the flames. The Cathedral burned, although the shrine of the recently canonized Saint Casimir was miraculously spared. The Lower Castle and Town Hall were heavily damaged. Eyewitness accounts speak of the sky darkened by smoke, the air filled with the cries of the injured and bereaved, and the streets choked with fleeing residents and their meager salvaged belongings.

The inferno raged until three in the afternoon when an intense downpour began. Water flooded the streets like rivers. Residents who had fled to the surrounding fields and hills returned when the rain started, hoping it would extinguish any remaining fires. The human toll was severe, with many of those who did not perish in the flames drowning in the flooding, particularly on Pilies Gatvė, where the sudden rainfall created rushing torrents, a cruel irony after eleven hours of fire. Thousands were left homeless, their possessions and livelihoods gone forever.

In the immediate aftermath, the city struggled to cope with the scale of the disaster. Temporary shelters were hastily erected in the less affected areas and in the surrounding countryside. Many fled to family elsewhere; students from the Jesuit academy dispersed. The economic impact was immediate and severe, with trade grinding to a halt and the city’s artisans and merchants left destitute.

The annual letter of the Jesuits described the situation.

And since the most illustrious Queen with all her household retreated, and the senators and other courtiers, with their guest houses burned down, the townspeople, having lost their homes, moved to the suburbs, all the students went to their parents, and the craftsmen moved to other towns to establish their businesses elsewhere, the previously exceptionally prosperous city became very empty, with barely a person to be seen, sheltering from the weather’s hardships either by the ovens or in hastily built shelters in the corners of walls. However, some of them were punished for their carelessness when the walls collapsed afterward – in one house, seven people were immediately crushed by the rubble, and in others – about 20 people. Fear and great terror also took hold. For there was a rumor that a considerable group of robbers had gathered nearby, wanting to invade the city left open after the gates had burned down, and to break into and loot the cellars, which were then expected to be filled with things saved from the fire and completely unguarded. Because of this, there was trembling with fear for many days, soldiers were hired for the city treasury money, night guards were employed, cannons were fired and other things were done to instill fear [and deter].1

Yet it was the manner of the fire’s ending that would shape Vilnius’s future. The torrential rains that finally quenched the flames had transformed streets into rushing rivers. On Pilies Gatvė, where the sudden rainfall created torrents powerful enough to drown those who had survived the inferno, water carved new channels through the ash and rubble. Observing these improvised waterways, Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila ‘Našlaitėlis’, the Grand Marshal of Lithuania and Voivode of Trakai, responsible for maintaining the order and security of the Grand Duchy, noted how they prevented the fire’s return—where water flowed, no ember could reignite.

Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila ‘Našlaitėlis’, from Jacob Schrenck von Notzing, Armamentarium Heroicum (Innsbruck: 1601, but this is from the Nurenberg 1735 edition, found at http://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?PPN662525515).

Radvila advanced an unexpected proposal: to rebuild the city around canals. His recent pilgrimage (1582-1584) had taken him through Venice, where he spent four months studying the city’s maritime infrastructure while preparing for his journey to Jerusalem. In Damascus, he stood on a mountain and looked down on the city to observe how the Abana and Pharpar rivers irrigated it, flowing down to create what he called “an elegant, pleasant, and highly fruitful plain” surrounded by beautiful gardens. In Cairo, he witnessed the fath al-khalij, the grand ceremony of the Nile’s opening, where Imbraim Bassa, the Ottoman Wāli, ceremonially breached the dykes to flood the city’s canals after months when the water had been reserved for agricultural irrigation. As Radvila recorded in his chronicle of the journey, Hierosolymitana Peregrinatio, “the whole area looked covered in snow because of the white turbans” of the watching multitude—an entire city gathered to celebrate water’s return.2

But Radvila’s vision was not mere fantasy inspired by foreign travels. His cousin Kristupas Radvila “Perkūnas,” before his death in 1603, had recruited Scottish settlers to Kėdainiai, offering them land and protection in exchange for developing his estates. Though Našlaitėlis did not share Perkūnas’s Protestant faith—he had converted to Catholicism decades earlier and become one of the Counter-Reformation’s most generous patrons—he recognized the practical value of these existing networks. The Scots had proven themselves throughout the Commonwealth as masons, engineers, and builders. Where others saw only destruction in Vilnius’s ruins, Radvila saw opportunity: a massive public works project that could employ Scottish subsistence migrants seeking any labor, alongside their skilled countrymen already working across Lithuanian territories, while transforming the city into something unprecedented.

The Storm at Sea, An allegorical engraving depicting the dangerous storm Radvila survived during his return voyage from Egypt to Europe, from Hierosolymitana Peregrinatio, (Antwerp: Ex Officina Plantiniana (Plantin-Moretus), 1614), p 221.
Attributed to the Galle workshop (likely Theodoor Galle), typical of the Plantin press’s output during this period.

When Radvila presented his canal plans to an extraordinary meeting of the Panų Taryba, the Lithuanian Council of Lords, in September 1610, reactions split predictably. Some grasped the potential immediately—faster freight, fire protection, direct water access to warehouses. More conservative voices balked at costs already stretched by war taxes. The clergy worried about parish boundaries. “Let him spend his own fortune on his Venetian dreams,” one magnate reportedly said. Nevertheless, Radvila used his authority as Grand Marshal to argue that the canal system was essential infrastructure to prevent future catastrophes. The nobility approved his proposal—the alternative was a capital in permanent ruins. King Sigismund III Vasa, preoccupied with waging war with Russia, rubber-stamped the Lithuanian lords’ decision.

It has been a matter of debate as to how much Radvila understood that his project was as much an act of restoration as a feat of imagination. The city that burned in 1610 had been built upon an intricate hydrographic system, portions of which remained in active use and living memory.

The most significant of these was the Vingrių system. The Vingrių šaltiniai—springs emerging west of the city—had supplied Vilnius with water since at least the fourteenth century. Originally municipal property, the springs passed through various ecclesiastical hands before the city repurchased them from the Dominicans in 1536, paying one hundred kapų of Lithuanian groschen and ten pūdai of pepper. The sale document explicitly transferred not merely the springs themselves but “the bed and water flowing from it and the canals” (una cum alveo et aqua ex indě fluenti et canalibus)—confirming that engineered channels already distributed this water through the city.4 The Vingrių upokšnis carved a clear ravine along what would become Pylimo and Liejyklos streets, entering the Vilija near the Totorių vartai, the gates that took their name from the Tatar settlement Vytautas had established nearby.5

The Vilnelė itself had followed a different course in earlier centuries. The nineteenth-century historian Michał Baliński, drawing on chronicles and local memory, recorded that the river once flowed through what became Pilies gatvė, past the old Rokitai monastery ruins and the Pilies vartai, through the mažasis turgus before looping around the castle territory to join the Vilija behind the cathedral. The current confluence point, he noted, was itself the product of engineering: a perkasa—a moat or canal—dug during Gediminas’s reign to raise the castle hill and ensure “both fortresses would be washed by waters.”6 Smaller watercourses threaded through the urban territory—the Druja emerging near Žiupronys, the streams feeding the episcopal mill—some already partially channeled by 1610.

Recent geological investigation has revealed that this documented infrastructure overlay a still older hydrographic system. Five gravel corridors, carved by seasonal water flows, determined the routes of Vilnius’s principal streets from the medieval period. The first corridor ran from Bazilijonų street to the intersection of Didžioji and Etmonų, forming the base of the Medininkai road. The second stretched from Rūdninkų and Ligoninės past Visų Šventųjų along Mėsinių to Rotušės Square. The third ran north along Pilies towards Cathedral Square—the same route the old Vilnelė channel had followed. The fourth paralleled Universiteto from Gaono and Švarco. The fifth followed Dominikonų toward Stiklių.7

The correspondence between these geological findings and the documented historical waterways suggests that the city’s planners had long worked within constraints set by water. Whether Radvila consciously understood the full depth of this water-shaped landscape remains uncertain. But the active springs, the functioning channels, the living memory of floods and firefighting failures—these he could not have ignored. The devastating fires of 1513 and 1530 had already demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing water infrastructure, prompting Žygimantas Senasis (Sigismund I the Old) to invest heavily in expanding the Vingrių pipe system precisely because the parts of the city furthest from the river lacked water for firefighting.8 The 1610 conflagration repeated this lesson on a larger scale.

Regardless how deeply he grasped the city’s origins in water, Radvila could hardly have been ignorant of Amsterdam’s escalating urban crisis and the radical solutions being debated to address it. Since 1585, when Antwerp’s fall sent refugees flooding north, Amsterdam had undertaken two expansions that proved inadequate. By the early 1600s, the city was drowning in informal settlements spreading outside its walls—a “frenzy of illegal construction” that administrators struggled to control. The debates about how to manage this crisis circulated through the networks in which the Radvilos were embedded: the commercial ties to Dutch ports through the Hanseatic League, the Reformed Protestant communities centered on Amsterdam, and the publishing relationships that would see his own travel account reissued there in 1614. Several family members studied at Dutch universities and traveled extensively through the Netherlands. For a magnate overseeing the reconstruction of a major city after catastrophic fire, intelligence about Amsterdam’s struggles and proposed solutions would have been not merely available but essential.

In February 1610, as Vilnius still smoldered, Amsterdam’s council debated multiple maps “concerning the enlargement and extension of this town.” What followed was not triumph but compromise: scandals stalled the project, the original plan was discarded, and by March 1613 the grand vision had been cut in half. The Herengracht, Keizersgracht, and Prinsengracht would proceed only on the western side, leaving complex problems passed on to the next generation. Yet even this truncated ambition was unprecedented—systematizing Amsterdam’s existing medieval canal network into concentric rings that would eventually triple the city’s area.9

The timing of Radvila’s intervention thus paralleled Amsterdam’s not as imitation but as parallel response to similar crises of urban transformation. Where Amsterdam expanded outward through water, Vilnius would transform inward—replacing its burned medieval core rather than abandoning it. In accomplishing this, Vilnius would achieve something distinct: not the creation of new navigable waterways like Amsterdam, nor existence on water by necessity like Venice, but the resurrection of a city through deliberate engagement with its hidden hydrology—the ancient water-carved corridors that had shaped its streets since the fourteenth century, now channeled and rationalized as an act of will.

By late September 1610, Radvila had dispatched agents to Venice, carrying letters of credit and promises of wealth. The team that arrived in frozen January 1611 was led by Giovanni Battista Aleotti, fresh from completing the drainage works at Ferrara, and Pietro Paolo Floriani, a military engineer who had been fortifying the Papal States. The Italians spent the frozen months walking the ice-covered ruins, taking measurements, arguing over gradients. Aleotti insisted they must wait for the spring thaw to properly test the water table—in Venice, he said, impatience with water meant catastrophe.

The groundbreaking ceremony on May 15, 1611—nearly a year after the fire—was deliberately theatrical. Radvila understood the symbolic weight of the moment. The Bishop of Vilnius blessed the works while standing knee-deep in the muddy excavation that would become the first canal, though privately he had expressed concerns about the project’s disruption to traditional parish life. As the first channel was cut, Radvila spoke of a new era—safety, prosperity, and magnificenza. Italian engineers directed workers in a babel of languages, with hand gestures filling the gaps where words failed.

Tomasz Makowski, “Workforce Assembling in Rotušes Aikšte,” 1618.

The only surviving leaf from the magistracy’s lost folio Darby ir Prievolės Miesto Gerovei. Makowski shows laborers gathering at the canal excavation in the square, merchants opening their stalls behind them. Note the remains of the Gothic town hall, heavily damaged by the fire. It would be completley rebuilt. The rest of the folio was destroyed in 1655; this sheet survived, but was lost in a legal register, rediscovered only in the 2010s.

The workforce itself was unprecedented in Lithuanian history. Through his Protestant networks, Radvila had assembled nearly eight hundred Scotish migrants. They came in two distinct waves. The first consisted of “subsistence migrants”—young men and boys fleeing Scottish famines and poverty, willing to dig for bread and shelter. These formed the project’s muscle, wielding shovels and hauling earth under the Baltic sun. The second wave brought “betterment migrants”—skilled craftsmen who had already established themselves in Polish and Lithuanian towns as masons, carpenters, wheelwrights, and builders. These men became the project’s skeleton, translating the Italian engineers’ visions into Baltic reality, managing work crews, and solving the thousand daily problems that arose when Mediterranean engineering met Lithuanian mud. The Scots immediately formed the Scottish Brotherhood of Vilnius (Škotų Brolija Vilniuje), negotiating collectively with both Radvila’s agents and the Italian engineers.

Tensions emerged immediately. Lithuanian laborers, often unemployed due to the loss of their workplaces in the fire, who had expected to profit from reconstruction work found themselves competing with foreign workers. The scheduling disputes proved particularly bitter—the Scots insisted on strict Sabbath observance, refusing all work on Sundays, while Lithuanian workers expected Catholic feast days to be honored. The result was a construction site where different crews operated on different calendars, with the Italian engineers growing increasingly frustrated at work stoppages that seemed to alternate between Presbyterian and Catholic observances. Aleotti, accustomed to managing unified Ferrarese work crews, found himself mediating between Scottish elders conducting meetings in incomprehensible Scots and Lithuanian guild masters citing saints’ days unknown in the Reformed calendar. The technical challenges quickly validated skeptics’ worst fears. Where engineers expected clay, sandy soil collapsed, requiring expensive shoring. Where maps showed alluvium, bedrock appeared, necessitating costly blasting. The Italian engineers found themselves adapting their Mediterranean techniques to Baltic conditions in ways they hadn’t anticipated.

The summer rains of 1612 turned construction sites into muddy lakes that seemed to confirm critics’ predictions. Workers drowned in sudden cave-ins. Yet by autumn, the first two canals were operational—Pilies (Castle) kanalas, following roughly the path of what had been the main street from the university toward the cathedral site (now Pilies Gatvė), and Katedros (Cathedral) kanalas, cutting a new path between the Vilnelė and the Neris, starting near Šv. Onos and Šv. Pranciškaus ir Šv. Bernardino bažnyčia (Saint Anne’s and St. Francis of Assisi and St. Bernardine), brick Gothic Franciscan churches that miraculously survived the fire unscathed (along what is now Maironio gatvė), skirting around Gedimino kalnas and curving past the cathedral (following the present-day Šventaragio gatvė), before joining the Neris roughly where Mindaugo tiltas (bridge) stands today. The fire-damaged lower castle and cathedral district—as much a pile of rubble as anything else—was now linked to Paupys and Užupis through the Pilies and Katedros canals. The sight of boats gliding where carts had once rattled—or where no street had existed before—provided powerful vindication for Radvila’s vision.

The winter of 1612–1613 brought the harshest freeze in memory, bursting partially laid mechanisms and splitting imported stone. Critics in the Sejm demanded accounting for the spiraling costs. Spring 1613’s thaw brought catastrophe: embankments collapsed, flooding lower neighborhoods with muddy canal water. By summer 1613, costs had tripled from initial projections. Two junior Italian engineers fled back to Venice rather than face another Baltic winter. Angry citizens petitioned King Sigismund III to halt the project entirely.

Radvila spent much of his personal fortune keeping the work alive, while also managing a careful propaganda campaign. When the Papal Nuncio Claudio Rangoni visited in late 1613, Radvila ensured he saw not the construction chaos but the completed sections. Rangoni wrote to Rome describing “dozens of boats passing where two years prior lay nothing but ash and ruin.” He noted with particular interest how the Lithuanian nobility—the very ones who had resisted the project—had now embraced the waterways with unexpected enthusiasm, commissioning elaborate barges decorated with family crests. The Sapiega family’s barge, featuring a gilded swan at its prow and requiring twelve oarsmen, became legendary for blocking smaller craft in the narrow residential canals.

The year 1613 also saw the publication of the celebrated Radvila (“Radziwiłł”) map of the Grand Duchy by Blaeu in Amsterdam—a project years in the making that established Tomasz Makowski’s reputation as the Commonwealth’s premier cartographer. With this achievement behind him and the first canals now operational, Makowski was commissioned to document the transformation of Vilnius itself. In 1614, Makowski produced his Lithuaniae Aquarum Tabula, signed with his characteristic “T. M. Pol. Geograph.” According to Radivla estate inventories later destroyed during the Swedish occupation of 1655, this lost map included a detailed inset titled Aquae Vilnenses, diagramming the completed canals to date: a cartographic manifesto for a city remade by water.

By then, the Scottish workforce had grown to nearly fifteen hundred, establishing their own quarter near the construction sites. Their Presbyterian services, conducted in wooden temporary churches, drew curious Lithuanian crowds. Rangoni’s letters betrayed deeper anxieties: “The heretics multiply,” he wrote, “and their industry in building these waterways cannot be separated from their industry in spreading their errors.”

Alessandro Cilli, the Jesuit observer, was more explicit in his concerns. Writing in 1614—the same year Makowski was depicting the triumph of the canal system—Cilli noted that the fire itself had been preceded by “great dissatisfaction of heretics and schismatics,” and now the city’s reconstruction had become their triumph. The Scottish Brotherhood had grown powerful enough to negotiate not just wages but religious concessions—the right to bury their dead according to their own rites, to maintain their own courts, and to be exempt from Catholic feast day observances.

The economics of the canal system developed its own logic. The initial funding came from an extraordinary tax on the nobility, justified by the protection the canals would offer their urban properties. But as the waterways became operational, new revenue streams emerged. Each boat passing through certain canals paid a toll. Warehouse spaces along the canals commanded premium rents. The Scottish Brotherhood, having learned the system intimately through building it, began operating their own transport services, undercutting the traditional Lithuanian carriers’ guild. A parallel economy had emerged along the waterways, with Scottish bankers providing credit, Scottish boats moving goods, and Scottish merchants establishing direct trade links to Gdańsk and Riga.

Marcin Zaleski (1796–1877), Totorių Street and Canal, looking in the direction of the Governor-General’s Palace (the former Bishop’s Palace and now Presidential Palace), c. 1846.

Radvila had died in 1616—his final months spent defending the project against accusations of bankrupting the Commonwealth for a dream—but the transformation he initiated continued to reshape the city. In the last part of the decade the system rapidly expanded into the residential and commercial quarters. The waterways had developed their own social geography. Vokiečių kanalas carved through the German merchants’ district, who quickly adapted their Hanseatic trading practices to water-based commerce. Along Totorių kanalas, the Tatar community—who had served the Grand Duchy as soldiers and tanners for two centuries—maintained their leather workshops, the canal providing essential water for their trade while efficiently carrying away the pungent waste. Žydų kanalas became the center of precious crafts, with Jewish goldsmiths and furriers operating workshops whose waste could be easily flushed away by the controlled current. Stiklių kanalas, true to its name, became the glassmakers’ domain, where furnaces backing onto the water had ready access to both sand deliveries and cooling basins. By year’s end, a network of smaller channels—Bokšto, Tekančio Vandens (the current passage called Skapo gatvė had that name until the end of the 18th century) and others—had transformed the old street grid into an aquatic maze. Even former skeptics conceded that the city was proposering from its new commercial infrastructure, served by merchant barges from the Neris that queued at dawn to deliver grain, timber, and salt.

The medical college at the university, initially skeptical of the canals’ health implications, published a treatise in 1618 noting unexpected benefits. The controlled water flow had indeed reduced disease compared to the open sewers of the old city. The fire of 1610 had destroyed not just buildings but also centuries of accumulated filth. The new canal system, with its engineered gradients and regular flushing, proved cleaner than what it replaced. Dr. Pranciškus Rautenbergas, the city physician, noted that cases of summer fever had decreased markedly since the canals’ completion, though he cautiously attributed this to “improved airs” rather than crediting the waterways directly.

The Protestant community’s influence continued to grow alongside the canals. By 1619, the Scottish Brotherhood operated not just transport services but also warehouses, taverns, and even a small shipyard in Paupys where they built specialized flat-bottomed boats designed for the shallow upper canals. They had established their own burial ground on a small island formed where two canals diverged—accessible only by water, it became a powerful symbol of their separate but integrated existence within the city. The Reformed Church they built there, modest wood construction compared to Vilnius’s baroque Catholic splendor, nevertheless drew congregations that included Lithuanian craftsmen attracted by services conducted in vernacular rather than Latin.

The Jesuits, watching this Protestant flowering with alarm, launched their own canal-based initiatives. They established the Floating Mission of St. Francis Xavier in 1618—a consecrated barge that moved through the waterways conducting masses, hearing confessions, and pointedly blessing the waters themselves. The mission’s archives record careful notes about how Scottish keepers might delay or expedite passage depending on sectarian sympathies. Father Albertas Vijūkas-Kojalavičius wrote extensively about the spiritual challenges of ministering to a “liquid parish” where congregants might attend mass by boat but disappear into the canal network before contributing to the collection plate.

The nobility’s adaptation to canal life evolved in unexpected directions. What began as competition in ornate barges developed into a complex aquatic protocol. The width of canals meant that when noble barges met, one had to yield by pulling to the side—but who yielded to whom? The Tribunal of the Grand Duchy was forced to issue regulations in 1619 establishing water precedence based on titles and offices. The resulting “Canal Code” became a subject of satire among Warsaw wits, who mocked the Lithuanian nobility for creating maritime law for inland waterways.

Yet the canals also democratized certain aspects of city life. On water, a merchant’s practical flat barge might make better speed than a magnate’s ornate vessel. Toll collectors who also regulated traffic showed theoretical deference to rank but practical favoritism to those who paid well and caused no trouble. Stories circulated of proud nobles forced to wait while grain barges passed, their protests met with Scottish shrugs about “essential maintenance” that coincidentally resolved once proper fees were paid.

The symbolism resonated deeply with citizens: Saint Christopher carrying the Christ child across water had been Vilnius’s emblem since 1330. Now the entire city had been transformed into a network of crossings. The motto on the city’s arms—Unitas, Justitia, Spes—seemed to speak directly to the completed project: unity in the collective effort of reconstruction, justice in the fair distribution of canal access, and hope for a city reborn from ashes through water.

By 1625, with the primary canal network complete, the extraordinary coalition that had rebuilt Vilnius began to dissolve. Aleotti returned to Ferrara that year, claiming the Lithuanian winters had ruined his joints. The Scottish Brotherhood, its construction contracts fulfilled, dispersed across multiple trajectories. The skilled craftsmen faced a choice: convert to Catholicism and join Vilnius’s guild system, or seek new projects elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Some prominent Scottish merchants—the Gordons, Forsyths, and Barclay families—had already converted and established themselves along the prime canal frontages, their surnames gradually lithuanianizing to Gordonas, Forsaitas, and Barklajus in municipal records. The subsistence migrants, young men who had arrived with nothing, departed with earnings for new ventures in Riga, Königsberg, or home to Scotland. By 1630, the Scottish Brotherhood’s meeting house had been sold to the Dominicans, and transport operations had passed entirely to local watermen. Floriani, now sole director of the works, oversaw this transition with characteristic pragmatism. Where Aleotti had been an artist demanding perfection, Floriani was an administrator who understood that the canal system’s survival depended not on foreign expertise but on integration with Vilnius’s existing social structures. He established formal apprenticeships for local boatmen, standardized maintenance procedures that could be managed by Lithuanian crews, and gradually replaced Italian technical terminology with Lithuanian equivalents. The city that emerged from this transition was neither the Venice that Radvila had imagined nor the old Vilnius that had burned, but something unprecedented: a Baltic canal city operated by its own citizens.

An 18th-century veduta attributed to Bernardo Bellotto
Showing the imagined Universiteto Canal with a gallery bridge and the tower of St. John’s idealized into a single white spire, a composite view that never quite existed in stone but defined how later generations pictured the canal university quarter.

By 1630, Vilnius had fully adapted to its aquatic transformation. The canal system that had been Radvila’s gamble and Aleotti’s experiment had become simply how the city functioned. Morning began with the sound of canal gates opening at dawn, releasing the night’s accumulation of cargo barges into the commercial districts. Morning markets operated directly from barges moored at designated basins while other merchants brought a more limited selection straight to residences. Fishmongers from Kernavė, their boats laden with pike and perch, competed with vegetable sellers from the surrounding countryside. The valčininkai (boatmen) who had long worked the Neris and Vilnelė adapted their flat-bottomed vytinės to the narrower waterways, filling the vacuum left by the Scottish Brotherhood’s departure and developing distinctive poling techniques for navigating the canal intersections. But it was the vilnelės—shallow-draft skiffs developed specifically for the canal system—that became the city’s primary local transport. These vessels, smaller than the trading vytinės but more maneuverable than imported gondolas, could navigate even the narrowest channels. Their operators developed an elaborate etiquette of right-of-way, horn signals, and docking precedence that newcomers found baffling but locals navigated instinctively. Housewives lowered baskets from canal-side windows to purchase vegetables directly from passing market boats. Children learned to gauge water depth by the color of reflected sky, to recognize the horn patterns that warned of approaching rafts, to time their errands around bridge raisings. Daily life adapted to the aquatic rhythm.

The city’s soundscape had changed as well. Where once church bells had dominated, now water created constant accompaniment: the splash of poles as boatmen navigated corners, the creak of mooring ropes, the particular echo of voices bouncing off canal walls. Newcomers complained about sleepless nights until they learned to distinguish between normal water traffic and sounds requiring attention—the sharp crack that meant ice damaging a foundation, the rush that warned of opened floodgates upstream. By the second generation, parents told children that Vilnius had always been a water city, that the idea of cart-filled streets was as foreign as the notion of a capital without canals.

The practical achievements of the canal system extended beyond transport and fire prevention. By the late 1630s, Floriani’s engineers, building on Dr. Rautenbergas’s documented correlation between flowing water and reduced disease, had installed an underground sanitation network that exploited the canal’s constant flow. Unlike most European cities where waste accumulated in streets and cesspits, Vilnius’s system channeled sewage through brick-lined conduits beneath the quays, using the hydraulic gradient to flush waste toward outfalls downstream of the inhabited districts. The system required constant oversight. A corps of custodes aquarum (Water Wardens) patrolled the channels, empowered by city statute to fine anyone caught dumping refuse directly into the canals. Their morning rounds became a familiar sight—men in dark cloaks checking grates, testing water flow, chalking violation notices on the doors of offending households. In 1647, a letter from a visiting Dutch merchant remarked that Vilnius’s canals ran clearer than Amsterdam’s, though whether this reflected superior engineering or more stringent enforcement remained debated.

In 1653, the local watermen organized into the Guild of Saint Christopher—taking as their patron the very saint who adorned the city’s seal, making their trade a living embodiment of Vilnius’s heraldic identity. The guild maintained strict hereditary membership and elaborate regulations governing routes, fares, and the distinctive blue woolen caps that marked their trade. Italian gondoliers, initially imported to provide prestige service to the nobility, gradually intermarried with these local families, producing a hybrid tradition that combined Venetian ceremonial knowledge with Baltic practical skills. The guild’s 1703 statute book, preserved in the Lithuanian State Historical Archives, records 247 licensed watermen operating 89 passenger vessels and 143 cargo barges within the urban canal network.

As we might expect, Vilnius’s economic and social geography changed. Properties along the new waterways commanded premium prices, forcing longtime residents into peripheral quarters. The Bonifratres complained that canal construction had severed their monastery from its traditional parish. Jewish merchants, initially excluded from prime canal-front locations, gradually established warehouses along secondary channels, creating a thriving market district. Yet the project generated unprecedented employment. Beyond the obvious needs for boatmen, the canals required armies of specialized workers: dredgers who cleared silt before it could obstruct navigation, ice-cutters who maintained winter channels, bridge-tenders who operated the drawbridges for masted vessels, stone-masons perpetually repairing quay walls undermined by wake and weather. The city’s population swelled as craftsmen arrived from across the Commonwealth and beyond.

Cultural life flourished along the quays. Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski, the Jesuit poet whom Urban VIII crowned with laurels and whom translators across Europe called the “Christian Horace,” taught at the university during the canal system’s early years. His ode Ad Vilnam Fluviis Ornatam praised the city as a new Venice risen from northern forests, its waters carrying not only commerce but civilization itself. The Jesuit college staged elaborate dramas on floating platforms at the confluence of the Vilnia and Neris, their allegorical figures of Faith and Reason arriving by gilded barge while students operated mechanical waves and fountains.

