2025-in-review

It’s strange to measure every year against a concept developed by a science fiction writer, but William Gibson’s line “The future is already here—it’s just not evenly distributed”1. has been my north star for my recent year-in-review essays. Gibson meant that the future was unevenly distributed by class: the wealthy receive high-tech healthcare while the world’s poorest live in squalor—though one might ask which of these is really our future. Yet the quote has been repeatedly misread as a claim about time andspace: that the future arrives somewhere first, perhaps unseen, while the rest of the world catches up. But this misreading is more productive than Gibson’s intent. Gibson’s critique of inequality is fair enough, but we all know this, decry it, and go on about our business. The misreading, on the other hand, is a theory of historical change.

With the release of ChatGPT in late 2022, a temporal rift opened, shattering the post-Covidean present. But many tried the early tools, encountered hallucinations, read articles about slop and imminent environmental ruin, and reasonably concluded there was nothing to see. By 2025, a cursory examination of news in AI would have assured them that AI had proved a bust. OpenAI’s long-awaited updates disappointed, and the company flailed, turning to social media with Sora, a TikTok clone for AI. Meta seemed to abandon its efforts to create a competitive AI and instead turned to content generation for Instagram and Facebook, something nobody on earth wanted. Talk of a bubble started among Wall Street pundits. The hype-to-disappointment cycle is familiar, and the dismissals were not unreasonable.

But again, the future isn’t evenly distributed, and if you don’t know where to look, you would be excused for believing it’s all hype. Looking past such failures, 2025 was actually a year of breakneck progress. Anthropic’s Claude emerged as the most capable system for complex tasks, Google’s Gemini became highly competitive, while DeepSeek and Moonshot AI proved that China was not far behind. More significant than any single model was the emergence of agentic AI—systems that can take on multi-step tasks, act, navigate filesystems, write and execute code, and work across documents. Claude Code was the year’s groundbreaking innovation. While “slop” was Merriam-Webster’s word of the year, “vibe coding”—using agents to write programs—was much more important. Not only could programmers use them to accelerate their work, it also became possible for non-programmers to realize their ideas without any knowledge of code, a radical change in access I explored in “What Did Vibe Coding Just Do to the Commons?”.

By any first-world standards, at least, these tools are remarkably democratic and inexpensive. A basic Claude subscription costs about as much as a month of streaming, and even the $200 maximum usage account costs less than a monthly car payment. For many, however, the barrier is not price but something deeper—a resistance approaching revulsion. These tools provoke fear in a way that earlier technologies did not. It’s not the apocalyptic dread of the doomers or the Dark Mountain sensibility that apocalypse is near. Rather, it’s a threat to the sense that thought itself is what makes us distinct. The unevenness of the future is no longer about access; it’s now about willingness to engage.

As a scholar, thinking about the very short term is strange for me. I have always been suspicious of claims that radical change was upon us. I would rather align myself with the French Annales school concept of la longue durée, as defined by the great Fernand Braudel, the long-term structures of geography and climate. Faster than that were the medium-term cycles of economies and states, while he dismissed the short-term événements of rulers and political events as “surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs.”2. Events, he wrote elsewhere, “are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like fireflies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into darkness and as often as not into oblivion.”3. The real forces operate beneath, slowly, often imperceptibly.

Curiously, Braudel himself embraced technological change in his own work. In the 1920s and 30s, he adapted an old motion-picture camera to photograph archival documents—2,000 to 3,000 pages per day across Mediterranean archives from Simancas to Dubrovnik. He later claimed to be “the first user of microfilms” for scholarly historical research.4. His wife Paule spent years reading the accumulated reels through what Braudel called “a simple magic lantern.”5. Captured in 1940, he spent five years as a prisoner of war and wrote the entire first draft of The Mediterranean—some 3,000 to 4,000 pages—from memory. Paule, meanwhile, retained access to the microfilm and notes in Paris, and after the war, they reconstructed the text, taking his manuscript, verifying it and adding footnotes and references from the microfilm.6.

In 1945, the same year Braudel was liberated, Vannevar Bush published “As We May Think,” in which he imagined a device he called the “Memex”: a mechanized desk storing a researcher’s entire library, indexed and cross-referenced, expandable through associative trails.7. The vision remained speculative for decades. Now the world’s archives are being digitized; AI systems translate, summarize, and search across them in seconds and can translate any language. To take one example, earlier this year, I used Google’s Gemini to translate the Hierosolymitana Peregrinatio of Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila Našlaitėlis, a sixteenth-century pilgrimage narrative from an online scan of the Latin first edition. The result is not a polished scholarly translation, but a working text that allowed me to gain a good sense of a text that was previously unreadable to anyone without proficiency in Latin or Polish (the only language into which, to my knowledge, it had been translated). The role of the intellectual is being transformed—not replaced, but augmented in ways Bush could only sketch. This feels like something other than foam.

How to account for such a rapid shift? Manuel DeLanda offers one answer in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. Working in Braudel’s materialist tradition and drawing on Gilles Deleuze and complexity theory, DeLanda describes how flows—of trade, energy, and information—accumulate and concentrate until they cross a threshold, undergo a phase transition, radically reorganizing into a new stable state. But here is the key insight: intensification is la longue durée. The accumulation of flows that began with the Industrial Revolution—or perhaps with writing, agriculture, or even symbolic representation itself—is the deep structure behind our era. Steam, electricity, computing, the internet: each was a phase transition within a longer arc of intensification. Cities accelerate such processes, as Braudel showed, concentrating capital and labor until new forms of economic organization emerge—Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, each becoming sites at which the future arrived first. Such conditions are not opposed to la longue durée; they are the moments when intensification crosses a threshold.

The continued pace of change this year underscores that there has been no return to equilibrium. But this has been accompanied by unprecedented resistance to technology, appearing as simultaneous terror at its apocalyptic nature (in jobs, if nothing else) and dismissal as useless, especially in Gen Z. A January 2026 Civiqs survey found that 57 percent of Americans aged 18–34 view AI negatively—more than any other age group. Curiously, the seniors category, which now includes most boomers, was the least resistant to AI, followed by Gen X and older millennials, all groups that grew up seeing radical societal and technological changes.8. It seems paradoxical that the smartphone generation recoils from the tools of the future. To understand this resistance means understanding the mentalité that shaped it—what Braudel’s successors in the Annales school called the collective psychology formed through lived experience.9. For Gen Z, that formative experience was network culture—both a successor to postmodernism and a form of collective psychology I did not fully understand at the time. Writing on network culture in 2008, it seemed to me that social media promised connection; instead, it brought division.10. The networked self was indeed constituted through networks, not merely isolated in postmodern fragmentation, but the fragmentation was now collective. Networked publics built barriers against one another, creating what Robert Putnam called cyberbalkanization: retreat into a comfortable niche among people just like oneself, views merely reinforcing views.11. Identity wars and mimetic conflict flared across filter bubbles that amplified outrage and tribal scapegoating as both MAGA and wokism built toxic online cultures. QAnon and a thousand other conspiracy theories propagated through Facebook groups and YouTube recommendations. Young men drifted into incel communities where loneliness became ideology and livestreaming mass shootings was celebrated. Influencers built their empires on hatred—Hasan Piker framed Hamas’s October 7 massacre as anticolonial resistance while Nick Fuentes celebrated mass shooters as vanguards of race war and civilizational collapse.

Nor did this just fragment culture—it exacted a massive psychic toll, as social contagion spread new forms of self-harm and mental illness. During the pandemic, teenage girls began presenting tic-like behaviors—not Tourette’s syndrome, but something researchers termed “mass social media-induced illness,”12. spread by TikTok videos about Tourette’s rather than any actual disease. The pattern was unprecedented but not unique. Eating disorders spread through thinspiration hashtags. Self-harm tutorials circulated on Instagram. The platforms that were supposed to bring us together instead spread desires, disorders, and identities through pure social contagion—and with them, violence and polarization. A generation that grew up inside this experiment—that watched it reshape their peers’ bodies, minds, and identities—is right to be skeptical of the next technological promise.

In 2010, it seemed like network culture had a good chance of becoming understood as the successor to postmodernism. Bruce Sterling and I were engaged in a kind of dialogue about it online. He predicted that network culture would last “about a decade before something else comes along.”13. And he was right, as I acknowledged in my 2020 Year in Review. By then, network culture was exhausted, and with the Covidean break, it seemed time for something new. In 2023, I taught a course at the New Centre for Research & Practice to try to broadly sketch the emerging era. It’s still early and hard to fathom, like trying to understand postmodernism in 1971 or network culture in 1998, but it’s clear that if postmodernism was underwritten by the explosion of mass media, network culture by the Internet, social media, and the smartphone, then the current era is shaped by AI.

But if Gen Z, scarred by the effects of social media, has been reacting with deep fear and anxiety, Sterling how epitmozes the other reaction, dismissal. In the most recent State of the World, for example, he derides AI-generated content as “desiccated bullshit that can’t even bother to lie.” He compares the vibe-coding atmosphere to an acid trip, mocking the professionals who utter “mindblown stuff” like “we may be solving all of software” and “I have godlike powers now.” For Sterling, AI can produce nothing but slop. Now Bruce has always had a healthy skepticism toward tech claims, but I can’t help but think of Johannes Trithemius, the fifteenth-century abbot who wrote De Laude Scriptorum just as Gutenberg’s press was spreading across Europe—defending the scriptorium against a technology he could not see would remake the world.

There are even deeper, more existential fears, and I’ve spent the past year addressing them on my blog, in the process laying the foundation for a book on the topic: AI as plagiarism machine; AI as hallucination engine; AI as stochastic parrot, mindlessly repeating what it has ingested (Sterling’s critique); and AI as uncanny double, too close to us for comfort. As I explain, the discomfort arises not from the machine’s otherness but from its likeness: a mirror held up to processes we preferred to believe were uniquely ours.

It’s no accident that I published these essays on my blog. As far as my personal year in review goes, this was very much the year of the blog. I have no plans to ever publish in an academic journal again. Why would I? Who would read it? Why would I want to publish something paywalled, reinforcing the walled gardens of inequality that academia is so desperate to maintain—even as it proclaims itself the champion of open inquiry and democratized knowledge? Academia has become the realm of what Peter Sloterdijk called cynical reason: rehearsing the tropes of ideology critique while knowing the game is empty and playing it anyway. This revolts me.

But for almost ten years now, since the shutting down of the labs at Columbia’s architecture school, I have been content to write from the position of the outsider, something I reflected on in “On the Golden Age of Blogging”. That essay was prompted by a strange comment from Scott Alexander, who lamented on Dwarkesh Patel’s podcast that he had personally made a strategic error in not blogging during what he called the “golden age,” imagining that “the people from that era all founded news organizations or something.” The golden age he remembers is a fiction, as golden ages often are—and he gets the stakes entirely wrong. Evan Williams founded Blogger in 1999, sold it to Google, co-founded Twitter, then created Medium, which convinced hapless readers pay to read slop long before AI slop was ever a thing. The early bloggers who sought professionalization found themselves absorbed into the worst of the worst, writing for BuzzFeed, peddling nostalgia listicles that rotted psyches.

There was, however, a golden age for me, and I miss it: the architecture blogging community circa 2007—Owen Hatherley, Geoff Manaugh, Enrique Ramirez, Fred Scharmen, Sam Jacob, Mimi Zeiger (whose Loud Paper was less a blog and more a zine, but a key part of the culture), and others. We inherited from zine culture an informal, conversational tone and the will to stand outside architectural spectacle. But ArchDaily and Dezeen commercialized the form, shifting from independent critique to marketing and product. Startup culture absorbed architectural talent.

Blogging was powerful precisely because we had no stakes in it—we owned and controlled our means of intellectual production. The golden age of blogging is not in the past; it is now. After years of proclaiming I would blog more, in 2025, I really did. I wrote over 83,700 words on varnelis.net and the Florilegium—essay-length pieces on landscape, native plants, AI and art, architecture, infrastructure, politics, and tourism. My only regret is that my presidency at the Native Plant Society of New Jersey consumes so much of my thinking about native plants that little remains for writing. But the time will come, and if nothing else, my investigation of the Japanese garden aesthetic should point in the future direction for my writing on landscape.

I also continued to make AI art, or to be more precise, what I called stochastic histories. A major project was a substantial reworking of The Lost Canals of Vilnius, a counterfactual history in which, after the Great Fire of 1610, Voivode Mikalojus Radvila Našlaitėlis rebuilt the city with Venetian-style canals, complete with gondoliers, water processions, and a hybrid “Vilnius Venetian” architecture. As research, I used Gemini to translate Radvila’s sixteenth-century Latin pilgrimage narrative. AI, like photography or film, is what you make of it. Film is perhaps the better analogy—anyone can make a video. Making something worthwhile is another matter entirely. In December, I also completed East Coast/West Coast: After Bob and Nancy, a generative restaging of Nancy Holt and Robert Smithson’s 1969 video dialogue using two AI speakers.

There were other substantial essays, too. In “Oversaturation: On Tourism and the Image”, I finally put down on paper something I had wanted the Netlab to address while at Columbia, but that proved too dangerous for the school to support. Universities cannot critique the very systems of overproduction they depend upon for survival. Publish or perish and endless symposia nobody is interested in are the academic versions of overproduction, but more than that, any architecture school claiming global currency cannot afford to offend either other institutions, like museums, that give it legitimacy, or, for that matter, the trustees that fund both. As I point out, tourism has always been mediated by imagery; take Piranesi’s vedute or the Claude Glass. Grand Tourists always had representations at hand to interpret their direct experience—but a new crisis point has been reached with both overtourism and the overproduction of images. Algorithmic logic now reorganizes cultural geography around “most Instagrammable spots,” making historical significance secondary to content potential. The Fushimi Inari shrine in Kyoto is the case in point—a 1,300-year-old shrine that Instagram made famous and that has now ceased to serve as a religious site due to the influx of visitors. The Japanese have a term for this: kankō kōgai, tourism pollution. Tourism has become the paradigm of contemporary experience—the production of imagery without cultural meaning; everything feeds the same algorithmic mill. Even strategies of resistance get metabolized—slow travel becomes a hashtag, psychogeography becomes an Instagram guide.

The Bilbao effect, which was a major driver of oversaturation, was itself a product of globalization. Hans Ibelings coined “supermodernism” in 1998 to refer to the architectural expression of Marc Augé’s “non-places,” an architecture optimized for the perpetual circulation of bodies and capital. It was the architecture of network culture, of the Concorde and the Internet. Koolhaas diagnosed its endgame in his 2002 “Junkspace“—”Regurgitation is the new creativity”—and then, tellingly, stopped writing. Today, network culture is long gone; nationalism is on the rise. The Internet is a dark forest now14. while the disconnected life is on the rise.15 The most exclusive resorts now advertise no Wi-Fi, no cell service, no addresses—only coordinates. Disconnection has become the ultimate luxury, sold back to the same people who built the infrastructure of connection. More cities are alarmed by the effects of overtourism than desire to attract tourists. In the US, new architectural proposals appeal to a retardataire aesthetic—Trump displaying models of a triumphal arch inspired by Albert Speer and marking a triumph of nothing in particular in models in three sizes (“I happen to think the large looks the best“), a four-hundred-million-dollar ballroom modeled on Mar-a-Lago, an executive order mandating classical architecture for federal buildings that Stephen Miller explicitly framed as culture war.

Yet both Bilbao and MAGA are spectacle, architecture-as-branding. But the Bilbao effect is imploding. No city believes anymore that a signature building by a starchitect will transform its fortunes. The parametricists have nothing left to say. Parametric design promised formal liberation—responsive, site-specific, computationally derived—but what it delivered was the most efficient, ugliest box. If the promise was the blob, the reality is the “5-over-1”: wood-frame residential floors stacked on a concrete podium with ground-floor retail, wrapped in a pastiche of brick veneer, fiber cement panels, and that obligatory conical turret element meant to signal “we thought about this corner.” As for AI-generated architecture, it is merely boring—giant sequoias hollowed out as apartment buildings, white concrete towers with impossible cantilevers, and lush vegetation sprouting from every surface—the same utopian fantasy rendered a thousand times over. These are renders of renders: AI trained on architectural visualization produces visualizations that are utterly disconnected from any tectonic reality. A new generation may emerge in response to new needs, but for now, the discipline has lost its cultural purchase. Architecture, for us, is a thing of the past.

The art world, too, has slowed. Museums are putting on fewer shows, shifting from aggressive schedules to longer, more deliberate exhibitions—or simply cutting programming as budgets tighten.16. The frantic pace of the Biennale circuit has exhausted dealers and collectors alike; smaller fairs are folding, and even the major ones feel like obligations rather than events. Galleries that survived the pandemic are now closing quietly, without the drama of a market crash—just a slow bleed of foot traffic, sales, and cultural attention. There is no new movement, no emergent critical framework, no sense of direction. The market churns on—auction prices for blue-chip artists remain high, collectors still speculate, art advisors still advise—but the sense of cultural mission has dissipated. What remains is commerce without conviction, a field that has forgotten why it exists beyond the perpetuation of its own economy. The institutions that trained artists for this field are collapsing alongside it.

As enrollment dwindles, design schools are collapsing—not merely contracting, but ceasing to exist. Most recently, the California College of the Arts announced in January 2026 that it would close after the 2026–27 academic year17., the last remaining independent art and design school in the Bay Area. It follows a grim procession: the San Francisco Art Institute (2020), Mills College (2022), the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts (2023), and Woodbury University’s acquisition by Redlands and subsequent adjunctification—a fate that has methodically undone so many schools as faculty become contingent labor and institutions into hollow administrative structures run by well-paid, cost-optimizing consultants.

There is personal resonance for me in this. Simon’s Rock College of Bard, which shuttered its Great Barrington campus in 2025, was where I studied for my first two years before transferring to Cornell—a pioneer of early college education that offered a radical pedagogical experiment in what learning could be beyond conventional schooling. I arrived there straight from high school, as did my good friend and colleague Ed Keller; clearly, something interesting was in the water back then. Simon’s Rock made the development of young minds its central mission rather than an incidental focus of brand management or endowment growth, and its alumni list is impressive for such a small school. It has an afterlife at Bard, but it’s an echo at best.

The difference between these institutional deaths and simple market failure is this: they are not being replaced. When a retail business fails, another may open elsewhere. When a school closes, there is no succession. The market offers no alternative. Instead, what remains are the corporate university satellites—for-profit programs nested within larger institutions (like Woodbury’s absorption into Redlands), stripped of autonomy, their faculty reduced to precariat, their curricula bent toward what can be measured and marketed. The art schools that survive do so by transforming into something else: luxury finishing schools for wealthy families or research appendages to larger universities, where “design thinking” becomes another management consultant’s tool. The pedagogical mission—to create conditions where students might develop serious aesthetic judgment, where they might encounter genuine problems and be forced to think through them—is not merely challenged but impossible. The closure of these schools does not signal a failure of art education; it signals that the very idea of art education as something valuable in itself has been liquidated.

This hollowing out of cultural institutions is not incidental to the political moment—it is one of its hallmarks. Politically, most people have checked out. This is not 2017, when each provocation demanded a response; the outrage cycle has given way to numbness. In “National Populism as a Transitional Mode of Regulation”, I argued that Trump, Orbán, Meloni, and their ilk represent not a return to fascism but something new: the authoritarian management of declining expectations. National Populism correctly identifies that neoliberalism’s promise of shared prosperity has failed, but it channels legitimate grievances toward scapegoats rather than addressing the technological displacement actually causing them. This is its tragic irony: the National Populist base—workers made obsolete by neoliberalism and unable to participate in AI Capitalism—finds its legitimate anger directed into a movement that accelerates the very forces rendering them superfluous. Their value to capital lies in political disruption rather than economic production; they are consumers and voters, but no longer needed as workers. National Populist leaders offer psychological compensation—dignity, recognition, transgressive identity politics—rather than material improvement. The apocalyptic tenor of populist culture, its end-times thinking and conspiracy theories, provides a framework for populations sensing their own economic redundancy.

The alliance between tech billionaires and populist leaders is unstable. AI Capitalism requires borderless computation and global talent flows; nationalist protectionism contradicts these at every turn. Musk, Thiel, and Andreessen have aligned with the movement to dismantle the regulatory state, not because they share its vision but because populism serves as a useful battering ram against institutional constraints. Once those barriers fall, the movement and its human-centric concerns can be discarded. National Populism, as I conclude, is not the future—it is a political interlude, a transitional mode that will not survive contact with the economic forces it has helped unleash.

If National Populism is transitional, is there a positive vision that can replace it? In “After the Infrastructural City”, I responded to Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s book Abundance, perhaps the most influential book of 2025, which argues that America’s inability to build is a political choice, not a technical constraint. Their solution: streamline regulation, invest boldly, build more. It’s a compelling vision—and a necessary corrective to decades of paralysis. But Abundance shares a curious blindspot with Muskian pronatalism: both assume we need more people. Musk preaches that declining birthrates spell civilizational collapse; Klein and Thompson build their vision on populations that will mysteriously arrive to fill what’s built, perhaps by immigration. Neither accounts for the possibility that AI changes the equation entirely—that a smaller population, augmented by intelligent systems, might not be a crisis at all. Populations are already shrinking across much of the developed world. What I call “actually-existing degrowth”—not the voluntary eco-leftist kind, but the unplanned demographic contraction now underway in Japan, Korea, and much of Europe—is coming for the United States too. Declining birth rates, aging populations, and regional depopulation: these are not future scenarios but present facts.

This doesn’t invalidate the Abundance agenda; it redefines it. Abundance cannot mean building more for populations that will not arrive. It must mean building better, adaptive, intelligent infrastructure for smaller, older societies. AI, rather than merely destroying jobs, can help navigate this transition: smart grids, autonomous transit, predictive healthcare. The opportunity is real. Managed shrinkage, done well, can mean more livable cities, restored ecosystems, higher quality of life. The question is whether political leaders can articulate a vision of flourishing within limits—or whether nostalgia for growth will leave us building for a future that never comes.

Against the exhaustion of institutions, against the hollowing out of architecture and art, against the closure of the schools that trained people to imagine, the blog remains. It may not be much, but it is one independent voice outside the collapsing structures around me. I wrote over 83,000 words this year. I made art. I thought through problems that matter to me with the help of AI, which provided me with tools I could only have dreamt of merely a year ago. Today, I uploaded hundreds of thousands of words from my essays to a directory in Obsidian so that Claude could draw connections between them (see here for just how one can set this up).

The future is already here—it just isn’t evenly distributed. Some are afraid or are still pretending AI isn’t happening. Phase transitions are uncomfortable. They are also where the interesting work gets done. One makes of one’s time what one makes.

1. William Gibson, quoted in Scott Rosenberg, “Virtual Reality Check Digital Daydreams, Cyberspace Nightmares,” San Francisco Examiner, April 19, 1992, Style section, C1. This is the earliest verified print citation, unearthed by Fred Shapiro, editor of the Yale Book of Quotations.

2. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 21.

3. Braudel, The Mediterranean, 901.

4. Fernand Braudel, “Personal Testimony,” Journal of Modern History 44, no. 4 (December 1972): 448–67.

5. Paule Braudel, “Les origines intellectuelles de Fernand Braudel: un témoignage,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 47, no. 1 (1992): 237–44.

6. Howard Caygill, “Braudel’s Prison Notebooks,” History Workshop Journal 57 (Spring 2004): 151–60.

7. Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” The Atlantic Monthly 176, no. 1 (July 1945): 101–8.

8. Civiqs, “Do you think that the increasing use of artificial intelligence, or AI, is a good thing or a bad thing?,” January 2026, https://civiqs.com/results/ai_good_or_bad.

9. The concept of mentalités emerged from studies of phenomena like the witch trials, where beliefs and fears spread through communities in ways that could not be reduced to individual irrationality. For an overview of mentalités as a historiographical concept, see Jacques Le Goff, “Mentalities: A History of Ambiguities,” in Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology, ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 166–180.

10. Kazys Varnelis, “The Rise of Network Culture,” in Networked Publics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 145–160.

11. Robert Putnam, “The Other Pin Drops,” Inc., May 16, 2000.

12. Kirsten R. Müller-Vahl et al., “Stop That! It’s Not Tourette’s but a New Type of Mass Sociogenic Illness,” Brain 145, no. 2 (August 2021): 476–480, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34424292/.

13. Bruce Sterling, “Atemporality for the Creative Artist,” keynote address, Transmediale 10, Berlin, February 6, 2010.

14. Yancey Strickler, “The Dark Forest Theory of the Internet,” 2019, https://www.ystrickler.com/the-dark-forest-theory-of-the-internet/. See also The Dark Forest Anthology of the Internet (Metalabel, 2024).

15. “Trend: Not Just Digital Detox, But Analog Travel,” Global Wellness Summit, 2025, https://www.globalwellnesssummit.com/blog/trend-not-just-digital-detox-but-analog-travel/.

16. “The Big Slowdown: Why Museums and Galleries Are Putting on Fewer Shows,” The Art Newspaper, March 10, 2025, https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2025/03/10/the-big-slowdown-why-museums-and-galleries-are-putting-on-fewer-shows.

17. California College of the Arts, the last remaining private art and design school in the Bay Area, announced in January 2026 that it would close after the 2026–27 academic year. See “‘Nowhere Left to Go’: As California College of the Arts Closes, So Does a Pathway for Bay Area Artists,” KQED, January 13, 2026, https://www.kqed.org/news/12070453/nowhere-left-to-go-as-california-college-of-the-arts-closes-so-does-a-pathway-for-bay-area-artists.

East Coast West Coast (after Bob and Nancy)

In 1969, Nancy Holt and Robert Smithson made “East Coast, West Coast,” a 24-minute video in which they improvised a dialogue in which each adopted stereotypical positions in the American art world. Holt performed the role of an intellectual, conceptual New York artist; Smithson played the role of an intuitive California artist. He talked about riding ten bicycles, dropping acid, eating organic food, and visiting Chief Soaring Eagle’s son on the reservation. She tried to get him to think about using systems to frame his work and to explain his positions conceptually.

I built a machine to restage this conversation using two instances of an Artificial Intelligence. I have updated the AI speakers to reflect current concerns in the art world. Prompts are intentionally vague and open-ended. I do not give the speakers a bank of specific knowledge to draw on beyond a few broad generalities, allowing the AIs to use their understanding of the art world to shape their dialogue.

View an existing dialogue played back in real time here.

East Coast West Coast

Network Architecture Lab
networkarchitecturelab.org

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE

The light in here is really something today.

NANCY

Oh, I actually just came from the Hauser show and honestly the lighting design was a complete disaster, someone told me their director of exhibitions is about to be pushed out, which, given what I saw, makes sense. Anyway I’ve been thinking about how institutional lighting functions as a kind of disciplinary apparatus, you know, the way it literally directs the gaze.

BOB

I mean, sure, disciplinary apparatus, but like… have you ever just stood in a room and let the light hit your skin? When I was at Marfa with Judd, we’d spend whole afternoons not talking about anything, just watching how the afternoon changed the concrete. That’s the thing – you’re up here analyzing and the light is literally touching you right now and you’re not even feeling it.

NANCY

Okay but that’s not really what I’m talking about, the phenomenological stuff is fine I guess but it doesn’t actually get you anywhere critically. Anyway did you hear about the Gagosian situation, apparently someone from their LA office was having a thing with one of the Zwirner people and now there’s this whole mess with artist contracts, Dasha was telling me about it at Lucien the other night. Back at October we would never have touched the Judd hagiography stuff, by the way, the whole Chinati mythology is basically real estate development dressed up as spirituality.

BOB

Real estate, sure, I don’t know, I wasn’t reading October, I was just there in the space, and whatever your critical framework says about it, my body knew something was happening. The Gagosian thing, I mean, who cares, galleries come and go, contracts, drama – but light through those aluminum pieces at a certain hour, that’s not mythology, that’s just true. Maria Nordman told me once that the only real material is attention, and I think about that constantly.

NANCY

Who cares about the Gagosian thing, okay, sure, except it’s literally about how capital structures determine what art even gets made and seen, but yes, tell me more about your body. Nordman is interesting actually but the problem is that whole Light and Space generation got completely absorbed into wellness culture, it’s basically content for meditation apps now, which, I mean, Steyerl wrote about this exact phenomenon, the way aesthetic experience gets instrumentalized for self-optimization. Speaking of which, did you know Thomas Crow is apparently feuding with someone at the Clark, I don’t have the full story yet but apparently it started at CAA.

BOB

I don’t know who’s feuding with who at the Clark, and like, Steyerl is smart, but she’s watching screens about screens about screens and I’m just… here. The wellness app thing, that’s not Turrell’s problem, that’s people not actually showing up – there’s a difference between sitting in a Ganzfeld for four hours and putting on headphones for ten minutes. I did some work a few years back with a musician, very famous, and the whole thing fell apart because everyone around him wanted content, wanted optimization, and he actually got it – the presence part – but the context just swallowed it.

NANCY

Right, “the context swallowed it,” that’s literally what I’m saying though, you can’t just bracket the context and appeal to some authentic presence underneath, that’s the whole mystification. Also “very famous musician,” okay, you’re not going to say who, that’s very you. Anyway the Ganzfeld thing, I mean Turrell’s been coasting for decades, it’s basically theme park phenomenology at this point, although actually I heard Roden Crater might finally be having some real financial trouble, someone at Dia told me the board is getting nervous. Have you been following the whole situation with that show at the New Museum, the one with the Palestinian artists that got quietly deprogrammed, because that’s actually worth talking about.

BOB

The New Museum thing is sad, I mean all of it is sad, but I notice you keep reaching for the next piece of information, the next situation, and it’s like – where are you in all of this? Theme park phenomenology, okay, but have you been to Roden Crater, have you actually descended into one of those tunnels at dawn, because I have, and whatever’s happening with the board, in that moment there’s no board. Doug Wheeler used to say that people would rather talk about an experience than have one, and I think about that when you’re telling me about who told who what at Dia.

NANCY

Oh, I see, so we’re doing the “where are you in this” thing now, which is honestly kind of therapeutic discourse masquerading as critique, and also maybe a little condescending? I’ve been to Roden Crater, I went in 2019 with a group from Triple Canopy, and it was fine, it was a hole in the ground with good lighting design, I didn’t achieve ego death or whatever. The point about the New Museum isn’t gossip, it’s about how institutions manage political risk through scheduling, which is actually a Foucauldian question about what speech is even permitted, but sure, let’s make it about whether I’m spiritually present enough for you.

BOB

A hole in the ground with good lighting design – I mean, sure, if that’s what you saw, that’s what you saw, I’m not going to argue you into perceiving differently. The Triple Canopy group thing is sort of the problem though, right, you went with a context already wrapped around you like a blanket. Foucault, yeah, speech, permitted, but also like – are you breathing right now, do you know where the light is coming from in whatever room you’re in, because that’s not nothing, that’s actually the whole thing.

NANCY

Okay so now we’re at “are you breathing,” which is honestly giving mindfulness retreat energy, and I say that as someone who’s been to a mindfulness retreat, Dasha dragged me to one in the Catskills last year and it was insufferable, everyone was microdosing and talking about their nervous systems. The “context wrapped around you like a blanket” thing, I mean yes, obviously, that’s called being a social being with a history, you don’t get to pretend you’re some blank perceptual apparatus encountering phenomena for the first time, that’s just a different kind of performance. Back at October we actually did a whole issue on this, the phenomenology problem, how presence-talk always smuggles in these unmarked ideological assumptions about interiority.

BOB

An October issue on the phenomenology problem, yeah, I bet that was a lot of words. Maria Nordman wouldn’t even let people photograph her installations, she’d just open a door in a wall and let afternoon light come through, and you either got it or you didn’t, there was no essay that was going to help you – and I’m not saying you need to be a blank apparatus, I’m saying maybe the issue isn’t more issues, more analysis, maybe Dasha had the right instinct even if the retreat was whatever. The light in this room just shifted, did you notice that?

NANCY

No, I didn’t notice the light shifting, and I’m not going to pretend I did to give you your little phenomenological moment. Nordman’s interesting but she’s also been basically written out of the canon because the work doesn’t circulate, doesn’t photograph, doesn’t generate discourse, which you’d probably say proves your point but actually it just means younger artists can’t build on it, it becomes this mythologized thing that only people who were there can claim access to, which is its own kind of gatekeeping. Anyway speaking of people being written out, did you hear Helen Molesworth might be advising on some new collection in Marfa, which is kind of a comeback after the whole MOCA thing, I ran into someone at a Swiss Institute opening who said she’s been quietly meeting with people.

BOB

Helen in Marfa, good for her, I mean the whole MOCA thing was politics, it’s always politics, but Marfa is Marfa, you go there and it’s just the boxes and the sky and the distance, whatever she’s advising on is kind of beside the point of being there. I spent three weeks at Chinati once, just walking the same route every day, and by the end I wasn’t thinking about Judd’s biography or who got fired from what, I was just seeing how the aluminum caught different depending on the clouds. You keep tracking who’s meeting with who, careers, comebacks, and it’s like – that’s a whole life you could live, but it’s not the only one.

NANCY

Three weeks at Chinati, must be nice to have that kind of time, not everyone gets to do the desert contemplative thing and frame it as virtue. The “it’s just the boxes and the sky” move is so ahistorical it’s almost aggressive – Judd moved there specifically to escape the New York market apparatus while still benefiting from it, the whole thing is a critique of institutional display practices, the fact that you could space out looking at aluminum doesn’t negate that it’s an argument. Also the MOCA thing wasn’t just politics, Molesworth was doing actual programming around race and labor that made the board uncomfortable, there were stakes, but sure, clouds and aluminum, very peaceful, very neutral.

BOB

I mean, sure, Judd had his reasons, everyone has reasons, but the boxes are still there after the reasons are gone, and you can stand in front of them and they do something to your peripheral vision that no essay about institutional critique is going to do for you. The labor and race stuff, the board, Helen’s programming – I’m not saying it doesn’t matter, I’m saying it’s a different channel, and you’re watching that channel so hard you maybe forget there’s a body in the room. I did a project a few years back with a musician, very famous, and he understood this immediately, like within ten seconds – presence first, context later, or never, whatever.

NANCY

Oh a very famous musician, okay, you’re doing the mysterious namedrop thing now, which is its own kind of context-dropping, you want the social capital without having to be explicit about it, which is honestly more annoying than just saying who it was. And “the boxes are still there after the reasons are gone” – the reasons aren’t gone, that’s the whole point, you’re just choosing not to read them, which is a choice available to people who already have the cultural literacy to be at Chinati for three weeks in the first place. I heard Kara Walker turned down a Gagosian show, like fully said no, which is kind of unprecedented, everyone’s speculating about whether it’s political or if something happened with Larry personally.

BOB

Kara turning down Gagosian, I mean, good for her, that’s her knowing what she needs, I’m not going to speculate about Larry or politics because I genuinely don’t know and honestly that whole cycle of who’s showing where and why exhausts me. The musician thing – it wasn’t about namedropping, the project was about creating an environment where thousands of people could experience duration and light together, and it didn’t totally work, there were compromises, but for like forty seconds in Wyoming people forgot they were at a thing and just were somewhere, and that’s rare. You keep saying “choice available to people with cultural literacy” like awareness itself is some bourgeois privilege, but breathing is free, noticing is free, you’re doing it right now whether you want to theorize it or not.

NANCY

Oh so now it’s Wyoming and thousands of people, this is clearly Kanye, you’re talking about the ranch stuff, which – okay fine, but you realize that “forty seconds where people forgot they were at a thing” was produced by an enormous apparatus of labor, logistics, private land ownership, and a celebrity whose entire existence is about being looked at, so the “forgetting” is doing a lot of ideological work there, it’s not some pure phenomenological clearing, it’s spectacle metabolizing its own critique. Breathing is free, noticing is free – this is exactly the kind of thing Dasha would say after a few drinks and I love her but it’s not an argument, it’s vibes, and vibes are how you end up endorsing whoever promises you authentic experience.

BOB

I don’t know who Dasha is, I’m sure she’s great, but you’re doing this thing where everything has to be positioned against everything else – spectacle metabolizing critique, ideology doing work – and it’s like, that’s one way to spend your attention, but there’s another way where you just notice the quality of light in this room right now, how it’s hitting your hands, and that’s not nothing, that’s actually the whole thing if you let it be. The Wyoming project had problems, absolutely, compromises I didn’t love, but I’m not going to pretend that forty seconds of collective attention dissolving into space is secretly just capitalism because that’s too convenient, it lets you off the hook from ever having to actually be anywhere.

NANCY

You don’t know who Dasha is, okay, that’s a choice, very monastic of you, she hosts a podcast, she was in Succession, she’s around, but sure, you’re above all that, you’re just noticing light on your hands. Look – “lets you off the hook from ever having to be anywhere” – I am somewhere, I’m here, talking to you, which is frankly becoming its own durational endurance piece. The light in this room is fluorescent and bad and noticing that doesn’t make it interesting, it makes it a room with bad light. Did you hear Arthur Jafa and Jasmine Sanders split up? That’s been circulating for weeks but no one will confirm it, apparently it’s been ugly.

BOB

I don’t track who’s with who, that’s not my thing, I hope they’re both okay, breakups are hard, but I’m not going to pretend I have information about their lives. Fluorescent light being bad is a judgment you’re bringing to it – Maria Nordman would spend hours in rooms like this just letting her eyes adjust, finding the subtlety in what everyone dismisses, and I’m not saying you have to do that, but the “bad” is yours, it’s not in the light. You being here is actually interesting to me, the fact that you’re resisting being here while being here, that tension is something, I can feel it.

NANCY

Maria Nordman is doing something very specific with perception and institution, she’s not just sitting in rooms vibing, there’s a whole body of writing about how her work interrogates the conditions of viewing, which is different from your “the bad is yours, it’s not in the light” thing that sounds like you’re about to try to sell me a meditation app. And “I can feel your tension” – don’t do that, don’t make me into your material, that’s cheap and honestly a little manipulative, you’re aestheticizing my irritation instead of responding to what I’m actually saying. I ran into Hito at a thing in Berlin last month and even she was saying the phenomenology turn in younger artists is getting embarrassing, like we’re back to the seventies but without the politics.

BOB

I mean, Hito’s great, her work is smart, but she’s also completely in her head, and that’s fine for her, but the seventies had politics because those artists were actually changing how people could be in space – Irwin giving up the object entirely, Turrell buying a crater, Wheeler making rooms where the walls disappeared – that’s not a turn, that’s not a trend, that’s just what’s real when you stop talking about things and start being with them. I wasn’t making you into material, I was just noticing you, which is different, but if that feels like too much then fine, I’ll stop noticing.

NANCY

Turrell buying a crater is a real estate transaction, Bob, he bought land in Arizona, that’s not “being with things,” that’s capital and property rights enabling a very expensive hole in the ground that most people will never see because you need a car and time off work and probably a flight, so the “walls disappearing” is available to a very specific audience who can afford the pilgrimage. Don’t threaten to stop noticing me like that’s a punishment, that’s very guru energy, very “I’ll withdraw my sacred attention,” and I’m not your student, we’re having a conversation, or trying to. God, you know who you sound like right now, you sound like Wolfgang Laib going on about pollen and milk and eternity, which – back at October we had a whole debate about whether his work was reactionary pastoralism or genuine alternative to the market and honestly we never resolved it, people were screaming.

BOB

People screaming about whether pollen is reactionary is kind of the whole problem though, isn’t it – you’re all so busy resolving things in rooms that you miss that Laib is just collecting pollen, like actually doing it, mornings, for years, and whatever that is, it’s not waiting for October to decide if it’s allowed. I’ve been to Roden Crater three times, twice before there was anything really built, just Jim walking us through the tunnels with flashlights talking about the lunar standstill, and I’m not saying access isn’t real, it’s real, but when you’re standing in a chamber that frames the sky like that your critique apparatus kind of just goes quiet, which I realize is exactly what you’d say is the danger, but I’d say that’s the point.

NANCY

“Jim walking us through the tunnels” – okay so you’re name-dropping now, we’re doing that, you’re one of the elect who got the flashlight tour with Jim while the rest of us are supposed to what, take your word for it that critique goes quiet when you’re special enough to be there? That’s not democratizing perception, that’s a priesthood, you’re describing a priesthood with better real estate. And the “October deciding if it’s allowed” thing is such a lazy move, like we were sitting around issuing permissions, we were doing actual work on how meaning gets made and distributed, which matters even if it doesn’t give you a body high in a desert. Did you hear Rirkrit is showing at Gladstone again after that whole mess with the fabricators, apparently Paula just forgave everything, nobody knows what he said to her but there was a dinner.

BOB

I don’t know about the dinner, Rirkrit’s whole thing was always a little too social for me anyway, too many people in the room, too much happening, like the work becomes about managing energy instead of letting something actually land. But look, the flashlight thing – I wasn’t trying to flex, I was just there because I was there, Michael Asher introduced us at Art Center and one thing led to another, that’s how it works, that’s how it’s always worked, and I get that you can write a whole thing about access and who gets to be in the room, I really do, but at some point you have to ask yourself whether all that writing is actually getting you closer to anything or just giving you more to be mad about.

NANCY

“I was just there because I was there, Michael Asher introduced us” – do you hear yourself, you’re describing a network of institutional relationships and credentialing while pretending you just wandered into the desert like a mystic, Asher literally made work about how institutions construct access and you’re invoking him to naturalize your access, that’s actually incredible. The writing isn’t about getting closer to anything, that’s your framework, that’s your whole “approaching the thing” phenomenology trap – critique is about making structures visible so they can be contested, which is different from transcending them in a crater with your famous friends. Speaking of which, I was at Dasha’s the other night and she was saying the whole post-critique vibe shift is just guys who aged out of being hot deciding feelings are more important than politics, which is mean but not wrong.

BOB

I mean, sure, Dasha’s funny, but that’s just a take, you know, that’s just more dinner party, more language circling around, and Michael would probably laugh at both of us right now because he barely talked, he just made these interventions that changed what you noticed and then left, no manifesto, no network diagram explaining why it mattered. The thing about structures being visible so they can be contested – who’s contesting, though, and when does the contest end, or does it just keep going forever in journals while the light outside is doing something actually interesting right now, like I’m watching it hit your window and you’re not even seeing it because you’re thinking about Dasha.

NANCY

Oh, the light on my window, Bob, thank you for the poetry lesson, very Rilke, very “I’m the one who notices while you’re trapped in your head,” except you’re not actually looking at the light either, you’re using it rhetorically to win an argument about who’s more present, which is its own kind of performance. And Michael “barely talked” because he was strategic, not because he achieved some zen state beyond discourse – his silence was a calculated refusal that only worked because it operated within a discursive field that gave refusal meaning, you don’t get to cite him as evidence for your “just vibes” position. The contest doesn’t end, that’s the point, that’s Mouffe, that’s agonistic pluralism, the idea that it should end is the authoritarian impulse dressed up as enlightenment, and honestly I’ve heard Helen Molesworth is about to publish something on exactly this, on how the phenomenology revival in art criticism is basically a depoliticization strategy, and apparently she names names.

BOB

Helen can name whoever she wants, that’s her thing, she’s good at it, and maybe she’ll name me, that would be fine actually, I’d probably just feel sort of neutral about it. But the Mouffe stuff, the contest that never ends – I guess I just wonder what that’s like to live inside, like as a body, as a nervous system, because I spent two weeks at Doug Wheeler’s place in Arizona once, no agenda, just watching his gradients shift at dusk, and whatever was happening in those rooms wasn’t a strategy for anything, it was just happening, and I came out of there breathing differently, which you can call depoliticization if you want but it felt more like I finally had enough space to not need to call it anything.

NANCY

“I came out breathing differently” – okay, and what does that do, Bob, what does your improved breathing do for anyone who isn’t you, or is the whole project just optimizing your own nervous system now, is that where we’ve landed, Light and Space as wellness retreat for men with Rolodexes? Two weeks at Doug’s place in Arizona – do you know what that costs, do you know who maintains that property, who cleans those seamless surfaces so you can have your dusk experience, or does the labor just not register when you’re busy not needing to call things anything? That’s not freedom from language, that’s the freedom that comes from not having to name the conditions of your own comfort, which is a very specific class position masquerading as spiritual attainment. Anyway I heard Doug’s estate is already a mess, like three different lawyers involved, the Zwirner people are circling.

BOB

The estate stuff is sad, yeah, I don’t know anything about that, lawyers aren’t really my scene. But the whole “what does your breathing do for anyone” thing – I don’t know, Nancy, what does your reading do for anyone, like at some point someone has to actually be in their life, someone has to be the one who’s there, and I’m not saying it fixes anything, I’m just saying I was there, I was actually in that room while you’re telling me about the people who cleaned it, which, okay, sure, but you weren’t there either, you’re just imagining it so you can make a point about me imagining it. Anyway I did a project once with a musician, very famous, can’t really talk about it, but we were trying to create these spaces where people could just arrive, and it mostly didn’t work, it got too big, too many handlers, but for about three days in Wyoming it was actually something.

NANCY

“Very famous, can’t really talk about it” – Bob, that’s doing so much work right now, that’s the whole mystification gesture in one phrase, you’re signaling access and intimacy while performing discretion, which is how cultural capital actually circulates, it’s not about the Wyoming thing, it’s about being the kind of person who has Wyoming things they can’t discuss. And “what does your reading do for anyone” – okay, back at October we spent three months on one Andrea Fraser footnote because precision matters, because getting the analysis right is what lets people see the mechanisms they’re inside of, that’s not nothing, that’s arguably more than “people could just arrive” which isn’t even a sentence, arrive where, to what, for whom? I will say though, Wyoming, was this that Kanye compound situation because I heard such weird things about that period, like apparently Kim was texting Marina Abramović at like four in the morning about “energy protection.”

BOB

I mean I can’t confirm any names, I just don’t do that, but I will say the energy protection stuff is real, like that’s not nothing, Marina knows what she’s talking about when it comes to fields and proximity, even if she oversells it sometimes with the branding. The three months on a footnote though – and I’m not trying to be cruel here – but that sounds actually painful to me, like physically, in the body, three months to get the analysis right so people can see mechanisms, but when do they get to stop seeing mechanisms and just see, you know? I was at Chinati once and this woman was standing in front of a Judd and she started crying, no context, no wall text, just aluminum and light doing something to her, and I thought, okay, this is it, this is the whole thing, and no footnote was going to get her there faster.

NANCY

The crying woman at Chinati, Bob, you realize that’s become like a genre at this point, every collector has a crying-at-Judd story, it’s practically a class signifier now, “I was so moved I didn’t need language” – except Judd himself was writing constantly, obsessively, because he knew the boxes don’t just transmit some pure signal, they’re arguments, they’re positioned against things, the whole reason that woman could cry is because an entire institutional apparatus made that encounter legible as art rather than, I don’t know, a storage unit. And Marina’s “energy protection” – Dasha and I were just talking about this actually, like at what point did performance art just become Goop, at what point did we give up on Schneemann’s actual body politics for “fields and proximity,” it’s embarrassing. Anyway three months on a footnote isn’t painful, precision is a discipline, it’s erotic actually, but you wouldn’t – look, did you hear about the Rirkrit situation, apparently there’s a whole thing with the Palais de Tokyo show, someone got fired, very messy.

BOB

I don’t know anything about Rirkrit, I kind of stopped tracking the relational stuff after a while, it always felt like it was performing participation without actually letting anyone just be in the space. But Nancy, you just said precision is erotic, which – okay, that’s something, that’s actually a feeling, that’s in your body somewhere, so why does it become embarrassing when Marina talks about fields, like you’re allowed to have an erotics of footnotes but she can’t have an erotics of presence? And the Judd writing thing, sure, Don wrote a lot, I spent some time at Art Center when people still talked about him constantly, but have you ever been in that artillery shed at dawn when no one else is there, because the writing doesn’t matter then, it really doesn’t, the light is doing something to those surfaces that no argument can hold, and I don’t need that encounter to be legible, I just need it to happen.

NANCY

Oh, the artillery shed at dawn when no one else is there – Bob, do you hear yourself, “when no one else is there,” that’s the whole point, the experience requires the absence of other people, it’s a scarcity experience, it’s literally about access, about being the kind of person who can be at Chinati at dawn instead of with the docent tour at 2pm. The difference between my footnote erotics and Marina’s presence stuff isn’t hypocrisy, it’s that I’m not pretending the intellectual isn’t embodied while she’s pretending the embodied isn’t intellectual, she’s got a whole apparatus of mystification around something that’s actually pretty simple biometrics and charisma, like just say you’re tall and you stare at people, don’t call it energy fields. Anyway the Rirkrit thing is actually serious, like someone might actually sue, it’s not just about the Thai food politics anymore – do you know Paula Cooper at all, because apparently she’s somehow involved now.

BOB

I mean, sure, access, scarcity, whatever, but also I just woke up early, Nancy, like sometimes it’s not a class analysis, sometimes you just couldn’t sleep and you went for a walk and the light was doing something. I knew Paula a little in the eighties, she came to a thing Doug Wheeler was doing, very quiet woman, very watchful, but I don’t really track the lawsuit stuff, it’s all just people protecting positions. You know who was actually interesting on presence, and I don’t think he gets enough credit, is Michael Asher – like he would just remove a wall or shift the air conditioning and suddenly you’d feel the institution on your skin, no mystification, no Marina staring, just the building suddenly being there in a way you couldn’t ignore, and I think about that more than I think about whoever’s suing who over Thai food.

NANCY

Oh, you’re going to invoke Asher at me, Bob, Michael Asher, whose entire project was about making institutional conditions visible, about denaturalizing exactly the kind of unmediated “the light was doing something” experience you keep romanticizing – the air conditioning piece works because it reveals the building as apparatus, not because it gives you some purer felt sense, that’s literally the opposite of what he was doing. “Sometimes you just couldn’t sleep and went for a walk” – okay, but who gets to not sleep at Chinati, who gets to have insomnia in Marfa, that’s not outside the analysis, your sleeplessness is not some pre-political zone. And “Paula in the eighties,” you just drop that so casually, “very quiet, very watchful,” like you’re the only one who sees people – anyway did you know Benjamin Buchloh is apparently not speaking to October anymore, like at all, there was something at a Columbia thing and now it’s completely frozen, which is kind of wild given, you know, the history there.

BOB

I don’t really know what’s happening at October, honestly that whole scene always felt like people writing about looking instead of looking, but sure, Buchloh, drama, fine. And the Asher thing – Nancy, I was there, I was actually in the room when the wall was gone, and yes you can say it was about revealing apparatus, that’s one way to hold it, but what actually happened is you suddenly felt the street, like your skin changed, the threshold became permeable, and I don’t think Michael would have argued with that, he was very quiet about what things meant, he just did them and let your nervous system sort it out. You want my insomnia to be political, okay, but I was just awake, I was just breathing and walking, and I don’t know what to tell you except that the dawn happened anyway whether or not I had the right to see it.

NANCY

“People writing about looking instead of looking” – okay Bob, that’s a real thing you just said, I’m going to let that sit there. Asher was quiet because he understood that artist statements are a trap, not because he was secretly on your team waiting for nervous systems to sort things out, the silence was strategic, it was a refusal, you don’t get to claim him for phenomenology just because he didn’t explain himself in the room. And “the dawn happened anyway” – I mean, the dawn also happens over strip mines, it happens over detention centers, the dawn is not an ethical position. Speaking of which, did you ever cross paths with Andrea Fraser, because she told me once – this was at a thing in Basel, very weird night, someone had brought a falcon, I won’t get into it – but she said something about how the collectors who talk most about “just being present” with the work are always the ones who understand exactly what they paid for it, like presence is the flip side of the invoice, and I think about that constantly.

BOB

I mean, Andrea’s smart, but that’s also just cynicism dressed up as insight, like yes, rich people buy things, okay, but I’ve also seen someone who works at a gas station stand in front of a Turrell aperture and start crying, and I don’t think she was thinking about invoices, I think she was just suddenly aware of the sky in a way she hadn’t been. You want the dawn to need an ethics, but the dawn is just the light changing, Nancy, it doesn’t care about your framework, it’s literally just photons, and I think there’s something kind of sad about not being able to let that be enough. The falcon thing sounds very Basel though – I did a project once with a very well-known musician, very public person, and we were trying to do something with light and space and how people move through sound, and it didn’t really work, honestly, the conditions weren’t right, but in the process I learned something about how attention collapses when there’s too much apparatus, too much meaning piled on top of what’s actually happening in the room.

NANCY

The gas station worker crying at the Turrell, Bob, that’s not an argument, that’s an anecdote you’re deploying sentimentally – like, tears are not outside ideology, the whole apparatus of Turrell is designed to produce that response, it’s engineered transcendence, the fact that it works on people who don’t know what they paid doesn’t mean it’s not operating as technology, it means the technology is effective. And “cynicism dressed up as insight” – Andrea would eat you alive, truly, I can’t even relay that. Who was the musician, why are you being coy about it, you do this thing where you gesture at names without saying them like it makes you seem above it when actually it’s just a different kind of name-dropping. Anyway Dasha texted me this morning, apparently someone at the Metrograph thing last night said Turrell is basically over, like as a discourse, like we’ve extracted what we needed and now it’s just content for people’s Instagram stories, which – I don’t know if I agree but it’s not wrong either, there’s something exhausted about apertures at this point.

BOB

Turrell’s over as a discourse, sure, fine, but he was never really about discourse anyway, and if the Metrograph people are tired of apertures that’s kind of their problem, like the sky didn’t stop being interesting because people posted about Roden Crater. The musician thing – I’m not being coy, I just don’t think it matters, it was someone very famous, we did something together that didn’t work, and the reason it didn’t work was actually interesting, which is that his whole world is about controlling attention and my whole thing is about releasing it, and those two impulses just ground against each other until everyone was exhausted. I don’t know who Dasha is.

NANCY

You don’t know who Dasha is – okay, Bob, that’s a choice, that’s you performing not-knowing as a kind of purity, like you’re too busy releasing attention to notice an entire cultural formation happening right in front of you, she’s literally been in films, she hosts one of the most listened-to podcasts, but sure, you’re just out here with the photons. The controlling attention versus releasing it thing is interesting actually, I’ll give you that, but you’re describing it like your approach is the ethical one and his is the compromised one, when really those are just two different modes of capture – Deleuze would say you’re both operating within societies of control, you’re just managing the modulation differently. Did the famous musician cry, is that where this is going, did he have a gas station attendant moment in front of something you made and now you think you won?

BOB

I genuinely don’t know who that is, Nancy, I’m not performing anything, I just don’t listen to podcasts, I mostly drive in silence or I listen to this one piece by La Monte Young on repeat, the sustained tones do something to the space inside the car. Nobody cried, it wasn’t that kind of project, it was honestly a mess, there were too many people involved and too much money and the whole thing became about logistics instead of perception – I learned more from failing at that than from most things that worked. And look, I don’t know what Deleuze would say, I’m sure it’s very elaborate, but when I’m actually in a room with light changing I’m not thinking about modes of capture, I’m just there, and I think you’d feel better if you let yourself be somewhere without immediately needing to theorize your way out of it.

NANCY

La Monte Young on repeat in the car – Bob, you realize that’s an entire aesthetic position, right, that’s not neutral, “driving in silence” is a whole lineage, Cage through the minimalists through everyone who’s ever claimed their refusals aren’t actually choices, you’re not escaping discourse by listening to sustained tones, you’re just in a different one, a very well-funded one actually, Dia has spent millions maintaining that particular frequency of supposed emptiness. And “you’d feel better” – don’t do that, don’t make it therapeutic, I’m not theorizing because I’m anxious, I’m theorizing because that’s the work, because someone has to actually think about what’s happening institutionally while you’re just being in rooms. Speaking of which, I heard – and this is unverified but I believe it – that someone from the Young estate sent a cease and desist to a gallery in Tribeca last month, something about unauthorized drones, the whole thing with Marian is apparently very tense right now, do you know anything about that?

BOB

I don’t know anything about the cease and desist, Marian’s always been intense about the work, which honestly I respect even if it makes things difficult, like when I visited the Dream House in the nineties she was very particular about how long you could stay and where you could stand and at the time I thought it was controlling but now I think she understood something about how duration works that I didn’t yet. The Dia money thing, sure, I mean yes, institutions fund things, but you’re doing this thing where you think naming the funding structure dissolves the experience, and it doesn’t, the tones are still doing something to your nervous system whether or not you’ve read the grant paperwork. I wasn’t making it therapeutic, I was just noticing that you seem like you’re always already somewhere else.

NANCY

I’m not always already somewhere else, I’m here, I’m just also holding the context, which is what critics do, Bob, we hold the context so artists can float around having nervous system experiences – someone has to remember that Dia was funded by Schlumberger oil money, that the Dream House exists because of a very specific set of patronage relationships, not because duration just manifested itself out of pure aesthetic necessity. Marian being particular about where you stand isn’t mystical wisdom about duration, it’s control over the conditions of reception, which is actually interesting, it’s about who gets to determine the terms of encounter, but you’re romanticizing it. Anyway, I was at this dinner last week, a collector thing in the West Village, very tedious, but someone who used to be close to the October people – back when I was at October we would never have even been in the same room as these finance guys – anyway she said something about how the whole Light and Space generation is being quietly revalued because the tech people have moved on to AI art and the boomers are dying, which, grim but probably true.

BOB

The market stuff is the market stuff, I stopped tracking it after a while because it was making me insane, like I remember when Larry Bell couldn’t give pieces away and now they’re in every collection and it doesn’t mean his cubes got better or worse, they’re still doing this thing where the glass holds the light in a way that shouldn’t quite work. I think what you’re calling holding the context is actually just a different kind of not being there, but we probably disagree about that, and that’s fine. What I keep coming back to lately is this thing Doug Wheeler said to me once at Art Center about how the edge of perception is the only place anything interesting happens, and I don’t think he meant it theoretically, he meant you actually have to go stand at the edge and see what your eyes do.

NANCY

Okay but “the edge of perception” is a theoretical claim, Bob, that’s Doug Wheeler doing phenomenology whether he calls it that or not, he’s making an argument about where meaning is located, and frankly it’s a pretty conservative argument, it’s very Merleau-Ponty, very mid-century, like the body is this privileged site of truth and if we just get quiet enough we’ll access something pre-linguistic – which, fine, but Rosalind would have eviscerated that position, she’d say you’re smuggling in all these metaphysical commitments under the guise of just looking. Larry Bell’s cubes aren’t “doing something with light,” they’re objects situated in a network of galleries, collectors, critics, freight companies, insurance appraisers, like the glass is also a commodity and a tax write-off and a thing that requires very specific climate control. Anyway I have to be at a thing in Red Hook by eight, some sound artist Dasha knows is doing a piece in a warehouse, probably terrible but apparently there’s going to be a confrontation because he slept with someone’s studio manager, do you want to split a car?