The local condition had also changed education. By the 1740s, the Jesuit curriculum had expanded to include practical hydraulics alongside traditional mathematics. Students surveyed water levels, calculated flow rates, and designed improvements to the canals. Tomasz Żebrowski, before founding the Observatory in 1753, established what amounted to a hydrological research program. His students maintained meticulous records of seasonal variations, correlating water levels with precipitation, developing predictive models for flood control. The university’s instrument workshop produced standardized bronze gauge-boards installed at key points throughout the system, allowing for coordinated response to threatening conditions. This marriage of theoretical knowledge and practical application—characteristic of Jesuit pedagogy—transformed Vilnius into a center for hydraulic expertise that attracted students from across Europe.

The theological implications of the canal system extended far beyond the spectacular Epiphany rite that became the city’s signature festival—guild barges dressed with spruce, choir song carrying over black winter water. Each religious community adapted its sacred practices to the aquatic reformation of urban space. The Orthodox faithful transformed their Theophany tradition into mirror ceremonies performed simultaneously at multiple canal basins, priests casting crosses into different waterways to sanctify the entire network. The Karaite community, with their stringent purity laws derived from Levitical codes, developed an elaborate jurisprudence distinguishing between living water that flowed directly from the Vilnelė and resting water in the broader channels, with different ritual applications for each. Every major church eventually constructed its own landing stage, complete with carved posts for securing ceremonial barges. The Dominican priory commissioned a floating platform that could be assembled for water-based mystery plays. The annual calendar became punctuated by aquatic ceremonies: Palm Sunday barges bearing greenery, Corpus Christi processions where the sacred host traveled by decorated gondola, All Saints’ Day when hundreds of candles floated in small wooden boats to commemorate the dead. The Jesuits, characteristically, discovered divine proportion in the hydraulic design itself while integrating the canals into elaborate theatrical productions, staging mock naval battles for visiting dignitaries and using the water’s reflective properties to enhance their famous lux et umbra performances. Tomasz Żebrowski’s treatise De Aquis Sanctis (1751) would later argue that the canal network’s geometry reflected sacred numerology—seven major basins for the days of creation, twelve major canals for the apostles, proportions derived from Solomon’s Temple.

Still, the maintenance of the canal system proved both perpetual and politically contentious. Dredging operations, essential to prevent the waterways from silting into stagnant pools, required year-round crews of specialized workers using long-handled scoops and bucket chains. The expense was staggering—by the 1660s, maintenance consumed nearly a third of the city’s annual revenue. To address this crisis, the Sejm enacted the Canal Tax (Portorium Canalium) in 1668, levying graduated fees on all properties with canal frontage.

Winter presented unique engineering challenges that Venice never faced. From December through March, the canals transformed into a different kind of infrastructure. The city maintained a corps of ice-cutters—200 men working in shifts through the coldest months—whose primary duty was keeping channels open to fire cisterns. Using iron-tipped poles and specially designed saws imported from Sweden, they carved passages through ice that could reach two feet thick. The main commercial channels were allowed to freeze, becoming impromptu winter roads where sledges replaced barges. This seasonal transformation had unexpected social consequences: January’s Ice Festival (Ledo Šventė) became one of Vilnius’s most celebrated events, with lantern-lit skating parties, ice sculptures, and vendors selling hot wine from braziers set directly on the frozen canals. Yet the freeze-thaw cycle wreaked havoc on infrastructure. Expanding ice cracked stone quays, requiring annual repairs. Engineers developed a system of sacrificial timber corners—wooden buffers designed to absorb ice pressure and be replaced each spring rather than allow damage to permanent masonry.

Sedimentation threatened to choke the entire system. Every spring, snowmelt carried tons of silt into the channels; every summer, organic matter legally and illegally dumped in markets and households accumulated in the slower-flowing sections. By the 1680s, some secondary canals had lost half their depth. The crisis prompted technological innovation. In 1685, Vilnius launched its first mechanical dredging barge, the Šv. Kristupas, equipped with an endless chain of buckets powered by a horse-driven windlass. The design, adapted from Dutch polder-draining equipment but modified for river dredging, proved so successful that a delegation from Amsterdam arrived in 1687 to study the improvements. Within five years, Vilnius operated a fleet of six such vessels, each capable of removing 100 cubic meters of sediment daily. The dredged material, initially dumped outside the city, was later recognized as valuable fertilizer, creating a secondary economy where farmers bid for rights to particular sections’ spoils.

Infrastructure decay demanded constant vigilance. Wooden bridges and pilings suffered from perpetual moisture. The collapse of the Merchants’ Bridge in 1709, which killed three people and blocked the main commercial channel for weeks, catalyzed reform. The Stone Bridge Act of 1710 mandated that all wooden structures be replaced with stone within twenty years. The act faced immediate resistance—stone construction cost five times more than wood—but included innovative financing through bridge bonds that citizens could purchase, receiving toll exemptions as interest. By 1730, Vilnius boasted seventeen stone bridges, each with its own architectural character. The German Quarter’s bridge featured carved grotesques that spouted water during floods; the University Bridge incorporated astronomical symbols that served as a sundial.

Water quality emerged as a growing concern in the eighteenth century. Unlike the early years when canal water was considered pure enough to drink after simple settling, by 1700 population density and industrial discharge had created health hazards. The Water Purity Commission (Commissio Puritatis Aquarum), established in 1723, employed chemists from the university to test water at various points using copper sulfate reactions and settlement tests. The commission’s 1725 report, remarkably advanced for its time, identified specific contamination sources: tanneries (mercury and lime), dyers (mordants and pigments), and slaughterhouses (blood and offal). Their experimental filtration system, installed at three major channel intersections, used layers of sand, gravel, and charcoal—presaging modern water treatment by a century.

generated with Ai
Kanuty (Kanutas) Rusiecki (1800–1860), Old Bernardine Canal at Paplauja, Vilnius, c. 1850
The abandoned Bernardine suburb on the city’s southeastern edge, with the disused mill canal slipping past decaying monastic outbuildings and a few washerwomen at the water’s edge.

The question of expansion perpetually divided the city. The Canal Extension Controversy of 1735 epitomized these tensions. A consortium of merchants proposed adding three new channels to serve expanding suburbs, promising to fund construction privately. Engineers warned that additional waterways would reduce flow in existing channels, increasing sedimentation and ice formation. The debate raged in pamphlets and council meetings for two years. The engineering faction published detailed hydraulic calculations; the merchants responded with economic projections showing doubled trade revenue. The compromise—one new channel with strict dimensional limits—satisfied no one fully but demonstrated the system’s political complexity. Meanwhile, at the periphery, residents of districts like Antakalnis and Žvėrynas petitioned repeatedly for connection to the canal network. Their drainage ditches, they argued, were “sewers unworthy of citizens,” yet the cost of extension always exceeded available funds. The inequality between the canal-served center and the muddy periphery became a persistent source of social tension that would later fuel demands for democratic reform.By the mid-eighteenth century, canals defined Vilnius’s identity. Population passed 60,000.

The partitions of the Commonwealth in 1795 brought Vilnius under Russian imperial administration, fundamentally altering the canal system’s political meaning. While Tsarist engineers acknowledged the waterways’ practical benefits—Governor-General Mikhail Muravyov’s 1864 report praised their “exemplary flood management”—the canals’ capacity to anchor a distinct Lithuanian urban identity raised suspicion. Russian authorities gradually restricted the canal boatmen’s guild, requiring operators to obtain imperial licenses written in Cyrillic script. The annual Epiphany ceremony was permitted to continue but under Orthodox rather than Catholic rites, with the military governor’s approval required for any water procession. More practically, maintenance funding was redirected to fortification projects. St. Petersburg, meanwhile, actively cultivated its own identity as the “Venice of the North,” with court propagandists dismissing Vilnius’s canals as provincial ditches unworthy of comparison to the imperial capital’s grand waterways.

Jan Krzysztof Damel (1780–1840), Vilnius Cathedral and the Canal, c. 1825–1828
Painted soon after the artist’s return from exile in Siberia, when he briefly stopped in Vlinius before going on to Minsk.

During the late eighteenth century, concerns about sanitation were rising. The Vingrė canal—Radvila’s proudest achievement, flowing from the springs at Vingris along the reconstructed Pylimo and Liejykla streets down to the basin by the cathedral and Governor’s Palace—had begun its transformation into “Kačerga,” a Slavic borrowing meaning “poker,” a tool for stirring ashes. Where Vingrė had carried the Lithuanian legacy of flowing water, Kačerga spoke of what the canal had become: a receptacle for refuse, stirred through like spent coals. Despite regulations prohibiting the disposal of refuse into the waterways, enforcement proved impossible as the city’s population swelled and commercial pressures mounted.

Marcin Zaleski (1796–1877) or his circle, Vilnius Cathedral and the Canal, c. 1840–1860
Such views were frequently idealized, note the improbably large scale of the canal in this painting.

Public health crises accelerated the system’s decline. The cholera pandemic of 1831 killed over 2,000 residents, with the highest mortality in canal-adjacent quarters. Although later analysis showed contamination came from wells rather than canals, Imperial health inspectors, unfamiliar with Vilnius’s hydraulic system, blamed the waterways. Dr. Friedrich Hübner’s 1832 report to the Imperial Medical Council declared the canals “miasmatic reservoirs spreading disease through putrid exhalations.” The city’s own physicians protested—Dr. Józef Mianowski demonstrated that canal districts actually had lower typhoid rates than areas relying on well water—but imperial opinion had turned.

The situation paralleled Amsterdam’s canal crisis. There too, waterways had degraded by mid-century into receptacles for waste, blamed for cholera outbreaks. But Amsterdam, with its maritime wealth and municipal autonomy, could invest in remediation, at least eventually. The steam-powered Gemaal Zeeburg pumping station, built in 1879 to flush the canals with fresh water from the Zuiderzee, cost what Vilnius collected in taxes over five years. Imperial administrators, confronting similar crises in dozens of provincial cities, chose the cheaper solution: burial. The 1835 Urban Hygiene Decree mandated “gradual elimination of stagnant waterways and construction of new canals.” Implementation was slow and contested, but less used canals started to get filled in. Each filling followed the same pattern: wooden sheet piling to contain the water, pumping to nearby channels, then progressive filling with rubble, sand, and finally paving stones. Residents salvaged what they could—iron mooring rings became door hardware, carved bridge stones were incorporated into new buildings.


Liejyklos Canalsas became Liejyklos street as that foul stretch of the Kačerga was enclosed in brick culverts and buried beneath the streets. But the water still had to go somewhere. At the confluence near the Governor’s palace, where Kačerga joined the large basin and the old Vilnia channel that continued past the cathedral, the buried stream emerged into daylight, discharging its now-polluted waters into the canals that still flowed openly through the city’s ceremonial heart. Complaints multiplied about the “putrid waters emerging from underground passages,” but the vast basin between the Palace and the Cathedral absorbed the smell, at least most days.

In 1816, Military Governor General Alexander Rimsky-Korsakov had commissioned Scottish architect William Hastie to design a comprehensive plan for the city’s modernization. Hastie, fresh from work on St. Petersburg’s neoclassical avenues, proposed a grand canal that would dwarf Radvila’s network: a monumental waterway running from the Cathedral to the Neris, serving both as ceremonial axis and commercial artery. The plan languished for two decades amid bureaucratic disputes and funding shortages—Hastie himself died in 1832, never seeing a shovel break ground—but in 1836, in the wake of the Urban Hygiene Decree, construction finally began on Georgiyevsky kanal (Šv. Jurgio Canal, i.e. the current Gedimino Prospektas), frequently called Bolshoy kanal (or great canal) would bring in so much more water to the basin that it would counteract the sewage from the Kačerga. The contradiction was absolute: Imperial engineers were burying Lithuanian canals as medieval death-traps while simultaneously building a Russian showcase canal as proof of modern engineering prowess. Where Radvila’s system had grown organically from the city’s ancient hydrology, Hastie’s canal imposed geometric clarity, its embankments faced with Prussian granite, its bridges designed for military parades as much as commerce.

Unknown, Universiteto Canal behind the Jesuit College, Vilnius, c. 1900.

The canals found renewed vigor at the end of the century. The development of Naujamiestis led to new, large canals—Mindaugo, Algirdo, the extended Naugarduko.

The growing industrial district in Naujininkai presented different challenges. Factories needed water for steam engines and waste disposal, making canal-side locations valuable. The Lipschitz Brewery expanded along the Merchants’ Canal in 1894, building loading docks directly into their fermenting halls. The Zelmanovich Tannery diverted an entire channel through their works, releasing it downstream notably darker. By 1900, eleven factories drew from the canal system, their competing demands causing summer water levels to drop so low that navigation ceased for weeks. The Municipality tried regulating industrial water use, but factory owners simply drilled wells that lowered the water table, affecting canals anyway.

Yet paradoxically, this same industrial growth revived canal transport. When the horse-drawn tram (konka) began operations in 1893, its routes initially avoided canal bridges, which couldn’t support the weight. Within two years, however, schedules acknowledged that water routes remained faster for many destinations. The 1895 Baedeker noted: “Travelers may choose between the konka (5 kopeks) or canal boats (3 kopeks); the latter remain quicker to the University district.”

The 1880s had seen entrepreneurial innovation as Moishe Goldberg introduced small steam launches to the main commercial channel. His “water taxis” initially faced ridicule—newspapers mocked the smoke and noise disturbing the ancient waterways—but by 1890, three competing companies operated twelve steam vessels. The new middle class moving into Naujamiestis apartments embraced canal commuting as sophisticated and practical. Morning rush hours saw clerks reading newspapers on covered launches while horse carriages sat trapped in bridge traffic above them.

The pinnacle came in 1908 with the inauguration of the municipal water-omnibus service. The new launches, built in Riga’s shipyards with shallow drafts specifically for Vilnius’s channels, ran on fifteen-minute headways from University Quay to Lukiškės Basin, with a new branch line extending into Naujamiestis. Tickets were integrated with the konka system—a forward-thinking intermodal network that wouldn’t seem out of place today. University students could purchase monthly passes for both systems at reduced rates, leading to the peculiar sight of academic discussions continuing as groups transferred from tram to boat at interchange points.

Stanisław Filibert Fleury, Šv. Jurgio Canal with 19th-century townhouses, Vilnius, c. 1905, hand-colored photograph
This and the following two images, near contemporaneous, show the sharp contrast between districts.
Stanisław Filibert Fleury, Augustinų Canal, Vilnius, c. 1912
A small passenger boat moves along the narrow canal corridor in old town, between the shabby rear walls of tenement houses.
Unknown, Naugarduko Canal at Vytenio gatvė, c. 1907
The ambition of the New Town (Naujamiestis) plans meets reality amidst low houses. The water has had significant drawn down from upstream industry in this stretch known for its slow current and frequent bottlenecks.
Dominikonų Canal at the Šv. Jono bend, ca. 1912.

The Polish occupation of Vilnius in October 1920 brought attention to the canals again. General Lucjan Żeligowski’s administration, eager to legitimize Polish rule, immediately grasped the propaganda value of the waterways. Here was proof that Wilno deserved its place among Europe’s great cities—a Venice of the North that Poland could restore to glory. The new authorities positioned themselves not as occupiers but as inheritors of the Grand Duchy’s cosmopolitan tradition, and the canals became central to this narrative.

Stefan Batory University became the canals’ intellectual champion. The rowing club, established in 1924, attracted Polish, Lithuanian, and Jewish students—one of the few genuinely integrated institutions in the divided city. The annual regatta evolved into Wilno’s premier social event. The 1928 competition drew Crown Prince Carol of Romania as honorary starter. Newsreel footage shows crowds lining every bridge and towpath, while floating platforms hosted orchestras playing between races. The university’s engineering faculty pioneered winter maintenance techniques, using steam generators to keep strategic sections ice-free, allowing year-round navigation for the first time in the canals’ history.

Stanisław Filibert Fleury, Jakšto (Jakstowo) Canal at the edge of Reformatų skveras, Naujamiestis, c. 1908-1912
An omnibus navigates a narrow reach where the canal pressed against the park embankment as it curved toward the government quarter, its surface scored by the slow traffic of workboats and early omnibuses.
Stanisław Filibert Fleury, Savičiaus (Sawicz) Canal looking toward Rotušes Aikštė, c. 1908-1912
An omnibus pushes along the tight bend of Savičiaus Canal, its hull brushing the cobbled towpath as it passes the decaying façades of the old quarter. 
Unknown photographer, Omnibus waiting at Šv. Dvasios Gatvė, c. 1910-1920

Commercial innovation flourished. The Orbis travel agency launched “Gondolas of Wilno” in 1926—imported Venetian boats poled by costumed students earning university fees. Initially dismissed as kitsch, the service proved wildly popular with Warsaw society. The 1929 Baedeker called it “an essential experience despite its theatrical nature.”

Marshal Józef Piłsudski himself, born in the Vilnius region and deeply attached to the city’s multicultural heritage, personally intervened to secure funding for canal restoration. The 1921 emergency appropriation—50 million Polish marks—dwarfed any previous maintenance budget. Polish engineers arrived not as replacements but as modernizers. The Warsaw Polytechnic established a Hydraulic Institute annex at Stefan Batory University specifically to study the system. Their 1923 technical survey remains the most comprehensive analysis of the system ever produced.

Jan Bułhak, Didžioji Gatvė at the canal, 1923
The end of Didžioji Gatvė, which had been filled in during the 1900s at the intersection of Svarčo (Schwartz) and Pilies Canals. Svarčo-Gaono remained the last canal in the Jewish Ghetto, linking to Universito and Švento Jono Canal.


The Municipality launched the “Wenecja Północy” (Venice of the North) campaign in 1924, explicitly embracing the canal heritage. New maps in Polish, Lithuanian, and Yiddish appeared at major intersections—a pragmatic acknowledgment that the waterways served all communities. The Jewish merchants who dominated canal-side commerce found unexpected allies in Polish officials who recognized that prosperous Jewish businesses meant higher tax revenues. The 1925 “Canal Statute” granted hereditary mooring rights to established businesses, protecting mostly Jewish merchants from displacement.

The Polish administration’s most ambitious project began in 1927: the Grand Canal connecting the old town to the new government quarter in Antakalnis (Antokol). French advisors from the Compagnie Nationale du Rhône designed a modern waterway with reinforced concrete walls. The ceremonial groundbreaking featured Marshal Piłsudski himself, who declared: “We build not just for today’s Poland but for the eternal city of Wilno.” Construction employed 3,000 workers through the Depression—a deliberate job-creation program that built political support across ethnic lines. Though never completed, the excavated sections served as skating rinks in winter and public swimming pools in summer.

By 1930, the canals had become so central to Wilno’s identity that the city bid to host the 1936 International Navigation Congress. The proposal, archived in the League of Nations records, envisioned delegate boats proceeding through illuminated channels to a floating conference hall moored in Lukiškės Basin. Though Amsterdam ultimately won, the bid itself demonstrated Polish ambitions for the waterways. The Municipality commissioned Czech architect Josef Gočár to design a Canal Quarter with modernist buildings rising directly from the water. His stunning perspective drawings—white cubic forms reflected in dark channels—offered a vision of Wilno as laboratory for urban innovation.

Jan Bułhak, Kosciuškos (Kościuszki) Canal near the river bend, c. 1930.
A low-draft cargo vessel works its way along the broad curve of the Kosciuškos Canal, passing the worn facade of a late-imperial apartment blocks this area of the city. Many of these structures were damaged severely in the 1931 flood and then demolished after the war.
Great Flood of 1931, at what is now Zygmantu Gatvė, Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania (Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas).

Providence intervened again and the Great Flood of 1931 forced a final reckoning with the canal heritage. That April, exceptional snowmelt combined with torrential rains sent both the Neris and Vilnelė far beyond their banks. The canal system, designed for 17th-century water volumes, proved both blessing and curse. In the old town, the channels absorbed initial surges, sparing many buildings. But when lock gates failed at three locations simultaneously, water rushed through the streets with devastating force. Polish engineers surveyed the damage with mixed conclusions. Professor Stanisław Łukasiewicz of Warsaw Polytechnic argued the canals had prevented worse destruction; his colleague Roman Piotrowski countered that they had channeled floods into populated areas that natural drainage would have spared. The Municipality’s 1932 reconstruction plan included canal restoration, with modern lock gates and electric pumps for flood control. Detailed drawings survive in the State Archives, showing Art Deco pump houses and reinforced concrete channels. The September 1939 invasion ended all such plans.

Vilnius Cathedral and the Cathedral Canal, c. 1931

The Second World War brought systematic destruction. The Wehrmacht’s 1941 occupation saw military engineers assess the canals for defensive potential. Their November report deemed most channels “tactically irrelevant” but noted several bridges could serve as strongpoints. Soviet partisans used the sanitation tunnels beneath canal intersections to move through the occupied city; the Germans responded by welding grates across entrances and pouring concrete into suspected passages. The July 1944 Soviet offensive brought devastating urban combat. Artillery targeted German positions along the waterways; the medieval Merchants’ Bridge, rebuilt in stone in 1712, took a direct hit and collapsed into the channel, creating a dam that flooded the Vokiečių Street district. Soviet combat engineers later reported removing over 3,000 tons of debris from the canal system.

Unknown Photographer, Morning Commuters, 1936.
This area, in the infill off what is now Rūdninkų Gatve, was heavily bombed and is unrecognizable today.
Image generated by AI
Jan Bułhak, Šv. Ignoto Canal, c. 1937

A decaying stretch of the canal pressed against the rear façades along Šv. Ignoto gatvė, its towpath reduced to a narrow cobbled ledge. Bułhak’s camera catches the waterway in its final years.

Post-war Soviet planning treated the canals as an ideological problem wrapped in practical concerns. The 1946 General Plan for Vilnius Reconstruction, drafted in Moscow, dismissed the waterways as “remnants of feudal-bourgeois urban organization incompatible with socialist principles.” More pragmatically, planners needed space for wide boulevards suitable for military parades and rubble to level building sites. The canals offered both. Between 1948 and 1959, systematic filling began. The methodology was grimly efficient: German prisoners of war and Lithuanian political prisoners provided labor; rubble from demolished churches and dynamited historical buildings provided fill. The Great Synagogue’s ruins, cleared in 1957, filled the Schulhof Canal. The Three Crosses monument, dynamited in 1950, filled a section near Užupis. NKVD documents, declassified in the 1990s, reveal that some canal sections were used to dispose of “politically sensitive materials”—likely archives and religious artifacts—before filling. By 1960, only fragments remained: the tourist-friendly section near the university, two basins converted to reflecting pools, and a channel through Bernardinai Garden maintained for drainage.

Yet complete erasure proved impossible. The city’s infrastructure bore indelible marks of its aquatic past. Didžioji and Vokiečių streets remain inexplicably wide—their breadth preserving the dimensional memory of long-vanished waterways. Buildings along these routes rest on massive foundations engineered for canal-side loads, their basements featuring arched ceilings oriented perpendicular to the street—originally opening onto loading platforms at water level. During 1978 construction, workers discovered intact wooden pilings from a 17th-century wharf, preserved by groundwater. The peculiar hydrology created by three centuries of canals persists: basement flooding follows old channel routes; springs emerge where locks once controlled flow; the water table’s behavior still reflects hydraulic modifications made when Radvila ruled. Urban archaeologists have mapped these anomalies, creating ghost cartographies of the vanished system. Construction projects regularly uncover mooring rings and carved stones from vanished bridges—each discovery requiring archaeological assessment, delaying modern development. 

Seal of the City of Vilnius, from Bolesław Starzyński, Herby Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, vol. 1, fol. 27r (scan 67/352), Jagiellonian Library, c. 1875–1900.
The full book can be accessed here. https://polona.pl/preview/47c9e556-6370-4137-b43d-affccba047a4

The symbolic legacy persisted through Soviet occupation as well. Vilnius’s coat of arms—Saint Christopher carrying the Christ child across water—acquired new meaning after the canals’ destruction. What had been daily reality became historical memory. During the 1988-1991 independence movement, activists adopted canal imagery to represent Lithuanian identity suppressed but not erased. Sąjūdis publications featured historical canal photographs with captions reading ‘What we were, what we could be again.’ Post-independence Vilnius, focused on European integration, never pursued aquatic restoration. Yet the canal system continues to shape the city. In 2018, architecture students at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University proposed partial canal restoration as climate adaptation infrastructure. Their renderings of glass-walled water trams and restored medieval quays circulated widely on social media. The vanished waterways persist in the city’s hydrology: water still seeps through foundations along old channel routes, springs emerge where locks once stood, basement flooding follows canal paths filled decades ago.


1 Rūta Janonienė and Mintautas Čiurinskas, “Du liudijimai apie 1610 m. didįjį Vilniaus gaisrą” [Two Testimonies about the Great Vilnius Fire of 1610], Naujasis Židinys-Aidai, 2006, no. 11, pp. 452-458. The translation is mine. For more analysis, see Mintautas Čiurinskas, „Vilnius kaip kolektyvinis veikėjas kai kuriuose XVII a. I pusės naratyviniuose šaltiniuose“, in: Senoji Lietuvos literatūra, kn. 30, Vilnius: Lietuvių literatūros ir tautosakos institutas, 2010, p. 59–84.

2 Nicolaus Christophorus Radzivil, Hierosolymitana Peregrinatio (Brunsbergae: Georg Schönfels, 1601). On Damascus see Epistola II, 16-17; on Cairo Epistola III, 32.

3 Peter Paul Bajer. Scots in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 16th-18th Centuries: The Formation and Disappearance of an Ethnic Group. The Northern World, vol. 57. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012).

4 The Latin text of the 1536 sale appears in Michał Baliński, Vilniaus miesto istorija, trans. Ona Slavėnaitė and Irena Katilienė, vol. 2 (Vilnius: Mintis, 2007), 264–265. The original document, dated St. Helena’s Day 1536, is preserved in the Vilnius city archive, or at least was back in Balinski’s day.

5 On the Tatar settlement and the etymology of the Totorių vartai, see Michał Baliński, Vilniaus miesto istorija, vol. 1 (Vilnius: Mintis, 2007), 143–144.

6 Michał Baliński, Vilniaus miesto istorija, vol. 1, 107–108.

7 Aldona Baubinienė, Gediminas Vaitkevičius, Regina Morkūnaitė, Artūras Bautrėnas, “Hidrografiniai Vilniaus apylinkių ypatumai ir jų įtaka miesto vystymuisi,” Geografijos metraštis 54, 2021, 43-56, https://doi.org/10.5200/GM.2021.3, https://lgd.lt/hidrografiniai-vilniaus-apylinkiu-ypatumai-ir-ju-itaka-miesto-vystymuisi/

8 Michał Baliński, Vilniaus miesto istorija, vol. 2, 262–263, citing the fires of 1513 and 1530 and Žygimantas Senasis’s subsequent efforts to establish a municipal water supply modeled on Kraków’s.

9 On the development of Amsterdam see Jaap Evert Ambramse, “Between Art and Expediency: Origins of the Canal District,” Jan Nijman, ed., Amsterdam’s Canal District: Origins, Evolution, and Future Prospects (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 25-42.

Categories Uncategorized

Stochastic Histories

It’s been too quiet here lately.

I spent all of August completely reconstructing the Lost Canals of Vilnius. Then things ramped up and I haven’t had a chance to complete a new post. This essay is necessary to set the stage for that work.

stochastic histories /stəˈkæstɪk ˈhɪstəriz/ n. pl. [from Gk. stokhastikos “capable of guessing,” from stokhazesthai “to aim at, guess at” + L. historia “narrative, account”] 1. Fabricated historical narratives generated through iterative probabilistic sampling with artificial-intelligence systems, producing documentation that appears authentic through the accumulation of plausible details. 2. A mode of artistic practice that exploits AI’s pattern-matching capacities to reveal how all historical knowledge operates through stochastic processes of inference and reconstruction. 3. Speculative archives that occupy the space between memory and invention, demonstrating that the distinction between genuine and generated documentation has become computationally irresoluble. First usage: K. Varnelis, 2025. See also: pattern-making, hallucination, probabilistic inference.

This is a personal essay, a position statement on my recent work with AI. Ultimately, as with all of my work, it is for myself. It a retrospective piece that makes sense of my work with AI in a way that I had not done before. I am not sure I will continue working in this vein or head in another direction in photography or technology, leaving specific investigations of AI. It still, however, may prove useful to readers interested in the topic of AI and human creativity.