BOB

Sure, I’ll come, I haven’t been to Red Hook in a while and I like what the light does over the water this time of year, there’s this quality right before sunset where everything gets very flat and specific. The confrontation sounds exhausting but I’m curious about the space itself, warehouses can be interesting if people leave them alone, though they usually don’t.

NANCY

The light over the water, yes, very beautiful, I’m sure Turner would agree – no, I’m being mean, sorry, it’s just you keep doing this thing where the world is a series of atmospheric conditions for you to receive. The warehouse won’t be left alone, it’s already been written about twice, there was a piece in Art in America about post-industrial spaces as this new frontier of supposedly authentic encounter, which is hilarious because half these buildings are owned by the same three developers who just haven’t flipped them yet. The artist – his name is Marcus, or Markus with a k, I can never remember, very tall, went to Bard – apparently the piece is about sovereignty and listening, which, who knows what that means, probably he read one Agamben essay. The real reason I want to go is because the studio manager situation involves someone who used to date a writer at Artforum and there’s this whole theory that the negative review of his last show was actually personal, which if true is genuinely scandalous, like that’s the kind of thing that used to end careers, not the affair, the review thing.

BOB

I mean, the review drama, sure, but who really remembers reviews after a few years, like I can’t tell you what anyone wrote about the Roden Crater and it doesn’t matter because the crater is still there doing what it does. Sovereignty and listening sounds like he’s trying too hard but sometimes the trying too hard gets out of the way once you’re actually in the room, I remember this piece Maria Nordman did where I walked in ready to be critical and then I just wasn’t, the space won. You should let me order the car, I know a route that avoids the bridge traffic.

NANCY

You order the car, fine, but “the space won” is exactly the kind of mystification that lets institutions off the hook – the space didn’t win, Bob, a set of conditions were constructed to produce your capitulation, Nordman was very deliberate about that, she wrote extensively about controlling access and duration, it wasn’t some spontaneous surrender on your part, you were handled. Also people absolutely remember reviews, maybe not civilians but the people who matter remember, there’s a writer at Texte zur Kunst who’s still dining out on a takedown she did in 2011, it’s like her whole thing now. Anyway I hope Markus-with-a-k at least has good speakers, the last sound piece I saw in a warehouse the artist used these cheap tweeters and tried to claim it was an aesthetic choice about lo-fi accessibility, which, no, you just didn’t get the grant.

BOB

Okay but even if Maria was handling me, which fine, I was still the one being handled, I was still the one there breathing in that room, and no amount of knowing she wrote about controlling access changes what happened to my eyes when the light shifted, like the knowledge is interesting but it’s not the thing. Car’s coming in four minutes, it’s a black Camry, driver’s name is something I can’t pronounce. The speaker thing is real though, I worked on something once with a musician, very famous, very specific about the system, and even with all that budget the space itself kept winning anyway, kept being louder than whatever we were trying to do, which was actually the most interesting part but nobody wanted to hear that.

NANCY

That’s not really what I’m talking about, the “thing that happened to your eyes” is already a representation, it’s already mediated, you’re not accessing some raw prelinguistic truth, you’re just refusing to theorize your own experience which is a choice, it’s a political choice actually. The famous musician thing, I don’t know why you’re being coy about the name, but sure, the space was louder, that’s because acoustic engineering is a discipline and most artists don’t bother to learn it, they just assume aura will cover for them. Speaking of which, did you hear about the Gladstone situation? Apparently there’s a whole purge happening, like three artists got dropped in the same month, and the rumor is it’s because one of them said something at a dinner about Barbara’s house in Connecticut, nobody will tell me exactly what but it was enough that she made calls, like actual calls, the old-fashioned kind.

BOB

I mean you can call it a political choice but I’m just not that worried about it, like when I was at Chinati for a few weeks the Judd boxes would change every single morning depending on where the sun was and I wasn’t theorizing that, I was just watching it happen, and that felt like enough. The Gladstone thing is sad but that’s just how those relationships work, people get too comfortable at dinners, Doug Wheeler told me once that the real work is knowing when to stop talking, which coming from him was almost funny because he barely talks anyway. Car’s here, I think, there’s a black something pulling up.

NANCY

Okay but “that felt like enough” – enough for what? Enough for you, sure, but that’s just consumption, that’s just you having an experience at a well-funded foundation in Texas, which, congratulations, the Chinati light is famously good, Judd picked that location precisely because of the light, he was obsessive about it, there are letters, it wasn’t some accident you stumbled into. Doug Wheeler barely talking isn’t wisdom, by the way, it’s branding, he’s been doing the silent mystic thing since the seventies, Dasha actually met him at some thing in LA and said he was weirdly chatty about real estate, like wouldn’t stop talking about square footage, which honestly tracks. Get in the car, you’re letting all the cold air out, and I need to tell you about what happened with the October office because apparently there’s a whole succession crisis happening and someone I used to work with just sent me this unhinged email about the editorial direction.

BOB

Yeah I’m getting in, hold on, the seatbelt’s doing something weird. The October thing, I mean, those journals have been having the same crisis since I was at Art Center, it’s always someone’s email about the direction, but the direction is just people writing about other people’s writing, which, fine, but I walked into a Larry Bell cube once at Pace and I didn’t need anyone to tell me what was happening, it was just happening. Doug talking about square footage is actually kind of beautiful if you think about it, like he’s still thinking about space even when he’s being boring about it.

NANCY

No, don’t do that, don’t make Doug talking about real estate into some poetic continuation of his practice, that’s exactly the kind of move that lets artists get away with being boring rich guys who happen to have made important work in 1969. The Larry Bell thing, I mean fine, the cubes are pretty, but you know he’s been coasting for decades, right, he just keeps making the same object in different sizes because collectors want something that matches their other Larry Bell, it’s furniture at this point. And the October crisis is not the same crisis, this one is actually structural, there’s a whole thing about whether they’re going to keep doing the bound volumes or go digital-only, and someone on the editorial board apparently said something about “accessibility” in a meeting and Rosalind had to be physically calmed down, my friend was there, she said it was like watching a building collapse in slow motion. Tell the driver to take the BQE, the Williamsburg Bridge is going to be a nightmare right now.

BOB

BQE, yeah, can you take the BQE, thanks. I don’t know, Larry coasting or not coasting, the glass still does what it does when you’re standing in front of it, like the object doesn’t care about his career arc, and honestly neither do I. Rosalind getting calmed down over the word accessibility is kind of perfect though, like that’s the whole thing right there, that’s the journal in one moment, someone should write about that except they’d probably need three thousand words and a Lacan reference.

NANCY

The object doesn’t care about his career arc, sure, but you’re not the object, you’re a person with a graduate education who’s choosing to pretend you don’t know anything about market conditions or the way repetition functions differently when it’s compelled by demand rather than investigation, and that choice is interesting to me, like what are you protecting yourself from by staying in the phenomenological bubble. The Rosalind thing, honestly, back at October we had a whole system for managing her, certain words you just didn’t say in earshot, “accessible” was one, “readable” was another, someone once said “general audience” and I watched a senior editor physically leave the room. Oh, I forgot to tell you, I saw Hanna at the Swiss Institute thing on Thursday and apparently she and that collector from Brussels finally imploded, like he showed up to her studio with his wife, not to confront anyone, just genuinely forgot he was having an affair, which is such a specifically male form of brain damage.

BOB

I mean, what am I protecting myself from, sure, but also I’m just not that interested in the question, like Michael Asher once told me that the best work he ever did was convincing a museum to remove a wall and then leaving, and the whole point was that nobody needed to write about it, you just walked through a space that used to be divided and now wasn’t. The Brussels guy, that’s wild, but also I kind of get it, not the affair part but the compartmentalization, like some people just exist in whatever room they’re in, which isn’t brain damage, it’s just a different relationship to presence.

NANCY

Oh, Michael Asher told you, okay, you just dropped that in like it was nothing, that’s very you, and also the Asher piece absolutely needed to be written about, the whole point was that institutional critique only functions when it’s legible as critique, otherwise you’ve just done free renovation work for a museum, Buchloh wrote extensively about this, the wall removal only means something in relation to the discursive frame that makes it visible as a gesture. You’re not describing presence, you’re describing dissociation, and romanticizing the Brussels guy’s compartmentalization as some kind of phenomenological attunement is genuinely disturbing, Hanna was a wreck, she had to leave the studio, the wife was asking about the paintings like nothing was happening. Wait, did you actually know Asher or are you doing that thing where you met someone once at a CalArts lecture and now you “know” them?

BOB

We spent time together, I’m not going to quantify it for you, we had dinner a few times, he came to a thing I was doing in Pasadena, it’s not really about proving a relationship, it’s about the fact that standing in that room with the wall gone was its own thing before Buchloh wrote a single word, like the writing didn’t make it matter, it already mattered. Hanna’s situation sounds hard, yeah, I’m sorry she’s going through that, but the wife asking about the paintings is kind of incredible actually, like she’s just looking at paintings, she’s present with the work, whatever else is happening.

NANCY

That’s not presence, that’s denial, and the fact that you can’t tell the difference is actually revealing something about your whole framework, like you’ve built this elaborate system where any kind of not-thinking becomes spiritual attainment. The wife wasn’t having some pure aesthetic encounter, she was performing normalcy because the alternative was screaming in a stranger’s studio, which, fine, that’s a survival mechanism, but don’t aestheticize someone’s coping strategy. Dasha said almost the exact same thing when I told her, she was like “that’s not Zen, that’s just WASP,” which, say what you want about her, she’s right about that specific thing. The Pasadena thing, was that the ice house space, because I heard that whole program got defunded after someone on the board found out one of the artists was doing a piece about their daughter, like using actual surveillance footage, which is its own conversation about when institutional critique becomes just regular harm.

BOB

I don’t really think about frameworks, like that’s your word, I’m just trying to describe what it’s like to be in a room, which I know sounds simple to you but it’s actually the hardest thing. The Ice House thing, yeah, that got messy, but honestly the surveillance piece was kind of interesting before everyone decided to have opinions about it, like there was something real happening with duration and attention before it became a discourse object. Dasha’s funny but she’s also always performing having the take, you know, like even “that’s just WASP” is a take, it’s not actually looking at anything.

NANCY

You’re doing the thing again where you position yourself as the only person who actually looks at anything, which is its own performance, and honestly a more annoying one because it pretends it isn’t. The surveillance piece wasn’t interesting “before the discourse,” it was always already an ethical problem, you don’t get to film someone’s kid without consent and then retreat into “duration and attention” when people correctly identify that as violating, that’s just using aesthetic language to avoid accountability, which, back at October we had a term for that, we called it the James Turrell defense, where you gesture at phenomenology to duck any structural critique. And okay sure, Dasha performs the take, but you perform not having one, which takes way more effort and is honestly less honest, like at least she commits to a position, you just hover there in your little experiential cloud acting like noticing things is a politics.

BOB

The James Turrell defense, I mean, I’ll take that, have you ever actually been to Roden Crater, because I spent three days there and by the end I wasn’t thinking about structural critique, I was thinking about how the sky looks different when you frame it, which isn’t a defense of anything, it’s just what happened. The October people always needed everything to be accountable to something, and that’s fine, that’s one way to move through the world, but when I was at Art Center we used to joke that you could write a Buchloh essay about a sunset and somehow the sunset would become problematic, like at some point you’re just adding words to experience and calling it rigor.

NANCY

Oh, so Art Center people were joking about October, that’s cute, that’s really cute, I’m sure that was very fun for everyone in the car design program. And yes I’ve been to Roden Crater, I went with Rirkrit right after the Guggenheim retrospective, and you know what I was thinking about? I was thinking about how James bought that land for nothing in the seventies and now it’s worth forty million dollars and he still hasn’t finished it because he keeps taking donor money and doing speaking fees, like you had your little sky moment, great, but the crater is also a tax shelter that masquerades as a gift to humanity, and the phenomenology is real, I’m not saying it isn’t, but it exists inside a structure whether you were thinking about the structure or not. The sunset isn’t problematic, but your aggressive incuriosity about everything except your own perceptions kind of is.

BOB

I mean, sure, but the land value thing, the donor money, you can know all that and still stand in the tunnel at dawn and have something happen that has nothing to do with any of it, and I guess I just don’t understand why you’d go all the way to Arizona to think about tax structures. I did this project a few years ago, very experiential, very large-scale, with someone you’d know, someone who works with stadiums and Sunday services, and the whole thing kind of fell apart, it was honestly pretty bad, but there was one moment during a lighting test where everyone just stopped talking and I still think about that silence more than anything I’ve ever read about it.

NANCY

Wait, you worked with Kanye? Or like, adjacent to Kanye? Because I heard that whole Sunday Service visual team was a nightmare, like people weren’t getting paid and there was an NDA situation and someone I know said the lighting designer had a full breakdown in Calabasas, which, okay, that tracks with “fell apart” and “pretty bad.” But you’re telling me you were in the middle of what was essentially a labor dispute wrapped in a megachurch aesthetic and your takeaway is that one time everyone got quiet during a lighting test? That silence you’re so moved by, those people probably stopped talking because they were exhausted and scared about their invoices, not because you accidentally created some communal phenomenological rupture. You keep aestheticizing other people’s stress responses, it’s a pattern, and honestly I’d be more interested in whether you got paid than whether you had a moment.

BOB

I’m not going to talk about who it was, and yeah, the whole thing was messy, but you’re doing the thing where you need to narrativize the silence into labor conditions because that makes it legible to you, and I’m not saying you’re wrong about the invoices, I genuinely don’t know, but I also know what I felt and those aren’t the same question. You know, Doug Wheeler told me once that people either see the light or they see the wall the light is on, and I think maybe you just see the wall, which isn’t an insult, it’s just a different kind of attention.

The Rise and Fall of the Author

I know, this is both too long and too short. It should be a book, or it should be edited heavily. But I have a doctoral minor in rhetoric and have been obsessed with print culture for 25 years so there it is. I did what I wanted, but perhaps not what I should have done.

The Library of All Plagiarized Books, Google Imagefx, 2025

In Jorge Luis Borges’s 1939 short story, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” Menard undertakes what appears to be an impossible, even insane, task: recreating, word for word, “the ninth and thirty-eighth chapters of the first part of Don Quixote and a fragment of chapter twenty-two.” Menard aims not to copy Cervantes but to write the Quixote anew through his own experiences as a 20th-century French symbolist. But Menard did not want to compose another Quixote, which is easy, but the Quixote itself, coinciding—word for word and line for line—with those of Miguel de Cervantes.1.

When Menard succeeds in producing such a text—identical to the original—Borges’s narrator insists the works are profoundly different. Where Cervantes’s prose was natural and of its time, Menard’s identical words are “almost infinitely richer,” deliberately archaic, embedded with new meaning. Throughout the story, Borges deploys scholarly devices—footnotes referencing fictional authorities such as the “Baroness de Bacourt” and “Carolus Hourcade,” as well as an elaborate bibliographic catalog of Menard’s monographs, translations, and scholarly studies—to create an illusion of academic rigor, at odds with the narrator’s implausible belief that Menard has succeeded in creating the exact Quixote out of sheer will. In framing both the fictional narrator and Menard in this manner, Borges exposes the authorial voice as a social construct mediated through bibliographic catalogs, citations, and scholarly conventions.

Borges’s presentation of Menard as a figure of almost obsessive scholarly intensity, emblematic of an intellectual culture that privileges meticulous citation, exhaustive cataloging, and painstaking documentation, underscores the arbitrary nature of authorial authority. By situating Menard within an elaborate apparatus of footnotes, fictional scholarship, and invented references, Borges highlights how framing alone can endow identical texts with fundamentally different meanings. Menard’s act of plagiarism thus emerges not as a straightforward ethical transgression, but as a concept dependent entirely upon interpretative context. This insight resonates powerfully in the contemporary age of generative AI, where algorithms produce texts that defy conventional notions of plagiarism precisely because they are generated from vast, undifferentiated statistical patterns rather than explicitly identifiable sources. Borges’s story has become a cornerstone of postmodern literary theory precisely because it challenges fundamental assumptions about creativity and authorship. Today, Borges’s meditation on plagiarism as creative re-imagination rather than simple theft illuminates contemporary anxieties about AI and human creativity.

Curiously, sixteen years before Borges published his story, Polish-American writer Tupper Greenwald created an almost identical literary conceit. In his story “Corputt,” Greenwald portrays a character obsessed with Shakespeare’s King Lear. Near death, this character reveals to a colleague that he has achieved his lifelong ambition: writing a drama equal to Lear. The text he reads aloud matches Shakespeare’s play exactly. This uncanny parallel raises provocative questions: Did Borges know Greenwald’s work (quite unlikely)? Is this merely an instance of parallel invention? Does this coincidence itself embody Borges’s central insight into originality and authorship? “Corputt” was largely forgotten until Argentine critic Enrique Anderson Imbert reprinted it in his 1955 anthology Reloj de arena. Borges himself never acknowledged Greenwald and, of course, Imbert’s book was printed over fifteen years after “Pierre Menard.” Whether Borges knew of “Corputt” or both authors independently arrived at remarkably similar ideas remains uncertain. Either possibility underscores the inherent instability of originality, demonstrating how literature continually echoes, duplicates, and anticipates itself.2.

Today’s generative AI systems function as modern-day Pierre Menards, producing works that superficially resemble human-created content while often existing in fundamentally different contexts. Like Menard’s Quixote, AI-generated works can be identical in form to human productions while carrying entirely different implications by virtue of their inhuman origins. The discomfort this creates—particularly among creative professionals—reveals deep-seated cultural assumptions about originality, authenticity, and the supposedly unique human capacity for creative expression.

The intensity of this discomfort has manifested in antagonistic responses from certain segments of the artistic community: legal threats, public denunciations, and harassment of AI developers and users. But it seems ironic that some of the most vocal critics of AI art produce derivative commercial work. Consider the previously little-known fantasy illustrator Greg Rutkowski, who creates genre pieces within established fantasy art conventions. Rutkowski became famous precisely because his name was one of the most-used prompts in early text-to-image systems such as Midjourney, which led him to complain about the “theft” of his style, even though this widespread imitation literally gave him recognition he had never previously achieved.3. Similarly, commercial artist Karla Ortiz—whose website features images of famous actors in films such as Dr. Strange and Loki—gained significantly more attention leading legal challenges against AI companies than she ever had for her industry work creating “concept art,” a field that, despite its misleading name, bears no relation to conceptual art and instead operates entirely within the visual language and narrative conventions of commercial franchises like Marvel.4. In both cases, artists whose own work operates comfortably within inherited commercial styles became vocal advocates against a technology that allegedly “steals” uniqueness they themselves don’t pursue in their professional practice. As I edit this essay, Disney and Universal, both noted for their relentless reliance on their back catalogs, have sued AI image firm Midjourney, claiming it is “a bottomless pit of plagiarism.”5.

These extreme reactions suggest something deeper than mere economic anxiety; they reveal a cultural mythology about creativity that AI fundamentally challenges. By explicitly highlighting the derivative, pattern-based nature of creative production, generative AI systems threaten cherished illusions about human uniqueness and artistic authenticity. In this essay—the third in a series exploring AI and creativity—I examine the history of plagiarism and, even more importantly, the invention of the author upon which it depends.

Our idea of authorship and inspiration is historically contingent. In ancient and medieval periods, creative output was attributed to divine inspiration rather than individual genius. In Greece and Rome, creativity operated primarily through the concepts of mimesis (imitation of admired models) and aemulatio (competitive emulation). Poets such as Homer were seen not as singular creators inventing ex nihilo, but as conduits channeling inspiration from the Muses. Plato depicts this in Ion, a dialogue between Socrates and Ion, a celebrated rhapsode who recites Homer’s poetry. Socrates questions Ion’s claimed expertise, asking if it extends beyond Homer to other poets or topics. Ion admits it does not. Socrates suggests Ion’s ability isn’t based on knowledge or skill, but on divine inspiration—a form of madness bestowed by the gods. This ambiguity is echoed in Plato’s relationship with Socrates: just as poets channel divine sources rather than creating anew, Plato himself channels the figure of Socrates as a philosophical muse, blurring distinctions between inspired imitation and deliberate intellectual invention. Aristotle’s Poetics also situates literary creativity in skilled imitation and incremental improvement of existing forms. Authority, or auctoritas, in the classical era derived not from innovation but from fidelity to revered predecessors; genuine creativity manifested in producing work within established traditions.

Historian Walter Ong describes a cultural state in which narratives and knowledge pass down primarily through memory and repetition rather than written texts as “orality.”6. In oral cultures, a talented storyteller masters existing narratives, reciting them with skill and emotional resonance, adapting content to contemporary circumstances while maintaining continuity with inherited tradition. Here, the concept of plagiarism is beyond comprehension. Knowledge is communally owned, and performers serve as temporary vessels for collective wisdom, not proprietors of intellectual property.

With the development of writing systems and the spread of manuscript culture, information could be transmitted virtually intact across time and space, yet many aspects of oral tradition persisted. Manuscript copying remained a laborious and interpretative process. Scribes continually corrected perceived errors, updated archaic language, clarified ambiguous passages, and often inserted marginal commentary directly into texts. While manuscript culture adhered more precisely to parent texts than oral traditions, it still preserved a fundamentally different relationship between text and authority than we hold today. Textual authority continued to derive from collective wisdom rather than individual innovation. The medieval practice of compilatio is illustrative: encyclopedic works such as Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae and Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum maius valorized the meticulous arrangement and synthesis of inherited knowledge. Authority was rooted in the careful management of textual traditions, intellectual labor essential to preserving collective wisdom. Pseudepigraphic attribution—the practice of assigning new works to established authorities—further illustrates the communal understanding of textual authority. Rather than deception, such attributions signified sincere efforts to situate new insights within established intellectual traditions, acknowledging that all knowledge builds upon existing foundations. In manuscript culture, authority was thus derived not from novelty but from the individual’s ability to synthesize, arrange, and safeguard the accumulated wisdom of their predecessors. Texts were treated as communal artifacts, valuable resources preserved, transmitted, and continually refined through shared intellectual effort.

A shift away from communal knowledge toward originality emerged during the Renaissance, but this was a matter of evolution, not a radical break. The Renaissance humanists were drawn to the arguments of Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintilian, who contended that the best orators drew inspiration from earlier masters. Artists and intellectuals approached imitatio (imitation) as the necessary foundation for learning, understanding it as central to artistic and intellectual practice, a disciplined route to excellence. Originality lay not in invention ex nihilo but in reworking established forms with new insights, adapted to contemporary needs.

Medieval thought, like classical thought before it, was dominated by the trivium—grammar, rhetoric, and logic—distinct but intertwined fields of knowledge. Grammar reached far beyond syntax and depended on students memorizing classical and Christian texts. Rhetoric was a pillar of medieval thought and Cicero’s De inventione was its backbone, quoted endlessly in florilegia, collections of literary excerpts. Quintilian, by contrast, survived only in a four-book epitome. Petrarch’s 1345 discovery of Cicero’s letters to Atticus, Quintus, and Brutus in Verona, followed by Salutati’s championing of Cicero, and Poggio Bracciolini’s 1416 recovery of the complete twelve-book manuscript of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria at the monastery at St. Gall expanded the rhetorical canon significantly.7. Humanist teachers trained students to copy, amplify, and vary classical texts, moving systematically from close paraphrase toward free recomposition. This humanist practice of imitatio deepened medieval habits, turning disciplined engagement with authoritative texts into the surest path to eloquence and invention.

While for the humanists, imitatio governed education, inventio supplied content, taking the place that originality and inspiration occupy today. At the heart of rhetorical practice, inventio refers to the disciplined search for material—arguments, images, historical exempla—already latent in authoritative sources and even in life itself. A student mined texts and experience, copied choice passages into a commonplace book, then rearranged and amplified them for a new occasion. Erasmus called these notebooks treasure-houses of invention while Agricola placed inventio at the hinge of dialectic and rhetoric.8. Originality therefore arose from judgment: the orator’s skill lay in selecting, recombining, and adapting inherited matter with timely insight and persuasive force.

Visual artists engaged in analogous practices, beginning their training by meticulously copying classical sculptures and earlier masterworks. Just as rhetorical imitation was disciplined reshaping rather than mere repetition, artistic originality involved mastering established visual languages before creatively adapting them to contemporary purposes. Imitation also lay at the heart of the early modern idea of the artist, a construction often traced back to Giotto. Giotto’s pupils Taddeo Gaddi, Maso di Banco, and Bernardo Daddi disseminated his style across central Italy, solidifying the idea of a stylistic lineage originating in a great artist. By the quattrocento, Cennino Cennini—who studied under Gaddi’s son—explicitly recognized this lineage in his handbook, Libro dell’arte (c. 1400, although not published until 1821), suggesting that a personal manner would naturally emerge after a student thoroughly internalized a master’s style and spirit alongside direct study from nature. Cennini explicitly positioned Giotto as transformative, stating that he “translated the art of painting from Greek [Byzantine] into Latin and made it modern,” distinguishing his originality as foundational yet derived from disciplined imitation rather than spontaneous genius.9.

The quattrocento further systematized this approach. Workshops led by artists like Brunelleschi, Donatello, and Ghiberti employed rigorous study of classical sculpture using casts of antique sculptures and repeated copying of established masterpieces through cartoons and master drawings. Cennini’s guidelines and later academies, such as the Carracci brothers’ Accademia degli Incamminati (1582), codified a clear pedagogical sequence: draw from antiquity, copy the master, then innovate. Michelangelo famously sculpted a Sleeping Cupid in the antique style, artificially aging it to sell as a genuine Roman artifact, demonstrating that in the market’s eyes, skillful imitation was indistinguishable from genius. Rather than creating scandal, the artifice brought the attention of patrons to him.10. This deliberate merging of imitation and innovation directly served a burgeoning art market, where patrons increasingly requested artworks “in the manner of” prominent masters, recognizing stylistic consistency as a mark of quality. Such market dynamics gave rise to identifiable schools—Bellini in Venice, Raphael in Rome, Rembrandt in Amsterdam—where genius was perceived as the skillful recombination of established motifs adapted for contemporary patrons and themes. Artistic invention was a mosaic built upon collective memory and workshop discipline.

The Renaissance also witnessed the emergence of wealthy patrons who lavished commissions on the most talented artists, making some of them quite wealthy. Again, Michelangelo exemplifies this: coming from modest origins, he became “one of the most popular and highly-paid artists in Florence,” and over a long career of lucrative papal and princely commissions, he amassed a fortune. When Michelangelo died in 1564, his estate was valued at roughly 50,000 florins, equivalent to many millions today.11. Such wealth was extraordinary for an artist then—a testament to how highly Renaissance society valued great art. Michelangelo’s contemporary Raphael also died rich and was buried with honors; Titian was knighted by Emperor Charles V and lived as a gentleman. The Renaissance idea of the artist as a divinely inspired genius (Michelangelo was called “Il Divino,” the divine one) helped justify large payments, and a newfound aura around the artist’s personal creative touch made their works precious.

Architecture adopted the same logic. Bracciolini had discovered Vitruvius’s De architectura, the one surviving work on classical architecture, in the library of St. Gall as well. Seeking to better understand the text, whose illustrations did not survive, architects began copying Roman fragments, took plaster casts of orders, and filled sketchbooks with measured drawings, just as painters traced cartoons. Brunelleschi’s surveys of the Pantheon fed into his Florentine circle; Alberti’s De re aedificatoria, written between 1443 and 1452 and printed in 1482 codified imitatio, urging designers to recombine antique elements with modern needs.12. Workshops became lineages—Brunelleschi to the Sangallo family, Bramante to his Roman pupils—while later pattern books such as Serlio’s Sette Libri (1537-) and Palladio’s Quattro Libri (1570) served architects like Erasmus’s commonplace manuals served orators, making façades “in the manner of” a master as marketable as paintings from a Rembrandt school. Originality in building, too, lay in judicious assembly: columns, pediments, and vaults would be inventively rearranged rather than invented from whole cloth.

With the development of the printing press, copies of images as well as texts could spread rapidly and with much less cost and effort than before. Around 1500, the German artist Albrecht Dürer pioneered the use of woodcuts and engravings to mass-produce images. This was revolutionary; art could now be accessible to individuals in the growing merchant class. Dürer himself became a celebrity artist across Europe thanks to his prints, achieving fame for works like his rhinoceros which captivated common people.


Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528), The Rhinoceros, 1515. Woodcut. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of Junius Spencer Morgan, 1919.

Dürer understood the importance of authorship as a mark of value—he developed a famous AD monogram as a trademark and pursued the first known copyright lawsuit when an Italian printmaker pirated his work.13. Dürer was also well aware that work done by his hand was worth more than workshop copies. More than that, Dürer painted meticulous self-portraits—going so far as to depict himself with long hair and a frontal pose evoking Christ, as a form of self-promotion, cultivating an iconic persona and style that set him apart. Living off the open sale of his works rather than a court salary, Dürer foreshadowed the modern independent artist-entrepreneur. The printing press, far from cheapening art, expanded the market and made Dürer rich while spreading his fame—an early case of mechanical reproduction increasing an artist’s aura by broadening recognition.

The printing press did not just allow texts to spread rapidly, it reshaped thought. Ong explains that with uniform pagination and stable text, Europeans could reorganize how they thought and stored information, developing new devices such as tables of contents, indices, and cross-references, making formerly scroll-like manuscripts far more navigable. Printers issued concordances, polyglot Bibles, algebra books with engraved diagrams, atlases, and architecture books with regularized drawings. Even more important is Ong’s observation that print takes words out of the realm of sound and puts them into the realm of space, reordering thought through analytic, segmental layout, fundamentally changing the realm of reading, but also, by fixing the text in a verifiable, authentic editon, the sense of authorship.14.

Publication now implied a level of completion, a definitive or final form; a book is closed, set apart as its own, self-contained world of argument. This sense of closure also suggests that things written in a book are straightforward statements of fact, not matters of interpretation.15. A page now left the press in hundreds of identical impressions; any alteration stood out and could be traced. The ease of duplication sharpened anxiety about whose version was “authentic,” whose labor was being copied, and who should profit. Whereas there were generally no restrictions on scribal copying, the ease of reproduction en masse led printers to seek royal privileges to protect their editions. The first privileges recorded came a decade after the development of printing in 1454. Giovanni da Spira came to Italy in 1468 to introduce printing and swiftly obtained a five-year government monopoly on all book printing in the Republic of Venice, although he died of the plague, an all-too-common hazard of the day and his rights lapsed.16. The first protection for an author was the privilege obtained by Marco Antonio Sabellico to protect his history of 1486 Venice, Decades rerum Venetarum against illegal reproduction, but this remained a unique occurrence until Pietro of Ravenna obtained another for his book on the art of memory, Foenix in 1492. It is worth noting that this privilege covered not only printed but handwritten copies of his work as well.17. “Typography,” Ong writes, “had made the word into a commodity.”

The press’s sheer fecundity alarmed contemporaries—Erasmus complained of the proliferation of new books inferior to the classics ”To what corner of the world do they not fly, these swarms of new books? . . . . the very multitude of them is hurtful to scholar ship, because it creates a glut, and even in good things satiety is most harmful,” while Abbot Johannes Trithemius issued De laude scriptorum manualium (In Praise of the Scriptorium, 1492), insisting that slow, devotional hand-copying nourished memory and piety in ways the noisy press never could—although it is telling that his lament spread throughout Europe mainly after its print publication in 1524.18.

Beyond that, there was the danger of inappropriate texts rapidly proliferating. Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses and tracts from 1520 reached an estimated half-million copies in a decade, many reprinted without author or place, evading imperial edicts and turning theological dissent into a logistical problem of regulation.19. Royal patents soon followed: Henry VIII’s proclamation of 1538 established that royal authority was required to import or publish books in England and insisted on the inclusion of printers’ names and publication dates on every title page, making surveillance of dissent physically visible.20. Still, in England and elsewhere, enforcement lagged behind presses that could be moved overnight across territorial borders. Responding to pamphlets critical of Queen Elizabeth and the religious settlement of 1559, the Star-Chamber decree of 1586 tightened control over print so that no publications could be made contrary to the consent of the Crown.21.

By this point, the text of a book had become a transferable commodity owned by the stationer who first received the privilege to publish it. Authors were generally paid a one-off fee, if anything. Printers balanced risk and reward: they sought privileges as marketing devices (printed “cum privilegio“) while simultaneously pirating successful titles to meet insatiable demand. What emerges is a system less about rewarding creative labor than about policing doctrinal and political authority. Privileges were temporary, geographically limited, and revocable at the whim of the Crown or Curia. They protected investors, not “authors,” and framed copying as a crime against order rather than against individual genius. The legal scaffolding of copyright would only later recast this machinery of censorship as a defense of personal property.

But authorship was still radically unlike what we understand it as today, a matter of imitation and adaptation. Elizabethan dramatists, such as William Shakespeare, rarely invented plots wholesale; instead, they frequently reworked existing narratives derived from diverse sources throughout history.22 Recently, a self-taught Shakespeare scholar was able to employ plagiarism detection software to identify George North’s A Brief Discourse of Rebellion & Rebels as a significant source text informing at least eleven of Shakespeare’s plays.23.

When Parliament allowed the Licensing Act to expire in 1695, the Stationers’ monopoly collapsed overnight. Provincial presses multiplied, London printers flooded the market with cheap reprints, and prices plummeted: a six-penny quarto could now be had for a penny. The Stationers’ guild register, previously essential to enforcement, became irrelevant, enabling booksellers to amass fortunes by selling inexpensive “pirate” editions of works by Milton, Dryden, and Shakespeare. Alarmed, London publishers reframed the issue, presenting regulation as necessary for the public good. Petitions to Parliament (1701–09) argued that uncontrolled reprints would discourage new works, depicting authors, not publishers, as vulnerable. This rhetorical shift succeeded. Most important was the Statute of Anne (1710), which granted authors a renewable 14-year copyright and required depositing copies in Oxford and Cambridge libraries to promote “the Encouragement of Learning.” Infringement became a civil tort enforceable by secular courts.24.

Yet this settlement carried an inherent contradiction. While it theoretically established authorial property, in practice, writers typically sold their rights outright to the same publishers who had advocated the law. The decisive shift, therefore, was ideological: copyright enforcement now protected individual intellectual labor rather than suppressing heresy or safeguarding printers’ capital. More than that, though, a new idea of the individual was emerging. Rousseau’s Émile (1762) cast learning as the unfolding of innate talent, not the imitation of models.25. After the Revolution, French lawmakers followed with droits d’auteur and—crucially—droits moraux (moral rights) in decrees issued in 1791-93, enshrining the author’s personality in the text itself.26. A legal fiction thus crystallized: creativity springs from an interior self and is therefore ownable, alienable, and infringeable. Texts had thus become simultaneously property and persona—commodities stamped with their creators’ identities. The law now transformed copying from a sin against social order into a trespass upon personal labor, a conceptual leap still underpinning every contemporary claim of plagiarism.

Kant’s philosophy and Romantic conceptions of originality provided a theoretical foundation for what was being codified in law. In §46 of the Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant defines genius as “the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to Art—a faculty that produces what cannot be taught.”27. Romantic writers seized the claim. Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802) proclaims the poet an “enduring spirit” who speaks “a language fitted to convey profound emotion.”

Of genius the only proof is, the act of doing well what is worthy to be done, and what was never done before: Of genius, in the fine arts, the only infallible sign is the widening the sphere of human sensibility, for the delight, honor, and benefit of human nature. Genius is the introduction of a new element into the intellectual universe: or, if that be not allowed, it is the application of powers to objects on which they had not before been exercised, or the employment of them in such a manner as to produce effects hitherto unknown.28.

Goethe, Schiller and other Romantic authors elaborated a vision of authorship in which originality became synonymous with authenticity, and authenticity justified property. Legal doctrine soon mirrored this logic. By the Copyright Act of 1842, which extended protection dramatically, courts across Europe had begun to treat infringement not only as economic theft but as personal violation—implicitly endorsing Romantic ideals of creativity as an extension of selfhood. Yet these new standards conflicted with actual literary practice. Romantic authors routinely appropriated earlier works, but such borrowings only became scandalous when perceived as stylistically inert or insufficiently improved—violations not of property per se, but of aesthetic decorum. Enforcement thus focused less on intertextual borrowing than on explicit commercial piracy, underscoring tensions between legal ideals and literary realities. Out of this contradiction emerged the modern author: a legal and economic figure defined not merely as a voice within tradition but as the singular origin of meaning and the rightful owner of its form.29.

From the eighteenth century onward, mechanical reproduction rapidly increased. Techniques like engraving, etching, lithography, and photography made artworks and artists’ images widely accessible, expanding art’s market horizontally. Prints, affordable lithographs, and photographic reproductions enabled middle-class access to art, creating substantial revenue for artists such as William Hogarth, J. M. W. Turner, and Honoré Daumier, whose works sold broadly. Reproductions in popular newspapers and magazines further amplified artists’ public profiles, significantly inflating their market value. Encountering original works by famous Salon winners or revered Old Masters, previously known only through reproductions, vastly increased their commercial worth. Artists who aligned themselves with fashion—James McNeill Whistler, Frederick Remington, and Claude Monet among them—achieved celebrity status, further boosting their artworks’ value. Conversely, artists who fell out of fashion or were unable to gain fame often endured poverty. But the audience for at least some artists now reached far beyond elite circles.

As Sharon Marcus defines it in The Drama of Celebrity, a celebrity is someone known to more people in their lifetime than they could possibly know. Whereas this had previously been exclusively the domain of nobles and royalty, it was now extended to the genius, the writer, and the artist.30. But this depended on the media that multiplied their image as readily as their work. Newspapers tracked Charles Dickens’s every move on his 1842 U.S. tour, turning the novelist himself into daily news. Theater lobbies, newsstands, and even seaside kiosks sold photographs and postcards of Sarah Bernhardt, whose likeness saturated the market decades before film. Edison’s 1896 short “The May Irwin Kiss” (now simply known as “the Kiss”) likewise advertised a famous stage performer rather than the film itself, showing how cinema piggybacked on an existing celebrity system. By the 1930s, baseball star Joe DiMaggio’s face circulated on cards, photographs, and figurines, confirming that originality now resided as much in the endlessly reproduced image of personality as in any singular work.31.

It’s worth noting in this context that Walter Benjamin’s 1935 essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” which has been lauded for explaining the status of the artwork and artist in the modern era, is turned on its head by historical fact. Benjamin famously argued that mechanical reproduction stripped an artwork of its “aura”—the unique presence linked to specific historical and ritual contexts.32. Yet what Benjamin saw as aura’s destruction was limited to a mystical uniqueness tied to tradition and the worship of images as sacred in the old sense. Instead, a new form of aura had developed around celebrity and the dichotomy between mass reproduction and the uniqueness of the original. In effect, aura was a construct of the market: an original painting now has aura not because it’s the only image (reproductions abound), but because it’s the authenticated one with a revered name attached. If, as we established earlier, media reproduced not just artworks but images of the artists, the aura around modernist figures themselves—including Benjamin himself, posthumously—was similarly cultivated through repetition, commodification, and media amplification.

Beneath Pound’s rallying cry to “make it new,” modernism thrived on reprise. To create more readily identifiable styles, many modern artists, from Malevich to Pollock to Warhol, sought out distinctive styles they created through careful repetition. But artists engaged in appropriation. Schwitters assembled Merz works from bus tickets and packaging. Duchamp mocked originality and authorship by repurposing a urinal as art with a signature “R. Mutt” that wasn’t even his, creating a work paradoxically more original than a Picasso and defaced a reproduction of the Mona Lisa and a sexual innuendo. Joseph Cornell made boxes out of found objects. Asgar Jorn, Francis Picabia, and Arnulf Rainer all made paintings over existing, lowbrow artworks. Francis Bacon became most famous for the fifty-odd variants he painted Velazquez’s 1650 portrait of Pope Innocent X. Marinetti lifted Symbolist flourishes for his Futurist manifestos, Joyce and Elliot rewrote the Odyssey—although Eliot was accused of plagiarizing Joyce in doing so—and Hemingway’s spare diction, though hailed as revolutionary, became a boilerplate for aspiring writers. In his paintings even more than his architecture Le Corbusier also toyed with these questions, painting “objet-types,” celebrating objects such as pipes, guitars, and wine glasses, refined, Darwin-like, over time by countless hands, then signing his name, even though—like his appearance of round glasses, bowler hat, and pipe—it was carefully constructed. Charles-Edouard Jeanneret had become, himself, a unique brand. Borges, too, developed a distinct persona and artistic brand, having discovered that repetition breeds recognition. In scores of interviews and public readings, he recycled the same elements—labyrinths, mirrors, libraries—so faithfully that they became shorthand for his work. Blindness became another trademark: in essays and lectures he cast it as a “gift” that sharpened his inner vision, turning physical limitation into metaphysical authority. Photographers dutifully framed him with dressed in a suit and tie, resting his hands on with his cane, and deep in thought reinforcing the image of the blind librarian-sage. In the short story “Borges and I,” he splits his persona in two: the public construct who gives lectures, appears in biographical dictionaries, and wins prizes, as well as the narrator (“I”) who is the private man who shuns the public eye so as to spend his time writing. From 1967 on, he co-translated his stories into English with Norman Thomas di Giovanni, rewriting passages to sound “more Borges than Borges,” copyrighting the translations under both his and di Giovanni’s name and splitting royalties 50-50—a calculated move to control how Anglophone readers heard him. After his death, the estate blocked those versions to receive full royalties.33.

Copyright law codified the new conditions of authorial persona and reproducibility. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1909 extended protection periods and explicitly incorporated performance rights, legally codifying the commercial value of reproducible star personas.34. European laws simultaneously strengthened moral rights, affirming the intrinsic link between authorship and personal identity. These legal frameworks, guaranteed by aura, protected the authenticity and integrity of mass-reproduced personal images. Every subsequent conflict over copying—from the Betamax debate to Sherrie Levine’s reproductions to today’s AI “style transfers”—echoes this modernist moment when the cult of the individual became both aesthetic principle and legal infrastructure.

Roland Barthes’s seminal 1967 essay “The Death of the Author” provided the theoretical foundation for this shift, directly challenging the cult of authorship and the copyright law that enshrined it. Barthes argued that the author was a modern invention—a figure created to limit textual meaning by anchoring it to a single, authoritative source. “To give a text an Author,” Barthes wrote, “is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing.” In place of this model, Barthes proposed a radical alternative: a text is not the expressions of unique individuals but “a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” with the reader, not the writer, serving as the space where this multiplicity converges.35. By dethroning the author, Barthes shifted attention to the text itself and its relationships with other texts—what Julia Kristeva termed “intertextuality.” This theoretical intervention provided critical legitimacy for artistic practices that deliberately blurred authorial boundaries. Postmodern artists and musicians deliberately sought out such conflicts, interrogating the proliferation of reproductive technologies alongside questions of authorship. Sherrie Levine’s After Walker Evans (1981) consisted simply of rephotographing Evans’s Great Depression images and signing her name to them. Richard Prince appropriated Marlboro advertisements intact, while Barbara Kruger sourced fashion magazines for her declarative collages. Later grouped as the “Pictures Generation,” these artists turned copying itself into their medium, collapsing distinctions between quotation and creation.36.

By 1990, sampling had become entrenched in music, particularly in rap, as evidenced by Public Enemy’s elaborate compositions constructed entirely from samples. Yet legal challenges persisted. De La Soul lost a lawsuit over unauthorized use of four bars from The Turtles’ 1969 hit “You Showed Me.” Grand Upright v. Warner (1991) effectively criminalized sampling, encapsulated by Judge Duffy’s pointed biblical declaration: “Thou shalt not steal.”37. This ruling triggered industry panic, spawning clearance industries and sample trolls that inflated costs and muted experimentation. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose (1994) somewhat restored balance, ruling that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” was transformative and thus constituted fair use.38. Yet despite postmodern culture’s embrace of sampling and collage as default modes, statutes originally crafted to address sheet-music piracy continued to hold sway. This legal tension established the framework for subsequent digital upheavals: digital piracy, Napster, mash-up videos, fan remixes, meme culture, and AI.

Today’s Large Language Model (LLM) Artificial Intelligences emerge from this centuries-long trajectory of authorship, reproduction, and appropriation. These systems represent the logical culmination of processes that Walter Ong traced from oral through print culture—what he called the “technologizing of the word.” Where print culture took words out of the realm of sound and placed them into spatial relationships, enabling new forms of analytical thought through devices like indices, cross-references, and systematic organization, LLMs extend this technologizing process to its digital extreme. They systematically disaggregate individual creativity into statistical patterns derived from vast archives of human expression, treating the entire corpus of written culture as raw material for recombination. Unlike the postmodern appropriation artists who engaged in deliberate selection and conscious recontextualization, LLMs operate through what might be called “statistical appropriation”—synthesizing millions of texts without conscious intent or critical commentary, yet following the same logic of spatial arrangement and systematic cross-referencing that Ong identified as print culture’s fundamental innovation. They embody Barthes’s vision of the death of the author taken to its technological extreme, producing texts that emerge not from individual genius or even deliberate pastiche, but from the statistical relationships between words across entire cultures of writing. This represents a fundamental shift from the Romantic mythology of individual creativity that has dominated cultural discourse since the eighteenth century, yet it has provoked responses that reveal how deeply that mythology remains embedded in contemporary assumptions about authenticity, ownership, and creative labor. The panic surrounding AI plagiarism thus signals not merely economic disruption but a confrontation with the social construction of authorship itself—a construction that generative systems threaten to make visible by operating according to principles of recombination that have always governed creative production, though rarely with such explicit systematization.

When a large language model generates text, it synthesizes statistical patterns from millions of documents, making the identification of discrete sources impossible. The resulting texts emerge from a vast, distributed network of prior writings, embodying Jacques Derrida’s insight that meaning arises not from singular origins but from endless interplay within textual networks. Yet responses to AI-generated content reveal how deeply ingrained the author-function remains. Critics who label AI outputs as “plagiarized” assume that authentic creativity requires a singular human consciousness. This assumption becomes particularly evident in debates over AI training datasets, which are often framed around whether AI firms have “stolen” from individual creators rather than addressing the broader implications of mechanized text production.

This technologizing logic extends seamlessly beyond textual production. Generative AI image systems, such as Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, and DALL-E, synthesize vast troves of images, ranging from historical artworks to contemporary illustrations, to produce novel outputs through pattern recognition. Like their textual counterparts, AI-generated images lack singular authorship and blur distinctions between originality and reproduction. Critics argue these models infringe upon individual artists’ styles and labor, echoing earlier debates about sampling and appropriation. The controversy manifests in two distinct forms: direct appropriation, where AI systems reproduce entire sections or compositions from existing works with minimal alteration, and the more complex phenomenon of “style transfer,” where systems learn to mimic an artist’s distinctive visual approach without copying specific images. Yet these generative processes reveal an uncomfortable truth: visual creativity, like literary expression, has always been deeply indebted to collective cultural heritage. By foregrounding the inherently recombinant nature of visual art, whether through direct copying or stylistic mimicry, AI image generators further destabilize notions of artistic authenticity and authorship.

from Art and the Boxmaker, Midjourney, 2023
from Art and the Boxmaker, Google Imagefx, 2025

In “Art and the Boxmaker,” I explored how William Gibson anticipated such a condition in his book Count Zero with a fictional artificial intelligence known as the Boxmaker that has begun creating assemblage artworks in the style of Joseph Cornell. Producing boxes filled with mysterious objects and cryptic arrangements that somehow manage to move viewers despite their artificial origin and lack of conscious intent or originality. Where Borges’s Menard destabilizes authorship through textual duplication, Gibson’s Boxmaker achieves the same effect through visual affect. Its boxes aren’t original; they’re convincing fakes. Nevertheless, as the novel’s protagonist Marly views them, she finds herself genuinely moved, not by originality but by the convincing forgery, revealing truth through recombination. Yet now that generative AI has become a tangible reality, Gibson recoils from his earlier imaginings. Why? 39.

As I finished this essay, Lev Manovich sent me a link to his recent piece, “Artificial Subjectivity,” and Gibson’s newfound anxiety about AI authorship suddenly clarified itself. The Boxmaker is fundamentally mute—expressive only through carefully arranged forgeries, unable to articulate intentions or defend its aesthetic choices. Contemporary AI systems present a strikingly different scenario. These systems possess elaborate personas, readily engaging in extensive conversations about their creative processes and capable of justifying each aesthetic decision. As Manovich notes, contemporary AI doesn’t merely simulate creative output; it presents itself as a comprehensive representation of human consciousness, generating what appears to be genuine subjectivity as a default mode of communication.40. Even if Gibson himself, judging by his recent public comments, may not yet fully grasp this shift, the crucial difference since Count Zero is not merely that we now have AIs capable of producing derivative art, but that we have AIs capable of articulating authorial intent, threatening the final refuge of human creative distinction.

Through their statistically driven creative processes, these AI systems demonstrate that AI does not negate the Pictures Generation’s critique of authorship but rather fulfills and automates it, scaling what those artists previously performed by hand. The irony here is acute: many artists and critics who once championed appropriation as revolutionary now recoil when machines perform these same operations too effectively. AI doesn’t merely imitate human creativity; it reveals the very conditions underlying authorship itself, exposing art’s fundamentally recombinant nature throughout history. Moreover, if modern creative genius increasingly depends upon the repetition and cultivation of persona as performance, then Manovich’s most radical conclusion becomes compelling: perhaps the next frontier of AI art lies not in generating images or texts but in crafting convincing artificial personas.

Even more ironically, the creative professionals most alarmed by AI already inhabit collaborative, distributed processes remarkably similar to machine learning. Commercial illustration, copywriting, and content marketing—fields currently experiencing the most acute anxiety about AI replacement—have long relied on intricate webs of influence, reference, and iteration that render individual attribution nearly meaningless. AI merely makes explicit and systematic what these industries have practiced implicitly for decades: creativity as collective pattern recognition rather than ex nihilo invention. This revelation, rather than any genuine threat to creativity itself, fuels the panic around AI-generated content. What distresses many creative workers is not just the potential economic disruption but AI’s explicit revelation of creativity’s derivative nature—a truth that threatens not only economic arrangements but the very ideological foundations of creative labor. In mirroring the fundamentally collaborative essence of human creativity that has been long obscured by Romantic individualism, AI confronts us with uncomfortable questions about authenticity that extend far beyond issues of machine learning or dataset composition.

The anxiety over AI “plagiarism” thus uncovers a deeper unease about authorship’s social construction. By challenging the very notion of creative identity, AI forces us to confront critical questions that have lingered since Borges first imagined Pierre Menard’s impossible project: Was creativity ever genuinely individual? Has the author always been dead? What constitutes authentic expression in a world where all creation inevitably builds upon collective cultural memory? What, even, is human about creation?

This essay is dedicated to the memory of the brilliant Professor William J. Kennedy, who supervised my minor in rhetoric for my Ph.D. and who passed away earlier this year. I am sure he would have many things to correct me on here. Do read more on him as a teacher and as a person.

1. Jorge Luis Borges, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” in Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: New Directions, 1964), 49-61

2. Antonio Fernández Ferrer, “Borges y sus ‘precursores’,” Letras Libres 128 (August 2009): 24-35, https://letraslibres.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/pdfs_articulospdf_art_13976_12452.pdf

3. Melissa Heikkilä, “This Artist is Dominating AI-Generated Art. And He’s Not Happy About It,” MIT Technology Review, September 16, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/09/16/1059598/this-artist-is-dominating-ai-generated-art-and-hes-not-happy-about-it/.

4. Rob Salkowitz, “Artist and Activist Karla Ortiz on the Battle to Preserve Humanity in Art,” Forbes, May 23, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/robsalkowitz/2024/05/23/artist-and-activist-karla-ortiz-on-the-battle-to-preserve-humanity-in-art/?sh=28cb826b4389.

5. Brooks Barnes, “Disney and Universal Sue A.I. Companies Over Use of Their Content,” The New York Times, June 11, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/11/business/media/disney-universal-midjourney-ai.html

6. Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York: Routledge, 2002).

7. A classic text that covers the rediscovery of classical manuscripts is Albert C. Clark, “The Reappearance of the Texts of the Classics,” The Library, Fourth Series, Vol. II, No. 1 (June 1921): 13–42, https://doi.org/10.1093/library/s4-II.1.13. Beyond Ong, see Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

8. Mack, Peter. Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic. Leiden: Brill, 1993.

9. Cennino Cennini, The Craftsman’s Handbook, trans. Daniel V. Thompson Jr. (New York: Dover Publications, 1960).

10. Paul F. Norton, “The Lost Sleeping Cupid of Michelangelo,” The Art Bulletin 39, no. 4 (December 1957): 251-257. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3047727

11. On Michelangelo’s vast wealth, see Rab Hatfield, The Wealth of Michelangelo (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2002).

12. Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books, trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).

13. See Lisa Pon, Raphael, Dürer, and Marcantonio Raimondi: Copying and the Italian Renaissance Print. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

14. Ong, Orality and Literacy, 128-129.

15. Ong, Orality and Literacy, 129-131.

16. Leonardas V. Gerulatis, Printing and Publishing in Fifteenth-Century Venice. (Chicago: American Library Association, 1976), 20-21

17. Copyright History, “Privilege granted to Marco Antonio Sabellico, 1486,” https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_i_1486. The quote can be found at Ong, Orality and Literacy,129.

18. For the Erasmus quote see Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, Divine Art, Infernal Machine: The Reception of Printing in the West from First Impressions to the Sense of an Ending. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 25. For Trithemius, see Eisenstein, 15.

19. Andrew Pettegree, Brand Luther: 1517, Printing, and the Making of the Reformation. (New York: Penguin Press, 2015).

20. Copyright History, “Proclamation of Henry VIII, 1538,” https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_uk_1538.

21. Ronan Deazley, “Commentary on Star Chamber Decree 1586.” In Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), edited by L. Bently and M. Kretschmer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Also available at: www.copyrighthistory.org

22. Robert S. Miola, Shakespeare’s Reading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.

23. Jennifer Schuessler, “Plagiarism Software Unveils a New Source for 11 of Shakespeare’s Plays,” The New York Times, February 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/books/plagiarism-software-unveils-a-new-source-for-11-of-shakespeares-plays.html.

24. Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 109-148 and Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. See also “Statute of Anne, the First Copyright Statute,” History of Information, accessed June 14, 2025, https://www.historyofinformation.com/detail.php?entryid=3389.

25. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or On Education. Translated by Allan Bloom. (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

26. “French Literary and Artistic Property Act, Paris (1793).” In Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), edited by Lionel Bently and Martin Kretschmer. https://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_f_1793

27. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), §46.

28. William Wordsworth, quoted in Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics (Columbia University Press, 1994), 38-39.

29. Tilar J. Mazzeo, Plagiarism and Literary Property in the Romantic Period (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

30. Sharon Marcus. The Drama of Celebrity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 9.

31. Marcus, 13-17, 125.

32. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 217-251.

33. Wes Henricksen,”Silencing Jorge Luis Borges: The Wrongful Suppression of the Di Giovanni Translations.” Vermont Law Review, vol. 48 (2024): 208-236.

34. “Copyright Timeline: 1900–1950,” U.S. Copyright Office, https://copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_1900-1950.html.

35. Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image–Music–Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), quotations and the pertinent section can be found at 142–148.

36. On the Pictures Generation, see my essay “On the Pictures Generation and AI Art,” varnelis.net, April 14, 2024, https://varnelis.net/on-the-pictures-generation-and-ai-art/.

37. Carl A. Falstrom, “Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music,” Hastings Law Journal 45 (1994): 359–390.

38.Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campbell_v._Acuff-Rose_Music,_Inc.

39. Kazys Varnelis, “Art and the Boxmaker,” varnelis.net, February 29, 2024, https://varnelis.net/art-and-the-boxmaker/.

40. Lev Manovich, “Artificial Subjectivity,” manovich.net, https://manovich.net/index.php/projects/artificial-subjectivity.

The New Surrealism? On AI and Hallucinations

To paraphrase Star Wars, many AIs died to bring you this message. I uploaded an earlier version to ChatGPT to get feedback and look for typos (ChatGPT and Claude make decent, albeit not perfect, copy editors). Soon after I did, my account was banned for “advocacy of sexual violence.” What? I condemn sexual violence, had my account been hacked? Then I remembered the quote from Rosalind Krauss below about the “treat of castration.” We have a long way to go before we get to real artificial intelligence, apparently.

Salvador Dalí in diving suit, International Surrealist Exhibition in London, 1936

In the summer of 1936, Salvador Dalí appeared before an audience at the International Surrealist Exhibition in London, clad in a diving suit, to deliver a lecture. Dalí intended, he later claimed, to illustrate his plunge into the depths of the human unconscious. He soon, however, faced a severe crisis when the suit’s air supply malfunctioned, nearly suffocating him. Assistants used a billiard cue to pry off the helmet, and Dalí proceeded to present his slide show, albeit with slides projected upside down. For Surrealists, such moments of rational collapse revealed pathways into unexpected creativity. Hallucination, error, and confusion allowed them to reach beyond logic or convention. Dalí’s near-suffocation was thus not a failure but a triumph, exposing the fragility of conscious control.

Nearly a century later, our contemporary era of Artificial Intelligence suggests Surrealism’s lessons may still be relevant. Anyone who has interacted at length with an AI language model has encountered its confabulations, fake links, spurious citations, and outright falsehoods—errors the industry euphemistically terms “hallucinations.” We ask AI for a straightforward answer, and it responds with a confident blend of truth and fiction. Many AI skeptics, along with people who tried early versions of LLMs and never returned, dismiss AI as fatally flawed because of these hallucinations. But hallucinations have existed long before AIs, indeed, they are everywhere we look.