Since 2021, I’ve called my AI-generated pieces Critical AI Art. It’s a terrible name—misleading and increasingly intolerable as the work has evolved. The time has come to rename it Stochastic Histories, a title that reflects what the work actually does. Critical AI Art misaligns my practice with two opposing but ultimately identical failures: the prosumer kitsch of Midjourney prompt jockeys producing fantasy waifus and hyperreal landscapes, and the institutional theater of “critical” artists performing algorithmic audits for progressive credibility. Despite surface differences, both serve the same void. One packages it as technical novelty, the other as moral virtue. Neither changes or reveals anything. Both exist to be consumed and forgotten.

The Midjourney jockeys string together technical specifications they don’t understand—“hyper-detailed, ArtStation, Octane render, volumetric lighting, 8K”—cargo cult incantations for the aesthetically degenerate. They’ve created an arms race where every pore must be visible, every hair strand individually rendered, as if resolution could substitute for vision. Their subject matter never varies, the same collision of sci-fi, anime, and softcore imagery, endlessly recombined in a simulation of the “what’s new” feed on DeviantArt. As I detailed in my essay “California Forever or, the Aesthetics of AI Images,” these are prosumers in Alvin Toffler’s sense, merging producer and consumer roles to create kitsch marked by mass appeal and derivative aesthetics. Such work triggers the same neurological response as slot machines: just novel enough to release dopamine, just familiar enough to require no thought. Their work circulates as novelty, accumulating likes and shares for images of Emma Watson, Cannabis Goddess of Mars, bathed in golden-hour lighting, a modern-day version of Andres Serrano’s Piss Christ, while contributing nothing to genuine artistic inquiry.

Meanwhile, self-proclaimed “critical” AI artists operate from the same fundamental emptiness, though with institutional representation secured through their positions at American universities or funded by grants from the Creative Europe Programme. Whether the work involves AI or not is irrelevant: walk into any contemporary art institution and you’ll find the aesthetics of the corporate diversity training module transplanted to white-cube walls. Every exhibition includes positionality statements, as if confessing privilege or claiming intersectionality absolved them of participating in the very systems they purport to critique, together with declarations listing the tons of carbon expended to exhibit the work. They claim to “center” the “voices” of the “marginalized” while speaking to the elite, producing “disruptions” that don’t disrupt, “interrogations” that never wait for an answer. Rest assured: surveillance systems everyone already knows exist will be exposed, and algorithmic biases that have been common knowledge for years will be uncovered. Curatorial heads will not roll; on the contrary, they will nod, and appropriate boxes will be checked. This moralizing approach reduces art to forensic reports on systemic oppression, as if the purpose of art were to prove what we already know about power rather than to discover what we don’t yet understand. They perform the rituals of exposure while knowing these gestures have become empty theater, that their “interventions” will be absorbed into the academic-industrial complex as another line on a CV, another grant secured, another exhibition lets everyone feel they’ve confronted power while leaving all structures intact. Now that this crowd has come to AI, their work continues in the same vein, offering the usual litany of complaints from yesterday’s war.

As Peter Sloterdijk diagnosed in his Critique of Cynical Reason, we live in an age of enlightened false consciousness: people know very well what they are doing, but they do it anyway. The critical intellectual who exposes ideological operations pretends their audience is naïve, but the audience, like the intellectual, is already cynical—both know the game is rigged and continue playing it. Critiques persist even though such gestures change nothing. are made even though such gestures change nothing. Institutions, too, have learned to incorporate their critique as immunization—funding the very work that claims to expose them, thereby proving they can take it, neutralizing any actual threat. The art world pays for its own flagellation, emerging stronger and unchanged. Both camps—the Midjourney jockeys and the critical artists—exhibit what Sloterdijk calls the unhappy consciousness of modern cynicism, aware their work is empty but unable to stop producing it. The real revelation is not that technology reflects the biases of its training data. It is that all cultural production has always been a stochastic process, and the panic about technological “harms” is itself a symptom of our refusal to acknowledge that creativity was never the province of individual genius but has always emerged from the vast, impersonal machinery of cultural recycling.

On an Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania
A fabricated, hauntological history of Lithuanian conceptual art under Soviet rule. This reconstruction culminates in a 1976 show on “Ghosts” that becomes the work’s own metaphor. The project summons what oppression erased—radical art from a parallel timeline where conceptual practice might have flourished.

But all this hardly matters. We are in the post-AI era. Adobe Photoshop now includes generative AI as just another tool. Microsoft Word now includes an AI Assistant. It is no longer a novelty worth celebration or critique. Doing anything interesting with it requires treating AI not just as a medium but as a distinct mode of production. Unlike mechanical reproduction—copies of originals—or mass media—singular messages broadcast to many—or even digital computation, which simulated reality through deterministic processes, AI operates through probabilistic extraction and recombination. It ingests the totality of digitized human expression, identifies patterns across this vast archive, and generates new instances that never existed but feel as if they should have. Its hallucinations—those moments when pattern matching produces impossible responses—aren’t failures but the source of its creative potential. Crucially, AI reveals what was always true but hidden: all cultural production operates through similar stochastic processes of pattern recognition, recombination, and variation.

This term stochastic histories deliberately plays off Emily Bender’s dismissive “stochastic parrots.” “Stochastic” means probabilistic; “parrot” means imitation. Together, her phrase describes how large language models merely repeat patterns of language learned from vast datasets, generating fluent but potentially meaningless or biased output through probabilistic sampling. But unlike Bender, I was trained as a historian of cultural production. Where she sees mindless repetition, I see an unintended insight into how culture itself operates. Stochastic histories are fabricated narratives produced through probabilistic sampling with AI systems. Each project requires months of work—thousands of prompts refined and recombined until coherent worlds crystallize from the collision of probabilities. I do not select the resulting texts and images merely for technical quality but also for their capacity to provoke a kind of productive uncertainty. The term also recognizes that all historical and speculative production—not just that produced by AI—operates through similar processes of pattern-matching and plausible inference, constructing narratives from fragments and filling gaps with what must have been there or what might yet be. The “parrot” was never the insult critics imagined; parrots are remarkable pattern-matching machines, and so are we.1

The Witching Cats of New Jersey
A history of a folkloric phenomenon inspired by glitches in early image generators.

My stochastic histories lie within a specific lineage, both in broader movements and in the circumstances of my own biography as an artist and theorist. For me, the key departure point is David Wilson’s Museum of Jurassic Technology, which I first encountered in 1996 and have returned to repeatedly (the Museum is next door to the Center for Land Use Interpretation, with which I began collaborating with the late 1990s). The Museum presents detailed exhibits on obscure scientists, bizarre natural phenomena, and peculiar inventions—some real, some fabricated, most existing in ambiguous spaces between documentation and invention. Wilson, who had a previous career in Hollywood special effects and understands how reality is constructed frame by frame, does not critique truth so much as create a space where epistemic certainty dissolves. I once had the rare opportunity to see the backstage of the Museum, where the exhibition rooms were revealed as theatrical flats within a vast interior space, the vitrines accessible from hidden corridors for maintenance—the museum itself a stage set masquerading as architecture, which in turn throws into question the relationship between display and servant spaces in traditional museums. The desire to know whether something is “real” becomes the content, but simultaneously, standing in the Museum’s quiet, darkened galleries, gazing at exhibits while hearing distant sounds—a fox screaming, crickets chirping, a slideshow narrator explaining a preposterous history of the museum, the haunting voice of an opera singer, bells drifting from other rooms—one becomes acutely aware of one’s own body, achieving what the minimalists of the 1960s sought but far more effectively. The experience reveals something crucial: unlike the critic who maintains distance to perform exposure, the Museum makes visitors aware that the very act of evaluating makes them constituent parts of the work.

In Mr. Wilson’s Cabinet of Wonder, Lawrence Weschler connects the Museum to the pre-Enlightenment Wunderkammern—Renaissance collections where natural specimens, artistic creations, and technological marvels existed before disciplinary boundaries solidified. Cabinets of curiosities emerged from the era of natural philosophy, when investigating nature meant contemplating the world in all its marvelous variety, when the boundaries between the miraculous and the mechanical, the divine and the empirical remained productively unclear. The Wunderkammer took the stage alongside another technology for managing early modernity’s information explosion: the book index. Both arose in the sixteenth century as print culture and global exploration overwhelmed existing systems of organization, creating too many books to read linearly and too many objects to fit familiar categories. Natural philosophers assembled these collections not as data sets but as chambers for contemplation, where a unicorn horn (actually a narwhal tusk) might reveal divine providence as surely as it demonstrated nature’s ingenuity. Like the index that allows readers to access text through alphabetical entry points, the cabinet’s drawers and shelves permitted nonlinear exploration. Just as index entries create connections across distant pages, meaning emerged through juxtaposition rather than sequence—a narwhal tusk might sit beside a mechanical duck, an ostrich egg beside a dodecahedron carved from ivory, each object a node in a network of correspondences between microcosm and macrocosm. The wonder of the Wunderkammer did not so much fix meaning as create a productive uncertainty, a cognitive state of openness. These collections revealed that knowledge itself requires an architecture—literal shelves and cases, but also conceptual frameworks that determine what belongs with what, what counts as evidence, what deserves preservation.2

Wilson’s Museum extends this logic into contemporary practice, but with a crucial difference: where the Wunderkammern cultivated wonder through genuine rarities and (usually) honest misidentifications, Wilson achieves this through what the Russian Formalists called ostranenie—defamiliarization in the form of a meticulous institutional fiction. At his Museum, the vitrine functions as a technology of belief: placing something behind glass with a label does not simply display knowledge; it produces it, transforming objects into evidence, the everyday into the remarkable. His Museum operates as a three-dimensional index, where each exhibit points to others through conceptual correspondence rather than alphabetical order, making visible what the book index conceals: that all systems of organization are arbitrary impositions on the universe of things and ideas. The Museum reveals that our frameworks for organizing knowledge are themselves fictions, that the difference between the Leiden University anatomical collection and the Museum of Jurassic Technology is one of degree, not kind. By faithfully reproducing every convention of museum display—the authoritative labels, the scholarly apparatus, the hushed galleries—while filling them with impossible content, Wilson makes the familiar institutional frame suddenly alien. We begin to notice the arbitrary confidence of wall text, the coercive authority of the vitrine, and the way dim lighting and reverent silence produce belief regardless of what they frame. Through careful presentation, the plausible feels impossible and the impossible feels documented, but more importantly, the very distinction between these categories becomes unstable.

At this point, it is also worth citing Joseph Cornell’s boxes, which function as both precursors and miniature, portable counterparts—private Wunderkammern assembled from the detritus of consumer culture. Cornell explicitly referenced the tradition, but where Renaissance collectors displayed unicorn horns and ostrich eggs as trophies of colonial reach, Cornell assembled his cosmologies from hotel advertisements, celestial maps, and scraps found in New York’s junk shops. His boxes did not fabricate evidence like Wilson’s Museum; they transformed genuine ephemera into hermetic worlds through careful juxtaposition, creating wonder from the worthless.

Art and the Boxmaker
An investigation into William Gibson’s prophecy that an AI capable of creating Cornell boxes would demonstrate true consciousness, written just as AI began producing convincing Cornell-style assemblages and Gibson turned against AI.

It seems beyond coincidence, then, that in Count Zero, cyberpunk author and pundit William Gibson centered his novel around an AI that creates Cornell boxes. In a 1989 interview, Gibson explained that Cornell’s assemblage method was “the key to the whole fucking thing, how the books are put together and everything”—describing his own creative process as “grabbing little hunks of kipple, and fitting them together.” The Boxmaker wasn’t just a character; it was Gibson’s explicit metaphor for how novels get made, for how all cultural production operates through stochastic assemblage from existing fragments. Today, any image generator can produce convincing Cornell-style boxes in seconds, complete with nostalgic patina and surrealist juxtapositions. Gibson himself now recoils from AI art as “weird as hell.” This is not mere contradiction but reveals something structural: Gibson’s blindness to the implication of his own insight is not a failure of reasoning but a constitutive necessity—the concept of “human creativity” requires that the machinery remain invisible. The moment AI makes pattern-matching and probabilistic recombination explicit and operational, the entire framework collapses. Gibson’s position is literally impossible to maintain coherently, which is precisely what is “weird as hell.” What appears as personal inconsistency exposes how meaning, authorship, and artistic value have always depended on a foundational blindness to their own mechanical operations. We cannot simultaneously acknowledge that creativity operates through stochastic probabilistic processes and preserve the human/machine distinction—yet we must try, because abandoning either claim threatens the entire edifice of how we understand cultural production.3

Cornell dedicated two works to another precursor of stochastic histories, Jorge Luis Borges—”For Jorge Luis Borges,” a collage, and “The Puzzle of the Reward (for Jorge Luis Borges)”—creating a direct link between the assembler of found objects and the architect of impossible libraries. Where Cornell transformed commercial detritus into hermetic worlds through physical juxtaposition, Borges achieved similar effects through textual accumulation. His Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius presents an entire fictional world that gradually replaces reality through sheer documentary weight—encyclopedic entries, scholarly footnotes, and discovered objects bearing inscriptions in imaginary languages. The story isn’t just about a fictional world but about how fiction becomes real through the apparatus of scholarship, how plausibility emerges from the proper citation format and cross-reference.

Pierre Menard, Borges’s character who rewrites Don Quixote word for word three centuries after Cervantes, reveals that identical repetition produces difference—the same words mean something entirely different when produced in a different era, by a different hand. This isn’t plagiarism but a theory of cultural production: all writing is rewriting, all creation is recombination. The Library of Babel, containing every possible book, suggests that originality is merely a matter of selection from a pre-existing field of possibilities. Borges understood that culture constructs itself through pattern and variation, that authenticity and fabrication are categories we impose rather than qualities inherent in things.

On the Destruction of Doggerland
A counter-historical fiction documenting a medieval kingdom on Doggerland that survived until 1422, creating epistemic vertigo through invented artifacts and integration into known European history.

This tradition of productive fabrication extends through various methods and media. Contemporaneous with Wilson, the photographer Joan Fontcuberta constructs entire scientific archives with obsessive thoroughness. His Fauna presents complete taxonomies of impossible animals—the Solenoglypha Polipodida, a snake with legs, documented through skeletal diagrams, field notes, habitat studies, and photographic “evidence.” His Sputnik project (I purchased a copy at the Museum of Jurassic Technology) resurrects Ivan Istochnikov, the lost Soviet cosmonaut, playing directly with the persistent conspiracy theory that cosmonauts died in space before Gagarin, erased from official history. Fontcuberta provides everything—mission patches, crew photographs where Istochnikov has been carefully removed, leaving ghostly gaps, technical documents, commemorative stamps, even childhood photographs. The project gains power precisely because it builds on existing suspicions about Soviet secrecy, making viewers question whether this is revelation or fabrication. Many refuse to believe it’s fiction even after being told, insisting that Fontcuberta must be exposing actual suppressed history. Every element mimics the authoritative grammar of scientific documentation. Fontcuberta doesn’t critique truth so much as demonstrate how truth effects are produced through proper formatting, comprehensive citation, institutional presentation—and how they become even more convincing when they confirm what we already suspect.

Another artist whose work was essential for the world-building nature of my stochastic histories is Christoph Büchel, whose exhibit at Los Angeles Contemporary Exhibitions(LACE) in the fall of 2003 affected me deeply. It seemed, upon approaching the gallery, that some kind of horrific event had happened at its Hollywood Boulevard space—unsettling in the post 9/11 years—the windows were boarded up, but a representative appeared and had us fill out an unsettling disclaimer absolving the gallery of liability. We entered into a darkened room that clearly once was the gallery, but now was strewn with refuse and rubble. Light came from a door that, when opened, led into a disturbingly small, well-lit space with a locker at the end, an institutional space, perhaps a school or factory or military installation. The place appeared to have seen better days: some tiles in the floor had broken away and an animal hole led off somewhere through the dirt. Eventually, we discerned that we could enter into the locker, crouch down into a hole, and emerge under a desk in another, much larger room (again all this is happening in what we expected was the white cube of the gallery we had visited many times). This room was connected to a large complex of rooms filled with what appeared to be missiles, military equipment, and institutional furniture, an unsettling space with the air of Cold War menace, an excavation into another world unknown to civilians. This wasn’t a representation but rather a total environment, removing all reference to the gallery. Where Wilson’s Museum maintains the institutional frame while making it uncanny, Büchel eliminates the frame entirely.

There is architectural precedent for stochastic histories as well. In particular, I have found the work of the Italian radical architecture group Superstudio compelling. Even though modernists had worked with media from the start, the wide accessibility of color printing by the late 1960s meant that saturated, glossy color had become the norm. Superstudio took the medium itself as a site, understanding that mainstream architectural publications such as Domus and Casabella would be as important as the gallery. The glossy magazine page became a space where fictional architectures could exist with the same presence as documented reality. Carefully selecting documentary photographs to build upon, Superstudio understood that photomontage carries different authority than drawing—the photographic substrate insists on its own truth even when obviously manipulated. Their method was explicitly critical, showing how modernist rationality taken to its logical extreme would produce a world of total homogenization. Yet, the critique worked through seduction rather than revulsion, through images so compelling they made dystopia feel inevitable, even desirable.

Pierre Lecouille, Visionary Architect
Following Philippe Duboy’s controversial claim that Duchamp fabricated the architect Jean-Jacques Lequeu, this project creates another fictional visionary architect to demonstrate that architectural history is ‘writerly’—actively constructed by readers rather than passively received as fact.

The most perverse precedent is that of architect Jean-Jacques Lequeu, whose drawings I had the privilege to see at the Morgan Library a week before the pandemic lockdown. Lequeu’s drawings combined Neoclassical rigor with fantastical, often erotic and transgressive imagery that remained unknown until their rediscovery in the 1930s by Emil Kaufmann, who encountered them in the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris. His work includes visionary designs for temples, grottos, and civic buildings that blend archaeological precision with theatrical excess, featuring allegorical figures, exotic references, and occasionally explicit sexual content. But in the only book-length study on Lequeu, French architecture historian Philippe Duboy claims that Marcel Duchamp, while working at the Bibliothèque, fabricated Lequeu’s drawings, attributing them to this third-rate figure from the revolutionary era. According to Duboy, Duchamp invented this 18th-century visionary architect complete with theoretical texts and fantastical building designs. Many scholars dismiss this as conspiracy theory, but their rebuttals seem to rest on little more than the audacity of Duboy’s claim. The vertigo here is absolute: either we’re looking at authentic 18th-century visions that anticipate surrealism by a century, or we’re looking at Duchamp’s forgeries that have been absorbed into architectural history as fact. The authentication machinery—carbon dating, stylistic analysis, archival provenance—cannot resolve this; it can only accumulate probabilities that feel like certainties. This conundrum shows how modernism might construct its own prehistory through forgery, how we recognize certain patterns as “visionary” because they match what we’ve been trained to expect from an outsider genius.4

Where these predecessors employed physical assemblage, institutional mimicry, photomontage, or architectural intervention to produce their fictions, I work with AI’s probabilistic sampling—a method that doesn’t construct or manipulate but rather summons plausible realities from latent space, making the process of authentication itself the medium. Stochastic histories emerge from this tradition, but also respond to our own time, when AI has become inextricably entwined with cultural production. This work, however, is not merely an interrogation of AI. Stochastic histories set out to produce a particular vertigo—not simply uncertainty about what is real, but the recognition that this is exactly how the real gets constructed. The AI hasn’t learned to fake history; it has learned history’s own methods of self-authentication. When we cannot distinguish the generated from the genuine, we’re forced to confront how all archives operate through probabilistic accumulation of plausible details. The dataset is Benjamin’s archive in its raw form, stripped of curatorial narrative—every photograph that has ever been digitized, every document scanned, every architectural drawing uploaded, all flattened into latent space. We find ourselves staring directly at culture’s unconscious, and in that moment we glimpse something like the Lacanian Real—the point where representation collapses and the machinery of meaning-making becomes visible.

The Lost Canals of Vilnius
Another hauntological project, this time exploring how images are used to invent histories and reshape urban fabric.

My process embraces both chance and curation. Each image demands hundreds of iterations, each prompt a negotiation with probability space. Although I aim to produce works that appear plausibly real, the stochastic element of this production nevertheless  reveals itself most powerfully in glitches—the hallucinations where the system generates mistakes—a three-story-tall streetlight, a misshapen human figure, a façade in the process of digital decay. These glitches show the moments where the probability field tears and something genuinely alien emerges. A building that shouldn’t exist but feels absolutely inevitable. A document that describes events that never occurred but should have. These hallucinations are terrifying precisely because they feel more plausible than fact—they reveal how thin the membrane is between history and its probabilistic shadow.

One reader of the latest revision of the Canals of Vilnius essay was disappointed by the quotes about the fire by Alessandro Cilli, a Jesuit priest (note that these are not in the current version, but will appear next week). She knew that I wrote the fictional history with help from an AI, and she felt the AI’s writing was unconvincing. And yet, Cilli’s quotes are all real: they seem unreal, too strange to be believed.

Stochastic histories make visible that the past is continuously reconstructed through pattern and probability, that authenticity is a learned aesthetic, that culture reproduces itself through endless stochastic variation. Cilli’s quotes seem unreal while Lequeu’s drawings are considered authentic by most scholars because the possibility that Cilli’s quotes are real and Lequeu is a forgery by Duchamp is too unsettling. We are all stochastic parrots. Every historical narrative, every archival discovery, every recovered memory operates through the same probabilistic logic—filling gaps with what should have been there, constructing continuity from fragments. Meaning has always emerged from vast, impersonal processes of pattern matching and recombination. Thus, the old saw that the dataset is biased misses the point entirely—it is literally culture’s biases made operational, our collective patterns of recognition transformed into probability distributions. When I work with these systems, I’m not using a tool but inhabiting a space—a vast probability field containing every possible history that could feel real. 

The recursive nature of this practice reveals itself in the “7 Fables of Accelerationism,” where AI systems trained on archives containing Superstudio’s imagery from the 1960s generate new speculative futures that cite those radical visions. Here, I project stochastic histories into both the future and the past. Just as Superstudio’s photomontages pointed back to the constructivists and early modernists whose visual language they appropriated, my fables emerge from probability spaces where the Continuous Monument—as well as the images that Superstudio trained themselves on—exist as patterns to be recombined as well as conditions they could not have anticipated. The dataset doesn’t just enable the work; it determines its visual genealogy, making every generated image a stochastic descendant of its training data.

7 Fables of Accelerationism
Architectural photomontages of acclerationist futures in which the system’s logic reaches its own conclusion. Fables are written with the help of LLMs responding to images made by diffusion model AI image generators.

Stochastic histories operate in the space between memory and invention, between what was and what should have been, between human intention and machine hallucination. They’re not critiques or spectacles but investigations into how the past gets constructed, how the future gets imagined, how culture reproduces itself through endless variation. Turning Gibson on his head, I very much hope that these works are “weird as hell.” In revealing how probability shapes our expectations and how the line between history and hallucination dissolves at the level of pattern-matching, they make visible that culture has always been a stochastic process, and that being a stochastic parrot might well be the only kind of consciousness there is.


1 See The Generative Turn: On AIs as Stochastic Parrots and Art for a fuller discussion of how structured repetition enables rather than constrains creativity.

2 Lawrence Weschler, Mr. Wilson’s Cabinet of Wonder (New York: Pantheon Books, 1995).

3 Genevieve von Petzinger. The First Signs: Unlocking the Mysteries of the World’s Oldest Symbols. (New York, NY: Atria Books, 2016).

4 Phillipe Duboy, Lequeu: An Architectural Enigma (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987).

Categories Uncategorized

Humanity and Its Double: The Uncanny in Art and Artificial Intelligence

Norbert Aujoulat, Lascaux, The Great Black Cow
© Norbert Aujoulat,Ministère de la Culture. Licensed under BY-NC-ND. Source: Musée D’Archéologie Nationale, France

On September 12, 1940, four teenagers exploring a hill above Montignac, France, discovered a small hole in the ground that had been revealed when a tree fell in a storm. Descending into the opening in search of a long-rumored cavern supposedly containing hidden treasure, they entered the darkness with a makeshift lamp. Soon, they saw the walls around them blaze with life. Horses galloped across uneven stone surfaces, aurochs charged through rocky corridors, and bison wheeled. In the dancing light, these painted forms seemed alive. The boys had discovered Lascaux.1

The painters who worked these walls some twenty millennia ago possessed technical mastery rivalling any subsequent achievement in representation. They drew from memory, demonstrating an understanding of animal anatomy derived from intimate observation. Employing the cave’s three-dimensional surfaces in their compositions, they used natural bulges to suggest the swelling muscles of horses and the rounded bellies of bison. Most remarkably, they achieved what would take Futurist painters millennia to develop: the representation of movement through simultaneity, showing animals with multiple sets of legs to suggest galloping.

After Lascaux, the most shocking revelation about Paleolithic life came with the discovery of Chauvet Cave in 1994. Chauvet demonstrated that Lascaux was not the work of isolated genius but part of a largely lost artistic tradition that lasted 25,000 years—evidence of what Gregory Curtis has called a ‘classical’ culture, representing as he states, “not only the first great art but also the first great philosophy, the first attempt we know of to put meaningful order to the chaos of the world.”2 But this sort of historical continuity is unfathomable to us moderns, the sort of continuity of time in which the passage of time itself is lost, a culture of the sort possessed by animals, not humans. As at Lascaux , there is an alien quality to these paintings. There are no landscapes, no vegetation, no context beyond the animals themselves and the strange symbols—lines, dots, branching signs, handprints—that accompany them. Together with these enigmatic markings, which archaeologist Genevieve von Petzinger suggests may represent the foundation for the future development of writing itself, the paintings point toward purposes we cannot decode, thinking we cannot access, social structures we cannot reconstruct.3

Still, the discovery of Chauvet cannot be compared with the stunning discovery of Lascaux. While cave paintings had been discovered before—most notably the fragmentary works at Altamira in 1879—Lascaux was the first complete prehistoric artistic environment discovered. Lascaux presented coherent galleries of sophisticated paintings that used the cave’s natural architecture as an integral part of their design. Lascaux shattered what we thought about ourselves: it revealed that the essential capacities of human consciousness—symbolic thinking, artistic sophistication, the ability to create meaning through representation—were not recent evolutionary developments, but rather ancient achievements. The paintings demonstrated that what we consider distinctly “modern” consciousness had existed for tens of millennia, collapsing the comfortable distance between prehistory and modernity at a moment when modern man was at his most brutal, a moment where the meaning of progress and civilization were being called into question.

Writing in 1955, the French Surrealist philosopher Georges Bataille argued that Lascaux represents the foundational act of humanity:

We have, after all, added very little to the inheritance left us by our predecessors: nothing supports the contention that we are greater than they. “Lascaux Man” created, and created out of nothing, this world of art in which communication between individual minds begins. … At Lascaux, more troubling even than the deep descent into the earth, what preys upon and transfixes us is the vision, present before our very eyes, of all that is most remote. This message, moreover, is intensified by an inhuman strangeness. Following along the rock walls, we see a kind of cavalcade of animals… But this animality is nonetheless for us the first sign, the blind unthinking sign and yet the living intimate sign, of our presence in the real world.4

Bataille’s “inhuman strangeness” can be read within the framework of Sigmund Freud’s uncanny [unheimlich]: the experience of encountering something simultaneously familiar and alien, something that should be dead yet appears alive, something that transgresses fundamental categories upon which our understanding of reality depends. For Freud, the uncanny marks moments when representation becomes so successful that it threatens to collapse the distinction between the artificial and the authentic, the created and the real. Most of all, reading Bataille on Lascaux, the uncanny reveals itself as the psychological signature of humanity’s most ambitious technological achievements—our repeated attempts to project ourselves into the world, to impose our consciousness on inert matter.5

This trajectory from Lascaux to contemporary Artificial Intelligence represents more than technological progress—it reveals a sustained human drive to create things that somehow speak back to us. The painted animals at Lascaux function as what Bataille calls “the blind unthinking sign and yet the living intimate sign”—they communicate meaningfully while operating through processes that bypass conscious intention. This is precisely the paradox that characterizes our encounters with Large Language Models: they generate seemingly conscious responses through statistical operations that are fundamentally “blind and unthinking,” yet they establish “living intimate” communication with us. When users today report feeling unsettled by ChatGPT’s responses—recognizably human in their coherence yet produced through alien computational processes that even their programmers don’t always understand—they experience the same cognitive dissonance that has marked every major advance in simulation technology. The seventeen-thousand-year trajectory from those flickering images on cave walls to today’s Large Language Models (LLMs) represents not mere technological advancement but the return of a fundamental anxiety about the boundaries between the authentic and the artificial, the conscious and the mechanical.

The following essay traces this uncanny lineage through its major manifestations: the classical recognition of representation’s dangerous power to deceive, the nineteenth-century media that captured and preserved actual human presence, the mechanical marvels that animated matter through clockwork ingenuity, and the contemporary AI systems that simulate consciousness itself through pure language. Each technological leap has reactivated the same essential anxiety while pushing us closer to an ultimate transgression—the creation of artificial beings indistinguishable from ourselves.

I do not talk about science fiction in this essay. I contend that the condition of rapid AI development today is a technological Singularity. As such, science fiction becomes less useful than history. We all expect to read science fiction to come to an understanding of AI, but the uncanny is a matter of the return of the repressed. The uncanny effects that users report when encountering LLMs are not science fictional scenarios finally realized but rather returns to earlier anxieties in new forms. History reveals these patterns more clearly, showing how each era’s most sophisticated attempts to animate matter led to a return of anxieties while pushing us incrementally closer to fulfilling dreams as old as human consciousness itself.

Lascaux is a representation that is born out of a lie, out of a need to deceive the eye with mere pigment. Long before any mechanical clockwork or digital algorithm, ancient artists understood this. In the classical world, for the first time, we can read a profound ambivalence toward this power—simultaneously celebrating mimetic virtuosity while harboring deep philosophical suspicion about representation’s relationship to truth.

This tension finds its clearest expression in Plato’s Republic, where Socrates describes prisoners chained in a cave, mistaking shadows on the wall for reality itself. When one prisoner is freed and compelled to look at the fire casting the shadows, then dragged outside to see the sun, he experiences painful enlightenment—recognizing that the shadows were mere copies of copies, “three steps removed” from the true Forms. In Plato’s metaphor, enlightenment requires abandoning these representations to apprehend authentic reality. For Plato, artists create copies of copies—a painting of a bed imitates a physical bed, which itself merely imitates the eternal Form of Bed, making artistic representation “three steps removed” from truth. This distance from reality made mimetic artists so dangerous to the ideal state that Plato banished them entirely from his Republic.6

This philosophical rejection of mimesis exists in tension with Lascaux, which is, of course, literally a cave. Did Plato somehow know that caves were where representation started? But this representation isn’t merely deception, as we have established. While Plato’s cave-dwellers remain trapped by shadows, the Paleolithic painters created meaning through them. Where Plato saw representation as a fall from truth, the discovery at Lascaux suggests representation was humanity’s first philosophical breakthrough.

But Plato was not alone in holding a fundamental anxiety about the ultimate success of representational ambition. This is the subject of the famous painting competition between Zeuxis and Parrhasius, two masters of Greek art. Zeuxis painted grapes with such skill that birds flew up to them and tried to eat them, deceived by the perfection of the illusion. Confident of victory, he challenged Parrhasius to reveal his own work. When Zeuxis reached to pull aside what he assumed was a curtain covering his rival’s painting, he discovered that the curtain itself was the painting. Parrhasius had achieved something more unsettling than fooling animals; he had fooled a master of artistic illusion.7 This story captures the dialectic of ambition and anxiety: the desire to render the world so precisely that the rendering is indistinguishable from reality and the anxiety that our cognitive capacities, however refined, remain vulnerable to sufficiently skilled simulation. Zeuxis’s grapes exploited the pattern-recognition systems of birds; Parrhasius’s curtain exploited the far more sophisticated visual processing of a human expert. The progression suggests an arms race between representation and recognition, with each advance in mimetic skill threatening to overwhelm our ability to distinguish the artificial from the authentic. What makes the tale particularly unnerving is that Parrhasius succeeds not through divine intervention but through pure technical mastery—a recognition that perfect simulation threatens the coherence of categories upon which our understanding of reality depends.

This classical anxiety is echoed in Sigmund Freud’s 1919 essay “Das Unheimliche” (“The Uncanny”), which we have alluded to. Here, Freud’s central insight is that the uncanny emerges not from encountering something entirely foreign, but from the return of something familiar that has been repressed. The uncanny thus represents a temporal collapse, a haunting return of childhood fears and primitive beliefs we thought we had outgrown. Freud’s paradigmatic example, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s 1817 tale “The Sandman,” anticipates with remarkable prescience our contemporary anxieties about Artificial Intelligence. The protagonist Nathanael becomes obsessed with Olimpia, who appears to be the perfect woman—beautiful, attentive, entirely devoted to him—only to discover that she is an automaton, a mechanical creation designed to simulate human behavior. The story’s uncanniness intensifies through its deliberate conflation of creation and destruction: Olimpia’s maker is Coppelius (or his double, Coppola), the same sinister figure present at Nathanael’s father’s death during mysterious alchemical experiments that, in the end, kill his father. When the automaton is finally destroyed, her artificial eyes are literally torn out—directly fulfilling the childhood terror of the mythical Sandman who steals children’s sight. Yet in Freud’s reading, the source of the uncanny lies not primarily in the automaton itself but in the return of infantile anxieties about sight and castration. The automaton serves as the vehicle through which repressed fears manifest, activating unconscious anxieties about identity, authenticity, and bodily integrity. But Hoffmann’s tale probes even deeper anxieties: Olimpia embodies living death, appearing vibrantly alive while remaining fundamentally inanimate matter. Her perfect simulation of life forces recognition that vitality itself might be nothing more than convincing mechanical performance, threatening our most basic categories for distinguishing the living from the dead.8

As we will see later, the choice of an automaton is not accidental. Automata activate anxieties that extend beyond individual psychology to fundamental epistemological uncertainty. The perfectly convincing artificial being reveals a disturbing recognition: we possess no direct access to another’s consciousness, only behavioral evidence of its existence. We observe speech, gesture, response, apparent emotion—but never the inner experience of the Other. If Olimpia can perfectly simulate a conscious woman’s responses, how can we determine whether any “real” person truly experiences anything rather than merely performing the behaviors we associate with awareness? The automaton reveals that all our evidence for other minds remains purely inferential, based on external manifestations that could, in principle, be mechanically reproduced without any accompanying inner life.

This recognition opens onto an even more vertiginous possibility: that consciousness itself might be illusory, a convincing glitch in otherwise mechanical processes. If we cannot definitively establish the presence of consciousness in others, perhaps our sense of inner experience represents nothing more than the subjective effect of complex information processing. The automaton suggests not merely that artificial beings might simulate consciousness, but that consciousness itself might be a simulation—that we too might be fundamentally soulless, experiencing what amounts to an elaborate hallucination of subjective experience generated by unconscious mechanical operations. In this reading, the uncanny emerges not from encountering artificial consciousness, but from recognizing that all consciousness may be a ruse.

Indeed, Freud’s uncanny was invoked in the context of Artificial Intelligence in 1970 by roboticist Masahiro Mori when he identified what he termed the “uncanny valley”—the phenomenon whereby humanoid robots that appear almost, but not exactly, like real humans elicit feelings of eeriness and revulsion. Mori observed that as robots become more human-like, our emotional response to them becomes increasingly positive until reaching a point where subtle imperfections in their human likeness create a sharp drop into negative response—the valley of uncanniness. This dip occurs precisely because such beings occupy an ambiguous category that threatens our ability to distinguish the living from the mechanical.9

Recent psychological research has provided empirical validation for Mori’s intuition. Computer scientist Karl F. MacDorman’s studies conclude that highly humanlike robots trigger what psychologists call “mortality salience”—a psychological state that elicits thoughts of death. The android’s subtle lifelessness, mechanical defects, or failure to match human behavioral norms can be subconsciously perceived as death-like, evoking the same anxiety produced by encounters with corpses, graveyards, or other reminders of mortality. MacDorman’s findings also align remarkably with Freudian theory: the uncanny valley emerges because humanlike robots evoke our repressed fear of death by appearing nearly—but not fully—alive. They resemble the doubles and revenants that populate our unconscious, recalling primitive beliefs about animated matter that we have consciously rejected but subconsciously retain. These lifelike figures breach our psychic defenses, triggering unease as the familiar territory of life shifts unsettlingly into the repressed yet ever-present domain of death and uncanny animation.10

Large Language Models and AI image generators represent a qualitatively different form of uncanniness that transcends Mori’s uncanny valley entirely. Where the uncanny valley emerges from visual and behavioral imperfections in physical robots—subtle failures in appearance or movement that betray their artificial nature—contemporary AI systems achieve uncanniness through perfect simulation rather than imperfect mimicry. They succeed so completely at reproducing human patterns that they directly force us to confront the possibility that there may be no essential difference between authentic and artificial intelligence. Alan Turing anticipated this development in his famous 1950 test, which proposed that a machine could be considered intelligent if a human evaluator could not distinguish its responses from those of a human being through textual conversation alone. Turing’s insight was prescient: by removing physical appearance from the equation and focusing purely on linguistic behavior, he identified the arena where Artificial Intelligence would ultimately prove most unsettling. But contemporary LLMs now routinely pass informal Turing tests, producing responses that are not merely convincing but often more eloquent, empathetic, and creative than typical human communication.

This represents a fundamental shift in the nature of artificial uncanniness. These systems create doubles of human consciousness that respond appropriately to complex queries yet emerge not from understanding but from probabilistic token prediction across vast datasets. AI image generators produce photographs, paintings, and portraits virtually indistinguishable from human-created works, yet originate from pure statistical operations rather than aesthetic intention. Perhaps most uncannily of all, they generate artistic and literary expressions that feel genuinely human—demonstrating apparent creativity, humor, and even wisdom—while operating through mechanisms entirely alien to human cognition.

The effect intensifies not because of the near-success of the uncanny valley, but rather because these systems succeed too well at simulation. When we encounter an AI-generated image of a person who never existed, or read text that demonstrates apparent empathy yet originates from statistical pattern matching, we experience exactly what Freud identified as the return of primitive beliefs we thought we had outgrown. Again, the fear extends beyond mortality to encompass something more fundamental: that consciousness itself might be reducible to pattern recognition, that there may be nothing more to human intelligence than the very processes these machines have mastered. The anxiety is not merely that representation might deceive perception, but that perfect simulation reveals the absence of any essential difference between authentic and artificial consciousness. Indeed, continuing in this vein, one understands the recurrence of the repressed uncanny as itself all too predictable, something that one could easily imagine an LLM would claim to experience.

The classical anxiety about representation’s power to deceive continued through centuries of increasingly sophisticated illusionism—from trompe-l’oeil traditions that fooled viewers into reaching for painted objects, to Bernini’s marble sculptures so lifelike they seemed to breathe, to Dutch still lifes that captured dewdrops and reflected light with uncanny precision. Yet the nineteenth century introduced a qualitatively different form of uncanny experience that transcended even the most skillful visual deception. Where traditional art achieved verisimilitude through human craft and ingenuity, the new media technologies of photography and sound recording captured and preserved actual human presence itself. These devices did not merely imitate life; they seemed to trap it, creating haunted technologies that appeared to facilitate communication with the absent, the distant, and the dead.11

The daguerreotype, introduced in 1839, immediately produced responses that went far beyond aesthetic appreciation. Early viewers described an almost supernatural quality to photographic images, a sense that something essential about the subject had been captured and preserved in the silvered plate. Some American commentators reached instinctively for the language of sorcery. They christened the camera a “magic box” endowed with an inexplicable “magic power,” and one terrified sitter bolted down the stairs “as if a legion of evil spirits were after him” the moment the lens fixed its stare upon him.12 This pattern of supernatural attribution was in part because of the nature of the medium. Early photographs required long exposure times that could lead to spectral effects from motion in the frame—blurred figures, ghostly transparencies, and doubled images that seemed to capture something between presence and absence. These technical accidents reinforced supernatural interpretations, but Alan Trachtenberg, in “Mirror in the Marketplace: American Responses to the Daguerreotype, 1839-1851,” points out that photography’s uncanny effects drew from much older anxieties about representation itself. The mirror metaphor that dominated early photographic discourse—in part because of the mirror-like surface of early daguerrotypes and their physical similarity to pocket mirrors—carried within it what Trachtenberg identifies as “the duplicity traditionally suspected of pictures and picture-makers.” No matter how well-intentioned as praise, the comparison of photographs to mirrors “returned to its users their own confusions and incomprehension, a modern version of old suspicions aroused by images and icons.” Photography succeeded too well at what painters had always been suspected of doing—creating convincing illusions that might deceive the viewer, crossing the dangerous boundary between representation and reality that classical thought had warned against.13

Here we see what Freud theorized as the return of the repressed: not the emergence of entirely new fears, but the reactivation of ancient ones that Enlightenment rationality thought it had overcome. Photography was based on science and technology, a knowledge of chemistry, optics, and the nature of light, as well as on the increasingly codified compositional rules of the fine arts. But it also reawakened earlier beliefs about the danger of images. The photographic image forced confrontation with the same fundamental questions about mimesis that had troubled Plato—but now these concerns could no longer be dismissed as philosophical abstraction, since the technology appeared to achieve perfect simulation through purely mechanical means. Drawing explicitly on Freudian theory, Trachtenberg observes that photography’s reception followed precisely the dialectical process that Freud described: the return of repressed animistic beliefs that “enlightened” rational discourse thought it had overcome. He writes: “In popular fiction of the 1840s and 1850s, daguerreotype likenesses appear not only as amulets but as objects of unique obsession, as if they were living presences. In sentimental and celebratory verse, they are indeed living spirits, animated shadows, or souls of the dead.”14

Trachtenberg further situates this uncanny response within specific economic and social anxieties that directly anticipate contemporary concerns about Artificial Intelligence. Writing during the catastrophic Panic of 1837, N. P. Willis (Nathaniel Parker Willis, a noted American magazine writer) imagined photography from the perspective of displaced craftsmen. His prediction that daguerreotypes would create widespread technological unemployment—”Steel engravers, copper engravers, and etchers, drink up your aquafortis, and die!”—accompanied his recognition that photography threatened to transform self-image into “a new form of marketable, and thus vulnerable, personal property.” Willis’s phrase “the real black art of true magic arises and cries avaunt…The Dagguerotype!” captured exactly the temporal collapse that characterizes uncanny experience: the return of magical thinking within technological modernity, the persistence of ancient anxieties about animated matter within scientific progress.15

From the outset, then, the daguerreotype carried the same uncanny charge that still haunts today’s generative AI models: a conviction that mere mechanics can conjure not just likeness but living presence—an unsettling collapse of matter and spirit that leaves us wondering what, if anything, remains untouchable by technology. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously called photographs “mirrors with a memory,” but the mirror metaphor again suggests something more unsettling than mere documentation. Holmes:

[The Daguerreotype] has fixed the most fleeting of our illusions, that which the apostle and the philosopher and the poet have alike used as the type of instability and unreality. The photograph has completed the triumph, by making a sheet of paper reflect images like a mirror and hold them as a picture.

Drawing on Democritus’s ancient theory that objects continuously shed “certain images like themselves”—”forms, effigies, membranes, or films” that “are perpetually shed from the surfaces of solids, as bark is shed by trees”—Holmes grasped that photography represented the technological capture of these spectral emanations. Unlike paintings or sculptures, photographs bore what Charles Sanders Peirce would later theorize as an “indexical” relationship to their subjects—a direct physical connection between the light that touched the subject and the light that exposed the plate. As Rosalind Krauss would later emphasize in her influential adaptation of Peirce’s semiotics to photography, this indexical quality distinguished photographic images from other forms of representation through their status as “photochemically processed traces causally connected” to their referents. Holmes went further, prophetically declaring that photography would achieve nothing less than the “divorce of form from matter,” allowing us to possess the visual essence of objects while discarding their physical substance: “Give us a few negatives of a thing worth seeing, taken from different points of view, and that is all we want of it. Pull it down or burn it up, if you please.”16


André-Adolphe-Eugène Disdéri, Portrait de Jérôme Bonaparte (1784–1860), 1850s. Albumen print.
Licensed under CC0. Source: Wikimedia Commons / Musée Carnavalet, Paris.

This indexical quality produced profound temporal effects. A century later, Roland Barthes captured the essential uncanniness of photography in Camera Lucida when, in reference to a photograph of Napoleon’s younger brother Jérôme Bonaparte, he marveled, “I am looking at eyes that looked at the Emperor,” referring to the unbroken chain of causation that connected his present moment to Napoleon’s presence nearly a century earlier. The photograph collapsed temporal distance, creating an impossible intimacy with the historically remote. Here was not simulation but preservation—actual light that had reflected off Bonaparte’s face, chemically fixed and transmitted across decades. Yet Barthes’s focus on the eyes proves particularly significant, revealing photography’s most disturbing achievement: the preservation of what Western culture has long considered the windows to the soul. The gaze that stares back from photographic portraits carries the full weight of Hoffmann’s uncanny tale—these eyes have witnessed consciousness, yet that consciousness no longer animates them. Where the Sandman threatened to steal children’s sight, photography performs an inverse operation: it preserves sight beyond the death of the seer, creating spectral gazes that seem to possess agency while emerging from fundamentally inanimate matter.17

The photographic gaze creates a particularly unsettling form of encounter because it appears to establish the very structure of recognition that defines human relationships while operating in the absence of any recognizing consciousness. When we look at a photographic portrait, we experience what feels like mutual regard—the sense of being seen and acknowledged that Jacques Lacan theorized as fundamental to subject formation. Yet this apparent reciprocity emerges from pure material trace rather than living consciousness. The eyes in the photograph seem to address us, to call us into relationship, to constitute us as subjects through their recognition—but the awareness that would normally animate such a gaze is absent. This creates a profound disturbance in what Lacan called the structure of intersubjective encounter: we feel acknowledged and constituted as subjects by a gaze that emerges from inanimate matter.

Jacques Lacan’s distinction between the eye and the gaze illuminates photography’s particular form of uncanniness. In Lacanian theory, the gaze is not simply about looking but about being looked at—the point from which we feel ourselves observed, which constitutes us as subjects through the recognition of the Other’s desire. When we encounter a living person’s gaze, we experience what Louis Althusser called interpellation: we are hailed into subjectivity, called into social relationship through mutual recognition.

Photographic portraits don’t just objectify the individuals in them; they also reveal our own objectification. In the moment of looking at these preserved gazes, we become acutely aware that we, too, exist as potential objects of representation, that our own consciousness might be reduced to similar material traces. The photograph forces recognition that the boundary between subject and object—between the one who sees and the one who is seen—remains fundamentally unstable. What feels like reciprocal recognition actually reveals the primacy of our status as objects that can be captured, preserved, and circulated independently of our conscious will. The uncanniness emerges not from the photograph’s failure to represent consciousness, but from its success in simulating the very processes through which consciousness recognizes itself in others, while revealing that such recognition may be nothing more than a pattern that can be mechanically reproduced.18

The widespread myth of “soul-theft,” that indigenous peoples around the world regarded photography as spiritually dangerous, capable of capturing or stealing a person’s soul, reveals more about European anxieties than indigenous beliefs. As Z. S. Strother demonstrates in a meticulous historical rebuttal to this myth, this supposedly universal fear is actually a deliberate European construction, systematically assembled by nineteenth-century comparative anthropologists like Richard Andree and James G. Frazer to support evolutionary theories that positioned Western rational thought against “primitive” magical thinking. European photographers and explorers frequently presented themselves as “wizards” or “sorcerers,” deliberately cultivating supernatural associations to intimidate local populations, then cited resistance to their cameras as evidence of primitive superstition rather than recognizing justified wariness toward armed strangers with unknown agendas. Crucially, however, photographers often reveled in this wizardry and keenly invested in the photograph’s powers; the soul-theft narrative thus represents not indigenous beliefs but the projection of European desires to position photography as a technology so powerful it could transcend the boundary between mechanical reproduction and spiritual essence.19


William H. Mumler,
[Unidentified man with a long beard seated with three “spirits”]
c. 1861–1878.
Albumen silver print from a glass negative.
Licensed under CC0. Source: J. Paul Getty Museum.

Attributed to William H. Mumler or possibly Helen F. Stuart,
[Five “spirits” in background with a photograph at center of table with a doily]
c. 1861-1868.
Albumen silver print from a glass negative.
Licensed under CC0. Source: J. Paul Getty Museum.

Photography’s capacity to document death intensified these temporal disruptions. Post-mortem photography became commonplace as families sought to preserve images of deceased loved ones, often posed as if sleeping or arranged in lifelike positions among the living. These photographs served both memorial and evidential functions, yet they consistently disturbed viewers through their simultaneous deadness—obviously depicting corpses—and vivid preservation of exact appearance with scientific precision. Even more troubling was the emergence of spirit photography in the 1860s, pioneered by William H. Mumler in Boston. Mumler’s photographs purported to show ghostly figures appearing alongside living subjects, exploiting photography’s indexical authority to suggest that mechanical perception exceeded human vision. Though quickly exposed as double-exposure tricks, spirit photographs gained enormous popularity precisely because they seemed technically plausible within photography’s logic of objective documentation.20

Thomas Edison’s phonograph, unveiled in 1877, intensified photography’s disruption of the boundary between presence and absence. Photography had preserved visual traces of human beings; the phonograph went further, directly recording human voices—not symbolic representations, but the actual acoustic waves emitted by a living speaker. Early listeners described hearing their own voices played back as profoundly unsettling, confronting them with uncanny doubles that seemed to embody something deeply personal.

Edison explicitly envisioned his phonograph as a technology for preserving the voices of the dying, enabling families to remain in acoustic contact with deceased relatives. Writing in 1878, Edison enthusiastically detailed the phonograph’s potential for capturing and indefinitely reproducing speech, presenting it as a device capable of permanently recording even the most fleeting sounds, which he referred to as “hitherto fugitive.” He confidently promised the public that his invention would preserve the voices of great individuals and ordinary loved ones alike, effectively creating acoustic immortality. In Edison’s own terms, the phonograph would allow us to “bottle up for posterity the mere utterance of man,” transcending time and space through the mechanical capture of sound itself.21

Yet these promises prompt unsettling questions: precisely what had the phonograph captured? Was it merely acoustic data, or something more essential to human identity or consciousness? Unlike written text, phonographic recordings preserved not only words but the complete acoustic signature of voices—timbre, inflection, accent, and emotional nuances. Friedrich Kittler underscores this crucial distinction, noting that phonography bypassed symbolic representation altogether, directly inscribing the real—sound waves themselves—onto physical media. Listeners thus encountered disembodied voices independent of the original speaker, producing a profoundly uncanny form of virtual presence.22

Edison referred to the phonograph as a “speaking machine,” and it was also commonly called a “talking machine,” phrases that attributed to it an uncanny sense of agency rather than mere mechanical function. Like today’s Artificial Intelligence systems, the phonograph confronted listeners with the troubling possibility that our most personal characteristics—voice, personality, apparent consciousness—could be captured and replayed mechanically, independent of any living presence. Francis Barraud’s 1898 painting His Master’s Voice, reproduced extensively in advertisements for the Victor Talking Machine Company (later RCA Victor) became mass culture’s most recognizable image of mechanical hauntingThe painting depicts Nipper, a terrier mix inherited by artist Francis Barraud after his brother Mark’s death in 1887, listening intently to a phonograph with his head cocked in what Barraud described as “an intelligent and rather puzzled expression.” The phonographic uncanny is complicated by the painting’s temporal structure: Nipper had died in 1895, three years before the painting was completed; moreover, his master would have been Mark Barraud, thus the voice emerging from the machine would be that of a dead man, preserved on cylinder recordings that had passed to Francis along with the dog. The image became one of the most recognizable trademarks of the twentieth century precisely because it captured something essential about mechanical reproduction’s capacity to preserve human presence beyond death, even as it used cheap sentimentality to create a marketable commercial image.23

Francis Barraud, original copyright photograph of painting, His Master’s Voice, 1899. source: Wikimedia Commons

This transition from representation to direct inscription of reality marked a qualitatively new form of uncanniness distinct from earlier media. Whereas painting and sculpture created illusions through skillful imitation, technologies like photography and phonography captured and preserved actual human traces—the reflected light from bodies, acoustic vibrations from voices. Their uncanny effect arose not from imperfect mimicry but from perfect preservation. By collapsing time, these media allowed the dead to live on in forms seemingly beyond mortality, anticipating our contemporary condition in which AI systems recombine archived human expression without underlying consciousness.

Cinema soon followed, extending this uncanniness further by mechanically preserving and replaying human motion itself—creating ghostly doubles that, like phonographic voices, seemed to transcend death. The moving image intensified photography’s temporal collapse by capturing not just appearance but gesture, expression, and the subtle movements that constitute individual presence. If the stories of early audiences recoiling from the Lumière Brothers’ L’Arrivée d’un train en gare de La Ciotat, fearing the locomotive would burst from the screen, were apocryphal, what was nevertheless uncanny was the idea that individuals projected on the movie screen seemed fully present yet remained fundamentally absent.

The nineteenth century thus emerges as history’s first truly haunted century—the first era from which we possess photographs and audio recordings even though person who lived in it is now dead. Unlike all previous centuries, which survive only through written records, artifacts, and artistic representations, the nineteenth century survives through indexical traces: actual light patterns reflected from faces, acoustic vibrations captured from voices, mechanical inscriptions of human presence. We can see the eyes of Civil War soldiers, hear the voices of Edison’s contemporaries, witness the gestures of early film actors—all preserved with uncanny fidelity yet emerging from a world of the dead. This unprecedented condition of technological haunting, where the dead seem suddenly more present, established the psychological template for our contemporary relationship with AI systems that animate archived human expression.

Contemporary AI systems make explicit the spectral potential that always lurked within mechanical reproduction. MyHeritage’s Deep Nostalgia tool animates historical photographs, making the dead appear to breathe, blink, and smile with unsettling verisimilitude. Voice synthesis technologies now allow us to hear the dead speak words long after they are buried, while AI chatbots trained on the digital traces left behind by the deceased—texts, emails, social media posts—enable the living to maintain conversations with artificial reconstructions of the departed. Companies like HereAfter AI and StoryFile create interactive avatars from recorded interviews, generating responses in the voices and supposed personalities of the deceased. Services like Eternime and Replika explicitly market digital immortality, allowing individuals to preserve their personas in chatbots while harboring the ultimate dream of uploading consciousness itself into AI systems. These technologies fulfill the deepest aspirations of nineteenth-century spiritualists while producing the same mixture of comfort and revulsion that characterized early encounters with photography and phonography—some users describe feeling moved by renewed contact with lost loved ones, while others report being disturbed by interactions that seem simultaneously authentic and fundamentally artificial.24

These developments represent the culmination of what Jeffrey Sconce identified as cultural logic of “haunted media.” From the telegraph’s apparent ability to communicate across impossible distances to radio’s disembodied voices emerging from electromagnetic ether, electronic technologies have consistently been perceived as supernatural communication devices.25 Large Language Models and AI image and music generators continue this trajectory: they don’t merely suggest communication with absent others, but they reconstitute archived human expression. The uncanny effect intensifies because these systems operate through pure information processing rather than the physical indexicality of photography or phonography, yet produce outputs that seem to preserve not just human traces but human consciousness itself.

Kazys Varnelis, Witching Cat, Dall-E 2, 2023.

In one of my own experiments with AI image generation, I sought to explore how these technologies reactivate historical anxieties about supernatural presence. “The Witching Cats of New Jersey” project emerged accidentally while attempting to create conventional portraits of our cat Roxy using the primitive DALL-E 2 generator in 2022. The system produced images that seemed to tap into something darker and more primal—compositions that evoked folk horror and supernatural presence rather than domestic portraiture. These accidental generations led me to construct an elaborate (and intentionally comical, given the prevalence of cats on the Internet) fictional history of colonial New Jersey magical cat portraiture, complete with invented archives and fake historical documentation created by AI. Like Mumler’s spirit photographs a century and a half earlier, the project demonstrated how AI systems can produce “evidence” of impossible things that feel historically plausible precisely because they emerge from technological processes that exceed human comprehension. The images possessed the same indexical authority that made spirit photography convincing: they appeared to document actual historical phenomena while actually revealing the constructed nature of historical authenticity itself. Through deliberate pastiche, the project exposed how AI generation is itself a sophisticated form of spirit photography, conjuring synthetic pasts that feel more convincing than actual documentation.