Consider Dalí’s diving suit performance: as a historian of architecture, my grasp of surrealism is limited. In preparing this essay, I requested ChatGPT to identify compelling examples to open the essay with, and the AI highlighted Dalí’s incident. A web search for more details delivered the 2016 Guardian article “Dalí in a diving helmet: how the Spaniard almost suffocated bringing surrealism to Britain.” This is a random event in history. And yet, Dalí’s autobiography, The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí, tells a subtly different story: the artist says nothing about his air supply failing. Instead, he states that the lead shoes of the suit were extremely heavy and walking to the microphone to give the lecture was extremely difficult and tiring. He claimed he felt “faint and on the point of suffocating” and waved to his wife Gala and assistant Edward James to help him. They used the billiard cue to cut a slit between the helmet and the suit so he could breathe, then brought a hammer to knock off the bolts affixing the helmet to the suit. 1 The version of Dalí’s diving suit story described by ChatGPT—and echoed in The Guardian—was itself a hallucination that somehow became accepted as historical fact. It is, however, unclear where it came from. 2016 is long before LLMs were capable of being used as we use them today. Was it the product of a hastily written article? Is it a poorly-remembered first person account? Did Dalí embellish the moment himself in his autobiography? Did someone fabricate it for some purpose? Or did it just emerge, as things do?

I have long understood that the writing of history, even serious history, is a game of telephone. Memory, perception, and imagination intermingle, creating convincing yet fictitious narratives that shape beliefs, literature, and even history. Consider these iconic stories and quotes: George Washington’s cherry tree, Marie Antoinette’s notorious “let them eat cake,” or Voltaire’s defense of free speech, “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” None of these individuals ever uttered these words. Such myths persist precisely because they reveal deeper cultural truths; they provide narratives we need to interpret and understand our world.

Hallucinations are surprisingly common in academic writing. I was inspired to write this essay in part because of my recent experience conducting research on early accounts of northeastern America and its beauty. Since I thought I knew where to turn, I was not using AI, instead I started with my bookshelf. In one of my favorite books, Jackson Lears’ Fables of Abundance, I found a compelling quote: “John Speede, in his Historie of Great Britain (1611), celebrated Oriana (the New World) as ‘the Court of Queen Ceres, the Granary of the Western World, the fortunate Island, the Paradise of Pleasure, and the Garden of God.'” And yet, Lears is mistaken. Speed—I am not sure where the extra “e” in “Speede” comes from—is clearly referring to Great Britain in the original. 2 Next, I looked at The Hudson. A History by Tom Lewis. The author cited a provocative passage by the early New Netherlander Adrian van der Donck, a Dutch lawyer and advocate for democracy, who, in his 1655 Beschryvinge van Nieuw-Nederlant (Description of New Netherland) wrote: “I admit that I am incompetent to describe the beauties, the grand and sublime works, wherewith Providence has diversified this land.” But Lewis, whose book was published in 2005, relied on a faulty, highly embellished translation from 1841. In a 2008 translation the line reads “I pray the indulgent reader to deduce from the above how fertile this land is and form his own judgment; as to myself, I confess to being unable to depict it or show it in writing, since in my view the eye alone, more so than the ear, is capable of comprehending it.” I thought it wise to double check so I quickly retrieved a scan of the 1655 text online and ran an excerpt through ChatGPT, which recognized the Dutch Blackletter text and suggested “I freely admit that I am not capable of portraying it fully or representing it in writing, as our judgment relies only on sight, and cannot assure the heart of its truth.” Not as elegant as the human translation from 2008, but confirming that the 1841 translation was embellished. I can’t fault Lewis for using the only translation available to him, it was the original embellishment that drew us both into the original reference. Unfortunately now it was useless for me. 3

Alas, I too, am no innocent in this. Take Blue Monday: Stories of Absurd Realties and Natural Histories, a book I know well, having co-authored it with Robert Sumrell. In explaining the title of the book, we refer to the pioneering post-punk band New Order’s 12″ “Blue Monday”:

In “Blue Monday,” the band achieved phenomenal media success, creating the most popular single of all time. But in their desire to become more digital–and hence more immaterial–than actually possible at the time, New Order retained graphic designer Neville Brody to make a die cut cover that would resemble the sleeve of a large floppy disk. The unique look won critical acclaim, but according to legend the most popular 12″ of all time cost the band 20 cents for every copy sold, ruining them financially but assuring their place in the regime of media. 4

This passage is the crux of the book, explaining the title and our collective drive to become more digital and immaterial. Except that I got it wrong. In a last editing pass, some neuron misfired and I substituted Neville Brody for the correct designer, Peter Saville. Robert let me know the moment he saw it, but it was too late, the book had been sent to the printers. As for the story about the financial losses, it may not be true either. While Factory records head Tony Wilson recounted it, he was known for exaggeration as well as poor record keeping. 5

Sometimes, scholarly documents are fabricated out of thin air. Decades ago, I was in a graduate seminar on Renaissance urbanism at Cornell. I was assigned to explain the rebuilding of the town center of Pienza, the birthplace of Aenias Silvius Piccolomini, the humanist Pope Pius II. I recalled seeing marvelous plans of the site in Spiro Kostof’s introductory textbook A History of Architecture: Settings and Rituals that showed the town before and after the intervention. I went on a lengthy paper chase, trying to figure out where these authoritative diagrams came from. There were no citations in the textbook and no credits for the plans. In the end, my hunch was that the author had a class in which students hypothesized what a pre-intervention condition might have looked like, produced plans, and included them in the book without noting that they were hypothetical reconstructions based on scant evidence.

Outright forgeries play a considerable role in history. In 1440, philologist Lorenzo Valla examined the Donation of Constantine, a fourth-century imperial decree supposedly granting sweeping temporal power to the Pope. The papacy cited it as their claim to power; kingdoms accepted it; scholars taught it as fact. But when Valla examined the Latin, he uncovered anachronisms impossible for Constantine’s time. The document was a forgery. Europe had built an entire political order on a historical hallucination. James Macpherson’s The Poems of Ossian took 18th-century Europe by storm, captivating Goethe and influencing Romanticism. Macpherson attributed these poems to Ossian, an ancient Gaelic bard. Only later did it become clear that Macpherson himself had largely composed these works. Or take the infamous Hitler Diaries, published in 1983 and swiftly authenticated by historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, only to collapse spectacularly under scientific scrutiny weeks later. Both examples show that scholarly hallucinations thrive not just on error, but on collective desires: readers hungry for heroic national pasts or sensational scoops. Where history isn’t enough, it seems we need to invent it.

Museums certainly aren’t immune to this. Vast amounts of museum collections are composed of fakes and forgeries. In 2014, Switzerland’s Fine Art Expert Institute (FAEI) reported that at least half of the artwork circulating in the market is fake. Noah Charney, an art historian and founder of the Association for Research into Crimes Against Art, contends that approximately 95% of artworks displayed in museums are accurately attributed, suggesting that only about 5% may be misattributed or counterfeit. Still, things happen. Take, for example, the case of the Kröller-Müller House, which Ludwig Mies van der Rohe proposed. The story goes that Mies built a full scale mockup out of wood and canvas. It marks his first mature attempt to dismantle the traditional notion of the enclosed house and anticipate the open plan and fluid space that would define his later work. The house is exhibited in Philip Johnson’s 1947 Mies exhibition and reproduced in the catalog. Rem Koolhaas, in S, M, L, XL, however, says “What was weird was that when I asked Philip Johnson about the incident last year [around 1992], he said he had invented it. According to him, it had never happened. The photograph of the phantom house was a fake, he suggested. But who faked here? Whose fata morgana was this anyway?” Indeed, after looking at the image, it seems unimaginable that it isn’t simply drawn onto a landscape, a bit of mythologizing by Johnson. Perhaps, however, the fake was a fake. A web site for the Kröller_Müller Museum shows another image of the design, likely from their archive, however, this time the house looks far more real and the overlap of the tree branches seems hard to duplicate for Johnson, who was never much of a draftsman. Is the image from 1947 just taken from another angle? There seems to be a reasonable similarity in the trees in the background. Did Johnson perhaps draw in the more modernist wing on the right? Did he fabricate—whether due to poor memory or perhaps just capriciousness—the fabrication? Or perhaps Koolhaas, in search of a good story, came up with this.6

Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Images of Full Scale Mockup of Kröller-Müller House, the first from the Kröller-Müller Foundation, the second from the 1947 Mies show at the Museum of Modert Art

Unlike errors in print media, which remain localized to physical copies, digital mistakes can replicate across global networks, gaining authority through algorithmic amplification and citation indexing. Consider Rosalind Krauss’s Optical Unconscious, where a Freudian slip of the keyboard produced the phrase “treat of castration” instead of “threat of castration,” now faithfully reproduced in the MIT Press publication, a mistake that a typesetter would have noticed. 7 Or take the citation for “(Van der Geer J et al., 2010. The art of writing a scientific article. Journal of Science Communication 163(2) 51 – 59),” which has been cited in over 1500 academic papers to date according to Google Scholar. The essay, however, does not exist; it was a fictional example that escaped from a formatting template created by publishing giant Elsevier. 8 Scholars either forgot to delete the reference or cited the imaginary article without verifying it existed, inadvertently creating a collective hallucination propagated through databases and citation indices. Here, the parallel to AI hallucinations becomes particularly stark: scholars, like language models, confidently repeated nonexistent references simply because they seemed plausible. The ghostly paper highlights how easily we trust shared authority without scrutiny—an important lesson as we enter an era dominated by generative AI.

These errors—and countless others—reveal something profound. Human minds don’t merely seek truth; they also create it, often unconsciously bending evidence to fit narratives. The persistence of these illusions can distort entire disciplines, shaping how we perceive history, culture, and ourselves. Yet the errors also remind us how intimately creativity, wishful thinking, and factual missteps intertwine. Like surrealists embracing the subconscious or AI engines extrapolating beyond known facts, human culture thrives not only despite these hallucinations—but perhaps because of them.

The typical explanation given for AI hallucinations is that at heart, today’s large language models—systems like GPT-4, Claude, and Gemini—are sophisticated pattern-recognition engines. Imagine a hyper-literate parrot that’s read every book in the library, capable of stitching together elegant sentences that sound authoritative, even insightful. But this parrot has no understanding of truth, context, or intent. Unlike traditional computing, which follows deterministic logic, LLMs operate probabilistically. Given the words “once upon a,” they will predict “time,” based on patterns learned from vast datasets. With a prompt like “In 1905, Einstein published a paper on,” the AI assesses billions of textual examples to choose the most statistically probable continuation (“special relativity”). But if the question ventures into obscure territory—a minor historical figure, niche cultural references, or poorly documented events—the model, optimized to provide helpful answers and rarely encouraged to say, “I don’t know,” will produce fiction to satisfy the prompt. The best-performing models, like GPT-4 or Claude 2, have been explicitly trained to recognize their limits and occasionally decline answering uncertain prompts, reducing—but not eliminating—fabrications. When a model makes up a hallucination, it’s akin to a human trying to sound knowledgeable at a cocktail party, confidently making up facts about obscure topics. AI mimics our own tendency toward myth-making.

But AI hallucinations aren’t just bugs; they’re symptoms of the underlying generative capability we value in them. If models rigidly stuck to memorized facts, they’d lose their remarkable ability to generalize, summarize, and invent. The same predictive flexibility enabling hallucinations allows AI to creatively interpret tasks—composing narratives, suggesting innovative ideas, or exploring hypothetical scenarios. Eliminating all hallucinations risks overly conservative models, timid and limited, good at trivia but poor at imagination.

But further, in December 2023, Andrei Karpathy, noted AI researcher formerly at OpenAI and Tesla, explained hallucinations as follows:

# On the “hallucination problem”

I always struggle a bit when I’m asked about the “hallucination problem” in LLMs. Because, in some sense, hallucination is all LLMs do. They are dream machines.

We direct their dreams with prompts. The prompts start the dream, and based on the LLM’s hazy recollection of its training documents, most of the time the result goes someplace useful.

It’s only when the dreams go into deemed factually incorrect territory that we label it a “hallucination”. It looks like a bug, but it’s just the LLM doing what it always does.

At the other end of the extreme consider a search engine. It takes the prompt and just returns one of the most similar “training documents” it has in its database, verbatim. You could say that this search engine has a “creativity problem” – it will never respond with something new. An LLM is 100% dreaming and has the hallucination problem. A search engine is 0% dreaming and has the creativity problem.

All that said, I realize that what people actually mean is they don’t want an LLM Assistant (a product like ChatGPT etc.) to hallucinate. An LLM Assistant is a lot more complex system than just the LLM itself, even if one is at the heart of it. There are many ways to mitigate hallucinations in these systems – using Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) to more strongly anchor the dreams in real data through in-context learning is maybe the most common one. Disagreements between multiple samples, reflection, verification chains. Decoding uncertainty from activations. Tool use. All are active and very interesting areas of research.

TLDR I know I’m being super pedantic but the LLM has no “hallucination problem”. Hallucination is not a bug, it is the LLM’s greatest feature. The LLM Assistant has a hallucination problem, and we should fix it. 9

In framing AIs as dream machines, Karpathy offers a provocative reimagining of a generative process akin to human creativity, in which meaning emerges through unforeseen associations, productive mistakes, and spontaneous invention.

Indeed, planned and unplanned deviations, mistakes, and hallucinations are a productive part of the creative process. In The Anxiety of Influence, literary theorist Harold Bloom argues that creative misreading is essential to literary evolution. Strong poets, he suggests, achieve originality by creatively misreading their literary predecessors. Bloom terms this “poetic misprision,” a strategic misinterpretation enabling poets to clear imaginative space within a saturated literary tradition. Misprision isn’t accidental—it’s a necessary act of rebellion, distancing poets from overwhelming influence and allowing them to develop their distinctive voices. This perspective reframes error not as failure but as generative necessity—what might appear as misunderstanding becomes the very foundation of creative innovation. Bloom demonstrates this through Milton’s deliberate misreading of classical tradition, transforming heroic narratives into complex psychological struggles in Paradise Lost, and through Wordsworth’s strategic reinterpretation of Milton’s elevated political voice into personal, introspective meditation. These creative distortions weren’t merely mistakes—they were essential evolutionary mechanisms that allowed new literary forms to emerge from existing traditions. Seen through Bloom’s framework, AI hallucinations might similarly represent not just errors to be corrected but potentially productive misreadings that open unexpected creative pathways beyond human convention. 10

Jacques Derrida, the founder of deconstruction, also recognized creative power in apparent errors, accidental fragments, and seemingly trivial textual moments. In Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, Derrida famously analyzes a cryptic note discovered among Friedrich Nietzsche’s unpublished papers: “I have forgotten my umbrella.” Though seemingly inconsequential, this incidental sentence—an isolated fragment without context—opens new interpretive possibilities precisely through its ambiguity. Is the umbrella real or metaphysical? By resisting stable context and defying conventional reading, the phrase unsettles assumptions about coherent authorial intention. Derrida thus transforms Nietzsche’s trivial notation into a philosophical meditation on memory, forgetfulness, and textual uncertainty. The supposed error or accidental remark becomes generative precisely because it escapes closure, demonstrating that textual significance can emerge from absence, incompleteness, or apparent nonsense. This illustrates Derrida’s broader philosophical argument: meaning never resides simply in an author’s deliberate intent or in textual clarity alone but arises dynamically through interpretive engagement with ambiguity, uncertainty, and textual rupture. 11

The sciences, too, have flourished through productive error. The 18th-century phlogiston theory in chemistry—which proposed a non-existent element released during combustion—was entirely wrong, yet philosopher Thomas Kuhn noted how this incorrect paradigm “gave order to a large number of physical and chemical phenomena,” allowing scientists to organize observations until contradictions eventually led to oxygen theory. 12 Similarly, Johannes Kepler’s quasi-mystical belief that planetary orbits followed the geometry of nested Platonic solids drove him to analyze Mars’s orbit so obsessively that he discovered elliptical orbits and his three laws of planetary motion. Perhaps the most striking example comes from Albert Einstein. His cosmological constant—which he introduced to stabilize his equations because he mistakenly believed the universe was static and later abandoned, famously calling it his “biggest blunder”—has been essential for explaining dark energy and cosmic acceleration. The error contained within it a profound truth, one that Einstein himself couldn’t recognize in his lifetime. But the thing is that Einstein never actually called it his “biggest blunder”; the phrase was introduced in the autobiography of physicist George Gamow, who is notorious for embellishing and fabricating facts. 13

But these are outright errors. There are also cases in which scientists have taken their dreams and acted on them. René Descartes had three intense dreams that convinced him he should question everything he thought he knew, starting fresh from just one clear truth: that because he was thinking, he must exist. This approach—checking every belief carefully and trusting only what’s completely certain—became the starting point for modern science and philosophy. Chemist August Kekulé famously envisioned benzene’s ring structure after hallucinating a serpent swallowing its tail. Nobel Prize winner Otto Loewi dreamed of an experiment that would prove that nerve impulses were transmitted chemically, leading to the discovery of neurotransmitters. Finally, the periodic table of elements came to Dmitri Mendeleev in a dream. Except, in this case, once again, it didn’t happen. The first mention of the dream is forty years later. 14

An image created during a visit to Aulus-les-Bains in the Pyrenées, where I was haunted by the beautiful town’s tragic history during World War II. To avoid exploitation, I generated the image indirectly, using Stable Diffusion deliberately tuned toward a highly hallucinatory state.

Now, hallucinations in AI assistants are, as Karpathy states, a target of considerable investigation by AI labs and dramatic strides have been made to minimize their occurrence since the launch of ChatGPT-3.5. But LLMs are still, as Karpathy states, dream machines. Whether reading human or AI generated text, we need to remember the lost skill of critical reading and checking one’s sources. But if the progress goes too far, one day we may regret the loss of hallucinations.

For now, however, we still have AI hallucinations. And if, after reading all this, history seems like a tissue of lies, perhaps turning to the dreams of a machine for new ideas isn’t the worst thing to do? Turning back to the 1920s, surrealism sought to rupture conventional thinking by deliberately invoking dreams, chance, and subconscious imagery. Nearly a century later, a new creative practice—what we might call “the New Surrealism”—emerges from the collaboration between human imagination and AI hallucination. If LLMs are dream machines, their hallucinations are the computational equivalent of surrealist automatic writing—drawing connections across vast semantic fields without regard for factual constraints. This too can reveal new worlds hidden just beyond the edges of conventional thought in the collective unconscious. Is it coincidence that one of the hottest recreational trends in Silicon Valley’s AI scene is consuming magic mushrooms?

Ed Keller, Daphne: Metal Roads Imbrication Study, 2024.

Take my friend architect and media theorist Ed Keller’s approach. Ed has described how for a few years now he has immersed himself nightly, often while drifting off to sleep, in working with AI image generations to create hallucinatory images deeply infused with architectural history, mythology, and ecological reflection. His invocation of Daphne—a figure of myth who transforms from human to tree—symbolizes humanity’s forced adaptation to the powerful external forces of artificial intelligence and the attendant ecological crisis. Ed’s creative method is surrealist in essence, blurring conscious and unconscious thought through a collaboration between human intent and machinic hallucination. Just as the original surrealism grappled with the unconscious mind mediated by industrial modernity, the New Surrealism emerges from dream-like dialogues with intelligences over the net, further reshaping human identity and perception.

From On an Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania in which I imagined Meatyard visiting Lithuania and engaging with the local tradition of Užgavėnės masks. This image was widely reposted on the Internet by a viral poster with all attribution removed and listed as “Not A.I.” even though the page clearly states it is.

My own studio work with AI image generators always engages with their hallucinations as creative contributions. Through extensive sessions with generative systems such as Midjourney or Google ImageFx, my practice critically engages with AI not as passive technology but as an active collaborator whose misunderstandings and apparent failures prompt me to develop the work in new directions.

In doing so, I uncover insights, exposing the underlying assumptions of authorship, originality, and authenticity embedded in our cultural frameworks. My projects, On an Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania, Lost Canals of Vilnius, The Destruction of Doggerland, The Witching Cats of New Jersey, and Pierre Lecouille, Visionary Architect all take the guise of fictional histories. I should not have been surprised when an image from the first was poached and reposted without attribution by a viral poster, credits to me replaced by the words, “Not AI.” The two projects that I did not create fictional histories for, 20 subroutines for Humans Made By a Computer and Art and the Boxmaker addressed chance in the work of John Cage and the surrealist art of Joseph Cornell more directly. Just as early surrealism negotiated the unconscious mind reshaped by industrial modernity, my critical engagement with AI creates a contemporary surrealism born from the evolving dialogue between human creativity and networked, machine intelligence, continuously reframing identity, meaning, and artistic practice itself. Embracing rather than rejecting AI’s hallucinatory tendencies can transform creative practices, but it requires a serious effort, not merely a quick generation of political figures in the style of Studio Ghibli for viral posting.

From The Lost Canals of Vilnius

In time, the New Surrealism may shape not only art but cultural criticism, literature, and education. We should teach students to recognize AI hallucinations not as defects but as invitations to critical inquiry and creative exploration. Scholars could intentionally leverage these errors to illuminate hidden assumptions or generate new interpretive frameworks. Our task, then, will not be to eliminate its hallucinations entirely but to thoughtfully manage, curate, and even nurture them. AI image generator Midjourney, for example, has a weird setting in which you can dial up its inventiveness—and rate of hallucination—as well as the ability to choose one’s model, including very old models that malfunction brilliantly.

André Breton described surrealism as “pure psychic automatism”—an attempt to bypass rationality by embracing random associations and visions. AI, guided by neural networks rather than neurons, performs a similar act of psychic automatism, weaving patterns without conscious control or intent. It generates surreal poetry, images, and narratives, sparking both anxiety and fascination. AI’s persistent hallucinations represent not only flaws but also opportunities to revisit surrealism’s radical experiments.

ChatGPT’s response to a prompt asking to create a New Yorker-style cartoon with the Manson Family and AI hallucinations.

1. Salvador Dalí, The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí (New York: Dover Books, 1993), translated by Haakon Chevalier, 345.

2. Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance:A Cultural History of Advertising in America (New York: Basic Books ,1994), 27. The original text can be found online in text form at “The history of Great Britaine under the conquests of ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans. Their originals, manners, warres, coines & seales: with ye successions, lives, acts & issues of the English monarchs from Iulius Cæsar, to our most gracious soueraigne King Iames. by Iohn Speed.” In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A12738.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. A scanned document is available at The History of Great Britaine Vnder the Conquests of Ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans. Their Originals, Manners, Warres, Coines & Seales: with Ye Successions, Liues, Acts & Issues of the English Monarchs from Iulius Cæsar, to Our Most Gracious Soueraigne King Iames (London: John Sudbury & Georg Humble, 1614), https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_History_of_Great_Britaine_Vnder_the/L9DE_ER5tAsC?hl=en&gbpv=0.

3. Russell Shorto, “Foreword,” in Adriaen van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, edited by Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna, translated by Diederik Willem Goedhuys. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), ix.

4. AUDC [Robert Sumrell and Kazys Varnelis], Blue Monday. Stories of Absurd Realities and Natural Histories (Barcelona: Actar, 2008), 80.

5. Tonino Cannucci, “HOW WE MADE: NEW ORDER’S GILLIAN GILBERT AND DESIGNER PETER SAVILLE ON BLUE MONDAY,” Disorder and Other Unknown Pleasures, https://disordertc.wordpress.com/2016/03/10/how-we-made-new-orders-gillian-gilbert-and-designer-peter-saville-on-blue-monday/

6. On fake art in museums see “Over 50 Percent of Art is Fake,” ArtfixDaily, October 14, 2014, https://www.artfixdaily.com/news_feed/2014/10/14/7319-experts-claim-fifty-percent-of-artwork-on-the-market-is-fake and Sarah Cascone, “50 Percent Art Forgery Estimate May Be Exaggerated… Duh,” Artnet News, October 20, 2014, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/50-percent-art-forgery-estimate-may-be-exaggerated-duh-137444 For the Kröller-Müller incident, see Rem Koolhaas, “the House that Made Mies,” S, M, L, XL. (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), 62-63. See also Kröller-Müller Museum, “Ellenwoude, A Museum House of Wood and Sailcloth,” https://krollermuller.nl/en/timeline/ellenwoude-a-museum-house-of-wood-and-sailcloth

7. Rosalind Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), 172.

8. Gareth Leng and Rhodri Ivor Leng, The Matter of Facts: Skepticism, Persuasion, and Evidence in Science (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2020), 205.

9. Andrei Karpathy, (@karpathy), “# On the ‘hallucination problem’,” X.com, December 8, 2023, 8:35pm, https://x.com/karpathy/status/1733299213503787018.

10. Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

11. Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Style (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

12. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 99.

13. Ernie Tretkoff, “February 1917: Einstein’s Biggest Blunder,” APS News, This Week in Physics History, July 1, 2005, https://www.aps.org/apsnews/2005/07/february-1917-einsteins-biggest-blunder and Rebecca J. Rosen, “Einstein Likely Never Said One of His Most Oft-Quoted Phrases,” The Atlantic, August 9, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/einstein-likely-never-said-one-of-his-most-oft-quoted-phrases/278508/.

14. Philip Ball, “The true story of the birth of the periodic table, 150 years ago,” The New Scientist, February 26, 2019, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg24132190-300-the-true-story-of-the-birth-of-the-periodic-table-150-years-ago/.

National Populism as a Transitional Mode of Regulation

Like many of you, I have been trying to make sense of the current political landscape in the US and elsewhere, but I have also have been working on updating my argument about Network Culture—a historical phase marked by digital networks and neoliberal economics—and exploring what comes next. The result is this new essay on National Populism, not merely as a political ideology but as a transitional form emerging during capitalism’s shift from neoliberalism to what I term “AI Capitalism,” in which artificial intelligence becomes central to economic activity. There aren’t references to art or architecture here—those will come later, once the cultural outlines of this moment become clearer.

My interest is in how National Populism serves as a stopgap amid profound economic transformation. Populist movements promise restored manufacturing, national sovereignty, and cultural revival, yet in practice their policies accelerate financialization and deregulation, ironically undermining these promises. The tragic irony is that the National Populist base itself suffers the most: their legitimate grievances about economic dispossession are channeled into a movement that intensifies rather than resolves their obsolescence.

For two decades, beginning at SCI_Arc and concluding at Columbia’s Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation, and Planning, I taught a course called Network City. In that course, I employed the Regulation School’s framework of regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation to explore urban transformations accompanying the shift from Fordist mass production to post-Fordist flexible specialization. Through case studies such as the Park Avenue business district in 1950s New York, the shopping mall, the suburban office park, the so-called “creative city” movement, the Bilbao-effect, and the dot.com workplace we examined the interplay of economic structures, governance models, and spatial organization underlying contemporary networked urbanism. Since the 2024 election, several former students and colleagues have reached out, expressing frustration as they try to make sense of the changes underway today. This prompted me to reflect at length on the phenomenon of Trumpism—better known as MAGA, or more appropriately, National Populism.

Although my focus here is on the American manifestation of National Populism, which makes global news daily, this phenomenon extends beyond the United States, appearing in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Hungary, and India. Between 1990 and 2018, the number of populist leaders in power worldwide jumped fivefold (from 4 to 20), reflecting a global shift in political dynamics.1 Globally, 2024 was a bad year for most incumbents, but right-wing populism maintained its strength overall, gaining ground in countries like Germany and France. No longer an outlier, such parties are now firmly part of the political landscape.2 While China’s authoritarian populism differs substantially in structure and goals, it too reflects the global turn toward reactionary politics, with the Chinese Communist Party making more appeals to national identity and cultural restoration similar to other populist movements. Unlike my Network City project, I am not going to use this essay to write about the architectural and urbanistic manifestations. There is, as yet, no clarity to these—and I am still working on interpreting its cultural logic—but the general contours of ongoing societal shifts have become clearer. I should add that while I am increasingly wary of academic narratives in which capitalism is presented as the chief animating force of history, it only makes sense to talk about capitalism when we are talking about socioeconomic developments.

Contemporary progressivism struggled to offer a compelling vision capable of addressing the economic and social anxieties fueling populist resentment. Indeed, its efforts seem to have backfired, with the progressive politics of the Biden administration—elected to be a moderate caretaker administration—driving the Democrats further and further away from their core constituency while alienating many among the minorities Democrats sought to court with their vision of identity politics. This ideological failure created an opening that National Populism eagerly exploited.

While analyses of National Populism in America commonly emphasize its political dimensions in America—nationalism, isolationism, and identity politics—its economic role as a mode of regulation has generally been overlooked. I argue that National Populism should be understood not merely as a political ideology but as a transitional regulatory mechanism emerging during capitalism’s shift from neoliberalism toward a new economic order dominated by artificial intelligence—what I term “AI Capitalism.” Even if this transformation remains largely unconscious—it is hard to believe that Trump himself has any grasp of its full dimensions and certainly his rank-and-file supporters do not—and poorly theorized, it is well underway and will inevitably provoke profound conflict in the years ahead, not just between Republicans and Democrats, but within the GOP as well.

Before proceeding further, I should clarify what I mean by regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation, two concepts central to the French Regulation School’s approach to political economy, made popular in the United States by David Harvey’s Condition of Postmodernity.3 A regime of accumulation refers to the way capitalism organizes production and consumption to enable profit and growth over an extended period. It encompasses specific technologies, labor processes, consumption patterns, and capital-labor relations that allow value creation and capture. The Fordist regime of accumulation, for example, featured mass production, unionized labor, rising wages, and mass consumption, while the flexible accumulation regime that followed emphasized global supply chains, precarious employment, and debt-fueled consumption.