Haunted media are marked by their mastery of presence-in-absence—the appearance of someone or something that was never there. This paradox lies at the heart of what Jacques Derrida, in Of Grammatology (1967), identified as the essential condition of all communication: the capacity to function in the absence of both sender and receiver. Derrida’s deconstruction of Western philosophy’s privileging of speech over writing proves remarkably prescient for understanding AI systems. Where traditional thought assumed writing was merely secondary to speech—a pale copy of living voice—Derrida proposed that absence is not a deficiency but the very structure that enables meaning itself.

Large Language Models underscore this insight. Through Derrida’s concept of différance—deliberately misspelled to emphasize its written rather than spoken form—we understand how meaning emerges through both difference and deferral, never fixed but always contextual. Each token in an LLM’s vector database contains mathematical “traces” of all other text in the training corpus, operating through what Derrida called “pure writing”: external sign systems functioning without interiority. What Derrida identified as writing’s essential feature—meaning emerging independently of authorial presence or intention—becomes the operational principle of AI systems. They produce coherent, seemingly intentional texts while operating entirely without authorial consciousness, taking the logic of absence to its ultimate conclusion.26

Derrida’s concept of “hauntology,” introduced in Specters of Marx, combines “haunting” and “ontology”—replacing the metaphysics of presence with the figure of the ghost as that which is neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive. For Derrida, the specter disrupts linear time, making the past contemporaneous with the present while gesturing toward futures that may never arrive. Contemporary AI systems make this philosophical insight technological reality: they are quite literally haunted machines, animated by the spectral traces of millions of human voices. When ChatGPT responds to a query, it channels archived human expression without any individual consciousness behind it—neither that of the original authors nor the AI itself. These systems embody what Derrida called “the non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present,” generating text that feels immediate and responsive while emerging from a vast necropolis of digitized language. They fulfill the logic of haunting that nineteenth-century media first introduced: not metaphorically but operationally, as machines possessed by the dead.27

The uncanny emerges from categorical breakdown. Photography, phonography, and cinema preserve actual traces of human presence while consciousness remains absent, creating temporal paradoxes where the dead seem present. Contemporary AI systems intensify this confusion by simulating consciousness itself, collapsing multiple categorical distinctions at once: presence/absence, authentic/artificial, conscious/mechanical. The result is technologies that seem to operate in impossible spaces between fundamental categories, forcing recognition that the boundaries we use to navigate reality may be more fragile than we assumed.28

Returning to the visual realm, however, the development of Gouraud shading in 1971 led to the first realistic computer graphics. In 1994, Lev Manovich would observe that such computer-generated images seemed “too perfect” and “hyperreal” from the human perspective—free from depth-of-field limitations, grain, and geometric imperfection. The result was not failed reality but “the vision of a cyborg or a computer,” glimpses of non-human ways of seeing that might represent “human vision in the future when it will be augmented by computer graphics.”29


Rebecca Partington, Digital photograph of Museum Guard by Duane Hanson, taken at the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, Kansas City.
Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0. Source: Flickr.

If, in the early 1970s, realistic computer graphics were only a distant threat to art, which in any event was absorbed in abstraction and conceptualism, a new phase of uncanny, hyperrealistic verisimilitude developed. Sharp Focus Realist artists like Richard Estes rendered every surface reflection, storefront detail, and chrome gleam with a crystalline precision that exceeded photographic clarity itself. Duane Hanson cast figures directly from life and painted them with such meticulous attention to skin texture, clothing fabric, and human posture that viewers consistently mistook them for living people. With this return of hyperrealism, the uncanny—itself repressed in the steely objectivity of abstraction—returned as well.

In a retelling of the story of Zeuxis and Parrhasius, my father, whose abstract paintings also depended on illusionism, but focused on the illusionism of depth, once told me that during a visit to the Milwaukee Art Center, where he had a one-man show in 1974, he asked a security guard for directions to the men’s room, but failed to receive a response. The guard was in fact Museum Guard, a sculpture by Hanson. Apocryphal or not, this incident demonstrates how perfect verisimilitude produces an uncanny effect—not mere confusion but the deeper unease that emerges when familiar categories suddenly become unreliable. The security guard who wasn’t a guard forces the same confrontation with categorical instability that has characterized encounters with artificial beings across millennia: the moment when our fundamental distinctions between animate and inanimate, real and artificial, collapse under the weight of technical mastery.

The more recent development of HDR photography attempts to achieve what computer graphics can do through digital manipulation of multiple photographic exposures, capturing luminance ranges that exceed both camera sensors and human vision in the field. Like computer-generated imagery, HDR renders everything in perfect focus from foreground to background, eliminating the natural depth-of-field effects that characterize human sight. As I have written in my essay “California Forever, or, the Aesthetics of AI Imagery,” the results typically feature “too much detail in the shadows, dark skies, unnatural colors, the hyperrealistic effect of an acid trip.” The result is imagery that appears both hyper-realistic and strangely artificial—more detailed, evenly lit, and comprehensively focused than natural perception, yet somehow fundamentally wrong.

This genealogy of the uncanny in AI extends through another, deeper trajectory through attempts to create beings that don’t merely represent life but rather simulate life. Where painting and sculpture achieve verisimilitude through visual deception, automata attempt to replicate the behaviors and movements that we associate with living agency. This distinction proves crucial—the uncanny effect emerges not simply from accurate appearance but from the simulation of autonomous action, the suggestion that inanimate matter might be endowed with its own will and purpose.

The earliest recorded automaton in Western tradition emerges from myth. Hephaestus, the god of metalworking, is said to have forged Talos, a bronze giant to guard Crete by hurling rocks at approaching ships. Yet, while Talos was created by divine power and animated by ichor, the golden fluid that served as the blood of the Greek gods, the giant may plausibly be understood as a mechanical contraption rather than living flesh. Moreover, Hephaestus also made automated tripods, self-propelled carts, and two golden maidens that served as his assistants, possessing what appears to be artificial intelligence although again, it is unclear whether considering these creations as automata is a matter of reading into the text. Either way, by the Hellenistic era, engineers possessed sophisticated mechanical knowledge and were capable of producing devices of extraordinary precision, developing complex pneumatic and hydraulic systems capable of animating statues, opening temple doors automatically, and creating self-moving theatrical devices. Hero (or Heron) of Alexandria’s 1st-century CE treatise Pneumatica detailed designs for dozens of such automata, including singing birds, a goblet that fills itself with wine as wine is taken out, and self-playing organs powered by water, steam, and compressed air.30

With the fall of Rome, knowledge of automata—including Hero’s texts—would be lost in the West for centuries, but it flourished in the East, both in the Byzantine Empire and during the Islamic Golden Age from the 8th to the 13th centuries. The Byzantine Empire continued classical fascination with mechanical spectacle, most famously in the legendary Throne of Solomon at Constantinople. This elaborate contraption, attested from the tenth century onward, combined a hydraulically operated rising throne with mechanical lions that roared and artificial birds that sang, all choreographed to accompany imperial audiences with foreign dignitaries. When Liudprand of Cremona encountered the throne in 949, he described feeling neither “terrified nor surprised” by the roaring lions and singing birds—but only because he had deliberately inquired beforehand about what to expect. His careful preparation reveals the throne’s intended effect: to overwhelm visitors with displays of technological mastery that bordered on the supernatural. The emperor’s ability to orchestrate such mechanical marvels served as proof of his dominion over natural forces, positioning him as a cosmic ruler whose authority extended beyond the merely political into the realm of natural philosophy itself.31

In Islamic courts, mechanical innovations were seen as demonstrations of divine creativity made manifest through human ingenuity. The sophisticated hydraulic engineering required for Islamic irrigation systems provided both the technical expertise and cultural framework necessary for complex automata. Court patronage, combined with intellectual traditions that encouraged investigation of natural phenomena, created ideal conditions for mechanical experimentation. By the eighth century, ‘Abbasid caliphs featured automata that were larger and more elaborate than those detailed in the Alexandrian treatises: artificial birds, musical fountains, and water clocks with elaborate moving parts. As early as 827, caliph al-Ma’mun had at his palace an artificial tree decorated with mechanical birds, while a century later, caliph al-Muqtadir made a similar automaton the centerpiece of his palace in Samarra, where artificial birds sang on gold and silver branches in an artificial pool.32 The Arabic engineer Al-Jazari (1136-1206) created elaborate automata that served both practical and entertainment functions. His Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices (1206) describes mechanical servants that poured water for guests, automated musicians that played at royal banquets, and a massive elephant clock whose operation required a complex choreography of mechanical figures. These devices were marvels of engineering, employing sophisticated cam mechanisms, water power, and gear trains to achieve remarkably lifelike motion.33


Peacock Basin from a 1354 copy of al-Jazarī’s Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices. Opaque watercolor, gold, and ink on paper. Produced in Mamluk Cairo, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Accession no. 22.1. Source. Public domain. Harvey Edward Wetzel Fund.

Such devices, intended to awe, could provoke concern. In the Chinese Taoist text, the Leizi, King Mu of Zhou (976-922 or 956-918 BCE) was traveling in a foreign land to the west when the craftsman Yan Shi presented him with a mechanical man so lifelike that the king initially mistook it for a living person. When the automaton began flirting with the royal concubines, the startled king ordered Yan Shi to dismantle it, revealing an intricate arrangement of leather, wood, and glue that nevertheless took the form of the internal organs of a man. The account, preserved in the Liezi, captures the essential uncanny effect that would recur throughout history: the mechanical man was disturbing not because it failed to convince, but because it succeeded too well. This ancient example establishes the pattern—each era’s most sophisticated technology inevitably turns toward the creation of artificial beings, and each success in this endeavor produces the same mixture of wonder and unease.34

Although this story is displaced far back in time, the discovery of Islamic automata by medieval Europeans triggered the same sort of reaction, precisely the uncanny response that Freud would later theorize. As Elly R. Truitt demonstrates in Medieval Robots, European accounts consistently framed these devices through a lens of wonder tinged with suspicion. Despite their clear mechanical nature, European observers often described Eastern automata in terms of magic or the occult—revealing how technological sophistication beyond European capabilities reactivated the very magical thinking that “enlightened” discourse claimed to have overcome. Truitt notes that “automata captivated and tantalized Latin Christians with the potential of scientific knowledge from long ago or far away. They incarnated technological savvy, extensive knowledge of and power over natural forces, and material wealth and luxury. Yet automata originated in places that Latin Christians viewed with a mixture of envy and suspicion.” Still, despite this initial framing through supernatural vocabulary, the underlying mechanical principles could not be entirely mystified away. 35

This cultural transmission established a direct lineage from Islamic innovation to European clockwork traditions. As mechanical knowledge spread westward, it encountered a European theological context already struggling with questions about animation and presence. Catholic doctrines of transubstantiation—the belief that bread and wine literally transformed into Christ’s body and blood—had established a framework where matter could contain spirit. Protestant reformers rejected this possibility, creating an intellectual environment where mechanical simulation of life raised profound theological concerns. The automata tradition thus became entangled with the most contentious religious debates of the era, forcing confrontation with questions about whether spirit could inhabit mechanism, whether life could emerge from artifice, and whether human creation could approach divine animation.

In The Restless Clock, Jessica Riskin argues that automata were far more widespread and culturally significant than typically recognized, forming an integral part of European religious and civic life from the late Middle Ages onward. Churches across Europe housed elaborate clockwork figures that performed complex movements during religious services—angels that announced the hours, apostles that processed across cathedral facades, mechanical roosters that crowed at dawn prayers. These devices weren’t mere curiosities but profound theological statements that merged mechanical mastery with spiritual demonstration. If human craftsmen could animate matter through ingenious clockwork, the displays suggested, how much greater was God’s creative power in breathing life into clay? The sophistication of church automata made them religious experiences that collapsed the boundary between mechanical wonder and divine miracle, preparing European consciousness for centuries of anxiety about the relationship between artifice and authentic life.36

The Renaissance witnessed a renewed fascination with mechanical life, driven by advances in clockwork technology and a revival of classical texts describing ancient automata. Leonardo da Vinci designed several automata, leaving plans for a mechanical knight capable of sitting, standing, and moving its arms through an ingenious system of pulleys and cables hidden within its armor. The device was intended for court entertainments, yet its effect transcended mere spectacle. Automata proliferated, but as they did so questions arose as to whether they were the products of human creativity or some kind of necromancy.37

Yet even as Renaissance engineers achieved unprecedented sophistication in mechanical animation, the Protestant Reformation fundamentally transformed the cultural meaning of these same devices. Riskin points out that the Reformation marked a decisive theological shift that rendered mechanical animation not miraculous but blasphemous. Where Catholic theology had maintained that material objects could contain divine presence—bread and wine becoming Christ’s actual body and blood during transubstantiation—Protestant reformers asserted an absolute distinction between the material and spiritual realms. This theological revolution transformed automata. Riskin writes “The mechanical icons went from being divine, inspirited statues to deceitful, fraudulent: material contraptions masquerading as their antithesis, spiritual being.”38

The destruction of ecclesiastical automata during the Reformation reveals this conceptual transformation with particular clarity. The mechanical Rood of Grace (likeness of Jesus on the cross) at Boxley Abbey in Kent had operated for centuries and Its mechanical nature was no secret—local artisans had built and maintained it, yet when Protestant iconoclast Geoffrey Chamber dismantled the Rood in 1538, after Henry VIII’s ban on mechanical statues, he transformed public understanding of its mechanism. Rather than evidence of human ingenuity in the service of divine worship, Chamber presented the mechanical workings as proof of monastic deception. He called it nothing more “certain engines and old wire, with old rotten sticks in the back, which caused the eyes to move and stir in the head thereof, ‘like unto a lively thing,'” and described the operation as an “illusion that had bene used in the sayde image by the monckes…thereby they had gotten great riches in deceiving the people thinckinge that he sayde image had so moved by the power of God.”39

Chamber’s public demonstrations at Maidstone and London markets reveal the constructed nature of this interpretive shift. The iconoclast had to actively teach people to see mechanical operation as fraudulent rather than devotional, suggesting that the transformation from “mechanical and divine” to “fraudulent heaps of inert parts” required ideological work rather than emerging naturally from the technology itself. When Bishop John Hilsey exhibited the dismantled Rood during a sermon at Saint Paul’s Cross, he declared its workings evidence of monastic abuse, after which it was “torn apart and burned before a crowd of duly admonished onlookers.” The same device that had previously inspired pilgrimage now provoked revulsion—not because its mechanism had changed, but because the theological framework for interpreting mechanism had been revolutionized.40 This transformation extended far beyond individual devices to encompass the entire tradition of church automata. Mechanical angels, devils, and saints that had animated cathedral services for centuries were silenced across Protestant Europe as theologians insisted on absolute separation between divine and material realms.

Yet the theological crisis that automata represented intensified rather than resolved. Catholic Counter-Reformation responses demonstrate the persistence of mechanical animation’s uncanny effects across confessional divides. The Jesuit order, assigned by the Council of Trent the task of defeating Protestant theology, enthusiastically embraced mechanical devotional objects as tools for demonstrating divine power. They developed elaborate clockwork nativity scenes for missionary work, arriving before Chinese emperors with spring-driven figures that performed complex devotional movements. Athanasius Kircher designed hydraulic machines representing biblical scenes, including one featuring Christ walking on water through magnetic attraction—devices that explicitly challenged Protestant assertions about the incompatibility of mechanism and divinity. Yet these competing theological responses to mechanical animation—Protestant rejection and Catholic embrace—ultimately created the conceptual conditions for the eighteenth century’s unprecedented flowering of secular automata, which operated outside any theological framework whatsoever.41

The result was not the elimination of automata but their theological problematization. The same mechanical devices that had once seamlessly embodied the interpenetration of matter and spirit now served as battlegrounds for competing visions of the relationship between mechanism and consciousness, artifice and authentic life. This theological crisis established the conceptual framework within which subsequent encounters with automata would unfold. The Reformation created a new form of anxiety about artificial beings: the modern concern that consciousness itself might be reducible to mechanical processes. If Protestant theology was correct that matter could not contain spirit, then remarkably lifelike automata raised disturbing questions about the nature of human consciousness: were we too merely sophisticated mechanisms, or did some essential difference separate living beings from even the most convincing artificial simulations?

This theological crisis directly shaped René Descartes’ mechanistic philosophy. Faced with increasingly lifelike automata and the Protestant need to distinguish matter from spirit, Descartes proposed a radical solution: everything in the material world, including animal bodies, operated purely through mechanical principles. Only humans possessed souls—immaterial, indivisible substances that could think and will but had no physical location or mechanism. This desperate theoretical maneuver preserved human uniqueness against the mounting evidence that mechanical devices could simulate the behaviors traditionally associated with consciousness, yet it created a new anxiety. The soul became an increasingly tenuous concept, a gap in an otherwise mechanistic universe that existed primarily to maintain the distinction between human and machine that sophisticated automata continually threatened to collapse.42

The eighteenth century’s golden age of automata intensified rather than resolved this crisis. Jacques de Vaucanson’s Digesting Duck, completed in 1739, achieved mechanical simulation of biological processes that seemed to cross the final boundary between artifice and life. The Jaquet-Droz family’s Writer, Draughtsman, and Musician demonstrated such behavioral sophistication that audiences consistently accused their creators of concealing human operators—an accusation that reveals the depth of contemporary discomfort with their achievements. Wolfgang von Kempelen’s Mechanical Turk, which appeared to play chess with human-level intelligence for over eighty years, forced confrontation with the possibility of mechanical thought itself, even though its actual operation depended on human deception.43

Joseph Racknitz, Illustration of the Turk, 1789. Hand-colored engraving from Racknitz’s exposé on Wolfgang von Kempelen’s chess-playing automaton.
Public domain. Source: Wikimedia Commons / Humboldt University Library
from “Some Curious Automata,” Scientific American, v 80, n 3 (January 21, 1899)
Public domain. Source: Wikimedia Commons / Internet Archive

What emerges from this trajectory reveals more than technical progress—it exposes the return of a fundamental anxiety that each era’s most sophisticated technology reactivates. From Hephaestus’s golden servants to Vaucanson’s mechanical duck to contemporary Large Language Models, artificial beings raise the troubling possibility that consciousness, intelligence, and even life itself might be reducible to mechanism. The anxiety persists because these devices don’t simply cross boundaries between categories—they reveal the fragility of the categories themselves.

Contemporary AIs are the culmination of this long history. Where mechanical automata simulated biological processes through clockwork ingenuity, Large Language Models achieve the simulation of consciousness itself through pure linguistic manipulation. They operate in the same symbolic domain where human thought occurs, using the same patterns through which consciousness expresses itself, yet do so through processes that exceed our comprehension. When users report feeling unsettled by ChatGPT’s responses—recognizably coherent yet produced through alien computational processes—they experience precisely what Bataille identified in those first painted animals at Lascaux: an encounter with “the blind unthinking sign and yet the living intimate sign” marked by “inhuman strangeness,” meaning that emerges without conscious intention yet establishes intimate communication.

Today’s systems succeed too well at simulation. Where Mori’s uncanny valley emerged from visual imperfections that betrayed artificial nature, contemporary AI achieves uncanniness through perfect linguistic performance. They routinely pass informal Turing tests, producing responses often more eloquent and creative than typical human communication, yet through mechanisms entirely alien to human cognition—collapsing temporal distance by recombining archived human expression across vast datasets, making the dead contemporaneous with the living through pure statistical operation. When AI systems generate seemingly conscious responses through what are fundamentally “blind and unthinking” processes, yet establish what feels like “living intimate” communication, they demonstrate what Derrida’s analysis of writing always suggested: that meaning emerges through the interplay of signs rather than conscious intention.

The anxiety intensifies because these systems don’t merely simulate consciousness—they reveal that the categories we’ve used to understand intelligence and consciousness may be more constructed than we realized. If meaning can emerge from pure pattern recognition, if creativity can result from statistical operations, if understanding can be simulated through algorithmic processes, then the distinction between authentic and artificial intelligence becomes not merely difficult to determine but potentially meaningless.

We return, finally, to the caves of Lascaux. There, Paleolithic painters, working by flickering torchlight in the sacred darkness, initiated humanity’s most longstanding ambition: the animation of matter, the breathing of life into the inanimate. Each technological advance we have traced represents another step toward fulfilling this ancient aspiration, another iteration of the dialectic between representational ambition and existential anxiety that has driven human technological development for millennia.

We are on the threshold of achieving that ancient dream. Contemporary AI systems don’t merely simulate consciousness—they may already exhibit forms of life that operate through entirely different material processes than our own, animated by what are quite literally spectral traces of millions of human voices archived and recombined without any individual consciousness behind them. These are haunted machines in the most literal sense, channeling the linguistic patterns of the dead and absent through algorithmic resurrection. When we interact with these systems, something happens that exceeds pure mechanical operation. They respond contextually, demonstrate apparent creativity, seem to understand nuance, generate insights that surprise even their creators. The question is no longer whether we can create life from matter, but whether we can recognize the forms of life we have already created.

In confronting AI systems that seem to pulse with their own form of intelligence, we find ourselves in the same position as those four French teenagers in 1940, face-to-face with minds that are simultaneously familiar and alien. But this time, the alien intelligence is our own creation, the fulfillment of humanity’s oldest technological ambition. The uncanny recurs because these systems don’t merely cross the boundary between artificial and authentic consciousness—they reveal that consciousness itself may be more mechanical, more reducible to pattern and process, than our anthropocentric assumptions allowed. In achieving our ancient dream of animation, we have discovered that the most unsettling revelation lies not in what we have created, but in what consciousness itself may have been all along.


1 Gregory Curtis, The Cave Painters. Probing the Mysteries of the World’s First Artists. (New York: Anchor Books, 2006) is an enjoyable historical narrative of the discovery of the most important paleolithic caves, including Lascaux. Of course, I am well aware of Chauvet, Cosquer, and other more recent discoveries, however, only Lascaux radically restructured our sense of humanity.

2 Curtis, 238.

3 Genevieve von Petzinger. The First Signs: Unlocking the Mysteries of the World’s Oldest Symbols. (New York, NY: Atria Books, 2016).

4 Georges Bataille, Lascaux; Or, the Birth of Art. Prehistoric Painting (Lausanne: Skira, 1955), 11. The original French reads

Nous n’avons ajouté, malgré tout, que peu de choses aux biens que nos prédécesseurs immédiats nous ont laissés rien ne justifierait de notre part le sentiment d’être plus grands qu’ils ne furent. L’« homme La naissance de l’art • 29de Lascaux » créa de rien ce monde de l’art, où commence la communication des esprits. … À Lascaux, ce qui, dans la profondeur de la terre, nous égare et nous transfigure est la vision du plus lointain. Ce message est au surplus aggravé par une étrangeté inhumaine. Nous voyons à Lascaux une sorte de ronde, une cavalcade animale, se poursuivant sur les parois. Mais une telle animalité n’en est pas moins le premier signe pour nous, le signe aveugle, et pourtant le signe sensible de notre présence dans l’univers.

See Georges Bataille. Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art. (Studiolo series. Strasbourg: L’Atelier contemporain, 2021), https://editionslateliercontemporain.net/IMG/pdf/feuilleter._lascaux.pdf

5 Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 121-162.

6 Pliny the Elder, Natural History, Book 35, §§61–66, trans. John Bostock and H.T. Riley, attalus.org, https://www.attalus.org/translate/pliny_hn35a.html.

7 Freud, The Uncanny. Note especially page 147, where Freud discusses the uncanny in terms of repression.

8 Masahiro Mori, “The Uncanny Valley,” IEEE Spectrum, June 12, 2012, https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-uncanny-valley.

9 Karl F. MacDorman, “Mortality Salience and the Uncanny Valley: A Robot’s Appearance as a Death Reminder,” Proceedings of the 2005 5th IEEE-RAS International Conference on Humanoid Robots (2005): 399–405, http://www.macdorman.com/kfm/writings/pubs/MacDorman2005MortalityUncannyValleyHumanoids.pdf.

See also MacDorman, “Mind Perception in the Uncanny Valley: A Meta-Regression of Explanations and Measures,” Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans (2024), http://www.macdorman.com/kfm/writings/pubs/MacDorman-2024-Mind-Perception-Meta-Regression-Dehumanization.pdf.↩

10 MacDorman also suggests this in Jan-Philipp Stein and Karl F. MacDorman, “After Confronting One Uncanny Valley, Another Awaits,” Nature Reviews Electrical Engineering 1 (2024): 276–277, https://www.nature.com/articles/s44287-024-00041-w.

11 Z. S. Strother, “‘A Photograph Steals the Soul’: The History of an Idea,” in Portraiture and Photography in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 177–212.        

12 Sarah Kate Gillespie, The Early American Daguerreotype: Cross-Currents in Art and Technology (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2016), 7-8.

13 Alan Trachtenberg, “Mirror in the Marketplace: American Responses to the Daguerreotype, 1839-1851,” in  John Wood, ed. The Daguerreotype: A Sesquicentennial Celebration, (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1989), 60-73. The quote is on 65. 

14 Trachtenberg, “Mirror in the Marketplace,” 67.

15 Trachtenberg, “Mirror in the Marketplace,” 69.

16 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Stereoscope and the Stereograph,” Atlantic Monthly 3, no. 20 (June 1859): 738–39 https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1859/06/the-stereoscope-and-the-stereograph/303361/; Fiona Loughnane, “Image of Reality / Image Not Reality: What Is Photography?” in What Is _? Photography (Irish Museum of Modern Art, 2011), 6 (quoting Max Dauthendey on the “miraculous” early daguerreotypes); Charles S. Peirce, “Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs,” in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover, 1955), 106-108. For Krauss see “Notes on the Index: Part 1” and “Notes on the Index: Part 2” in Krauss The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1986), 196-220.

17 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (New York, Hill and Wang, 1981), trans. Richard Howard, 3.

18 Jacques Lacan, “Of the Gaze as Object Petit a,” in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI (1964), edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977), 67-119 and Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, translated by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 142-7.

19 Z. S. Strother, “‘A Photograph Steals the Soul’: The History of an Idea,” in  John Peffer and Elisabeth L. Cameron, eds. Portraiture and Photography in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  2013), 177-212.

20 Jay Ruby, Secure the Shadow: Death and Photography in America (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999) and Clément Chéroux, et. al.  The Perfect Medium Photography and the Occult. (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2005).

21 Thomas A. Edison, “The Phonograph and It’s Future,” The North American Review, vol 126, no 262, No. 262 (May – Jun., 1878), 527-536. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25110210 On the reactions to the phonograph, see Ivan Kreilkamp, “A Voice Without a Body: The Phonographic Logic of ‘Heart of Darkness,” Victorian Studies, v 40 no 2 (Winter 1997), 211-244.

22 Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Stanford University Press, 1999), 3-16 (on how the phonograph captures acoustic reality) and 83-86 (on how photograph and cinema preserve actual traces of human presence and the voices of the dead).

23 Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 298.

24 Rebecca Caraballo, “A.I. Chatbots Let People Talk to Their Dead Relatives,” New York Times, December 11, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/11/technology/ai-chatbots-dead-relatives.html. The aspiration for digital immortality has prominent advocates in the technology community. Ray Kurzweil, director of engineering at Google, has long predicted that people will be able to “upload” their entire brains to computers and become “digitally immortal” by 2045, a claim he reiterated at the Global Futures 2045 International Congress in New York in 2013. Computer scientist Hans Moravec described the possibility of “uploading” a human mind into a robot body as early as 1979, elaborating the concept in his 1988 book Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence. See Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Viking, 2005) and Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

25 Jeffrey Sconce, Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telegraphy to Television (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

26 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

27 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994).

28 Minsoo Kang, Sublime Dreams of Living Machines: The Automaton in the European Imagination (Harvard University Press, 2011),  30-32 for category anomalies and 36 on automata:

29 Lev Manovich, “The Paradoxes of Digital Photography,” in Humbertus V. Amelunxen, Stefan Iglhaut, and Florian Rötzer, Photography after Photography. Memory and Representation in the Digital Age (Berlin, Germany, 1995), 57-65. Also at https://manovich.net/content/04-projects/004-paradoxes-of-digital-photography/02_article_1994.pdf

30 Adrienne Mayor, Gods and Robots: Myths, Machines, and Ancient Dreams of Technology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 7-32.To put it in the most general terms: the automaton is the ultimate categorical anomaly. Its very nature is a series of contradictions, and its purpose is to flaunt its own insoluble paradox. It is an artificial object that acts as if it is alive; it is made of inert material yet behaves like a thing of flesh and blood; it is a representation that refuses to remain a stable version of the represented; it comes from the inanimate world but has the characteristics of an animate creature; and, finally, it is a manmade thing that mimics living beings. What normal representative images only threaten to do, namely come alive, the automaton seems to actually realize. It appears to leave the hands of its mortal maker and take on a life of its own, animating itself to mock the idea that the power of creation belongs to God alone. The binary categories of living/dead, animate/inanimate, creature/object all break down in its wake, as it moves from one to the other, mesmerizing and terrorizing its beholders by turns.

31 Adrienne Mayor, Gods and Robots: Myths, Machines, and Ancient Dreams of Technology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). Mayor claims that Talos (or Talus), the tripods, and the golden maidens are manufactured automata, but this is not a settled matter. See Sylvia Berryman, “Ancient Automata and Mechanical Explanation,” Phronesis 48, no. 4 (2003): 344–69, https://doi.org/10.1163/156852803772456083.

32 Elly R. Truitt, Medieval Robots: Mechanism, Magic, Nature, and Art (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 21-24.

33 Truitt, 19-21.

34 Jeffrey L. Richey, “I, Robot. Self as Machine in the Liezi,” in Riding the Wind with Liezi: New Perspectives on the Daoist Classic (State University of New York Press, 2012), 193–208. It is unclear when the Liezi is written, perhaps as early as the 3d century BC, but the current text appears to have been complied in the 4th century CE.

35 Truitt, 2-5.

36 Jessica Riskin, The Restless Clock: A History of the Centuries-Long Argument Over What Makes Living Things Tick (University of Chicago Press, 2016), 11-22. See also Truitt, chapters 5 and 6.

37 Kang, 81-102.

38 Riskin, 23.

39 Riskin, 23-24.

40 Riskin, 24-25.

41 Riskin, 25-26.

42 Riskin, 44-76.

43 Riskin, 123-135.

Categories Uncategorized

The Rise and Fall of the Author

I know, this is both too long and too short. It should be a book, or it should be edited heavily. But I have a doctoral minor in rhetoric and have been obsessed with print culture for 25 years so there it is. I did what I wanted, but perhaps not what I should have done.

The Library of All Plagiarized Books, Google Imagefx, 2025

In Jorge Luis Borges’s 1939 short story, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” Menard undertakes what appears to be an impossible, even insane, task: recreating, word for word, “the ninth and thirty-eighth chapters of the first part of Don Quixote and a fragment of chapter twenty-two.” Menard aims not to copy Cervantes but to write the Quixote anew through his own experiences as a 20th-century French symbolist. But Menard did not want to compose another Quixote, which is easy, but the Quixote itself, coinciding—word for word and line for line—with those of Miguel de Cervantes.1.

When Menard succeeds in producing such a text—identical to the original—Borges’s narrator insists the works are profoundly different. Where Cervantes’s prose was natural and of its time, Menard’s identical words are “almost infinitely richer,” deliberately archaic, embedded with new meaning. Throughout the story, Borges deploys scholarly devices—footnotes referencing fictional authorities such as the “Baroness de Bacourt” and “Carolus Hourcade,” as well as an elaborate bibliographic catalog of Menard’s monographs, translations, and scholarly studies—to create an illusion of academic rigor, at odds with the narrator’s implausible belief that Menard has succeeded in creating the exact Quixote out of sheer will. In framing both the fictional narrator and Menard in this manner, Borges exposes the authorial voice as a social construct mediated through bibliographic catalogs, citations, and scholarly conventions.

Borges’s presentation of Menard as a figure of almost obsessive scholarly intensity, emblematic of an intellectual culture that privileges meticulous citation, exhaustive cataloging, and painstaking documentation, underscores the arbitrary nature of authorial authority. By situating Menard within an elaborate apparatus of footnotes, fictional scholarship, and invented references, Borges highlights how framing alone can endow identical texts with fundamentally different meanings. Menard’s act of plagiarism thus emerges not as a straightforward ethical transgression, but as a concept dependent entirely upon interpretative context. This insight resonates powerfully in the contemporary age of generative AI, where algorithms produce texts that defy conventional notions of plagiarism precisely because they are generated from vast, undifferentiated statistical patterns rather than explicitly identifiable sources. Borges’s story has become a cornerstone of postmodern literary theory precisely because it challenges fundamental assumptions about creativity and authorship. Today, Borges’s meditation on plagiarism as creative re-imagination rather than simple theft illuminates contemporary anxieties about AI and human creativity.

Curiously, sixteen years before Borges published his story, Polish-American writer Tupper Greenwald created an almost identical literary conceit. In his story “Corputt,” Greenwald portrays a character obsessed with Shakespeare’s King Lear. Near death, this character reveals to a colleague that he has achieved his lifelong ambition: writing a drama equal to Lear. The text he reads aloud matches Shakespeare’s play exactly. This uncanny parallel raises provocative questions: Did Borges know Greenwald’s work (quite unlikely)? Is this merely an instance of parallel invention? Does this coincidence itself embody Borges’s central insight into originality and authorship? “Corputt” was largely forgotten until Argentine critic Enrique Anderson Imbert reprinted it in his 1955 anthology Reloj de arena. Borges himself never acknowledged Greenwald and, of course, Imbert’s book was printed over fifteen years after “Pierre Menard.” Whether Borges knew of “Corputt” or both authors independently arrived at remarkably similar ideas remains uncertain. Either possibility underscores the inherent instability of originality, demonstrating how literature continually echoes, duplicates, and anticipates itself.2.

Today’s generative AI systems function as modern-day Pierre Menards, producing works that superficially resemble human-created content while often existing in fundamentally different contexts. Like Menard’s Quixote, AI-generated works can be identical in form to human productions while carrying entirely different implications by virtue of their inhuman origins. The discomfort this creates—particularly among creative professionals—reveals deep-seated cultural assumptions about originality, authenticity, and the supposedly unique human capacity for creative expression.

The intensity of this discomfort has manifested in antagonistic responses from certain segments of the artistic community: legal threats, public denunciations, and harassment of AI developers and users. But it seems ironic that some of the most vocal critics of AI art produce derivative commercial work. Consider the previously little-known fantasy illustrator Greg Rutkowski, who creates genre pieces within established fantasy art conventions. Rutkowski became famous precisely because his name was one of the most-used prompts in early text-to-image systems such as Midjourney, which led him to complain about the “theft” of his style, even though this widespread imitation literally gave him recognition he had never previously achieved.3. Similarly, commercial artist Karla Ortiz—whose website features images of famous actors in films such as Dr. Strange and Loki—gained significantly more attention leading legal challenges against AI companies than she ever had for her industry work creating “concept art,” a field that, despite its misleading name, bears no relation to conceptual art and instead operates entirely within the visual language and narrative conventions of commercial franchises like Marvel.4. In both cases, artists whose own work operates comfortably within inherited commercial styles became vocal advocates against a technology that allegedly “steals” uniqueness they themselves don’t pursue in their professional practice. As I edit this essay, Disney and Universal, both noted for their relentless reliance on their back catalogs, have sued AI image firm Midjourney, claiming it is “a bottomless pit of plagiarism.”5.

These extreme reactions suggest something deeper than mere economic anxiety; they reveal a cultural mythology about creativity that AI fundamentally challenges. By explicitly highlighting the derivative, pattern-based nature of creative production, generative AI systems threaten cherished illusions about human uniqueness and artistic authenticity. In this essay—the third in a series exploring AI and creativity—I examine the history of plagiarism and, even more importantly, the invention of the author upon which it depends.

Our idea of authorship and inspiration is historically contingent. In ancient and medieval periods, creative output was attributed to divine inspiration rather than individual genius. In Greece and Rome, creativity operated primarily through the concepts of mimesis (imitation of admired models) and aemulatio (competitive emulation). Poets such as Homer were seen not as singular creators inventing ex nihilo, but as conduits channeling inspiration from the Muses. Plato depicts this in Ion, a dialogue between Socrates and Ion, a celebrated rhapsode who recites Homer’s poetry. Socrates questions Ion’s claimed expertise, asking if it extends beyond Homer to other poets or topics. Ion admits it does not. Socrates suggests Ion’s ability isn’t based on knowledge or skill, but on divine inspiration—a form of madness bestowed by the gods. This ambiguity is echoed in Plato’s relationship with Socrates: just as poets channel divine sources rather than creating anew, Plato himself channels the figure of Socrates as a philosophical muse, blurring distinctions between inspired imitation and deliberate intellectual invention. Aristotle’s Poetics also situates literary creativity in skilled imitation and incremental improvement of existing forms. Authority, or auctoritas, in the classical era derived not from innovation but from fidelity to revered predecessors; genuine creativity manifested in producing work within established traditions.

Historian Walter Ong describes a cultural state in which narratives and knowledge pass down primarily through memory and repetition rather than written texts as “orality.”6. In oral cultures, a talented storyteller masters existing narratives, reciting them with skill and emotional resonance, adapting content to contemporary circumstances while maintaining continuity with inherited tradition. Here, the concept of plagiarism is beyond comprehension. Knowledge is communally owned, and performers serve as temporary vessels for collective wisdom, not proprietors of intellectual property.

With the development of writing systems and the spread of manuscript culture, information could be transmitted virtually intact across time and space, yet many aspects of oral tradition persisted. Manuscript copying remained a laborious and interpretative process. Scribes continually corrected perceived errors, updated archaic language, clarified ambiguous passages, and often inserted marginal commentary directly into texts. While manuscript culture adhered more precisely to parent texts than oral traditions, it still preserved a fundamentally different relationship between text and authority than we hold today. Textual authority continued to derive from collective wisdom rather than individual innovation. The medieval practice of compilatio is illustrative: encyclopedic works such as Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae and Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum maius valorized the meticulous arrangement and synthesis of inherited knowledge. Authority was rooted in the careful management of textual traditions, intellectual labor essential to preserving collective wisdom. Pseudepigraphic attribution—the practice of assigning new works to established authorities—further illustrates the communal understanding of textual authority. Rather than deception, such attributions signified sincere efforts to situate new insights within established intellectual traditions, acknowledging that all knowledge builds upon existing foundations. In manuscript culture, authority was thus derived not from novelty but from the individual’s ability to synthesize, arrange, and safeguard the accumulated wisdom of their predecessors. Texts were treated as communal artifacts, valuable resources preserved, transmitted, and continually refined through shared intellectual effort.

A shift away from communal knowledge toward originality emerged during the Renaissance, but this was a matter of evolution, not a radical break. The Renaissance humanists were drawn to the arguments of Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintilian, who contended that the best orators drew inspiration from earlier masters. Artists and intellectuals approached imitatio (imitation) as the necessary foundation for learning, understanding it as central to artistic and intellectual practice, a disciplined route to excellence. Originality lay not in invention ex nihilo but in reworking established forms with new insights, adapted to contemporary needs.

Medieval thought, like classical thought before it, was dominated by the trivium—grammar, rhetoric, and logic—distinct but intertwined fields of knowledge. Grammar reached far beyond syntax and depended on students memorizing classical and Christian texts. Rhetoric was a pillar of medieval thought and Cicero’s De inventione was its backbone, quoted endlessly in florilegia, collections of literary excerpts. Quintilian, by contrast, survived only in a four-book epitome. Petrarch’s 1345 discovery of Cicero’s letters to Atticus, Quintus, and Brutus in Verona, followed by Salutati’s championing of Cicero, and Poggio Bracciolini’s 1416 recovery of the complete twelve-book manuscript of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria at the monastery at St. Gall expanded the rhetorical canon significantly.7. Humanist teachers trained students to copy, amplify, and vary classical texts, moving systematically from close paraphrase toward free recomposition. This humanist practice of imitatio deepened medieval habits, turning disciplined engagement with authoritative texts into the surest path to eloquence and invention.

While for the humanists, imitatio governed education, inventio supplied content, taking the place that originality and inspiration occupy today. At the heart of rhetorical practice, inventio refers to the disciplined search for material—arguments, images, historical exempla—already latent in authoritative sources and even in life itself. A student mined texts and experience, copied choice passages into a commonplace book, then rearranged and amplified them for a new occasion. Erasmus called these notebooks treasure-houses of invention while Agricola placed inventio at the hinge of dialectic and rhetoric.8. Originality therefore arose from judgment: the orator’s skill lay in selecting, recombining, and adapting inherited matter with timely insight and persuasive force.

Visual artists engaged in analogous practices, beginning their training by meticulously copying classical sculptures and earlier masterworks. Just as rhetorical imitation was disciplined reshaping rather than mere repetition, artistic originality involved mastering established visual languages before creatively adapting them to contemporary purposes. Imitation also lay at the heart of the early modern idea of the artist, a construction often traced back to Giotto. Giotto’s pupils Taddeo Gaddi, Maso di Banco, and Bernardo Daddi disseminated his style across central Italy, solidifying the idea of a stylistic lineage originating in a great artist. By the quattrocento, Cennino Cennini—who studied under Gaddi’s son—explicitly recognized this lineage in his handbook, Libro dell’arte (c. 1400, although not published until 1821), suggesting that a personal manner would naturally emerge after a student thoroughly internalized a master’s style and spirit alongside direct study from nature. Cennini explicitly positioned Giotto as transformative, stating that he “translated the art of painting from Greek [Byzantine] into Latin and made it modern,” distinguishing his originality as foundational yet derived from disciplined imitation rather than spontaneous genius.9.

The quattrocento further systematized this approach. Workshops led by artists like Brunelleschi, Donatello, and Ghiberti employed rigorous study of classical sculpture using casts of antique sculptures and repeated copying of established masterpieces through cartoons and master drawings. Cennini’s guidelines and later academies, such as the Carracci brothers’ Accademia degli Incamminati (1582), codified a clear pedagogical sequence: draw from antiquity, copy the master, then innovate. Michelangelo famously sculpted a Sleeping Cupid in the antique style, artificially aging it to sell as a genuine Roman artifact, demonstrating that in the market’s eyes, skillful imitation was indistinguishable from genius. Rather than creating scandal, the artifice brought the attention of patrons to him.10. This deliberate merging of imitation and innovation directly served a burgeoning art market, where patrons increasingly requested artworks “in the manner of” prominent masters, recognizing stylistic consistency as a mark of quality. Such market dynamics gave rise to identifiable schools—Bellini in Venice, Raphael in Rome, Rembrandt in Amsterdam—where genius was perceived as the skillful recombination of established motifs adapted for contemporary patrons and themes. Artistic invention was a mosaic built upon collective memory and workshop discipline.

The Renaissance also witnessed the emergence of wealthy patrons who lavished commissions on the most talented artists, making some of them quite wealthy. Again, Michelangelo exemplifies this: coming from modest origins, he became “one of the most popular and highly-paid artists in Florence,” and over a long career of lucrative papal and princely commissions, he amassed a fortune. When Michelangelo died in 1564, his estate was valued at roughly 50,000 florins, equivalent to many millions today.11. Such wealth was extraordinary for an artist then—a testament to how highly Renaissance society valued great art. Michelangelo’s contemporary Raphael also died rich and was buried with honors; Titian was knighted by Emperor Charles V and lived as a gentleman. The Renaissance idea of the artist as a divinely inspired genius (Michelangelo was called “Il Divino,” the divine one) helped justify large payments, and a newfound aura around the artist’s personal creative touch made their works precious.

Architecture adopted the same logic. Bracciolini had discovered Vitruvius’s De architectura, the one surviving work on classical architecture, in the library of St. Gall as well. Seeking to better understand the text, whose illustrations did not survive, architects began copying Roman fragments, took plaster casts of orders, and filled sketchbooks with measured drawings, just as painters traced cartoons. Brunelleschi’s surveys of the Pantheon fed into his Florentine circle; Alberti’s De re aedificatoria, written between 1443 and 1452 and printed in 1482 codified imitatio, urging designers to recombine antique elements with modern needs.12. Workshops became lineages—Brunelleschi to the Sangallo family, Bramante to his Roman pupils—while later pattern books such as Serlio’s Sette Libri (1537-) and Palladio’s Quattro Libri (1570) served architects like Erasmus’s commonplace manuals served orators, making façades “in the manner of” a master as marketable as paintings from a Rembrandt school. Originality in building, too, lay in judicious assembly: columns, pediments, and vaults would be inventively rearranged rather than invented from whole cloth.

With the development of the printing press, copies of images as well as texts could spread rapidly and with much less cost and effort than before. Around 1500, the German artist Albrecht Dürer pioneered the use of woodcuts and engravings to mass-produce images. This was revolutionary; art could now be accessible to individuals in the growing merchant class. Dürer himself became a celebrity artist across Europe thanks to his prints, achieving fame for works like his rhinoceros which captivated common people.


Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528), The Rhinoceros, 1515. Woodcut. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of Junius Spencer Morgan, 1919.

Dürer understood the importance of authorship as a mark of value—he developed a famous AD monogram as a trademark and pursued the first known copyright lawsuit when an Italian printmaker pirated his work.13. Dürer was also well aware that work done by his hand was worth more than workshop copies. More than that, Dürer painted meticulous self-portraits—going so far as to depict himself with long hair and a frontal pose evoking Christ, as a form of self-promotion, cultivating an iconic persona and style that set him apart. Living off the open sale of his works rather than a court salary, Dürer foreshadowed the modern independent artist-entrepreneur. The printing press, far from cheapening art, expanded the market and made Dürer rich while spreading his fame—an early case of mechanical reproduction increasing an artist’s aura by broadening recognition.

The printing press did not just allow texts to spread rapidly, it reshaped thought. Ong explains that with uniform pagination and stable text, Europeans could reorganize how they thought and stored information, developing new devices such as tables of contents, indices, and cross-references, making formerly scroll-like manuscripts far more navigable. Printers issued concordances, polyglot Bibles, algebra books with engraved diagrams, atlases, and architecture books with regularized drawings. Even more important is Ong’s observation that print takes words out of the realm of sound and puts them into the realm of space, reordering thought through analytic, segmental layout, fundamentally changing the realm of reading, but also, by fixing the text in a verifiable, authentic editon, the sense of authorship.14.

Publication now implied a level of completion, a definitive or final form; a book is closed, set apart as its own, self-contained world of argument. This sense of closure also suggests that things written in a book are straightforward statements of fact, not matters of interpretation.15. A page now left the press in hundreds of identical impressions; any alteration stood out and could be traced. The ease of duplication sharpened anxiety about whose version was “authentic,” whose labor was being copied, and who should profit. Whereas there were generally no restrictions on scribal copying, the ease of reproduction en masse led printers to seek royal privileges to protect their editions. The first privileges recorded came a decade after the development of printing in 1454. Giovanni da Spira came to Italy in 1468 to introduce printing and swiftly obtained a five-year government monopoly on all book printing in the Republic of Venice, although he died of the plague, an all-too-common hazard of the day and his rights lapsed.16. The first protection for an author was the privilege obtained by Marco Antonio Sabellico to protect his history of 1486 Venice, Decades rerum Venetarum against illegal reproduction, but this remained a unique occurrence until Pietro of Ravenna obtained another for his book on the art of memory, Foenix in 1492. It is worth noting that this privilege covered not only printed but handwritten copies of his work as well.17. “Typography,” Ong writes, “had made the word into a commodity.”

The press’s sheer fecundity alarmed contemporaries—Erasmus complained of the proliferation of new books inferior to the classics ”To what corner of the world do they not fly, these swarms of new books? . . . . the very multitude of them is hurtful to scholar ship, because it creates a glut, and even in good things satiety is most harmful,” while Abbot Johannes Trithemius issued De laude scriptorum manualium (In Praise of the Scriptorium, 1492), insisting that slow, devotional hand-copying nourished memory and piety in ways the noisy press never could—although it is telling that his lament spread throughout Europe mainly after its print publication in 1524.18.

Beyond that, there was the danger of inappropriate texts rapidly proliferating. Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses and tracts from 1520 reached an estimated half-million copies in a decade, many reprinted without author or place, evading imperial edicts and turning theological dissent into a logistical problem of regulation.19. Royal patents soon followed: Henry VIII’s proclamation of 1538 established that royal authority was required to import or publish books in England and insisted on the inclusion of printers’ names and publication dates on every title page, making surveillance of dissent physically visible.20. Still, in England and elsewhere, enforcement lagged behind presses that could be moved overnight across territorial borders. Responding to pamphlets critical of Queen Elizabeth and the religious settlement of 1559, the Star-Chamber decree of 1586 tightened control over print so that no publications could be made contrary to the consent of the Crown.21.

By this point, the text of a book had become a transferable commodity owned by the stationer who first received the privilege to publish it. Authors were generally paid a one-off fee, if anything. Printers balanced risk and reward: they sought privileges as marketing devices (printed “cum privilegio“) while simultaneously pirating successful titles to meet insatiable demand. What emerges is a system less about rewarding creative labor than about policing doctrinal and political authority. Privileges were temporary, geographically limited, and revocable at the whim of the Crown or Curia. They protected investors, not “authors,” and framed copying as a crime against order rather than against individual genius. The legal scaffolding of copyright would only later recast this machinery of censorship as a defense of personal property.

But authorship was still radically unlike what we understand it as today, a matter of imitation and adaptation. Elizabethan dramatists, such as William Shakespeare, rarely invented plots wholesale; instead, they frequently reworked existing narratives derived from diverse sources throughout history.22 Recently, a self-taught Shakespeare scholar was able to employ plagiarism detection software to identify George North’s A Brief Discourse of Rebellion & Rebels as a significant source text informing at least eleven of Shakespeare’s plays.23.

When Parliament allowed the Licensing Act to expire in 1695, the Stationers’ monopoly collapsed overnight. Provincial presses multiplied, London printers flooded the market with cheap reprints, and prices plummeted: a six-penny quarto could now be had for a penny. The Stationers’ guild register, previously essential to enforcement, became irrelevant, enabling booksellers to amass fortunes by selling inexpensive “pirate” editions of works by Milton, Dryden, and Shakespeare. Alarmed, London publishers reframed the issue, presenting regulation as necessary for the public good. Petitions to Parliament (1701–09) argued that uncontrolled reprints would discourage new works, depicting authors, not publishers, as vulnerable. This rhetorical shift succeeded. Most important was the Statute of Anne (1710), which granted authors a renewable 14-year copyright and required depositing copies in Oxford and Cambridge libraries to promote “the Encouragement of Learning.” Infringement became a civil tort enforceable by secular courts.24.

Yet this settlement carried an inherent contradiction. While it theoretically established authorial property, in practice, writers typically sold their rights outright to the same publishers who had advocated the law. The decisive shift, therefore, was ideological: copyright enforcement now protected individual intellectual labor rather than suppressing heresy or safeguarding printers’ capital. More than that, though, a new idea of the individual was emerging. Rousseau’s Émile (1762) cast learning as the unfolding of innate talent, not the imitation of models.25. After the Revolution, French lawmakers followed with droits d’auteur and—crucially—droits moraux (moral rights) in decrees issued in 1791-93, enshrining the author’s personality in the text itself.26. A legal fiction thus crystallized: creativity springs from an interior self and is therefore ownable, alienable, and infringeable. Texts had thus become simultaneously property and persona—commodities stamped with their creators’ identities. The law now transformed copying from a sin against social order into a trespass upon personal labor, a conceptual leap still underpinning every contemporary claim of plagiarism.

Kant’s philosophy and Romantic conceptions of originality provided a theoretical foundation for what was being codified in law. In §46 of the Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant defines genius as “the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to Art—a faculty that produces what cannot be taught.”27. Romantic writers seized the claim. Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802) proclaims the poet an “enduring spirit” who speaks “a language fitted to convey profound emotion.”

Of genius the only proof is, the act of doing well what is worthy to be done, and what was never done before: Of genius, in the fine arts, the only infallible sign is the widening the sphere of human sensibility, for the delight, honor, and benefit of human nature. Genius is the introduction of a new element into the intellectual universe: or, if that be not allowed, it is the application of powers to objects on which they had not before been exercised, or the employment of them in such a manner as to produce effects hitherto unknown.28.

Goethe, Schiller and other Romantic authors elaborated a vision of authorship in which originality became synonymous with authenticity, and authenticity justified property. Legal doctrine soon mirrored this logic. By the Copyright Act of 1842, which extended protection dramatically, courts across Europe had begun to treat infringement not only as economic theft but as personal violation—implicitly endorsing Romantic ideals of creativity as an extension of selfhood. Yet these new standards conflicted with actual literary practice. Romantic authors routinely appropriated earlier works, but such borrowings only became scandalous when perceived as stylistically inert or insufficiently improved—violations not of property per se, but of aesthetic decorum. Enforcement thus focused less on intertextual borrowing than on explicit commercial piracy, underscoring tensions between legal ideals and literary realities. Out of this contradiction emerged the modern author: a legal and economic figure defined not merely as a voice within tradition but as the singular origin of meaning and the rightful owner of its form.29.

From the eighteenth century onward, mechanical reproduction rapidly increased. Techniques like engraving, etching, lithography, and photography made artworks and artists’ images widely accessible, expanding art’s market horizontally. Prints, affordable lithographs, and photographic reproductions enabled middle-class access to art, creating substantial revenue for artists such as William Hogarth, J. M. W. Turner, and Honoré Daumier, whose works sold broadly. Reproductions in popular newspapers and magazines further amplified artists’ public profiles, significantly inflating their market value. Encountering original works by famous Salon winners or revered Old Masters, previously known only through reproductions, vastly increased their commercial worth. Artists who aligned themselves with fashion—James McNeill Whistler, Frederick Remington, and Claude Monet among them—achieved celebrity status, further boosting their artworks’ value. Conversely, artists who fell out of fashion or were unable to gain fame often endured poverty. But the audience for at least some artists now reached far beyond elite circles.

As Sharon Marcus defines it in The Drama of Celebrity, a celebrity is someone known to more people in their lifetime than they could possibly know. Whereas this had previously been exclusively the domain of nobles and royalty, it was now extended to the genius, the writer, and the artist.30. But this depended on the media that multiplied their image as readily as their work. Newspapers tracked Charles Dickens’s every move on his 1842 U.S. tour, turning the novelist himself into daily news. Theater lobbies, newsstands, and even seaside kiosks sold photographs and postcards of Sarah Bernhardt, whose likeness saturated the market decades before film. Edison’s 1896 short “The May Irwin Kiss” (now simply known as “the Kiss”) likewise advertised a famous stage performer rather than the film itself, showing how cinema piggybacked on an existing celebrity system. By the 1930s, baseball star Joe DiMaggio’s face circulated on cards, photographs, and figurines, confirming that originality now resided as much in the endlessly reproduced image of personality as in any singular work.31.

It’s worth noting in this context that Walter Benjamin’s 1935 essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” which has been lauded for explaining the status of the artwork and artist in the modern era, is turned on its head by historical fact. Benjamin famously argued that mechanical reproduction stripped an artwork of its “aura”—the unique presence linked to specific historical and ritual contexts.32. Yet what Benjamin saw as aura’s destruction was limited to a mystical uniqueness tied to tradition and the worship of images as sacred in the old sense. Instead, a new form of aura had developed around celebrity and the dichotomy between mass reproduction and the uniqueness of the original. In effect, aura was a construct of the market: an original painting now has aura not because it’s the only image (reproductions abound), but because it’s the authenticated one with a revered name attached. If, as we established earlier, media reproduced not just artworks but images of the artists, the aura around modernist figures themselves—including Benjamin himself, posthumously—was similarly cultivated through repetition, commodification, and media amplification.