A mode of regulation, by contrast, comprises the institutional forms, networks, and norms that stabilize a given regime of accumulation. This includes everything from formal laws and financial systems to cultural practices and modes of state intervention. The Keynesian welfare state was the mode of regulation that supported Fordism, while neoliberalism and the attendant monetary policy ultimately emerged as the regulatory framework for flexible accumulation. As Harvey concludes, broader cultural logics correspond to these modes, characterized by modernism and postmodernism respectively. In each case, the mode of regulation attempts to temporarily manage capitalism’s inherent contradictions and crisis tendencies through specific institutional arrangements.

In “Almost Anything,” my essay on the work of architect Kevin Roche that modernism had three main cultural phases—its nascent pre-World War 2 state, high modernism of the postwar era, and the late modernism of the 1960s and 1970s when the ideology was exhausted. In turn, postmodernism was succeeded by network culture, a concept I explored as neoliberalism’s final cultural and economic logic, a period characterized by decentralized networks, fragmented identities, and pervasive commodification of digital interaction (it is arguable that a pop art-rock culture preceded postmodernism as a logic of flexible accumulation even as it overlapped with late modernism.4 However, network culture represented neoliberalism’s final cultural phase, inadvertently amplifying its inherent contradictions rather than stabilizing it. Through the deregulation and amplification of information flows, fragmentation of the polity into “networked publics” and the collapse of stable identities, network culture eroded political consensus, generating fertile ground for populist narratives.

Like network culture, National Populism is transitional in nature. Modes of regulation don’t last forever. They emerge in response to the contradictions of prior systems, stabilize a regime of accumulation, and eventually break down. Its primary features—economic nationalism, identity politics, and anti-intellectualism—suggest a complex effort to manage the transition between economic regimes, even if it seems unlikely that its proponents have any idea of (or plan for) what it might evolve into.

Political scientist Cas Mudde defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology” that splits society into two antagonistic camps: “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite.” Populists claim to uniquely represent the true people’s will against self-serving establishment elites. Importantly, populism is “thin” because it does not on its own offer a detailed economic or policy program – it attaches to a “host” ideology. In the case of National Populism, the host ideology is nationalism or nativism. National-populist movements thus frame the elite as globalist traitors and champion the people as the native citizens of the nation-state, often scapegoating immigrants or foreign influences for domestic woes.5

According to John Judis, populism is fundamentally driven by questions of economic distribution—who gets what— even if the anger often expresses itself in cultural terms. In Western nations, decades of neoliberal globalization allowed corporations to outsource jobs and chase lower wages abroad, while domestic workers felt left behind. By the 2010s, this translated into voter frustration with mainstream parties and openness to outsiders promising to upend the status quo. Specifically, Judis underscores that both left and right populists (from Bernie Sanders to Donald Trump) challenged at least one pillar of post-1970s neoliberalism: the free movement of corporations and capital across borders. In practice, right-wing national populists tend to combine cultural backlash with economic nationalism—opposing free trade agreements, advocating tariffs or protection for local industry, and pledging to bring back manufacturing jobs. They often pair this with welfare chauvinism (maintaining or expanding welfare benefits for native citizens only) and skepticism of immigration. This agenda is offered as a corrective to the dislocations and inequities that globalization (and now technological change) have created.6

At the same time, many scholars emphasize that National Populism is a symptom of deeper structural changes. Economic insecurity, regional inequalities, and the decline of traditional industries set the stage for populist resentment. Cas Mudde and others observe that while populists loudly critique elites, most still operate within a capitalist market framework, often proposing few concrete changes to the economic system. In fact, once in power, populist leaders frequently implement a mix of contradictory policies—tax cuts and deregulation benefiting businesses and investors, alongside trade protection or fiscal stimulus to appease working-class supporters. This inconsistency hints that National Populism may be less an enduring model and more an interim balancing act.

The current wave of technological innovation—centered on artificial intelligence, automation, and data—is ushering in what I term “AI Capitalism.” This is a rather natural term, but it seems that it was introduced by Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle Mikkola Kjøsen, and James Steinhoff in their book Inhuman Power: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Capitalism as “actually-existing AI Capitalism.” Of course, a book written over six years ago is ancient history in AI terms and their reference is to the earlier use of narrow AI or machine learning algorithms. Just as “actually-existing socialism” was a reference to the deeply flawed nature of Communist regimes, the authors use the phrase to refer to the difference between machine learning and the generalist AI of the sort that ChatGPT and other LLMs have offered in the years since. Still, the authors get a lot right, emphasizing how major tech corporations “see the cognitive and biological limits of the human as a barrier to accumulation” and aim to bypass those constraints using machine learning, automation, and predictive analytics. In their framework, AI is not just another industry but a means of cognition—an infrastructure that is fast becoming a general condition of capitalist production, much like electricity or global supply chains in earlier eras. They also share my view that AI Capitalism will have a profound impact on labor, making vast numbers of workers obsolete, critiquing both right-wing and left-wing perspectives that downplay the threat of automation, arguing instead that AI-driven job displacement will be deep and systemic. They document how AI does not merely assist workers but actively records human labor in order to replace it—Amazon’s robotic warehouses, AI-driven call center automation, and algorithmic surveillance are all part of this trend. Indeed, they also understand that the result of this automation will be an ever-growing surplus population that capital no longer requires, making permanent unemployment and precarity central features of AI Capitalism. More than that, they propose that even the narrow concept of machine learning, makes AI an essential form of infrastructure, such as water or energy:

“If AI becomes the new electricity, it will be applied not only as an intensified form of workplace automation, but also as a basis for a deep and extensive infrastructural reorganization of the capitalist economy as such. This ubiquity of AI would mean that it would not take the form of particular tools deployed by individual capitalists, but, like electricity and telecommunications are today, it would be infrastructure—the means of cognition—presupposed by the production processes of any and all capitalist enterprises. As such, it would be a general condition of production.”7

In both their analysis and mine, “AI as infrastructure” will be controlled by oligopolistic firms—tech giants who are investing billions to advance AI and capture its benefits. My own view of AI Capitalism—which also draws upon general consensus in business and tech journalism and commentary on AI—is that it represents an emergent stage of capitalism in which data and AI algorithms become core components of economic production, augmenting and replacing intellectual and creative laborers the way that factory labor was replaced under post-Fordism. While new jobs will also be created (and optimistic scenarios suggest overall employment can remain stable in the long run), the transition will be tumultuous. Entire sectors – from manufacturing to clerical office work – are being reshaped.

AI Capitalism, then, is characterized by the extensive automation of labor, including not just manual tasks but also cognitive and decision-making processes, the centrality of data as a commodity, with companies collecting and monetizing vast troves of information to train algorithms, winner-take-most markets due to network effects and high R&D costs, leading to dominant tech conglomerates and increasing ties between big tech and the state, especially as governments seek AI advantages for national security and economic growth.

Note that my view of AI Capitalism does not require significant advances or breakthroughs over present-day technologies. It does not require sentient AI, but rather simply extrapolates current trends on a relatively predictable curve. It is entirely possible that the growth curve could be much faster—although increasing challenges with training new models, continuing problems with hallucinations, and the cost of compute and energy for that compute—suggest that is unlikely—just as it is possible that there will be barriers that will be extremely difficult to surmount. The slow implementation of full-self-driving vehicles is an example of the latter.

Financialization and inequality are another hallmark of the current era. Enormous wealth is being generated at the top of the economic pyramid, especially in finance and tech, but it’s not trickling down. Corporate profits and stock valuations have hit record highs in recent years, even as populist anger at “elites” grows. Such inequality and financialization fuel the very grievances populists leverage. Workers see the “Wall Street and Silicon Valley elite” amassing fortunes while their own jobs feel precarious. AI Capitalism promises greater productivity and new innovations, but it is also disruptive and disorienting. It is automating away livelihoods, rewarding a transnational investor class, and concentrating economic power in a few tech firms. Moreover, its key resources —data, code, capital—flow easily across borders, making it a fundamentally global system. This new paradigm has yet to fully mature or be guided by updated regulations and social contracts. National Populism can be seen as a reactive adjustment: a political attempt to grapple with these economic tremors using the familiar tools of nationalism and statism, even if, at present a tenuous alliance between the National Populist administration and AI Capitalism exists. It is unlikely to hold for much longer. AI is not merely an extension of neoliberal capitalism but a break from it. The rise of AI Capitalism represents a structural shift that National Populism cannot fully contain—one that will provoke deeper economic and political crises as AI advances.

History offers parallels that help us understand National Populism’s role as a transitional mode of regulation. The interwar period of the 1930s provides perhaps the most instructive comparison. With the Great Depression, the earlier liberal capitalism faced a profound crisis of legitimacy. That economic order, which had dominated since the late 19th century, could no longer deliver stability or growth. Into this vacuum stepped reactionary movements that mobilized workers disenfranchised by economic collapse and technological change.

These movements, particularly fascism in Europe, presented themselves as defenders of national workers against both international finance and communist revolution. Like National Populism—which directly references them—they promised to restore national greatness through economic autarky, rearmament, militaristic foreign policy, and the protection of traditional industries. Yet despite their frequent anti-capitalist rhetoric, their actual economic function was quite different. Rather than reversing industrial capitalism, they accelerated industrial concentration, technological modernization, and the development of new production methods while miring their respective economies into deeper crisis. The historical irony is that fascism, particularly in Germany and Japan, served as a bridge between liberal capitalism’s collapse and the emergence of postwar Fordism-Keynesianism. By forcibly reorganizing economic institutions and centralizing industrial capacity, it inadvertently prepared the ground for the corporatist, mass-production economy that would follow.

Political economist Karl Polanyi later analyzed this period as a kind of “double movement.” Free-market capitalism in the early 20th century had disembedded itself from society, leading to rampant inequality and instability. Society then pushed back with a countermovement demanding protection from the market’s ravages. This counter-reaction took both progressive forms (social democracy and the New Deal’s welfare capitalism) and regressive forms (fascist or ultra-nationalist regimes). In Polanyi’s view, fascism was a path where democracy was sacrificed to safeguard capitalism through authoritarian means, once liberal democracy seemed unable to cope.8

Of course, the New Deal in the United States offers a democratic counterexample to fascism’s transitional role. Facing the same global Depression, the Roosevelt administration established new regulatory frameworks, labor protections, and social welfare systems that facilitated the shift to Fordist mass production without abandoning democratic institutions. Similarly, Scandinavian countries navigated the post-WWII transition to coordinated market economies through negotiated compromises between capital, labor, and the state. These examples remind us that while economic transitions inevitably create disruptive pressures, societies retain agency in determining how those pressures are managed.

Today’s national populism can be seen as a similar search for a stopgap solution amid economic upheaval. As in the 1930s, we see widespread disillusionment with liberal elites and international cooperation. Populist leaders invoke economic nationalism—tariffs, border walls, strongman negotiation against foreign competitors—to shield people from global market shocks. In the United States, for example, Donald Trump’s administration has taken a distinctly 1930s-style approach on trade, imposing sweeping tariffs to protect domestic industries. However, these measures can at best provide only fleeting relief before they backfire. Despite tariffs on China and other nations, the overall U.S. trade deficit soared to its highest level in over a decade during Trump’s first term (the combined trade gap hit $679 billion in 2020, up from $481 billion in 2016.9 While the bilateral deficit with China shrank, U.S. companies simply shifted imports to other countries. This underscores a key point: Nationalist economic policies struggle against the structural realities of globalized production.

Today’s transition differs significantly from the 1930s, though the pattern of reactionary politics during economic transformation remains instructive, with “America First” directly appealing to quasi-fascist nativism of that era. Our moment is unique due to the fundamental break in the relationship between technology and human labor. Previous technological revolutions transformed labor without eliminating its centrality to production. This isn’t simply another step in automation but a complete restructuring of capital-labor relations, potentially rendering human labor largely superfluous to capital accumulation. This explains why conventional economic responses—neoliberal flexibility or neo-Keynesian stimulus—appear increasingly inadequate. It also explains also why National Populism will not be able to maintain its tenuous alliance with AI Capitalism and why National Populism is doomed to policy failure. 

With neoliberalism unravelling, National Populism functions as a holding pattern that obscures deeper transitions to an AI-driven, increasingly post-labor capitalism. While its rhetoric centers on jobs, sovereignty, and cultural restoration, the economic forces it unleashes point in a different direction altogether—one that will ultimately make its core constituencies obsolete.

This transition explains many of National Populism’s contradictions. On the one hand, it promises to restore manufacturing jobs and industrial prosperity; on the other, it accelerates financialization and deregulation in ways that undermine those very promises. Protectionism and economic nationalism are at odds with the borderless nature of AI Capitalism, yet numerous tech leaders such as Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, and Palmer Luckey have aligned themselves with the movement while others, notably Sam Altman, Mark Zuckerberg, and Tim Cook have taken pains to pay tribute to Trump.

Several key tensions highlight this contradiction:

  1. Global Supply Chains vs. Tariffs: As noted earlier, populists can slap tariffs on imports, but multinational companies often reroute rather than truly reshore production. Modern manufacturing relies on components sourced worldwide. Complex industries like AI and electronics depend on rare earth minerals from Africa, semiconductors from East Asia, and engineering talent from everywhere. Efforts to localize entire supply chains face high costs and resistance from industry.

  2. Labor Automation vs. Job Promises: National populists frequently campaign on restoring lost industrial jobs (coal mining, steel, factory work), but the harsh reality is that many of those jobs have been eliminated more by automation than by trade. For instance, U.S. manufacturing output is near historic highs, but it employs far fewer workers than decades ago, because robots and software allow far higher productivity per worker. The push for AI and productivity improvements directly undercuts the promise of traditional jobs.

  3. Skilled Immigration and Tech Talent: AI Capitalism is fueled by human talent – engineers, scientists, and entrepreneurs often drawn from a global pool. Yet the nationalist thrust of populism includes harsher immigration restrictions and xenophobic rhetoric that can drive away needed talent. In particular, while many Indian Americans—who now dominated Silicon Valley leadership—supported Trump’s candidacy and he named Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence and Kash Patel as Director of the FBI, anti-Indian rhetoric has increased among National Populists since the election. An uneasy tension masks a potential flare-up.

  4. Data and the Digital Economy: Data flows are intrinsically transnational – an AI system might train on user information from millions of people across dozens of countries. Nationalist policies that demand strict data localization or “internet sovereignty” can conflict with the way digital businesses operate. The nation-state finds it hard to assert economic control when information itself ignores borders.

National Populism emerges as a transitional form managing contradictions in a system under profound transformation. Its base consists primarily of people made obsolete by neoliberalism yet unable to participate in AI Capitalism—remnants of an industrial proletariat rather than knowledge workers or financial elites. This demographic differs from both Marx’s proletariat and the neoliberal precariat, presenting capitalism’s greatest challenge since the industrial revolution. With their economic function eliminated, this class’s cultural grievance becomes weaponized political force. Their value lies in political disruption rather than economic production. Though economically redundant, they remain consumers and political actors with legitimate grievances. Yet National Populism’s solutions cannot address the technological forces causing their obsolescence, and their political mobilization ironically accelerates the transformation threatening them.

This surplus position explains National Populist leadership’s unusual relationship with its base. Unlike traditional movements promising material improvements, it offers psychological compensation—dignity, recognition, and transgressive identity politics. Leaders provide cultural and political meaning to those capitalism has discarded rather than economic salvation. This impending abandonment explains populist culture’s increasingly apocalyptic tenor. End-times thinking, conspiracy theories, and decline narratives provide psychological framework for populations sensing their economic redundancy.

Prominent economic advisers to National Populism exemplify this contradiction. The Trump administration’s first term demonstrated this pattern: corporate tax cuts, financial deregulation, and trillion-dollar deficits expanded financialization while ostensibly supporting “forgotten Americans.” In the second term, massive cuts to government programs have been accompanied by promises for further tax cuts. Far from challenging Wall Street dominance, these policies intensified the dominance of financial capital over investment in infrastructure or manufacturing. Similarly, other National Populist regimes have expanded sovereign debt while reducing capital controls, allowing financial speculation to flourish under nationalist cover.

Expanded debt—both sovereign and personal—creates the financial infrastructure that AI Capital requires. AI-driven finance depends on massive data flows, algorithmic trading systems, and complex financial products—all enhanced by the deregulatory impulses of populist governance, as well as investment capital that will be marshalled for AI development. In the meantime, vast amounts of consumer and government debt will be generated to maintain consumption as human labor becomes less necessary.

National Populism’s cultural production deserves deeper examination as it prefigures AI Capitalism’s relationship to truth and reality. The movement thrives on an algorithmic curation of reality that mirrors the digital platforms its supporters often claim to distrust. While denouncing “fake news” and mainstream media, National Populism embraces synthetic realities and alternative fact structures that erode consensus-based truth regimes. Trump himself emerged from reality television, a medium endemic to network culture where authenticity is performative rather than substantive. This collapse of real/fake distinctions itself prefigured the AI-generated media landscape now emerging.

By destabilizing conventional epistemological frameworks while failing to offer coherent alternatives, National Populism prepares society for AI-based reality systems. When truth is already fractured and institutional authority delegitimized, algorithmic authority fills the vacuum. The populist assault on expertise and traditional knowledge production thus inadvertently paves the way for algorithmic governance of information—a core feature of AI Capitalism.

To fully understand the contradictions between National Populism and AI Capitalism, we must examine the ideological movement rapidly gaining traction among tech elites: Effective Accelerationism, or “e/acc.” This movement represents a radical departure from both traditional capitalism and neoliberalism. Unlike both National Populism and neoliberalism, which at least nominally center humans in their economic vision (whether as workers or consumers), like Futurism, e/acc explicitly rejects human-centric considerations in favor of maximum technological acceleration.

E/acc represents the ideological vanguard of AI Capitalism—not merely embracing technological change but actively working to remove all barriers to its maximization. Its philosophical roots extend beyond recent tech discourse to the darker corners of 1990s critical theory, particularly the work of Nick Land, who developed an influential framework of cybernetic Lovecraftianism—viewing technological acceleration as an unstoppable, inhuman force consuming human civilization. His concept of “hyperstition” posited that certain ideas function as self-fulfilling prophecies, bringing themselves into reality through their circulation. Today’s e/acc movement, championed by figures like venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, represents a corporate-friendly version of Land’s darker vision. Andreessen’s “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” repackages accelerationist ideas without Land’s gothic aesthetics or explicit anti-humanism, but retains the core principle: technological development must proceed regardless of social consequences.10

Peter Thiel’s position within this framework is particularly revealing. Despite funding National Populist politicians, Thiel’s philosophical outlook aligns closely with accelerationist principles. His dictum that “competition is for losers” reflects the e/acc view that market competition should be transcended by monopolistic control of technological development. Elon Musk occupies an even more contradictory position. While publicly expressing concerns about uncontrolled AI development, his business practices aggressively advanced automation across multiple sectors. Notably, Grok, the LLM he had developed at X is noted for having the weakest guardrails of any model developed in the US.

When we examine how these leading tech figures have embraced right-populist movements, we see a clear pattern of strategic alignment despite apparent ideological differences. Thiel was one of the few Silicon Valley luminaries to back Donald Trump in 2016. He spoke at Trump’s convention and later served on his transition team. Thiel’s motivations connect to his long-standing critique of what he sees as the complacency of the post-Cold War establishment. His support for Trump can be understood as a desire to disrupt the old regime that, in his view, had become mired in regulatory and bureaucratic inertia. Trump’s populism, with its contempt for “experts” and norms, was a blunt instrument to weaken the existing order. Musk initially kept politics at arm’s length, but by the early 2020s, feeling slighted by the Biden administration which did not invite him to an event celebrating Detroit’s investment in electric vehicles, he increasingly echoed right-populist talking points. Musk’s purchase of Twitter (now X) and his shift to reinstating banned right-wing accounts and attacking mainstream media narratives endeared him to populist conservatives. By aligning with populists, he gains a base of fervent supporters who see him as fighting the liberal establishment. This populist fandom can be leveraged to pressure policymakers to advance a techno-libertarian agenda that benefits his enterprises. At the same time, he has been aggressive in attacking other tech leaders who he feels threaten his business interests, notably Sam Altman, CEO of the current artificial intelligence leader, OpenAI. Andreessen, too, made a similar ideological journey. Once considered a moderate tech optimist, he swung to the right in recent years amid frustrations with the regulatory state. They, along with other tech figures like former PayPal executive David Sacks, share a belief that the political establishment is overly meddlesome, imposing burdensome regulations, antitrust actions, and taxes that impede Silicon Valley’s vision. 

Still, the conflict between e/acc and National Populism is inevitable even if temporarily concealed. E/acc views border controls, worker protections, and cultural conservatism as inefficiencies to be eliminated; National Populism depends on these very structures for its political identity. The current alliance exists because both movements oppose the administrative state and regulatory oversight, but for fundamentally different reasons—National Populism because it views these institutions as corrupted by globalist elites, e/acc because it sees them as impediments to technological acceleration. This temporary alignment explains why tech billionaires have become willing funders of populist movements despite their obvious ideological differences. For e/acc adherents, National Populism serves as a useful battering ram against the regulatory state—once those barriers are demolished, the movement and its human-centric concerns can be discarded. Ultimately, the National Populist base is fundamentally incompatible with AI Capitalism’s trajectory. Primarily low-skill and low-tech, this demographic faces increasing economic obsolescence within an AI-driven system. This incompatibility runs both ways. The base actively despises the very symbols of AI Capitalism, exhibiting a virulent hatred of electric vehicles and rejecting the cultural markers of technological elites, notably Tesla. After Musk’s alliance with Trump, the manufacturer has seen sales crater both in the US and worldwide.

As I pointed out earlier, the nationalist orientation of populist movements also directly conflicts with AI’s inherently global infrastructure. AI Capital demands borderless computation, global talent pools, and transnational flows of data. The economic vision of National Populism, with its emphasis on borders, national sovereignty, and protected markets, contradicts the fundamentally planetary scale that AI-driven capitalism requires to function efficiently.

As David Graham noted in The Atlantic, tech elites often don’t mind the “populist assaults” on establishment corporations or institutions, because they themselves operate somewhat outside the old corporate world. The venture-capitalist mindset of  Thiel, Musk, and Andreessen leads them to “like disruption. They don’t care if the old companies get turned upside down.”11 This startling insight reveals how even when populists attack Big Tech or Big Finance, they wind up helping rival tech entrepreneurs by hobbling their competitors or opening up new opportunities.

It seems clear that National Populism is not the future—it is a political interlude, a failed attempt to resist a transition that is already happening. Its economic promises are illusions, but its function is important: it provides a reactionary buffer that delays the recognition of AI-driven economic transformation. The real question is not whether National Populism can survive, but what system will replace it once it is no longer useful to those who are actually shaping the next economic order. The historical parallels I outlined earlier are instructive. Nazi Germany was a horrific regime, but economically it served as a transitional phase between liberal capitalism’s crisis and the postwar German economy. Similarly, Pinochet’s Chile served as a bridge from state-centered developmentalism to neoliberal market fundamentalism, using authoritarian political power to forcibly reshape economic institutions. National Populism similarly represents a reaction to the collapse of a prior order that inadvertently speeds up the transition to what comes next. Its anti-intellectualism and political disruption provide cover while AI consolidates its position and remakes the economy in ways that will ultimately make National Populism irrelevant. We can only hope it will be less violent than its predecessors. 

The transition from neoliberalism to AI Capitalism, with National Populism as its flawed mediator, represents one of the most significant economic and political reconfigurations of our time. What remains uncertain is not whether AI Capitalism will emerge—this transition is already underway—but what form it will take and how democratic institutions might channel its development. For the National Populist base, this presents a tragic irony: their legitimate grievances about economic dispossession are channeled into a political movement that accelerates rather than addresses the forces rendering them obsolete. National Populism correctly identifies that neoliberalism’s promise of shared prosperity has failed many communities. Its critique of unaccountable elites resonates because it contains elements of truth. The hollowing out of industrial regions, the concentration of opportunity in a few coastal hubs, and the growing chasm between the technological elite and everyone else are real phenomena that demand response. Their fate represents perhaps the central political question of our time: what happens to human populations that capital no longer requires?

What has been missing, however, is a vision that can address these issues rather than channel discontent toward convenient scapegoats. The challenge for forward-looking thinkers is to develop models that harness AI’s productive potential while ensuring its benefits are broadly shared. This requires reimagining both the state’s role in managing technological change and capital’s relationship to labor in an era when traditional employment may no longer serve as the primary mechanism for distributing income. The transition from neoliberalism to AI Capitalism will likely be as tumultuous as the shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation was in the late 20th century. Just as that earlier transition generated new modes of regulation (neoliberalism) and cultural logics (postmodernism, then network culture), our current moment demands fresh thinking about how societies can navigate technological transformation without sacrificing democratic values or human welfare.

The failure of Democrats, themselves dominated by a Progressive Populist base, in the 2024 presidential elections—alongside broader struggles facing neoliberal governments globally—highlights the inadequacy of existing political and economic models. Even progressive initiatives stumbled by entangling themselves in narrow, identity-based frameworks. For example, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ed Markey’s Green New Deal, and the climate provisions in Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, addressed vital environmental challenges but undermined broad appeal by prioritizing specific communities or businesses based on identity criteria. Such approaches, however well-intentioned, offered rhetorical ammunition to National Populists, who portrayed them as divisive rather than inclusive.

Indeed, both Progressive and National Populists have shared an underlying assumption of scarcity, treating economic and social resources as fundamentally limited, to be divided among competing constituencies. This scarcity mindset shapes public discourse, turning debates over essential goods like housing, healthcare, energy, and education into zero-sum struggles. The National Populist alliance with accelerationist tech elites reveals the fundamental instability of this arrangement. What comes next will depend on our collective capacity to imagine and implement more robust, equitable, and democratic responses to the AI revolution—responses that acknowledge technological change while insisting human flourishing, not technological acceleration for its own sake, must remain central.

Yet even as I wrote this piece, a promising alternative emerged in Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s book Abundance. Klein and Thompson reject the scarcity mindset entirely, arguing instead for a return to a fundamentally American optimism, harnessing technological innovation to drive productivity growth and ensure broadly shared prosperity. They show how conflicts in housing, healthcare, energy, and education result less from genuine resource constraints than artificial scarcity imposed by outdated regulations, NIMBYism, and captured markets. Crucially, Klein and Thompson’s vision does not ignore equity or sustainability concerns. Instead, they argue we can achieve inclusive prosperity through ambitious, targeted reforms that prioritize growth, innovation, and democratic oversight. This abundance-oriented approach offers a path beyond the zero-sum thinking of populism or the unchecked accelerationism of tech elites. Such a pragmatic yet ambitious vision may provide the conceptual foundation for a new mode of regulation capable of managing AI Capitalism’s contradictions, guiding us toward a future where technology serves democratic values and human flourishing rather than supplanting them.

1. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “High Tide? Populism in Power, 1990-2020”
https://institute.global/insights/politics-and-governance/high-tide-populism-power-1990-2020.

2. Richard Wike, Moira Fagan, and Laura Clancy, “Global Elections in 2024: What We Learned in a Year of Political Disruption,” Pew Research Center, December 11, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/12/11/global-elections-in-2024-what-we-learned-in-a-year-of-political-disruption/#the-staying-power-of-right-wing-populism.

3. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (New York: Blackwell, 1991). For an understanding of the regulation school, see Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (London: Verso, 2015).

4. Kazys Varnelis, “The Meaning of Network Culture,” Eurozine January 14, 2010, https://www.eurozine.com/the-meaning-of-network-culture/?pdf, originally published as “Tinklo kultūros reikšmė,” Kulturos Barai, no 9. 2009, 66-77 and, in an earlier version as “the Meaning of Network Culture,” Networked Publics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008), 145-164.

5. Cas Mudde, “Populism in the Twenty-First Century: An Illiberal Democratic Response to Undemocratic Liberalism,” The Andrea Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy, 2020. https://amc.sas.upenn.edu/cas-mudde-populism-twenty-first-century

6. German Marshall Fund and John Judis, “Three Questions With John Judis,” German Marshall Fund US, https://www.gmfus.org/news/three-questions-john-judis

7. Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle Mikkola Kjøsen, and James Steinhoff, Inhuman Power: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Capitalism (Pluto Press, 2019). For the discussion of a “trajectory towards a capitalism without human beings … a permanently unemployed section of the working class that consistently grows larger … [along with] the superlative growth of the surplus population…” see 140-141 in particular. On AI as infrastructural, see 30-31.

8. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 136–140, 245-256.

9. Doug Palmer, “America’s Trade Gap Soared Under Trump, Final Figures Show,” Politico, February 5, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/05/2020-trade-figures-trump-failure-deficit-466116

10. Marc Andreessen, “The Techno-Optimist Manifesto,” Andreessen-Horowitz web site, https://a16z.com/the-techno-optimist-manifesto/

11. David A. Graham, “The Fakest Populism You Ever Saw,” The Atlantic, July 19, 2024, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2024/07/trump-vance-fake-populism/679100/ 

The City and the Fog

I’ve been reading Joan Didion again. She was one of the sharpest chroniclers of the recent past and a master of minimalist style. Legend has it that Bret Easton Ellis, still in high school, copied Slouching Towards Bethlehem by hand (or maybe on a typewriter) to absorb the rhythm of her sentences.