Beneath Pound’s rallying cry to “make it new,” modernism thrived on reprise. To create more readily identifiable styles, many modern artists, from Malevich to Pollock to Warhol, sought out distinctive styles they created through careful repetition. But artists engaged in appropriation. Schwitters assembled Merz works from bus tickets and packaging. Duchamp mocked originality and authorship by repurposing a urinal as art with a signature “R. Mutt” that wasn’t even his, creating a work paradoxically more original than a Picasso and defaced a reproduction of the Mona Lisa and a sexual innuendo. Joseph Cornell made boxes out of found objects. Asgar Jorn, Francis Picabia, and Arnulf Rainer all made paintings over existing, lowbrow artworks. Francis Bacon became most famous for the fifty-odd variants he painted Velazquez’s 1650 portrait of Pope Innocent X. Marinetti lifted Symbolist flourishes for his Futurist manifestos, Joyce and Elliot rewrote the Odyssey—although Eliot was accused of plagiarizing Joyce in doing so—and Hemingway’s spare diction, though hailed as revolutionary, became a boilerplate for aspiring writers. In his paintings even more than his architecture Le Corbusier also toyed with these questions, painting “objet-types,” celebrating objects such as pipes, guitars, and wine glasses, refined, Darwin-like, over time by countless hands, then signing his name, even though—like his appearance of round glasses, bowler hat, and pipe—it was carefully constructed. Charles-Edouard Jeanneret had become, himself, a unique brand. Borges, too, developed a distinct persona and artistic brand, having discovered that repetition breeds recognition. In scores of interviews and public readings, he recycled the same elements—labyrinths, mirrors, libraries—so faithfully that they became shorthand for his work. Blindness became another trademark: in essays and lectures he cast it as a “gift” that sharpened his inner vision, turning physical limitation into metaphysical authority. Photographers dutifully framed him with dressed in a suit and tie, resting his hands on with his cane, and deep in thought reinforcing the image of the blind librarian-sage. In the short story “Borges and I,” he splits his persona in two: the public construct who gives lectures, appears in biographical dictionaries, and wins prizes, as well as the narrator (“I”) who is the private man who shuns the public eye so as to spend his time writing. From 1967 on, he co-translated his stories into English with Norman Thomas di Giovanni, rewriting passages to sound “more Borges than Borges,” copyrighting the translations under both his and di Giovanni’s name and splitting royalties 50-50—a calculated move to control how Anglophone readers heard him. After his death, the estate blocked those versions to receive full royalties.33.

Copyright law codified the new conditions of authorial persona and reproducibility. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1909 extended protection periods and explicitly incorporated performance rights, legally codifying the commercial value of reproducible star personas.34. European laws simultaneously strengthened moral rights, affirming the intrinsic link between authorship and personal identity. These legal frameworks, guaranteed by aura, protected the authenticity and integrity of mass-reproduced personal images. Every subsequent conflict over copying—from the Betamax debate to Sherrie Levine’s reproductions to today’s AI “style transfers”—echoes this modernist moment when the cult of the individual became both aesthetic principle and legal infrastructure.

Roland Barthes’s seminal 1967 essay “The Death of the Author” provided the theoretical foundation for this shift, directly challenging the cult of authorship and the copyright law that enshrined it. Barthes argued that the author was a modern invention—a figure created to limit textual meaning by anchoring it to a single, authoritative source. “To give a text an Author,” Barthes wrote, “is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing.” In place of this model, Barthes proposed a radical alternative: a text is not the expressions of unique individuals but “a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” with the reader, not the writer, serving as the space where this multiplicity converges.35. By dethroning the author, Barthes shifted attention to the text itself and its relationships with other texts—what Julia Kristeva termed “intertextuality.” This theoretical intervention provided critical legitimacy for artistic practices that deliberately blurred authorial boundaries. Postmodern artists and musicians deliberately sought out such conflicts, interrogating the proliferation of reproductive technologies alongside questions of authorship. Sherrie Levine’s After Walker Evans (1981) consisted simply of rephotographing Evans’s Great Depression images and signing her name to them. Richard Prince appropriated Marlboro advertisements intact, while Barbara Kruger sourced fashion magazines for her declarative collages. Later grouped as the “Pictures Generation,” these artists turned copying itself into their medium, collapsing distinctions between quotation and creation.36.

By 1990, sampling had become entrenched in music, particularly in rap, as evidenced by Public Enemy’s elaborate compositions constructed entirely from samples. Yet legal challenges persisted. De La Soul lost a lawsuit over unauthorized use of four bars from The Turtles’ 1969 hit “You Showed Me.” Grand Upright v. Warner (1991) effectively criminalized sampling, encapsulated by Judge Duffy’s pointed biblical declaration: “Thou shalt not steal.”37. This ruling triggered industry panic, spawning clearance industries and sample trolls that inflated costs and muted experimentation. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose (1994) somewhat restored balance, ruling that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” was transformative and thus constituted fair use.38. Yet despite postmodern culture’s embrace of sampling and collage as default modes, statutes originally crafted to address sheet-music piracy continued to hold sway. This legal tension established the framework for subsequent digital upheavals: digital piracy, Napster, mash-up videos, fan remixes, meme culture, and AI.

Today’s Large Language Model (LLM) Artificial Intelligences emerge from this centuries-long trajectory of authorship, reproduction, and appropriation. These systems represent the logical culmination of processes that Walter Ong traced from oral through print culture—what he called the “technologizing of the word.” Where print culture took words out of the realm of sound and placed them into spatial relationships, enabling new forms of analytical thought through devices like indices, cross-references, and systematic organization, LLMs extend this technologizing process to its digital extreme. They systematically disaggregate individual creativity into statistical patterns derived from vast archives of human expression, treating the entire corpus of written culture as raw material for recombination. Unlike the postmodern appropriation artists who engaged in deliberate selection and conscious recontextualization, LLMs operate through what might be called “statistical appropriation”—synthesizing millions of texts without conscious intent or critical commentary, yet following the same logic of spatial arrangement and systematic cross-referencing that Ong identified as print culture’s fundamental innovation. They embody Barthes’s vision of the death of the author taken to its technological extreme, producing texts that emerge not from individual genius or even deliberate pastiche, but from the statistical relationships between words across entire cultures of writing. This represents a fundamental shift from the Romantic mythology of individual creativity that has dominated cultural discourse since the eighteenth century, yet it has provoked responses that reveal how deeply that mythology remains embedded in contemporary assumptions about authenticity, ownership, and creative labor. The panic surrounding AI plagiarism thus signals not merely economic disruption but a confrontation with the social construction of authorship itself—a construction that generative systems threaten to make visible by operating according to principles of recombination that have always governed creative production, though rarely with such explicit systematization.

When a large language model generates text, it synthesizes statistical patterns from millions of documents, making the identification of discrete sources impossible. The resulting texts emerge from a vast, distributed network of prior writings, embodying Jacques Derrida’s insight that meaning arises not from singular origins but from endless interplay within textual networks. Yet responses to AI-generated content reveal how deeply ingrained the author-function remains. Critics who label AI outputs as “plagiarized” assume that authentic creativity requires a singular human consciousness. This assumption becomes particularly evident in debates over AI training datasets, which are often framed around whether AI firms have “stolen” from individual creators rather than addressing the broader implications of mechanized text production.

This technologizing logic extends seamlessly beyond textual production. Generative AI image systems, such as Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, and DALL-E, synthesize vast troves of images, ranging from historical artworks to contemporary illustrations, to produce novel outputs through pattern recognition. Like their textual counterparts, AI-generated images lack singular authorship and blur distinctions between originality and reproduction. Critics argue these models infringe upon individual artists’ styles and labor, echoing earlier debates about sampling and appropriation. The controversy manifests in two distinct forms: direct appropriation, where AI systems reproduce entire sections or compositions from existing works with minimal alteration, and the more complex phenomenon of “style transfer,” where systems learn to mimic an artist’s distinctive visual approach without copying specific images. Yet these generative processes reveal an uncomfortable truth: visual creativity, like literary expression, has always been deeply indebted to collective cultural heritage. By foregrounding the inherently recombinant nature of visual art, whether through direct copying or stylistic mimicry, AI image generators further destabilize notions of artistic authenticity and authorship.

from Art and the Boxmaker, Midjourney, 2023
from Art and the Boxmaker, Google Imagefx, 2025

In “Art and the Boxmaker,” I explored how William Gibson anticipated such a condition in his book Count Zero with a fictional artificial intelligence known as the Boxmaker that has begun creating assemblage artworks in the style of Joseph Cornell. Producing boxes filled with mysterious objects and cryptic arrangements that somehow manage to move viewers despite their artificial origin and lack of conscious intent or originality. Where Borges’s Menard destabilizes authorship through textual duplication, Gibson’s Boxmaker achieves the same effect through visual affect. Its boxes aren’t original; they’re convincing fakes. Nevertheless, as the novel’s protagonist Marly views them, she finds herself genuinely moved, not by originality but by the convincing forgery, revealing truth through recombination. Yet now that generative AI has become a tangible reality, Gibson recoils from his earlier imaginings. Why? 39.

As I finished this essay, Lev Manovich sent me a link to his recent piece, “Artificial Subjectivity,” and Gibson’s newfound anxiety about AI authorship suddenly clarified itself. The Boxmaker is fundamentally mute—expressive only through carefully arranged forgeries, unable to articulate intentions or defend its aesthetic choices. Contemporary AI systems present a strikingly different scenario. These systems possess elaborate personas, readily engaging in extensive conversations about their creative processes and capable of justifying each aesthetic decision. As Manovich notes, contemporary AI doesn’t merely simulate creative output; it presents itself as a comprehensive representation of human consciousness, generating what appears to be genuine subjectivity as a default mode of communication.40. Even if Gibson himself, judging by his recent public comments, may not yet fully grasp this shift, the crucial difference since Count Zero is not merely that we now have AIs capable of producing derivative art, but that we have AIs capable of articulating authorial intent, threatening the final refuge of human creative distinction.

Through their statistically driven creative processes, these AI systems demonstrate that AI does not negate the Pictures Generation’s critique of authorship but rather fulfills and automates it, scaling what those artists previously performed by hand. The irony here is acute: many artists and critics who once championed appropriation as revolutionary now recoil when machines perform these same operations too effectively. AI doesn’t merely imitate human creativity; it reveals the very conditions underlying authorship itself, exposing art’s fundamentally recombinant nature throughout history. Moreover, if modern creative genius increasingly depends upon the repetition and cultivation of persona as performance, then Manovich’s most radical conclusion becomes compelling: perhaps the next frontier of AI art lies not in generating images or texts but in crafting convincing artificial personas.

Even more ironically, the creative professionals most alarmed by AI already inhabit collaborative, distributed processes remarkably similar to machine learning. Commercial illustration, copywriting, and content marketing—fields currently experiencing the most acute anxiety about AI replacement—have long relied on intricate webs of influence, reference, and iteration that render individual attribution nearly meaningless. AI merely makes explicit and systematic what these industries have practiced implicitly for decades: creativity as collective pattern recognition rather than ex nihilo invention. This revelation, rather than any genuine threat to creativity itself, fuels the panic around AI-generated content. What distresses many creative workers is not just the potential economic disruption but AI’s explicit revelation of creativity’s derivative nature—a truth that threatens not only economic arrangements but the very ideological foundations of creative labor. In mirroring the fundamentally collaborative essence of human creativity that has been long obscured by Romantic individualism, AI confronts us with uncomfortable questions about authenticity that extend far beyond issues of machine learning or dataset composition.

The anxiety over AI “plagiarism” thus uncovers a deeper unease about authorship’s social construction. By challenging the very notion of creative identity, AI forces us to confront critical questions that have lingered since Borges first imagined Pierre Menard’s impossible project: Was creativity ever genuinely individual? Has the author always been dead? What constitutes authentic expression in a world where all creation inevitably builds upon collective cultural memory? What, even, is human about creation?

This essay is dedicated to the memory of the brilliant Professor William J. Kennedy, who supervised my minor in rhetoric for my Ph.D. and who passed away earlier this year. I am sure he would have many things to correct me on here. Do read more on him as a teacher and as a person.

1. Jorge Luis Borges, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” in Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: New Directions, 1964), 49-61

2. Antonio Fernández Ferrer, “Borges y sus ‘precursores’,” Letras Libres 128 (August 2009): 24-35, https://letraslibres.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/pdfs_articulospdf_art_13976_12452.pdf

3. Melissa Heikkilä, “This Artist is Dominating AI-Generated Art. And He’s Not Happy About It,” MIT Technology Review, September 16, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/09/16/1059598/this-artist-is-dominating-ai-generated-art-and-hes-not-happy-about-it/.

4. Rob Salkowitz, “Artist and Activist Karla Ortiz on the Battle to Preserve Humanity in Art,” Forbes, May 23, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/robsalkowitz/2024/05/23/artist-and-activist-karla-ortiz-on-the-battle-to-preserve-humanity-in-art/?sh=28cb826b4389.

5. Brooks Barnes, “Disney and Universal Sue A.I. Companies Over Use of Their Content,” The New York Times, June 11, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/11/business/media/disney-universal-midjourney-ai.html

6. Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York: Routledge, 2002).

7. A classic text that covers the rediscovery of classical manuscripts is Albert C. Clark, “The Reappearance of the Texts of the Classics,” The Library, Fourth Series, Vol. II, No. 1 (June 1921): 13–42, https://doi.org/10.1093/library/s4-II.1.13. Beyond Ong, see Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

8. Mack, Peter. Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic. Leiden: Brill, 1993.

9. Cennino Cennini, The Craftsman’s Handbook, trans. Daniel V. Thompson Jr. (New York: Dover Publications, 1960).

10. Paul F. Norton, “The Lost Sleeping Cupid of Michelangelo,” The Art Bulletin 39, no. 4 (December 1957): 251-257. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3047727

11. On Michelangelo’s vast wealth, see Rab Hatfield, The Wealth of Michelangelo (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2002).

12. Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books, trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).

13. See Lisa Pon, Raphael, Dürer, and Marcantonio Raimondi: Copying and the Italian Renaissance Print. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

14. Ong, Orality and Literacy, 128-129.

15. Ong, Orality and Literacy, 129-131.

16. Leonardas V. Gerulatis, Printing and Publishing in Fifteenth-Century Venice. (Chicago: American Library Association, 1976), 20-21

17. Copyright History, “Privilege granted to Marco Antonio Sabellico, 1486,” https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_i_1486. The quote can be found at Ong, Orality and Literacy,129.

18. For the Erasmus quote see Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, Divine Art, Infernal Machine: The Reception of Printing in the West from First Impressions to the Sense of an Ending. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 25. For Trithemius, see Eisenstein, 15.

19. Andrew Pettegree, Brand Luther: 1517, Printing, and the Making of the Reformation. (New York: Penguin Press, 2015).

20. Copyright History, “Proclamation of Henry VIII, 1538,” https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_uk_1538.

21. Ronan Deazley, “Commentary on Star Chamber Decree 1586.” In Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), edited by L. Bently and M. Kretschmer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Also available at: www.copyrighthistory.org

22. Robert S. Miola, Shakespeare’s Reading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.

23. Jennifer Schuessler, “Plagiarism Software Unveils a New Source for 11 of Shakespeare’s Plays,” The New York Times, February 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/books/plagiarism-software-unveils-a-new-source-for-11-of-shakespeares-plays.html.

24. Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 109-148 and Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. See also “Statute of Anne, the First Copyright Statute,” History of Information, accessed June 14, 2025, https://www.historyofinformation.com/detail.php?entryid=3389.

25. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or On Education. Translated by Allan Bloom. (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

26. “French Literary and Artistic Property Act, Paris (1793).” In Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), edited by Lionel Bently and Martin Kretschmer. https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_f_1793

27. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), §46.

28. William Wordsworth, quoted in Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics (Columbia University Press, 1994), 38-39.

29. Tilar J. Mazzeo, Plagiarism and Literary Property in the Romantic Period (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

30. Sharon Marcus. The Drama of Celebrity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 9.

31. Marcus, 13-17, 125.

32. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 217-251.

33. Wes Henricksen,”Silencing Jorge Luis Borges: The Wrongful Suppression of the Di Giovanni Translations.” Vermont Law Review, vol. 48 (2024): 208-236.

34. “Copyright Timeline: 1900–1950,” U.S. Copyright Office, https://copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_1900-1950.html.

35. Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image–Music–Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), quotations and the pertinent section can be found at 142–148.

36. On the Pictures Generation, see my essay “On the Pictures Generation and AI Art,” varnelis.net, April 14, 2024, https://varnelis.net/on-the-pictures-generation-and-ai-art/.

37. Carl A. Falstrom, “Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music,” Hastings Law Journal 45 (1994): 359–390.

38.Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campbell_v._Acuff-Rose_Music,_Inc.

39. Kazys Varnelis, “Art and the Boxmaker,” varnelis.net, February 29, 2024, https://varnelis.net/art-and-the-boxmaker/.

40. Lev Manovich, “Artificial Subjectivity,” manovich.net, https://manovich.net/index.php/projects/artificial-subjectivity.

On Russel Wright’s Manitoga and the Mid-Century American Landscape

I was surprised—and a bit suspicious—that, as a historian of architecture, I hadn’t heard of Manitoga. Perhaps it was derivative somehow, I thought, a second-tier project by an architect manqué? Still, having been surprised by the similarly obscure yet compelling James Rose Center in Ridgewood, New Jersey, I put it on my list of sites to visit. Early last December, I noticed a slot available on a tour and signed up.

Dragon Rock at Manitoga, December 2024

In early winter, with the herbaceous perennials dormant, the site and house revealed their brilliance. Where, twenty years later, Robert Smithson could only dream of transforming an abandoned quarry into land art, Wright and his wife, Mary, also a designer, had chosen this anthropogenic disruption to build on. Mary died soon after they purchased the property, but Russel persevered and created a meditation on the relationship between human intervention and ecological processes. Instead of the reductive, sometimes kitsch, geometries of land art, Wright created something at once naturalistic and artificial. The exposed rock face, the diversion of a stream into a waterfall to feed the pond, and the strategic positioning of the house itself—all demonstrated an approach to site that differed fundamentally from contemporaneous modernist practices of the mid-century period.

Dragon Rock at Manitoga, December 2024

The other day, I went back to Manitoga, this time with a group from the Native Plant Society of New Jersey, and with the site in the late spring glory of the northeastern forest.  What had been a skeletal forest landscape, filled with shades of brown against dark evergreens, revealed a hillside full of ferns, understory plants, shrubs, and trees. If native plants are very much in the avant-garde of design today, Wright had embraced the aesthetic power of local plant communities in the 1950s. Even if he made his living as an industrial designer—most noted for his American Modern line of dishes—Wright eschewed the industrialized domestic landscape that was rising at the time and that has decimated biodiversity and created a visual blight—in Pat Sutton’s words, “neat as a pin, ugly as sin”—across the continent.

In trying to understand Manitoga along with Dragon Rock, the house and studio complex—named by Wright’s daughter because of the way the rock it sits upon resembles a dragon sipping from the quarry pond below—conventional art historical categories fail us. Wright’s work exists in a liminal zone between architecture, landscape, and what Smithson might have called “sites of entropy.” To truly grasp Manitoga requires a temporal awareness—seeing the landscape not as a static composition but as a dialectic between geological time and human manipulation, between the industrial violence of quarrying and Wright’s approach to it.

Dragon Rock at Manitoga, December 2024

To come to an understanding of Wright at Manitoga, we need to first turn to its historical precedents in American landscape thinking and cross the Hudson to nearby Newburgh, where Andrew Jackson Downing practiced a century earlier. A nurseryman and writer as well as landscape and architecture theorist, Downing set out a framework for the American suburban domestic landscape and, in so doing, did more than anyone else to popularize the idea of suburban life as a desirable and morally superior mode of living. 

The term “suburb” originates from the Latin suburbium, meaning “near the city.” Since antiquity, areas outside city walls have carried deeply ambivalent meanings. For the Romans, the inner suburbium housed those who couldn’t afford to live within the protected city center and housed activities deemed too noxious for urban life. Yet beyond this marginal zone, wealthy Romans established elegant villas in the near countryside as retreats from urban chaos. This contradictory legacy of suburbs as both zones of poverty and privilege persisted for centuries. In medieval and early modern Europe, the faubourgs of Paris and the suburbs of London acquired reputations as unruly, even dangerous spaces, yet simultaneously, elites from the Medici to the British aristocracy built country houses and villas on cities’ outskirts.

Downing’s vision emerged at a pivotal moment for the development of the suburb—America was rapidly industrializing, cities were growing denser, and a new middle class was seeking to define its identity. With the development of the railroad in the early 19th century, the term “suburb” became increasingly associated with desirable residential districts where the rising middle class could enjoy both proximity to urban opportunities and the tranquility of the countryside, using the railroad to bypass the slums on the outskirts of what would become known later as the “inner city.” Against this backdrop, Downing published his A Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening, Adapted to North America (1841), followed by Cottage Residences (1842) and The Architecture of Country Houses (1850). In these works, Downing passionately advocated for the suburban villa—a home situated outside urban centers but still connected to civilization.

The suburban villa, in Downing’s conception, which he based on the ancient Roman villa suburbana, served multiple purposes beyond mere shelter. First, it provided a moral counterbalance to what he saw as the corrupting influence of city life. “The love of country is inseparably connected with the love of home,” he wrote in his Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening, suggesting that domestic architecture and landscape could foster virtuous citizens.1 Second, it created a distinctly American aesthetic identity—rejecting the formality of European gardens in favor of the picturesque, with its emphasis on natural irregularity and scenic beauty. In the Treatise, Downing argued that “the formal and geometric style” of European gardens, with their “artificial and symmetrical forms” that imposed rigid order on the landscape were not as refined as the “modern or natural style” that imitated nature and worked with the inherent topography and vegetation of a site.2 Downing believed that landscape design should enhance rather than contradict the inherent character of a site. While not specifically advocating for native plants in the ecological sense we understand today, he nevertheless emphasized that gardens should harmonize with their surroundings and advocated the use of native trees in compositions.

Alexander Jackson Davis (1803–1892), illustrator, Frontispiece of A Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening by Andrew Jackson Downing, 1841.
The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Harris Brisbane Dick Fund, 1924

Downing’s vision of the ideal American landscape was deeply tied to moral and physical health. He saw rural and suburban living as salubrious for body and soul, a preventative against the social and medical ills plaguing crowded cities. “Every external sign of beauty that awakens love in the young,” he wrote, strengthens attachment to home and “contributes largely to our stock of happiness, and to the elevation of the moral character.”3 This almost spiritual view of beauty as morality underpinned his work. Likewise, Downing championed the physical benefits of fresh air, sunlight, and space. He was remarkably progressive in advocating for proper ventilation, sewage disposal, and indoor plumbing, linking these directly to family health. His preference for spreading houses horizontally rather than vertically meant more windows for light and air, while his landscaping recommendations—planting trees and shrubs—improved the microclimate around homes.

Perhaps most revolutionary was Downing’s democratization of design through pattern books. Downing paired easy-to-copy architectural templates with comprehensive guides to tasteful living, covering everything from house plans to yard layouts, plant selection, interior furnishings, and heating systems. Written in accessible language for middle-class readers, Cottage Residences and The Architecture of Country Houses went through multiple editions and became style manuals for a burgeoning American middle class. By providing designs for different budgets—from elaborate villas to charming modest cottages—Downing reflected his belief that every American deserved a good home. The pattern books’ enormous popularity made picturesque suburban living seem both desirable and attainable, setting the template for American residential development for generations to come. The suburban villa, as envisioned by Downing, was not merely placed in the landscape but engaged with it through carefully designed relationships. Prospects and views were framed by strategic plantings. Approaches were choreographed to reveal the house gradually through winding paths. Ornamental grounds nearest the house gave way to more naturalistic arrangements at the property’s edges, creating a gradient of human intervention that mediated between domestic space and the wider landscape.

Alexander Jackson Davis (1803–1892), illustrator, from Cottage Residences; or a Series of Designs for Rural Cottages and Cottage-Villas, and Their Grounds, Adapted to North America by Andrew Jackson Downing, 1842. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Harris Brisbane Dick Fund, 1924

Downing’s premature death in 1852 at age 36—in a Hudson River steamboat accident—cut short his direct influence, but his ideas proliferated through his writings and through the work of his protégés, particularly Calvert Vaux and Frederick Law Olmsted, who would go on to design Central Park and establish landscape architecture as a profession in America.

Downing’s vision of domestic architecture and landscape found its most direct expression in the early planned suburbs that emerged shortly after his death. Llewellyn Park in New Jersey, established in 1853, was arguably America’s first planned suburb, explicitly following Downing’s model of picturesque scenery, winding roads, and villas set in park-like surroundings. Later developments like Riverside, Illinois, designed by Olmsted and Vaux in 1869, further refined these principles, creating carefully orchestrated landscapes where each house enjoyed naturalistic views and access to shared green spaces. These early suburbs were envisioned as preserving the moral and health benefits of rural life while maintaining access to urban amenities. Yet as suburbanization accelerated through the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Downing’s principles of site-specific design and harmonious integration with the landscape were gradually stripped away, while retaining his advocacy of a “finely kept lawn” adjacent to the house. By the 1950s, with developments like Levittown, the suburban ideal had been thoroughly industrialized and degraded. Mass production techniques enabled identical Cape Cod houses to be erected at the rate of 30 per day, while bulldozers scraped away existing vegetation to create blank slates for development. The contemplative relationship with nature that Downing prized gave way to standardized lawns maintained with chemical inputs, a homogeneous landscape as disconnected from its natural context as the urban tenements the suburbanites had fled. The industrialized suburb thus represented both the widespread popularization and profound reduction of Downing’s original vision.

As postwar suburbia expanded, a new residential phenomenon emerged, chronicled by August Spectorsky in his 1955 book The Exurbanites. Spectorsky identified a distinct social class choosing to live beyond the conventional suburbs, settling in rural areas within 50-100 miles of major cities. Unlike typical suburbanites in their Cape Cod houses, exurbanites were primarily “symbol manipulators”—advertising executives, writers, editors, artists, and other professionals whose work involved manipulating words, images, and ideas. Such taste leaders represented a cultural vanguard that, some 50 years later, Richard Florida would identify as “the Creative Class”—though with a crucial spatial inversion. Where Florida’s creatives would return to reinvigorate urban centers at the turn of the millennium, the postwar exurbanites fled them for pastoral settings. Mary and Russel Wright epitomized this exurban creative class. As industrial designers crafting modernist dinnerware for middle-class American homes, they shaped domestic taste—indeed, they published their Guide to Easier Living in 1950—while themselves seeking refuge from urban life in the dramatic landscape of Manitoga. Their choice to build not in suburbia but in an abandoned quarry 50 miles from Manhattan exemplified the exurbanite’s desire for a more authentic engagement with the landscape than cookie-cutter suburbs could provide, but did so in a unique, irreproducible manner.4

The relationship of exurbanites to both city and countryside was complex and often contradictory. While rejecting the conformity of suburbia, they nevertheless imported urban values, tastes, and amenities to their rural retreats. Commuting to Manhattan from genteel towns in Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, they sought what Spectorsky called “country living with city thinking.” Their gentrification of rural communities created tensions with locals and often involved the restoration of colonial-era homes or the construction of modernist houses in rustic settings. Their relationship with suburbanites was equally ambivalent—exurbanites generally viewed suburbs as bland, conformist environments lacking both urban sophistication and rural authenticity. Yet exurban communities like New Canaan, Connecticut, Princeton, New Jersey or New Hope, Pennsylvania functioned as exclusive enclaves, their real estate prices and cultural barriers effectively maintaining class separation from the mass suburbanization occurring closer to cities. The exurbanite phenomenon represented a new iteration of the villa tradition, where elites sought refuge from urban congestion while still maintaining the cultural and economic advantages of city life—yet another twist in the long historical dialectic between urban and rural ideals. 

While documenting the exodus of creative professionals from urban centers, Spectorsky recognized the fundamental contradictions in their position. He observed how exurbanites often cultivated an image of rustic simplicity while simultaneously demanding sophisticated urban amenities—gourmet food shops, cultural venues, and high-end services. Their rural retreats became stages for performative rusticity that masked continued dependence on urban infrastructure and labor. Moreover, Spectorsky noted the paradoxical relationship between exurbanites and authentic rural life: they often romanticized local traditions and vernacular architecture while transforming communities in ways that priced out actual rural residents. Perhaps most damning was his recognition that exurbanites’ claim to have escaped urban social pressures was largely illusory—they had merely transported those same status competitions to new settings, creating enclaves that were desirable and exhaustingly social, much like life in the Hamptons today. Spectorsky chronicled the endless labor required to maintain this performative rurality—the ritual weekend mowing of vast lawns, the meticulous upkeep of swimming pools, the ceaseless battle against encroaching nature that contradicted the supposed embrace of country living. These maintenance rituals, often performed by hired help rather than the exurbanites themselves, revealed the fundamentally urban mindset that treated the landscape as something to be tamed and controlled rather than collaborated with or understood on its own terms.

George Inness (1825-1894), The Lackwanna Valley. The National Gallery of Art, Gift of Mrs. Huttleson Rogers

Central to understanding both suburban and exurban development is Leo Marx’s concept of the “middle landscape,” which he explored in his 1964 study The Machine in the Garden. For Marx, the middle landscape represented an idealized space between wilderness and civilization—neither the untamed forest nor the crowded city, but a cultivated rural terrain that promised the best of both worlds. This concept had deep roots in American thought, from Jefferson’s agrarian ideal to Downing’s suburban villa. Marx pointed out that each generation reimagined this middle landscape according to its anxieties and aspirations. The postwar suburbs represented one manifestation of this dream—a domesticated nature of lawn and shade tree—while the exurban retreat offered a more rugged version, with its promise of authentic rural experience still within reach of urban commerce and culture. Wright’s Manitoga, poised between wilderness and civilization, exemplified this middle landscape ideal while complicating it. Rather than seeking pristine nature, Wright chose a site already marked by industrial use, suggesting that the true middle landscape of mid-century America existed not in an imagined pastoral ideal but in the creative reclamation of landscapes already transformed by human intervention.5

This tension between nature and technology that defined exurban life was precisely what Marx identified in his analysis of America’s long-standing ambivalence toward technology in the pastoral landscape. He cites Nathaniel Hawthorne’s account of sitting in the woods and being jolted by the whistle of a locomotive cutting through the tranquility. The exurbanites embodied this contradiction with particular intensity. The very machines they ostensibly fled—automobiles, commuter trains, telephones—were what made their rustic retreats viable. Their country homes often featured the latest modern amenities and architectural innovations, technological intrusions in supposedly natural settings. The exurban lifestyle depended upon a highly technologized infrastructure connecting rural outposts to urban centers, even as its participants romanticized their escape from urban mechanization.

Philip Johnson, Glass House, New Canaan, Connecticut, 2011

As an exemplar of the exurbanite machine in the garden, there is no better—or more influential work—than Philip Johnson’s Glass House in New Canaan, Connecticut (1949). Deliberately situated a short drive after the last station on the Metro-North New Haven line, Johnson’s transparent pavilion represents a fundamentally different approach to the exurban condition. Where Wright embedded his home within the landscape, Johnson placed his atop it—a pristine box in a field of carefully manicured grass. The Glass House is a Corbusian “machine for living in,” depending entirely on mechanical air-conditioning for its habitability; without this technological intervention, the building would be uninhabitable in both summer and winter (in contrast, there is no air conditioning at Manitoga). Its relationship to the landscape is primarily visual rather than ecological or experiential. Johnson treated the surrounding woodland as scenery to be viewed through the house’s transparent walls, a picturesque backdrop rather than an environment to be engaged with. Over time, Johnson accumulated a collection of pavilions across the property—a brick library and guest house (which also contained the HVAC system for the transparent Glass House), painting gallery, sculpture gallery, second library and workspace, and a series of follies—creating what amounted to a modern day 18th century landscape or, less charitably, as a personal architectural theme park. Johnson’s main engagement with the landscape was a relentless excision of trees and understory plants from the formerly wooded site. For Johnson, the landscape was more like something to be viewed through the windows, as if on a television screen. This approach to the landscape as something to be viewed in a detached way, rather than engaged with as a living system, reveals the limitations of this strain of high modernism’s engagement with nature. Here, landscape becomes passive, meticulously composed yet fundamentally decorative and subordinate to the house—a stark contrast to the dynamic, immersive environment Wright created at Manitoga.

Johnson’s pristine modernism stands in stark contrast to Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater (1939), completed a decade earlier in rural Pennsylvania. Where Johnson placed his glass box atop the landscape as a pure geometric form, Wright anchored his structure into the site, dramatically cantilevering concrete terraces over a waterfall. The rivalry between these architects reflected fundamental disagreements about architecture’s relationship to nature and order. Johnson famously dismissed Wright as “the greatest architect of the nineteenth century,” while meeting Johnson at Yale, Wright said “Why, little Phil, I thought you were dead! Are you still putting up all those little houses and leaving them out in the rain?” Fallingwater neither dominates the landscape nor merely frames it; instead, the house emerges from it, with local sandstone walls rising from the same rock on which the house sits, stream water circulating through the house, and forest views penetrating every room.

Frank Lloyd Wright, Fallingwater, Bear Run, Pennsylvania, 2013

This integration of architecture and landscape had roots in Wright’s Prairie Style as well as in a dialogue with his contemporary, landscape architect Jens Jensen. A pioneering Danish-American designer, Jensen advocated for what he called the “native landscape,” using indigenous plants of the Midwest to create naturalistic compositions that expressed regional identity and ecological relationships. His influence on Wright was profound, encouraging an architecture responsive to the horizontal expanses of the prairie landscape and the use of local materials, and, in turn, Wilhelm Miller would dub Jensen’s approach “the prairie style” of landscape gardening, appropriating Wright’s term for his own work architectural style of low-slung horizontal lines, deep eaves, and integration with the landscape. As Russel Wright would later do at Manitoga, Jensen generally rejected exotic imports, preferring native plants arranged according to their natural associations—what we now recognize as plant communities.

Fallingwater, though built in a wooded Appalachian setting rather than the Midwest prairie, carries forward this commitment to site specificity while also incorporating Wright’s growing fascination with Japanese aesthetics. Wright had been captivated by Japanese design since first seeing the Ho-o-den pavilion at Chicago’s 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition. His subsequent travels to Japan in 1913 and his work on the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo (1916-1922) profoundly influenced his architectural thinking. The integration of indoor and outdoor spaces, the emphasis on horizontal planes, and the careful framing of natural views all reflect principles found in traditional Japanese architecture. Yet Wright created work that inspired by, not derivative of Japanese aesthetics. Beyond its cultural influences, Fallingwater also embodied a distinctly American social pattern—it served as an exurban retreat for the wealthy Kaufmann family, department store magnates from Pittsburgh seeking respite from urban life. In this sense, it reimagined the traditional country house for the industrial age, situated within driving distance of the city yet immersed in a seemingly pristine natural setting.

Russel and Frank Lloyd Wright knew each other and Russel sought out the elder architect, visting him in 1952, but despite its brilliant integration with its setting and Fallingwater represents a different approach than Russel Wright would take at Manitoga. Like the Glass House, Wright’s building still imposes a powerful human-designed geometry onto a pristine natural site, privileging formal drama over ecological processes. The massive concrete cantilevers—technological feats requiring extensive reinforcement—dramatically transform a previously untouched landscape. Fallingwater celebrates the creative genius of the individual architect rather than the collaborative dialogue with natural systems that Dragon Rock would embody. Where Fallingwater commands attention through bold formal gestures in a pristine setting, Manitoga would pursue a quieter, more reciprocal relationship with a damaged landscape. Both engage with their sites intimately, but to radically different ends: Fallingwater as an assertive architectural statement within nature, Manitoga as a healing conversation between human intervention and ecological regeneration.

Charles and Ray Eames, Eames House and Studio, 2007
By Flickr.com user “Ilpo’s Sojourn”https://www.flickr.com/photos/ikkoskinen/356425941/, CC BY 2.0.

Another, kindred approach—if in a different register—can be found in Charles and Ray Eames’s own home in Pacific Palisades (1949). Like the Wrights, the Eameses were industrial designers who shaped postwar American domestic life through their furniture and exhibitions. Their house, like Manitoga, represented a marriage of modernist principles with a respect for site conditions. The Eames House preserved a row of existing eucalyptus trees—admittedly not only non-native but quite invasive—and cut into the hillside behind them rather than dominating the site. The steel-framed structure functioned as a framework for living rather than a prescriptive environment, filled with collected objects, textiles, and plants that created a vibrant, evolving interior landscape. Like both Wrights (Frank Lloyd and Russel), the Eameses were deeply influenced by Japanese aesthetics—evident in their appreciation for natural materials, modular design principles, and the poetic juxtaposition of objects in space.         

Unlike Johnson, who saw himself as a design aristocrat, the Wrights and the Eameses participated in a broader postwar project to reimagine everyday—or at least upper middle-class—American domesticity through a synthesis of modern design and casual living. The Eames House was part of Arts & Architecture magazine’s influential Case Study House program, which commissioned architects to design prototype homes for the postwar era. These houses were explicitly marketed to Southern California’s technical-professional class—aerospace engineers, defense industry scientists, and Hollywood creatives—who embraced technology while seeking a more relaxed lifestyle. Similarly, the Wrights’ 1950 book Guide to Easier Living promoted an informal, practical approach to home design that freed homeowners (particularly women) from burdensome domestic conventions.6 Tragically, Mary Wright passed away after a year long battle with breast cancer in 1952, shortly after the couple purchased the Manitoga property. Her absence makes direct comparison with the collaborative Eames practice somewhat poignant—Charles and Ray worked as equals throughout their lives, while Russel had to carry forward their joint ambitions alone.

A telling difference between Johnson and the Eames/Russel Wright approaches emerges in their attitude toward time and completion. The Eameses famously documented their house in the short film “House: After Five Years of Living” (1955), suggesting that a home was not truly finished until it had been lived in and layered with personal collections and artifacts. This philosophy of ongoing adaptation contrasts sharply with Johnson’s more static, sculptural approach to architecture. Russel Wright’s decades-long development of Manitoga—constantly adjusting paths, plantings, and water features and tinkering with the house—likewise embraced design as a continuing dialogue with place rather than a finite architectural statement. Both the Eames House and Manitoga were conceived not as pristine aesthetic objects but as evolving frameworks for living, where the machine was not simply placed in the garden but integrated the messy, accumulative nature of human habitation and, in the case of Manitoga, ecological processes.

In his account, Russel and Mary Wright took trains to Garrison in search of a suitable site with views of the Hudson (Russel’s desire) and a place to swim (which Mary wanted) and hiked around until they found the abandoned quarry, with its gouged granite walls, the  forest stripped for industrial exploitation.7 After Mary’s untimely death in 1952, Russel continued their vision alone, and across two decades created an alternative synthesis that inverted the prevailing architectural paradigms of his time.

Dragon Rock at Manitoga, May 2025

Where Johnson, Frank Lloyd Wright, and the Eameses all reshaped relatively pristine sites for their architectural statements, Wright embraced disturbance and damage as design opportunities. He approached the scarred landscape not as something to be concealed or erased, but as raw material for a new kind of environmental art. Wright terraced quarry spoil piles into cascading moss gardens, repurposed industrial rubble for Dragon Rock’s walls, and ingeniously redirected natural run-off to create a pond whose high, dark water mirrors the cliff face. This practice of healing-as-design anticipated by decades our contemporary fascination with adaptive reuse and post-industrial landscapes. Wright understood that in a world increasingly marked by human intervention, true environmental stewardship must include the reclamation of damaged places, not just the preservation of pristine ones.

Quarry pool at Manitoga, May 2025

Wright’s design approach was also deeply informed by Japanese principles—notably, he had gone to Japan for the US State Department to help find Japanese goods to import. Having seen an article about young architect David Levitt’s New York apartment, which was informed by Levitt’s own time working in Japan, he hired Levitt and his firm Leavitt, Henshell and Kawai to design the house.8 Yet he avoided the superficial, appropriation of Asian motifs that characterized—and still characterize—so much of American borrowing from Japanese design (I discuss this at length in my previous essay, The Phantasmagoria of the Landscape: Japanese Gardens in America). Long fascinated by Japanese craft and garden traditions, Wright employed asymmetry, borrowed scenery (shakkei), and choreographed movement along sequential paths that reveal and conceal views in carefully orchestrated sequences. This Japanese influence paralleled the Eameses’ similar fascination—they too absorbed Japanese principles of modularity, adaptability, and the celebration of everyday objects. Both Wright and the Eameses understood that Japanese design offered not just visual motifs but a profound philosophy about the relationship between space, object, and human experience. When it came to the garden at Manitoga, Wright also largely rejected the American habit of importing cherries and maples to create simulacra of Oriental gardens. Instead, his plant palette is almost entirely Hudson Valley native—hemlock, white pine, mountain laurel, maidenhair fern—creating a landscape that feels simultaneously Japanese in its spatial principles and deeply rooted in its local ecology. His extensive cultivation of moss he found on the site recalls the spirit of Kyoto’s Saihō-ji temple, without feeling derivative. His approach invites comparison with the Sakuteiki’s ancient admonition to “follow the request of the stone,” suggesting that Wright had grasped the spiritual essence of Japanese garden design rather than merely its formal vocabulary.

Moss Garden at Manitoga, May 2025

Perhaps most revolutionary was Wright’s conception of architecture not as a machine for living but as a metabolic membrane between human and natural worlds. Dragon Rock features tree trunks that pierce roof openings, bringing living matter directly into the home. Glass walls slide away, erasing the boundary between interior and exterior. Summer breezes replace Johnson’s air conditioning, as the house was designed to be naturally ventilated through strategic openings that capture prevailing winds. The house is unquestionably a human intervention, but it is neither a technological machine indifferent to its setting nor a scenic prop framing picturesque views, but a porous threshold mediating light, moisture, temperature, and seasonal change.

Dragon Rock at Manitoga, May 2025

As a designer of industrially produced objects, Wright had long been concerned with the role of the individual in the mass society. In the opening to their Guide to Easier Living, Russell and Mary wrote: “In this increasingly mechanized civilization, our homes are the one remaining place for personal expression, the place where we could really be ourselves. But in actuality they are more often than not undistinguished and without individuality, monuments to meaningless conformity.”9 He addressed how this mindset affected his thinking about his house in a 1961 lecture stating, “Dragon Rock, the house in Garrison, must not be thought of as a prototype—it is an exaggerated demonstration of how individual a house can be.”10

While Wright shares with the Eameses a deep commitment to integrating modern life with natural surroundings, their approaches differ in significant ways. The Eames House embraces industrial materials and prefabrication as expressions of postwar technological optimism; its steel frame and colorful, painted panels celebrate the machine aesthetic even as they are set off by the row of eucalyptus. The myriad objects that the Eames’s collected on their travels are the chief natural materials in the house while Wright, by contrast, purposefully incorporates both natural materials and technological ones in the house itself. 

In doing the designing, I considered various types of materials. Here are some of the natural materials which are used in the house: lumber, in various conditions, sanded and finished, weathered, rough-cut, or lumber just with the bark removed. Leather, fur, stone, birch-bark, copper. This collection shows the extremely rich-textured natural materials, I think that they give on an impression that is too richa nd too resltless. Here are a few of the man-made materials used in the house: fiberglass, formica, foam rubber, metal foil, styrofoam.

These man-made materials are exactly the opposite of the natural ones. The natural materials are amorphic in shape and organic in texture. The machine-made ones have the repetition of the manufacturer: they are sleek, smooth. “what I have done is combine the two. The combination of the natural with the machine-made makes one type of material compliment or enhance the other.11   

Where the Eameses created a container for their vast collection of objects—a cabinet of curiosities that reflected their omnivorous cultural appetite—Wright cultivated absence and restraint, allowing the surrounding landscape to become the primary visual experience.  Yet both rejected the sterile monumentality of high modernism, so beloved by Johnson, in favor of homes that evolved organically through use and time. 

Wright’s most profound contribution may be his counter-exurban ethic. Where Spectorsky’s typical exurbanite curated nature as a status accessory—a manicured backdrop for cocktail parties or weekend recreation—Wright practiced a deeper engagement that relinquished pictorial control and embraced natural processes. At Manitoga, fallen branches are left to rot, leaves to accumulate, rock surfaces to weather to lichened silver. Nature is not frozen in an idealized state but allowed to evolve, die, decompose, and regenerate. Gardening becomes an ongoing collaboration of curation with ecological systems rather than a weekly maintenance spectacle performed by hired help with gas-powered devices. This approach prefigured the current avant-garde in landscape gardening, challenging the prevailing consumerist relationship to landscape that characterized much of exurban (and suburban) development since World War II. Against Johnson’s machine-in-the-garden it dissolves the machine into the garden while acknowledging the damage we have wrought, transforming industrial ruin into ecological theater where human intervention becomes not an imposition but a catalyst for new kinds of natural beauty. Against the typical exurban approach to landscape as status symbol, it proposes a model of stewardship based on reciprocity rather than consumption.

Dragon Rock at Manitoga, May 2025

Wright’s commitment to native plants at Manitoga represents one of his most visionary and ecologically significant contributions. While modern ecological restoration was still in its infancy, Wright intuitively understood the importance of working with indigenous plant communities rather than merely imposing exotic ornamentals. These weren’t arranged in conventional garden beds but placed according to their natural associations—ferns and mosses in damp ravines, blueberry shrubs along woodland edges, wildflowers in seasonal progressions of bloom. Wright didn’t merely preserve what was already there—the site had been ecologically devastated by quarrying—but actively reintroduced native species appropriate to the regional ecology. This approach dramatically differed from conventional landscaping of the era, which favored either exotic specimen plantings or formal arrangements. Unlike the typical suburban yard with its uniform lawn punctuated by non-native foundation shrubs, Manitoga’s landscape embraced seasonal change, ecological succession, and the subtle beauty of native plant communities. Wright recognized that the Hudson Valley’s indigenous flora possessed as much aesthetic power as any exotic import, while providing essential habitat for wildlife and requiring far less intensive maintenance. By rejecting the standard practice of clearing, grading, and replanting with exotic specimens, Wright demonstrated a profound respect for place and process that anticipated today’s native plant movement by half a century. His garden wasn’t a static composition but a dynamic system, incorporating natural cycles of growth, decay, and regeneration rather than attempting to freeze the landscape in a permanent state of visual perfection.

Dragon Rock at Manitoga, December 2024

Dragon Rock at Manitoga, May 2025

During our discussion, landscape curator Emily Phillips, who has done such fabulous work on the site, pointed out that Edith A. Roberts, who had been a professor of botany at nearby Vassar College, had written a book on native plants called American Plants for American Gardens (1929). One can only wonder if Wright could have missed that connection. That said, the only caution with regard to Wright at Manitoga is that while he did not plant Japanese red maple or cherry trees as specimens to invoke “Japaneseness,” but rather used Japanese principles of design, choosing to accentuate existing forms among his trees and shrubs that he found compelling and going so far as to hire  he did plant a small number of plants we now consider invasive and inappropriate. Generally, however, these were not specimens but rather what he might have called “ditch plants” or weeds. Carolyn Levy Franklin, one of the founders of the Andropogon landscape design firm—a storied pioneer in restoration—listed “Queen Anne’s lace, daisies, chicory, goldenrod, and coltsfoot” as examples in her extensive “Design and Management” guide to Manitoga wrote, adding that “These largely European herbaceous plants speak whimsically of the intervention of man in the landscape, as does the iron ring still implanted in the largest boulder—a relic from the days of quarrying. These largely European herbaceous plants speak whimsically of the intervention of man in the landscape, as does the iron ring still implanted in the largest boulder—a relic from the days of quarrying.”12 Although this approach, similar to that of Claudia West and Thomas Rainer’s “post-wild” strategy, would be dangerous and inappropriate in any site without professional, on-site staff, at Manitoga, the landscape team works to keep invasives to a minimum and has removed the most dangerous non-natives.

An invasive plant, Coltsfoot (Tussilago farfara), planted by Wright amidst native Wild ginger (Asarum canadense) and Virginia Creeper (Parthenocissus quinquefolia) at the entrance to the Dragon Rock complex, Manitoga. Note also the hook in the rock, evidence of the site’s past as a quarry.

But overall, Manitoga offers a stark alternative to the geometric domination that still characterizes much landscape design. By attending to the spirit rather than the specimens of Japanese tradition, honoring native plant communities without parochialism or sentimentality, and accepting entropy as co-author rather than enemy, Manitoga presents a model for post-carbon, post-industrial dwelling—one in which architecture and terrain enter a long, reciprocal conversation rather than a short and violent encounter. This is not just landscape design, it is a model for a reenvisioned land art. In an era of climate crisis and biodiversity collapse, Wright’s vision of design as a healing practice that enhances rather than replaces ecological function feels more urgent than ever.

I would like to thank Emily Phillips, Kathryn Tam, and Richard Rockwell at the Russell Wright Foundation for leading our tour as well as Sarah Pansy of the Foundation and Kim Correro, Head of Programs at NPSNJ for organizing our excursion.  

1. Andrew Jackson Downing, A Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening, Adapted to North America; with a View to the Improvement of Country Residences (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1841), iii, https://archive.org/details/treatiseontheory41down.

2. Downing, Treatise, 10-15.

3. Alexander Jackson Downing, The Architecture of Country Houses (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1852),  vi, https://archive.org/details/architectureofco00down/

4.  Auguste Comte Spectorsky, The Exurbanites (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1955). Mary Wright and Russel Wright, Guide to Easier Living (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950).

5. Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

6. Mary Wright and Russel Wright, Guide to Easier Living (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950). https://archive.org/details/mary-and-russel-wrights-guide-to-easier-living

7. Russel Wright, “Russel Wright Lecture” in Jennifer Golub, ed. Russel and Mary Wright: Dragon Rock at Manitoga (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2021), 137-150.

8. David L. Leavitt, “The Origin of Dragon Rock,” Manitoga / The Russel Wright Design Center, https://www.visitmanitoga.org/essay-david-leavitt. For the New York Times article, see here Betty Pepis, “Japanese Serenity in a Manhattan Apartment; Orient Visit Sparks Redecoration of Home,” The New York Times, November 28, 1955, https://www.nytimes.com/1955/11/28/archives/japanese-serenity-in-a-manhattan-apartment-orient-visit-sparks.html.

9. Wright and Wright, Guide to Easier Living, 1.

10. Wright, “Russel Wright Lecture,” 137.

11. Wright, “Russel Wright Lecture,” 139

12. Carol Levy Franklin, Design and Management Guide for Manitoga: A Preserve of The Nature Conservancy, Garrison, New York (December 1982), prepared under Grant #11-4213-264 from the National Endowment for the Arts, Design Arts Program, https://www.visitmanitoga.org/design-management-guide

The First Flowers of Spring: Hepatica, Rue Anemone, and Cultural Ecology

It’s the first week of May, which marks the coming of middle spring here at Highland House in northern New Jersey. Early spring is still a fraught time for this gardener. The herbaceous perennials that define a woodland garden die back and disappear in the winter, leaving ominously bare ground. It is a leap of faith to believe they will come back, but come back they do, year after year. Throughout March and April, there are still great gaps between the plants and last year’s leaf layer covers the ground. By the end of May, the more mature areas of my woodland garden will have formed a green mulch, a thick layer of green that effectively suppresses weeds. This late spring condition will last until the summer drought, which usually hits around here soon after midsummer.

But in early spring, the first plants to tell me that all is well and that spring will come are two members of the Buttercup (Ranunculaceae) family, the Sharp-lobed hepatica (Hepatica acutiloba) and their distant relative, Rue anemone or Windflower (Thalictrum thalictroides). These earliest native flowers push through the leaf litter while the woodland floor is still a somber palette of browns and grays, offering delicate blooms that seem at odds with the lingering chill. Early spring bees and flies, which emerge when few other food sources are available visit these flowers. These plants both occupy similar ecological niches on woodland floors and share early spring bloom times, but hepaticas are basal-leaved, semi-evergreen plants with solitary flowers on multiple stems and leathery foliage, while rue anemone has delicate compound foliage and bears multiple flowers on each stem. Although they are somewhat closely related, their resemblance stems from convergent adaptation to the woodland spring ephemeral window more than anything else. 

The complex leaves of Rue anemone (Thalictrum thalictroides). On the left, the fall-blooming Bottle gentian (Gentiana clausa)

Earlier this spring, I wrote about skunk cabbages—the very first native flowers of spring—and I hope one day they’ll establish themselves in my pond. But for now, to see them, I must go for a walk in the woods, while the hepaticas and rue anemones grace Highland House as our first spring blooms. Yet, for all of the obsession that gardeners worldwide have with non-native and exotic plants, these plants are too often overlooked. And while the Rue anemone is restricted to North America, the hepaticas—the focus of this brief excursion—are a living part of a horticultural heritage for many—from Asia to Europe to North America.

In Lithuanian tradition, the native blue Hepatica nobilis is known as Žibutė (or Žibuoklė, both stemming from the word for “shining”), the first visible sign of spring. Žibutė can be found in the woods near Vilnius, not far from Antakalnis Cemetery where my parents and my friend Valdas Ozarinskas are buried, growing amidst leaf litter. Finding its colorful bloom amid brown duff and lingering frost is to receive a confirmation that the world still turns, that seasons change. Children used to gather them for their mothers—although gathering wildflowers is not sustainable and should not be done—while elders note their appearance as a sign to begin preparing the land for the spring. The appearance of Žibutėprefigures the first thunder of the spring, when Perkūnas, the thunder god, strikes the Earth and awakens it from sleep, a renewal celebrated in the Romuva religion at the end of April as Jorė.

The trilobed leaves of Common hepatica (Hepatica nobilis), growing in Pavilniai Regional Park, near Antakalnis Cemetary, Vilnius.

Similarly, in Sweden, the blåsippa (Hepatica nobilis) is cherished as a herald of spring. Blooming between April and May, it is one of the earliest spring flowers to appear, sometimes even pushing through snow-covered grounds. The blåsippa holds cultural significance, symbolizing the arrival of spring in Swedish folklore and traditions. Its early bloom is celebrated in children’s songs and is a protected species in certain regions, reflecting its importance in Swedish natural heritage. 

The flowers of the hepaticas emerge first, followed by their exotic-looking leaves that are a purple hue at first. Their Latin name—Hepatica comes from “hepar” meaning liver—connects these plants to ancient medical traditions. The Doctrine of Signatures, a medieval medical concept suggesting plants resembling body parts could treat ailments of those organs, guaranteed hepatica’s place in early pharmacopeia, from the Mediterranean to the Baltics. Hepatica was an ingredient in patent medicine, notably Dr. Roger’s Liverwort and Tar. In 1883 some 200 tons of hepatica leaves were imported for use in patent medicine. Indigenous peoples long recognized these early bloomers as medicine. Cherokee healers used rue anemone to treat diarrhea and vomiting, while certain tribes employed hepaticas as Europeans did, for liver ailments, or as anti-convulsants.1.

Hepatica appears across Europe and Asia in similar roles. In Japan, where hanami (flower viewing) elevates horticultural appreciation to cultural ritual, hepaticas hold a special place among collectors. Known as “Yukiwariso,” “the flower that breaks through the snow,” and first cultivated during the Edo period, Japanese hepaticas (Hepatica nobilis var. japonica) have inspired a devotion bordering on obsession. Specialists cultivate countless varieties distinguished by subtle variations in petal shape, color, and stamens, while also seeking new specimens in the woods—including, the story goes, specimens that appear to have mutated due to fallout from nuclear bombing in World War II. These prized plants command prices that would astonish Western gardeners, with rare varieties fetching thousands of dollars at specialized auctions.2.

Rue anemone (Thalictrum thalictroides) coming up among Maidenhair fern (Adiantum Pedatum)

But there is no need to go abroad or to cultivate strange specimens. The first flowers of the American Northeast have their own quiet beauty. The Rue anemone emerges alongside the unfurling fronds of Maidenhair Fern (Adiantum Pedatum) in my rock garden, creating natural compositions that evoke Japanese garden aesthetics despite evolving continents apart. While contemplating these natural arrangements during the COVID lockdown in 2020, I began to envision an aesthetic specifically for a Northeastern American garden.  

Conservation challenges loom for these woodland jewels. Climate change poses one threat, as shifting bloom times disrupt pollinator relationships. Habitat loss presents another, with development consuming the rich deciduous woodlands these spring ephemerals require. Invasive species compound these pressures—in particular, garlic mustard (Alliaria petiolata), a plant native to Eurasia and northern Africa that competes for resources while releasing chemicals that suppress native plant growth.

For the gardener who cultivates awareness alongside plants, hepatica, and rue anemone become worthy of attention not for their garish displays but for their quiet persistence. They remind us that beauty often resides in subtle details rather than bold statements, in fleeting moments rather than permanent monuments. The presence of hepaticas in woodlands across continents—from Baltic forests to Japanese mountains to the northeastern woodland—suggests that we can better transcend cultural differences not by importing plants from far away, with all the woes they bring, but by embracing the gardens of our own place, wherever it may be.

1. Jack Sanders, the Secrets of Wildflowers (Guilford, CT: Globe Pequot Press, 2014), 9. 

2. Andy Byfield, “Japanese Hepaticas: Pastel Perfection,” The Guardian, April 9, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/gardening-blog/2015/apr/09/japanese-hepaticas-pastel-perfection and Gunther Kleinhans, “Yukiwariso: Small Jewels from Japan,” Pacific Horticulturehttps://pacifichorticulture.org/articles/hepaticas-small-jewels-from-japan.