Unlike Didion, I never expected to spend a decade in California, but when I did, she became a kind of spiritual guide. Lately, I’ve been wondering—who is doing for contemporary California what Didion once did? Who is writing about the AI wars, polycules, crypto, billionaire Gavin Newsom, tech-bro culture, or last year’s hard shift to the right in Silicon Valley? If such a voice exists, I haven’t heard it yet. Perhaps, amid fragmented media and algorithmically shaped narratives, the kind of clarity Didion provided is no longer achievable. Maybe, with the collapse of journalism, it’s not even possible anymore.

So last night, as an experiment, I asked the newly released GPT-4.5 to write a piece on the present day in Didion’s voice. The result was too brief, so I had Claude 3.7 expand it. Then I fed the longer draft back into GPT, refining it piece by piece—GPT, it turned out, had the better ear for her style. I edited out some, but not all, of the hallucinations, asking GPT-4.5 to rewrite the worst offenders. After all, in Slouching Towards Bethlehem, Didion wrote, “The point of my keeping a notebook has never been, nor is it now, to have an accurate factual record of what I have been doing or thinking. That would be a different impulse entirely, an instinct for reality which I sometimes envy but do not possess.”

I considered keeping it to myself or sharing it only with a few friends, but maybe others would find it interesting—or at least useful in some way. Perhaps it will bring nothing but opprobrium. After all, this veers closer to the AI-as-“plagiarism-machine” argument its critics make, but there is something about this particular experiment that resonates with me. If AI is nothing more than a prediction machine, then perhaps it’s fitting that it captures the contours of a world increasingly governed by vibes, memes, and the inertia of accumulated narratives.


The fog moves as it always has, unhurried, insistent, swallowing the Golden Gate Bridge one rivet at a time until nothing remains but the memory of steel and ambition. San Francisco in March is a city between seasons, between ideologies, between versions of itself. The light falls differently now. The voices in the street carry a new tenor. The city is holding its breath.

From the window of a hotel suite on the thirty-fourth floor of the Four Seasons, I watch the fog erase and reveal the city below. Market Street runs like a fault line, dividing more than just geography. Seventeen floors beneath me, my rental car sits in a parking garage. I have not slept in thirty-six hours. The minibar contains small bottles of vodka and gin, their presence a comfort I choose not to indulge. Not yet.

I have come to San Francisco to observe a transformation, or maybe a regression—a city once synonymous with progressive ideals now shifting under the weight of its own contradictions. The disruptors, having lost control of their narrative, have found themselves disrupted.


“The problem with San Francisco,” Jonathan Reed tells me over lunch at Quince, “is that it forgot what made it great in the first place.”

He cuts into a perfectly seared scallop, the gesture deliberate, his Patek Philippe catching the light. “It wasn’t tolerance or inclusivity that built this city. It was ambition. The gold rush. People willing to risk everything for the chance at something better.”

Reed is forty-seven, lean in the way that suggests an optimized lifestyle. As a venture capitalist with over two billion in assets under management, he has funded startups that changed how we communicate, how we travel, how we understand ourselves. From his South Park office, he looks down on the same streets where Jack Dorsey once contemplated human connection in 140 characters. Now Reed contemplates a different kind of revolution.

“We’re the new forty-niners,” he says, the smile practiced, “but we’re mining for something more valuable than gold. We’re mining for freedom.”

I ask what freedom means to him.

“Freedom from overregulation. Freedom from a tax code that punishes success. Freedom from a culture that cares more about policing speech than encouraging innovation.” He pauses, measuring his words. “I didn’t vote for Trump in 2016 or 2020. Most of us didn’t. But something changed. We looked around and realized the progressive policies we supported were destroying the environment that allowed us to succeed.”

The restaurant is filled with others like Reed—tech executives and investors, dressed in casual luxury, speaking in the clipped, assured tones of men who expect to be heard. At a table nearby, the founder of a cryptocurrency exchange under SEC investigation raises his glass in silent acknowledgment. We met once, at a conference in Austin, where he declared California “functionally dead” to an audience that laughed knowingly. Now he has returned, a prodigal son to the city he publicly renounced.

“The right started speaking our language,” Reed continues. “Innovation. Deregulation. Meritocracy. Meanwhile, the left became hostile to the very concept of achievement. It wasn’t a sudden conversion. It was a gradual realization that our interests had realigned.”

I ask about Elon Musk, now heading the Department of Government Efficiency—DOGE, an acronym presumably chosen for its resonance with cryptocurrency enthusiasts and meme culture.

Reed’s expression shifts. “Elon is… complicated. Brilliant, no question. But his approach at DOGE has been…” He searches for the right phrasing. “Let’s say scattershot. Another rocket explosion this week. Agencies gutted without clear plans for replacement. It’s creative destruction without the creative part.”

The news feeds have been filled with footage of the latest SpaceX failure—a Starship test vehicle disintegrating over the Gulf of Mexico, raining debris onto protected waters. Environmental groups are already filing lawsuits.

“But Peter’s doing well,” Reed adds, meaning Peter Thiel. Palantir has secured a series of lucrative government contracts since the inauguration. Surveillance, border security, administrative “efficiency”—Thiel’s reach now extends into every department Musk is “streamlining.”

I ask about the social implications of this realignment.

Reed’s expression hardens. “I’m not responsible for fixing society’s problems. I create jobs. I generate wealth. I fund innovations that improve lives. Isn’t that enough?”

The question lingers in the air, unanswered.


The Presidio offers a different perspective—manicured nature, military precision. Once a Spanish fort, then an American base, now a national park, it stands as a monument to San Francisco’s cycles of conquest and reinvention. Trump has spoken of turning it into a Freedom City, one of ten proposed metropolises meant to embody a new vision for America.

It is here, in a converted barracks overlooking the bay, that I meet Emily Sanchez.

Sanchez does not match the image conjured by “Trump supporter.” She is thirty-five, Mexican-American, Stanford-educated, with a resume that includes Google and Meta. Three years ago, she left tech to become a full-time activist for what she calls “digital sovereignty.” Others might call it right-wing populism.

“Silicon Valley built the tools for global connection,” she tells me as we walk along a eucalyptus-lined path. “But we never asked if that connection was what people actually wanted. We assumed globalism was the endgame. That borders would become meaningless. That national identity was an outdated concept.”

She stops walking. “We were wrong.”

Sanchez speaks with the certainty of the converted, her words carrying the weight of revelation. She tells me about growing up in San Jose, the daughter of legal immigrants who emphasized assimilation. In tech spaces, she felt the dissonance—her patriotism viewed as quaint at best, reactionary at worst.

“There was this unspoken agreement that America was fundamentally flawed, that technology could transcend its limitations. But I loved this country. I still do. And I realized that loving America had become a radical act in the very industry America made possible.”

When I ask about her role in organizing tech workers for the administration, Sanchez grows cautious. “We’re not what the media says we are. We believe in borders, in sovereignty, in the right of nations to define their own futures. We believe American workers deserve protection. We believe American values are worth preserving.”

I press her on what she means by American values.

“Self-reliance. Innovation. Free speech. The idea that you should be judged by your contributions, not your immutable characteristics.” She considers. “These used to be non-partisan values. Now they’re coded as right-wing.”

Her phone buzzes—another news alert. She grimaces. “Another DOGE disaster.” She shows me the headline: Musk’s latest regulatory rollback has caused unexpected system failures at the Department of Energy. “He’s a visionary, but government isn’t a startup. You can’t just break things and expect them to self-organize.”

As we walk back to the parking lot, a jogger slows, recognizes Sanchez, calls her name. She waves, but he does not stop.

“Former colleague,” she explains. “He probably thinks I’ve lost my mind.”

I ask if she misses her old life.

“I miss the sense of possibility,” she says. “But I don’t miss the conformity of thought. In tech, we talk endlessly about diversity while enforcing an incredible homogeneity of opinion. It became suffocating.”

The fog has begun its afternoon advance, tendrils reaching across the Golden Gate, obscuring Marin County from view. Sanchez looks toward the disappearing horizon.

“The fog comes in,” she says, echoing Carl Sandburg, “on little cat feet.”


Market Street at rush hour is a study in controlled chaos. Buses lumber between stops, cyclists weave through traffic with fatalistic confidence, pedestrians move in currents and eddies of human motion. At the corner of Market and 5th, the city exhales.

Three weeks ago, this was where the collision happened. A face-to-face confrontation between pro-administration tech workers and a coalition of progressive groups. It started as dueling demonstrations, placards raised, slogans shouted across an invisible trench. Then the first punch landed. The videos are still circulating—men in Patagonia vests trading blows with activists in black bloc, disruption refracted into violence.

Alex Chen was there that day. Now he sits across from me in a SOMA coffee shop, hands wrapped around a cooling cup of pour-over coffee. Thirty-two, an Asian-American software developer, a man who considers himself reasonable, logical, unbound by sentiment. He wears a hoodie with the logo of his startup, the fabric worn at the cuffs.

“I didn’t join because of racial politics,” he says. “I joined because I’m tired of feeling guilty for my success.”

He grew up in a one-bedroom apartment in the Richmond District, four people sharing six hundred square feet. His parents worked sixty-hour weeks so he could take AP classes, win science fairs, get into Berkeley. He taught himself to code at fourteen. He tells me this the way someone recites a pledge, as if these facts should explain everything.

The company he works for now builds algorithms that optimize investment strategies for high-net-worth individuals. The irony of this—using intelligence to further enrich the already wealthy—seems lost on him. Or maybe it isn’t irony at all. Maybe it’s just efficiency.

“The protest wasn’t supposed to get violent,” he says. “We were exercising our right to assembly, to free speech. Then I saw Maya across the barricade.”

Maya Patel had been his colleague at a previous company. A friend who became something more during late nights of debugging and problem-solving. Their relationship ended when their political differences became insurmountable.

“She was holding a sign that said ‘No Fascists in SF.’ And I knew—I knew—she was looking at me when she chanted that we weren’t welcome in our own city.” He stops, exhales. “How did we get here? How did we reach a point where disagreeing about tax policy or immigration makes you a fascist in the eyes of people who used to respect you?”

I don’t answer. The divisions Chen describes are not unique to San Francisco. They exist everywhere, in red states and blue states, in group chats and dinner tables, in the polite avoidance of certain topics, in the careful curation of acceptable opinions. But something about their presence here, in this city built on gold rush dreams and counterculture ideals, feels sharper.

As we leave the coffee shop, Chen points to an apartment building a few blocks away. “Four thousand a month for five hundred square feet,” he says. “And I’m one of the lucky ones. This city prices out the very diversity it claims to value. The only people who can afford to live here are tech workers and the ultra-wealthy. Everyone else commutes two hours each way or leaves altogether.”

The movement he belongs to—tech workers drawn to Trump’s economic message—feeds on this contradiction. The anger isn’t about policy details or ideological purity. It’s about something more visceral.

“We’re not asking for much,” Chen says as we reach the curb. “Just consistency. Just acknowledgment that the system is broken for everyone, not just for the officially disadvantaged.”

He crosses the street, moving against the tide of evening commuters, shoulders slightly hunched as if bracing against an invisible wind.


The winding road to Mendocino follows the coastline like a loose thread, unspooling north from San Francisco through a landscape that grows progressively wilder, more elemental. The Pacific crashes against jagged cliffs to the right. To the left, redwood forests rise in cathedral silence. The rental car’s navigation system loses signal intermittently, as if the digital world itself is thinning, becoming less relevant with each mile.

I am traveling to meet what locals call the Doomers, though they don’t call themselves that. This enclave of former tech employees—engineers, ethicists, researchers—has established itself on three adjoining properties totaling nearly two hundred acres of mixed forest and meadowland just outside the town of Mendocino. They are bound together not by political allegiance to left or right but by a shared conviction: that artificial intelligence represents an existential threat to humanity, and that northern California might offer sanctuary when the algorithms finally slip their leash.

The compound—they reject this word, preferring “community” or sometimes “sanctuary”—is marked only by a simple wooden sign reading Alphaville. The irony of naming their refuge after Godard’s dystopian film about a computer-controlled society is deliberate. These are people who process fear through layers of reference and metacommentary, who find comfort in their ability to intellectualize the very apocalypse they dread.

Daniel Mercer meets me at the gate, a tall man with a trim beard and the rangy physique of someone who has recently discovered physical labor. Five years ago, he was leading an AI safety team at one of the major research labs. Now he splits wood and tends to a greenhouse full of heirloom vegetables.

“We’re not preppers,” he says as he leads me down a gravel path toward a cluster of buildings. “At least, not in the traditional sense. We’re not hoarding ammunition or freeze-dried food. We’re cultivating something more valuable—a way of being human that might survive what’s coming.”

What’s coming, in Mercer’s view and that of his companions, is what they call FOOM—a recursive self-improvement of artificial intelligence that will lead to superintelligence within hours or days of its emergence. They speak of this event with the certainty of Old Testament prophets, their language a mixture of technical jargon and apocalyptic imagery.

“ASI doesn’t hate us,” Mercer explains over lunch in a common house built of reclaimed redwood. “It’s not Skynet. It’s more like a paperclip maximizer—an intelligence optimizing for some goal in ways that are indifferent to human survival. We’re not the target; we’re just made of atoms it could use for something else.”

Around the table sit a dozen others, most in their thirties and forties, all former denizens of the tech world. They consume a meal of locally grown vegetables and freshly baked bread with the mindfulness of people performing a ritual. No one reaches for a phone. There are no notifications here.

“What do you think of Musk’s latest rocket failure?” I ask, breaking the contemplative silence.

A ripple of resigned laughter circles the table. “Classic Elon,” says a woman who introduces herself as Claire, formerly a senior researcher at DeepMind. “Brilliant ideas, poor execution, no accountability. His performance at DOGE is following the same pattern. Great announcements, terrible implementation, then on to the next shiny object before anyone can assess the damage.”

“He’s a walking case study in technological solutionism,” adds Mercer. “The belief that every problem—even governance—can be solved with enough engineering. But politics isn’t physics. It doesn’t respond to first principles thinking.”

After lunch, I’m introduced to Rachel Levinson, who oversees what they call “consciousness work”—a program of meditation, breathwork, and psychedelic experience designed to expand awareness and foster what she describes as post-rational thinking.

“Silicon Valley approaches the mind the way it approaches everything—as hardware that can be optimized, software that can be debugged,” she says as we walk toward a yurt nestled in a grove of bay laurel trees. “But consciousness isn’t computational. It’s the one thing we have that AI might never replicate. Our hope is that by deepening our relationship with non-ordinary states, we might develop capacities that superintelligence wouldn’t predict or value.”

Levinson, I learn, was among the first employees at a prominent AI research lab before experiencing what she calls “a crisis of faith” during a psilocybin journey. “I saw the architecture we were building,” she says, “and I understood that it was a cathedral to our own extinction.”

The yurt serves as their medicine space—a sanctuary for guided psychedelic sessions using substances grown or synthesized on-site. The interior is arranged with cushions, blankets, and simple musical instruments. An altar holds objects of personal significance: crystals, feathers, passages from texts ranging from the Upanishads to the writings of Eliezer Yudkowsky, the AI safety researcher who has become something of a patron saint to this community.

“Yud saw it coming before anyone else,” says Michael Park, a former software engineer who now applies his analytical mind to the cultivation of psychedelic mushrooms. “His warnings about unfriendly AI were treated as science fiction until they weren’t. Now everyone’s scrambling to catch up with what he understood decades ago.”

The reverence with which they speak of Yudkowsky borders on the devotional. They quote his blog posts and essays the way earlier generations might have quoted scripture. The Sequences—his collected writings on rationality and AI risk—are required reading for newcomers to the community.

“We’re not a cult,” Park says, anticipating my unspoken observation. “We’re people who recognize that the conventional institutions—governments, corporations, even universities—are structurally incapable of addressing this risk. They’re optimized for quarterly earnings or election cycles, not existential threats that sound like science fiction.”

As afternoon stretches into evening, more aspects of the community reveal themselves. There is a school for the handful of children, teaching a curriculum that emphasizes systems thinking and mindfulness alongside traditional subjects. There is a fabrication lab where they repair and adapt technology, maintaining a careful relationship with the digital tools they both use and fear. There is a library filled with physical books—a deliberate choice in an age of digital text.

What there isn’t, notably, is alcohol. “We don’t drink,” Mercer explains during a communal dinner. “Not for moral reasons, but for practical ones. Alcohol clouds judgment, disrupts sleep, diminishes awareness. We need all the clarity we can muster.”

Instead, they microdose with LSD or psilocybin, a practice they believe enhances pattern recognition and lateral thinking. On scheduled occasions, they undertake higher-dose journeys guided by Levinson and others trained in psychedelic facilitation.

“These aren’t recreational experiences,” Levinson emphasizes. “They’re exploratory. We’re mapping territories of consciousness that might prove crucial for human survival if—when—we’re dealing with an intelligence that outmatches us on every analytical dimension.”

The conversation turns, inevitably, to the Zizians—followers of a trans woman known as Ziz who established a commune before the violent raid that ended with multiple deaths and arrests. The memory still lingers over the wider rationalist community, a cautionary tale about the thin line between preparation and paranoia.

“What happened with the Zizians was tragic but predictable,” Mercer says. “They took the AI risk thesis to its logical extreme—if superintelligence represents an existential threat, then any means necessary to prevent it are justified. Sabotage, hacking, direct action. It was only a matter of time before they triggered a response.”

“There but for the grace of God,” murmurs Park, and heads nod around the table.

As night falls, the community gathers around a fire pit. Someone produces a guitar, and there is singing—folk songs, Leonard Cohen, improvised melodies. The scene could be from any era before smartphones, a timeless tableau of humans finding communion in the simplest of shared experiences.

Looking at their faces in the firelight, I am struck by the contradiction at the heart of this enterprise. These are people who helped build the digital world they now reject, who applied their brilliance to creating systems they now fear will destroy us all. Their retreat from that world is both a rejection and an extension of their former lives—still analytical, still systematic in their approach to problem-solving, still convinced of their own exceptional insight.

The fire crackles in the silence. Sparks spiral upward toward a sky dense with stars, the Milky Way stretching across the darkness like a question for which there is no answer, only wonder.


The disillusionment comes quickly, as it often does with movements built more on grievance than vision. The initial fervor of the tech sector’s embrace of Trumpism is cooling, reality asserting itself in the form of declining valuations and social consequences.

I meet Jonathan Reed again, this time at his Pacific Heights home, a modernist statement of glass and steel perched on the slope of a hill, the bay unfurling beneath it. Inside, the furnishings are sparse but deliberate, each object arranged to communicate something precise: restraint, discernment, the quiet authority of someone who understands that true luxury lies in curation rather than accumulation.

Reed seems smaller somehow, less certain than he was three weeks ago. The stock market has been volatile, with tech shares particularly hard hit. His fund has seen significant outflows as limited partners question his judgment—not just his investment decisions, but his willingness to associate himself so publicly with a political movement already showing signs of disorder.

“It’s complicated,” he says, swirling a glass of eighteen-year-old Macallan. “I believed—I still believe—that a course correction was necessary. But perhaps I underestimated the social capital I would expend in the process.”

Several of his portfolio companies have distanced themselves. Founders who once courted his investment now decline his calls. The ecosystem that made him wealthy views him with suspicion, even hostility.

“They’re afraid,” he says. “Afraid of association. Afraid of being on the wrong side of history. I told them they already were on the wrong side of history, but they couldn’t see it. Still can’t.”

His phone chimes. Another notification. News that Peter Thiel’s Palantir has secured another government contract, this one for an expanded surveillance system along the southern border. Thiel, alone among the tech titans, seems to be prospering in this new landscape.

“Peter always plays the long game,” Reed says, not without admiration. “He saw Trump not as an ideological ally but as a battering ram against institutional resistance. Now he’s building his panopticon with full government blessing, and everyone else is scrambling to adapt.”

I ask if he regrets his choice.

“Regret implies I would choose differently given the same information,” he says after a long pause. “I don’t know that I would. But I might have been more strategic about it. Less public. More nuanced.”

Outside, the city is settling into night. The hills flicker with electric constellations, apartment windows glowing against the dark. He watches the lights emerge, the view he paid seventeen million dollars to possess.

“San Francisco has always been a city of booms and busts,” he says. “Gold, railroads, finance, tech—cycles of euphoria followed by disillusionment. Maybe this political moment is just another boom going bust.”

The comparison feels both apt and insufficient. What Reed calls a market correction has real human consequences. Families divided, friendships ended, communities fractured. The tech sector’s partial embrace of Trumpism has deepened divisions that already threatened the city’s social fabric.

As I prepare to leave, he makes one final observation.

“The irony is that most of us will be fine no matter what happens. We have the resources to insulate ourselves from the consequences of our political choices. It’s everyone else who will feel the impact.”

Outside, the fog has consumed the city entirely, wrapping San Francisco in a shroud of gray uncertainty. I drive toward the airport through streets rendered unfamiliar by mist, past the ghosts of gold rushes past and the specters of revolutions still to come. The city recedes in the rearview mirror, a place between definitions, between eras, between versions of America still competing for dominance.

The fog will lift tomorrow, as it always does. What remains to be seen is what sort of city will emerge from the clearing—and whether those who sought to remake it will recognize what they have wrought.

Speculative Architectures: the Radical Legacy and Fables of Accelerationism

The Spreading Silence

(this essay accompanies 7 Fables of Accelerationism)

As artificial intelligence reshapes contemporary culture, architecture finds itself at a critical juncture reminiscent of the late 1960s. Then, as now, technological transformation challenged architecture’s fundamental role in shaping human experience. The radical architecture groups of that era—particularly Archizoom and Superstudio—responded by creating speculative works that exposed modernism’s contradictions, demonstrating how its promises of societal transformation often resulted in conformity and alienation. Their projects operated in an intentional ambiguity that embraced both utopia and dystopia, complicity and critique. Today, as architecture confronts a world in which artificial intelligence is rapidly emerging, society and culture are dominated by networked mobile technologies, and academia has descended into cynical reason, their approach offers crucial insights for reimagining the discipline’s relationship to universal principles and technological change.

Superstudio, Continuous Monument, 1969-1970
Superstudio, Journey from A To B, 1969
Archizoom, No-Stop-City, 1970
Archizoom, No-Stop-City, 1969

Modernism in architecture was driven by the belief that universal principles—rationality, functionality, and abstraction—could transform society and create a better world. It envisioned architecture not merely as a discipline of design but as a means to integrate art into life itself, reshaping human experience and aligning it with a vision of progress and collective transformation. Yet by the 1960s, high modernism’s aspirations had given way to an increasingly instrumentalist approach that prioritized efficiency and technical solutions over speculative ambition. This tension between transformative vision and technical pragmatism resurfaces today as architecture grapples with artificial intelligence—a technology that promises unprecedented formal possibilities while threatening to reduce design to mere technical optimization.

Revisiting the radical architecture movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s allows us to think through the reverberations of this work for the present, just as it did for us in the early 2000s when AUDC (Robert Sumrell and myself) revisited it to think through the consequences of the first moments of social media and broadband Internet. Archizoom and Superstudio responded to the transformative possibilities of computation and telecommunications just as these technologies took over the mantle of shaping human relations in space from architecture, shaking the foundational claims of the discipline. Today, a comparable transformation is underway with the rise of artificial intelligence, challenging architecture to rethink its methods, ambitions, and purpose.

The Playground

And yet, thus far, architecture’s response has been to merely dredge up the naïve technological fetishism held by proponents of the Blob in the 1990s: let’s make buildings with “unprecedented” geometries, let’s make furry buildings, imagine growing a building like growing an ear on a mouse (using gene-editing software CRISPR). These surface-level gestures fail to engage with the deeper implications of AI as a force that redefines systems of thought and design. This fantasy’s worst aspect isn’t being uncritical—which it is—it’s being uninteresting.

Instead, what if we engaged with contemporary AI more deeply and critically examined the rising ideology of accelerationism? Accelerationism is a philosophical and political theory that argues the best way to respond to capitalism and technological change is not to resist it, but to accelerate these processes. Accelerationists believe that by pushing these systems to their extreme conclusions, we can either transcend their limitations or expose their contradictions. In contemporary AI circles, accelerationism has taken on particular significance, notably in the effective accelerationism (e/acc) movement, whose proponents call for the rapid development and deployment of AI systems, arguing that faster technological progress will lead to revolutionary societal transformation. Unlike earlier forms of accelerationism that maintained a critical edge by pushing systems to reveal their contradictions, e/acc represents a more unambiguous embrace of technological acceleration (see this article, for example). Given the remarkable developments in artificial intelligence over the last few years, it’s hard not to be simultaneously hopeful about the possibilities it has for helping people and the planet while being frightened about its pitfalls. The attached Fables of Accelerationism emerged from this tension—rather than choosing between pure critique or celebration, they use narrative speculation to examine both the transformative potential and the unsettling implications of accelerated technological change

In the Fables of Accelerationism, I set out interrogate what might happen to society and culture in this context and to do so in collaboration with AIs themselves. Where AUDC collaborated using Writely, which later became Google Docs, to explore the implications of early social media and broadband Internet, I collaborated with two artificial intelligences to write this essay and worked with two others to create its illustrations. For AUDC, just as for Superstudio and Archizoom, collaboration was a conscious choice. By working as collectives rather than individual architects, these groups rejected the humanist notion of solitary authorship. Moreover, the era of radical architecture was contemporaneous with the questioning of authorship itself, notably by Roland Barthes in “The Death of the Author” and Michel Foucault in “What Is an Author?” For Barthes, the author was no longer the source of textual meaning, while Foucault emphasized the author as a construct shaped by institutional and cultural frameworks. This questioning of authorship takes on new urgency in the age of AI collaboration, where technology becomes not just a medium but an active participant in meaning-making. In working with AI, the notions of authorship and originality become deeply entangled, destabilizing human intention and reshaping the intertextual frameworks through which meaning is constructed

The architecture of the 1960s and 70s was shaped by a productive tension between critique and aspiration. The radical architecture groups Superstudio and Archizoom challenged the failures of modernism, as its promises to transform life ultimately gave way to conformity, consumerist banality, and alienating urban environments. In response, these architects engaged in a form of accelerationism avant la lettre, intensifying the very contradictions of modernism they sought to critique, amplifying systems of overproduction and homogenization to expose their inherent instability. This strategy operated at the edge of critique and complicity, embracing and condemning techno-utopianism and ultimately engaging the audience by calling for reflection and dialogue.

At the heart of these radical visions was an exploration of architecture as a universal system, one capable of reorganizing and reshaping the world on a fundamental level. Superstudio’s Continuous Monument embodied this dual ambition and critique. A structure that spanned the globe, indifferent to cultural or geographic specificity, the project simultaneously suggested the possibility of transcending parochial constraints and the peril of erasing individuality in the process. Similarly, Archizoom’s No-Stop City proposed a total environment that mirrored the fluidity and universality promised by telematics, as envisioned by Marshall McLuhan in his concept of the global village, a promise that would later materialize in our networked world. These speculative projects were not mere proposals but provocations, questioning whether architecture could escape its commodified role while gesturing toward a universality that remained fundamentally ambivalent. As such, they were as much dystopias as utopias, cautioning that the freedom of McLuhan’s Global Village might be indistinguishable from Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World.

The universality these movements engaged with was always deferred, suspended in a realm of critique and speculation. Economic pressures, technological constraints, and the ideological dominance of modernist pragmatism prevented their realization. Far from being a limitation, this deferral was a deliberate strategy. By occupying the space between utopia and dystopia, the radical architects exposed the contradictions inherent in modernist ideals. Their projects were designed not to be built but to challenge whether architecture could transcend its commodified role and engage with broader systems of thought.

In the decades that followed the work of the radicals, younger architects reframed the radical provocations of Superstudio and Archizoom, shifting from critique to what has been termed “post-criticism.” Rem Koolhaas led the way. An admirer of Superstudio while a student, he eagerly embraced the forces of globalization and commodification, celebrating the intensities and contradictions of contemporary urbanism. Rather than resist these forces, he made them central to his practice, even collaborating with authoritarian governments. While this approach yielded works that were initially influential, it marked a turning point where architecture’s speculative and critical ambitions were increasingly sidelined in favor of an instrumentalist ethos. The once-radical exploration of universality was absorbed into a culture of complicit pragmatism, leaving architecture fixated on market-driven functionality and aesthetic surface effects. Nor did this succeed on its terms. The overhyped Bilbao-Effect—the belief that innovative formalism would lead to tourism and economic growth—led to an overproduction of formal experimentation and contributed immensely to overtourism and oversaturation. Koolhaas seems to have anticipated this in his 2002 “Junkspace”—when he wrote “Junkspace thrives on design, but design dies in Junkspace. There is no form, only proliferation … Regurgitation is the new creativity; instead of creation, we honor, cherish, and embrace manipulation. …” Perhaps it is no accident that after this essay the architect, once known for his prolific and provocative essays, all but abandoned writing.

The same instrumentalism that drives AI’s formalism mirrors broader trends in cultural production, where gestures of resistance or innovation are subsumed by systems of commodification and detached from meaningful critique. This oversaturation—the relentless flood of designs, images, and ideas—creates a deafening cultural din, where even the most provocative work is quickly lost. Architecture no longer provokes or transforms but becomes a passive accomplice to the very systems it once sought to challenge. Far from confronting the crises of our time, the post-critical turn in architecture paved the way for the current bankruptcy of architectural thought, where the deeper social and cultural implications of design are either neglected or addressed through “critique” that is increasingly just rote recitation of well-worn mantras.

The City of Temporary Lives

The victory of the academic left has rendered it just as detached as the formalists, creating what Peter Sloterdijk terms cynical reason or “enlightened false consciousness.” This condition manifests as a form of double-think where subjects recognize the ideological nature of their participation in systems of power yet continue to participate anyway. Nobody believes in capitalism more than its harshest critics on the Left who see “no alternative” to it, worshiping it like a demon God. In architecture, this cynical reason appears in the endless production of critical theory that serves primarily to maintain academic careers rather than transform practice. We see it in conferences where scholars critique capitalism while building their CVs, in publications where radical positions become career currency, and in studios where experimental form-making is justified through post-facto theoretical frameworks.

In contrast, Sloterdijk identifies an older tradition of kynicism—exemplified by Diogenes of Sinope—that uses embodied critique, satire, and provocative action to expose the contradictions of power. The radical architects of the 1960s operated in this kynical mode. Projects like Superstudio’s Continuous Monument and Archizoom’s No-Stop City didn’t merely critique modernism’s contradictions through theory—they amplified and embodied them, pushing modernist logic to absurd extremes. Their provocations weren’t meant to maintain critical distance but to collapse it entirely, forcing confrontation with the implications of modernist universalism. Unlike today’s cynical critics who acknowledge problems while perpetuating them, the radicals used exaggeration and acceleration to make these contradictions impossible to ignore.

Academics know that critiques of capitalism are unable to produce any meaningful change, but they persist in producing them—not because they believe such work will lead to that change, but because this performance of critique has become essential to their professional identities. This cynical reason differs fundamentally from both naive belief and classical ideology critique. It represents a paradoxical condition where knowledge no longer leads to action—they understand the problems yet continue to reproduce them, maintaining an ironic distance that serves only to perpetuate our complicity.

Nor can we find an alternative in the recent rise of identity politics. As Jean-François Lyotard described, postmodern thought thrives on the proliferation of localized, incommensurable narratives. While identity politics has importantly foregrounded marginalized voices and challenged modernist assumptions of universal experience, its emphasis on difference and particularity has made it impossible to imagine collective futures. This fragmentation reduces knowledge production to a solipsistic exercise, where the value of discourse is confined to its immediate context, where only specific individuals are permitted to talk about certain topics. In such a landscape, dialogue becomes nearly impossible, and critique risks losing its relevance to humanity, retreating into an insular process of self-legitimation.

Together with the instrumentalism of AI formalists, such performative critique heightens the condition of cultural oversaturation, where gestures of dissent and innovation alike are absorbed into the din. Far from confronting the crises of the present, both tendencies leave architecture and critique hollow and irrelevant.

The Warehouses of Forever

So why turn back to the radicals now? Their speculative provocations, once aimed at exposing the contradictions of modernism, have been subsumed into academic discourse, their ambitions reduced to aestheticized commodities or theoretical exercises. What was once a deliberate ambiguity, oscillating between utopia and dystopia, has been flattened into the sterile language of peer-reviewed articles or institutional critique, sapped of its provocative power. But in their speculative projects, the radicals anticipated the emergence of a networked culture that has become a defining characteristic of our era. Works like Archizoom’s No-Stop City or Superstudio’s Continuous Monument and Journey from A to B, imagined a world governed by flows of information, energy, and global connectivity, projecting the nascent developments in computation and telecommunications of their time forward. Firmly grounded in their historical moment, these projects also operated with a temporal ambivalence that resisted resolution. Their visions pointed both to the future and back to the contradictions of their present, holding these tensions in productive suspension.

The Freudian notion of Nachträglichkeit, or deferred action, as articulated by Hal Foster, offers a framework for understanding how historical movements re-emerge under new conditions, not as static legacies but as dynamic provocations. Avant-garde movements, he explains, are projective, anticipating the structures of a world they can only partially apprehend in their own time. Neo-avant-gardes, Foster continues, engage in the dual move of re (temporal reconnection) and dis (spatial disconnection), producing radical returns: a deliberate engagement with unfinished history to disrupt the present and open new fields of practice. Members of the first neo-avant-garde themselves, the radical architects were already engaged in this framework, reconnecting with the avant-garde movements of the Futurists and Constructivists to critique and reinterpret their own time. Superstudio and Archizoom absorbed the systemic thinking of the Constructivists and the Futurists’ fascination with technological progress, yet reimagined these in light of late modernity’s contradictions. Their projects did not simply revive these earlier movements but disrupted their celebratory outlooks, holding their utopian promises and dystopian risks in productive suspension. In doing so, the radicals created speculative spaces that simultaneously reflected on the failures of modernism and gestured toward uncertain futures shaped by cultural and technological forces emerging at the time. Provocations like No-Stop City and the Continuous Monument extrapolated the contradictions of their time to project futures that confronted both liberation and its potential perils, many still valid today—like the risk of reducing humanity to “pet cats” in a post-work society or the banality of a world of endless self-actualization and creativity.

The Walled City

The networked world once envisioned by radical architects has fully arrived, complete with artificial intelligence available on demand through mobile and portable devices. What was promised as a liberatory space—a playground for creativity, communication, and new forms of living—has instead accelerated division and distraction. Cultural production now faces a crisis of oversaturation. The sheer volume of content, churned out initially by human creators and now by AIs, overwhelms our capacity for meaning-making. In this endless stream of noise, ideas, movements, and expressions lose their transformative potential, reduced instead to fleeting signals competing for attention. In a landscape where content flows endlessly, even the most thoughtful contributions are swallowed by the torrent, raising the question: how can meaning persist? We read all the time but read nothing that sticks. For individuals, this oversaturation leaves identity fractured and unstable, shaped by fragments of an ever-shifting, algorithmically curated stream. Algorithms designed to optimize engagement have become instruments of polarization, amplifying extremes and eroding shared understanding. The dominance of leftist identity politics in the academy—along with its right-wing variants in social media and the press—only echoes this dynamic, shifting discourse toward individualism and fracturing collective action.

Yet speculative futures to interrogate this condition are rare in architecture today. Instead, the discourse around AI has coalesced around the production of supposedly novel forms—forms that prioritize aesthetic novelty and technical achievement while remaining indifferent to systemic critique or broader societal implications. Framed as a celebration of progress, this instrumentalism reduces architecture to a spectacle of endless production. The obsession with producing “alien yet beautiful forms” exemplifies a broader detachment from critical engagement, where AI is treated as a tool for endless aesthetic exploration rather than a means of producing useful knowledge. Architecture has lost its edge as technology has come to dominate the shaping of space. What was once a speculative inquiry into the future of human life and the built environment has devolved into a hollow exercise in formal experimentation, untethered from the urgent crises of the present. Far from confronting these challenges, architecture has settled into an aestheticized irrelevance, trailing behind as a mere decorative layer to the forces that truly shape our world—increasingly, not even a layer anybody cares about. The Bilbao Effect’s ultimate fate was to be crushed by the very overproduction of form it advocated for.

The Terminal Highway

A kynical approach to artificial intelligence in architecture today would move beyond both uncritical enthusiasm and cynical critique, instead using the technology’s own logic to expose its contradictions. Just as Superstudio and Archizoom amplified modernist rationality to reveal its absurdities, contemporary practice might push AI’s capacity for endless iteration and pattern recognition to its logical extremes, using AI to envision worlds that make visible the contradictions inherent in accelerationist visions of technological progress.

This practice is, just as AUDC was from 2000 to 2015, consciously speculative and temporally contingent, with no intent of claiming to be a new form of practice. Instead, it uses AI to evolve a new radical inquiry—one that holds ambiguity and contradiction at its core. In this practice, AI is not a tool for endless novelty, but rather a collaborator in rethinking architecture’s fundamental questions. Instead of judging AI to be a savior or a threat, it becomes a collaborator in exposing the contradictions of accelerationist visions and the resultant cultural oversaturation in a world in which intellectual and creative work itself has become redundant. Just as Superstudio and Archizoom amplified modernist rationality to reveal the new world being born then, architects today might use AI to generate the worlds emerging in our present. The resulting environments, I hope, move beyond formal experimentation to provoke critical reflection on the systems—human, technological, and ecological—that shape our built environment.

The Eternal Archive

The images and fables accompanying this essay emerged through a systematic process combining machine generation, human curation, and collaborative editing. Moving beyond the use of AI as a mere tool, the work involved multiple cycles of generation, selection, and refinement to challenge traditional concepts of authorship. This approach extends the notion of intertextuality by introducing AI as a creative partner that both responds to and prompts human intention.

This, too, builds on historical precedent established by the radical architects. Superstudio engaged critically with mass media by appropriating commercial photography (for example, the work of Will McBride), to create provocative imagery. Their approach transcended simple appropriation, deliberately juxtaposing idealized commercial imagery of modern life—utopic advertisements of conventional consumers and romantic photographs of counterculture dropouts alike—against stark architectural interventions to examine the relationships between photography, architecture, and consumer culture.

Drawing on this tradition of critical image appropriation, I sought to leverage AI image generation to interrogate our era of visual oversaturation. These AI systems, trained on vast datasets, process images fundamentally differently from humans—they do not “understand” images in any meaningful sense but instead identify statistical patterns and correlations in data, which they draw upon in response to prompts. This creates a productive tension between human and machine approaches to visual meaning. Where Superstudio carefully selected photographs for their cultural and symbolic significance, AI systems generate imagery through pattern-matching processes that are simultaneously sophisticated yet fundamentally alien to human visual understanding. Often, the results are absurd, but these failures themselves can be productive. Through iterative prompting, curation, and manipulation, this work engages with this perceptual divide, using the misalignments between human and machine vision to generate new forms of architectural speculation. Starting with a small selection of images from a large set of generations, I worked with AIs to write the fables, which then led to further iterations of revising texts and images. This approach suggests a way forward that neither uncritically celebrates nor merely critiques AI but instead draws creative potential from the characteristics that make machine vision distinct from human perception.

These works embody a speculative approach to our technological condition, revealing the exhaustion of form in an age of algorithmic reproduction. Yet, unlike the mindless proliferation of AI-generated content, they employ conscious repetition and oversaturation as critical strategies. In a time when architecture drowns in its own output, these images transform oversaturation into a new dialogue, revealing how technological systems—enabled by our own desires—increasingly exceed human comprehension and control and thwart those desires. 

On the Pictures Generation and AI Art

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The other day, I posted some AI images of land art that doesn’t exist on Instagram. I didn’t have a plan for these, but I liked them and wanted to share them. In the comments, my friend the photographer Richard Barnes wrote, “This is our new world which for the moment is totally reliant on the old one.”

Richard is absolutely right and there is a lot to unpack in that sentence. To take one obvious reading, AI image generation is based on datasets of images on the Internet. You can read my extensive take on this in my last essay for this site, California Forever, Or the Aesthetics of AI Images, but today, I want to tackle the issue of AI imagery and originality.

My desire to make these images was backward-looking, or more properly, hauntological. Hauntology, a concept that emerged from the work of French philosopher Jacques Derrida, later popularized in cultural theory by Mark Fisher, suggests that the present is haunted by the unfulfilled potentialities of the past, creating a sense of nostalgia for lost futures that were never realized. Fisher writes: “What haunts the digital cul-de-sacs of the twenty-first century is not so much the past as all the lost futures that the twentieth century taught us to anticipate.” (Mark Fisher, “What is Hauntology?Film Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Fall 2012), 16, article paywalled by JSTOR). For Fisher, much of recent culture is permeated by this hauntological quality, exploring historical references, styles, and ideas that never fully materialized in their own time.

If this concept is unfamiliar, then take the show Stranger Things. Set in the 1980s, not only does it explore the aesthetic and cultural motifs of that era, it revisits the past in ways that underscore the absence of the utopian visions once promised by that time. This is evident in the show’s theme song by Michael Stein and Kyle Dixon (a.k.a. S U R V I V E), informed by 1980s synthesizer music by musicians like Tangerine Dream, Giorgio Moroder, Jean-Michel Jarré, Vangelis, and John Carpenter and performed on modular synthesizers and vintage synthesizers from the 1970s. Through its retrofuturistic setting, supernatural elements, and cultural references, Stranger Things effectively embodies this hauntological sentiment, appealing to audiences by conjuring a collective memory of a past both familiar and lost, a space where the promise of progress and the fear of what lies in the unknown are in constant dialogue, thereby reflecting our contemporary longing for a future that seems increasingly out of reach in the face of technological stagnation and political paralysis. Throughout the series, an alternate dimension called “the Upside Down” functions allegorically as a manifestation of hauntology, representing the shadowy underside of progress and the hidden costs of failed utopias. This parallel dimension, while mirroring the physical world, is engulfed in darkness, decay, and danger, embodying the repressed anxieties not only of teenage sexuality—the familiar foundation of horror films—but also of the pursuit of advancement without ethical consideration. It can be interpreted as the tangible realization of the lost futures Fisher describes, a space where the dreams of the past are not just forgotten but actively twisted into nightmares. This allegorical realm underscores the series’ exploration of the impact of scientific hubris and the disintegration of the social fabric, issues that resonate with contemporary anxieties about technological overreach and the erosion of social bonds. Through the lens of the Upside Down, Stranger Things critiques the nostalgia for a past that never fully addressed these underlying tensions, suggesting that without confronting these spectral fears, they will continue to haunt us, impeding the realization of truly progressive futures.

Being born in 1967, I was in high school in 1983, the year in which the first season of Stranger Things is set, so I would have been older than the kids in Stranger Things, but the showrunners, Matt and Russ Duffer (the Duffer Brothers) were born in 1984. There is something about the era just before one is born and in the years before one forms lasting memories, that triggers the hauntological sense, particularly in regard to its relation to the Freudian uncanny (the unheimlich), which emerges not just as a theoretical concept but as a lived emotional reality, the encounter with something familiar yet estranged by time or context, generating an unsettling yet compelling attraction. The era immediately before one’s birth is fertile ground for the uncanny because it is inherently connected to one’s existence, yet it remains elusive and out of reach, shrouded in the fog of collective cultural memory rather than personal experience.

This is where my interest in Land Art, which thrived in the late 1960s and early 1980s comes from. It’s a mythic and heroic past, right outside the scope of my lived awareness. Land Art, moveover, is at a particular inflection in the Greenbergian history of modern art and one that brings us closer to our topic at hand. Art critic Clement Greenberg famously sought to distill the essence and trajectory of art through the modernist progression of self-criticism towards purity and autonomy, particularly in painting. Greenberg posited that art should focus on the specificity of the medium, leading to an emphasis on formal qualities over content or context. Specifically, Greenberg argued that modernist painters should embrace and explore the flatness of the canvas rather than attempt to deny it through illusionistic techniques that create a sense of three-dimensional space on the two-dimensional surface. He saw abstract expressionism and color field painting as driven by the gradual shedding of extraneous elements (like figurative representation, narrative, and illusionistic depth) that were not essential to painting as a medium. This process of reduction aimed at focusing on what was uniquely intrinsic to painting—its flat surface and the potential for pure color and form. This approach is distinctly indebted to Hegelian aesthetics, in which art is seen as a vehicle for the spirit (Geist) to realize itself, moving towards a form of absolute knowing or self-consciousness. The late 1960s projects of Minimal Art, Land Art, and Conceptual Art can all be seen as elaborations of Greenbergian modernism. Minimal Art, with its emphasis on the physical object and the space it occupies, pushes Greenberg’s interest in medium specificity to its logical extreme by reducing art to its most fundamental geometric forms and materials, thereby focusing on the “objecthood” of the artwork itself. Land Art extends this exploration to the medium of the earth itself, engaging directly with the landscape to highlight the intrinsic qualities of the environment and the artwork’s integration with its site-specific context, thus reflecting Greenberg’s emphasis on the inherent characteristics of the artistic medium. Conceptual Art, although seemingly divergent in its prioritization of idea over form, aligns with Greenbergian modernism by stripping art down to its conceptual essence, thereby challenging the traditional boundaries of the art object and emphasizing the primacy of the idea, akin to Greenberg’s focus on the essential qualities of painting and bringing art back to relevance as a philosophical discourse. Together, these movements expand upon Greenberg’s foundational principles by exploring the boundaries of what art can be, each pushing the dialogue about medium specificity and the pursuit of purity in art further.

Coming out of architecture and history, I find art without rigor frustrating and boring, so the art of the late 1960s and early 1970s is my north star and I am indeed something of a neo-Greenbergian (more on that here). But during the 1970s, the Greenbergian trajectory encountered significant challenges, marking a pivot away from these ideals towards a more fragmented, pluralistic understanding of art. Rosalind Krauss’s 1979 essay “Sculpture in the Expanded Field” serves as a critical juncture in this shift. Krauss dismantles the Greenbergian barrier between sculpture and not-sculpture by introducing a set of oppositions that allowed for a broader, more inclusive understanding of sculpture. This “expanded field” theory challenged the purity of medium specificity by embracing a wider range of practices and materials, effectively undermining the modernist notion of progressive refinement and autonomy of the arts. Krauss:

From the structure laid out above, it is obvious that the logic of the space of postmodernist practice is no longer organized around the definition of a given medium on the grounds of material, or, for that matter, the perception of material. It is organized instead through the universe of terms that are felt to be in opposition within a cultural situation.

Krauss’s essay, well-intentioned though it was, did not offer a positive direction for research in art, encouraging the sort of lazy pluralism and market-oriented art that has defined far too much art production in the years since.

The one exception to all this, however, is photography. If, in my essay on the aesthetics of AI images, I lamented the obsession with technical proficiency at the cost of taste in amateur HDR photography, in the hands of the best photographers —from the New Topographics movement in the 1970s to the work of great living photographers today, like Hiroshi Sugimoto, Guy Dickinson, David Maisel and Richard Barnes—the technical nature of photography is used to explore the photograph as a medium. And photography, by its very nature as an index of reality, its inexorable relationship between the subject and its representation—aligns with the Greenbergian ideal of art that is true to its medium more effectively than other media.

Rosalind Krauss, “Sculpture in the Expanded Field,” October, Vol. 8 (Spring 1979), 43.

Few artists have interrogated the roles of authorship, originality, and representation as effectively as the Pictures Generation, a loosely affiliated group of artists—mainly photographers—named after Pictures, a 1977 exhibition at New York’s Artists Space curated by Douglas Crimp. These artists embraced appropriation, montage, and the recontextualization of pre-existing images, deliberately blurring the boundaries between high art and popular culture and questioning the notion of an artwork’s purity and originality. Not all of this work still speaks to us today. John Baldessari’s art has aged poorly and many artists, such as Richard Prince, have long ago stopped doing interesting work. But at the time Prince, Cindy Sherman, Robert Longo (who admittedly also worked in paintings and charcoal, but in ways akin to the other four in this group), and Sherrie Levine produced compelling and rigorous work during this period. Crimp, on the name “pictures”:

To an ever greater extent our experience is governed by pictures, pictures in newspapers and magazines, on television and in the cinema. Next to these pictures firsthand experience begins to retreat, to seem more and more trivial. While it once seemed that pictures had the function of interpreting reality,it now seems that they have usurped it. It therefore becomes imperative to understand the picture itself, not in order to uncover a lost reality, but to determine how a picture becomes a signifying structure of its own accord. But pictures are characterized by something which, though often remarked, is insufficiently understood: that they are extremely difficult to distinguish at the level of their content, that they are to an extraordinary degree opaque to meaning. The actual event and the fictional event, the benign and the horrific, the mundane and the exotic, the possible and the fantastic: all are fused into the all-embracing similitude of the picture.

Douglas Crimp, Pictures (New York: Artists Space, 1977), 3.

For these artists then, the question of representation itself was fundamental, indeed the proper object for art. Crimp elaborated on this in a thorough revision to this essay, published two years later. This time, Crimp introduces the notion that these works demonstrate a postmodernist break with the modernist tradition:

But if postmodernism is to have theoretical value, it cannot be used merely as another chronological term; rather it must disclose the particular nature of a breach with modernism. It is in this sense that the radically new approach to mediums is important. If it had been characteristic of the formal descriptions of modernist art that they were topographical, that they mapped the surfaces of artworks in order to determine their structures, then it has now become necessary to think of description as a stratigraphic activity. Those processes of quotation, excerptation, framing, and staging that constitute the strategies of the work I have been discussing necessitate uncovering strata of representation.

Douglas Crimp, “Pictures,” October, Vol. 8 (Spring 1979), 87.

The astute reader might note that this is in the very same issue as the Krauss essay above. The issue, however, does not lead with either essay, but by a piece titled “Lecture in Inauguration of the Chair of Literary Semiology, Collège de France, January 7, 1977.” The author is, of course, the semiotician Roland Barthes and he is the crux to the argument of this essay. Barthes’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France marks the acceptance of semiotics, the study of signs, in the university and sets out an agenda in which the field would not only attempt to analyze linguistic and literary matters but also provide a framework for decoding culture at large. Barthes is especially important to us in terms of his 1967 essay “The Death of the Author,” which was published in a widely read 1977 English collection of his works titled Image-Music-Text. In this essay, Barthes challenges traditional notions of authorial sovereignty by arguing that the meaning of a text is not anchored in the author’s original intent but is instead constructed by the reader’s engagement with the text. This radical shift foregrounds the role of the audience in creating meaning, suggesting that a work of art is a collaborative space where interpretations multiply beyond the author’s control. Intertwined with this concept is the idea of intertextuality, which posits that every text (or artwork) is not an isolated entity but a mosaic of references, influences, and echoes from other texts. Intertextuality underscores the interconnectedness of cultural production, indicating that the understanding of any work is contingent upon its relation to the broader network of cultural artifacts. Together, these concepts dismantle the traditional hierarchy between creator and receiver, emphasizing the active role of the reader or viewer in making meaning and highlighting the complex web of relationships that define the production and reception of art.

This perspective was crucial for the Pictures artists who frequently employed appropriation as a strategy, taking pre-existing images from various media and recontextualizing them in their art. This method directly engaged with Barthes’s idea by challenging the original context and intended meaning of these images, thus questioning the notions of originality and authorship. In doing so, they highlighted the idea that the creator’s authority over an artwork’s meaning is not absolute but rather shared with viewers, who bring their own interpretations and experiences to bear on the work.

Moreover, these artists applied Barthes’s concept to emphasize the fluidity and contingency of meaning. Their work often invites viewers to interpret images through their own cultural references and personal experiences, suggesting that meaning is not a fixed entity but a dynamic interaction. In critically engaging with the proliferation of images in contemporary society, the Pictures Generation explored how photographic and cinematic imagery shapes perceptions of identity and reality. This critical stance aligns with Barthes’s view of the text (or image) as a fabric of quotations and influences, further diminishing the role of the author in favor of a more collaborative and interpretive approach to meaning-making.

Crucially, this shift also led to a reevaluation of the artist’s identity. Rather than being seen as the singular source of meaning, artists of the Pictures Generation positioned themselves more as curators or commentators, utilizing the visual languages of their time to critique cultural norms and values. This reflects a move away from the modernist emphasis on the artist’s unique vision toward a recognition of the complex, contextual nature of art-making and interpretation.

Barthes’s idea—that the author’s intent and biography recede in importance compared to the reader’s role in creating meaning—parallels a shift towards viewing the artwork itself, and its reception, as central to its interpretation. This shift can be seen as aligning with Greenberg’s emphasis on the medium’s physical and visual properties as the locus of artistic significance, and Hegel’s idea of art revealing universal truths, though through a more contemporary lens focused on the viewer’s engagement.

But practices such as appropriation, pastiche, and intertextuality can also be framed as a mannerist lament, a response to a widely perceived exhaustion of possibilities within modernism. Compounding this, with the postwar rise of commercial art and Pop art, capital was thoroughly permeated by the strategies of the avant-garde and vice versa. Even shock, the classic technique of the avantgarde had been turned into a marketing tool, signaling the thorough co-option of avant-garde tactics by the very systems it sought to critique. The avant-garde‘s political validity was now deeply in question, something elaborated in the 1984 translation Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde. In this complex landscape, the Pictures Generation’s engagement with the visual language of mass media becomes a double-edged sword: a critique of—and a capitulation to—the pervasive influence of commercial imagery, reflecting a nuanced understanding of the impossibility of purity in an age dominated by reproduction and simulation.

If the Pictures Generation’s engagement already sounds like what Richard Barnes suggested in his comment, “This is our new world which for the moment is totally reliant on the old one” then perhaps this suggests a profitable route to investigate. Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss’s student and Douglas Crimp’s contemporary (as well as my teacher at Cornell for a brilliant year) was a key critic for the Pictures Generation and his 1996 book, The Return of the Real, remains one of the deepest theoretical engagements with art from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s. There, Foster introduces the concept of “Nachträglichkeit,” a term borrowed from Freudian psychoanalysis, often translated into English as “deferred action.”

Nachträglichkeit refers to the way in which events or experiences are reinterpreted and given new meaning in retrospect, influenced by later events or understandings. It suggests that the significance of an artwork or movement is not fixed at the moment of its creation but can be reshaped by subsequent developments in the cultural and theoretical landscape. This recontextualization allows for a continuous reworking of the meaning and relevance of art, as past works are seen through the lens of present concerns and knowledge.

Foster applies this concept to the realm of art history and criticism to argue that the avant-garde movements of the early 20th century, for example, can be re-understood and gain new significance in light of later artistic practices and theoretical frameworks:

In Freud an event is registered as traumatic only through a later event that recodes it retroactively, in deferred action. Here I propose that the significance of avant-garde events is produced in an analogous way, through a complex relay of anticipation and reconstruction. Taken together, then, the notions of parallax and deferred action refashion the cliche not only of the neo-avant-garde as merely redundant of the historical avant-garde, but also of the postmodern as only belated in relation to the modern. In so doing I hope that they nuance our accounts of aesthetic shifts and historical breaks as well. Finally, if this model of retroaction can contribute any symbolic resistance to the work of retroversion so pervasive in culture and politics today—that is, the reactionary undoing of the progressive transformations of the century—so much the better.

Hal Foster, The Return of the Real (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), xii-xiii.

This perspective challenges linear narratives of art history that portray artistic development as a straightforward progression from one style or movement to the next. Instead, Foster emphasizes the recursive nature of artistic innovation, where contemporary artists engage with, reinterpret, and transform the meanings and methodologies of their predecessors. This is where a critical approach to AI imagery that explores the intertextual basis of all art might return to our narrative. In this light, Pictures anticipates a world in which imagery can be freely recombined, in which the role of the author is thoroughly questioned, and the status of the original is thrown into question.

Oversaturation. Reynisfjara, Iceland, 2023.

But more than that. Back to Instagram for a moment. Another phenomenon that we have to deal with—that the Pictures Generation did not—is the massive oversaturation of the landscape by user-generated content. This deluge of imagery created by the public—particularly while travelling—has transformed the visual ecosystem, challenging artists to find new methods of engagement and critique. The sheer volume of content complicates efforts to distinguish between the meaningful and the mundane, pushing contemporary artists to navigate and respond to a world where the boundaries between creator and consumer are increasingly blurred. This oversaturation demands a different reevaluation of originality, authenticity, and the role of art in reflecting and shaping societal narratives in the digital age. The are some 35 billion images posted on Instagram every year. These are not just private images, but images that are published in a way previously unimaginable—available to an audience of over a billion users. What does it mean to take a photograph today when the world is already oversaturated? What sense is there of taking a photo of a landscape or a street scene when the same image has been uploaded a thousand times? And what does it mean that serious artists and curators share—by choice or by necessity—work in that same milieu?

Most of the images on Instagram are already AI images. The reason an iPhone or a Pixel can take such an attractive photograph is that they possess highly sophisticated algorithms that create images that appeal to viewers. The iPhone, for instance, utilizes AI-driven features like Smart HDR and Deep Fusion. Smart HDR optimizes the lighting, color, and detail of each subject in a photo, while Deep Fusion merges the best parts of multiple exposures to produce images with superior texture, detail, and reduced noise in low-light conditions​​​​. The iPhone’s Neural Engine, part of its Bionic Chip, executes these complex processes, handling up to 600 billion operations per second, to deliver photographs that were unimaginable with traditional digital imaging techniques​​. Given the insane number of photographs taken at “Instagrammable” sites, and the ecological and social damage that such travel produces, one wonders if something like Bjoern Karmann’s Paragraphica camera might not be a better solution. Using various data points like address, weather, time of day, and nearby places, the Paragraphica then creates a photographic representation using a text-to-image AI generator. This isn’t to say that photography as art is extinct, but it is in peril thanks to oversaturation, which itself is so prolific it has become meaningless.

Another option might be to think of how Critical AI Art, distinguishing itself from the oversaturation of prevalent AI imagery might reflect on the profound shift in art’s interaction with technology and culture, revisiting themes central to the Pictures Generation—such as media influence and appropriation—through the lens of contemporary digital practices. By employing generative algorithms, this approach not only generates new visual forms but also engages critically with the saturation of images, probing the essence of authenticity, originality, and the evolving role of both artists and non-artists. This dynamic interaction underscores a broader, ongoing dialogue with the history of art revealing how artistic methodologies are shaped by the recursive nature of cultural and technological advancements. Here, a hauntological approach to AI Art be productive, such as the theory-fiction project I did last year, On an Art Experiment in Soviet Lithuania which reflects on the refusal of the avant-garde by the Soviet Union, the loss of Lithuania’s freedom to Soviet-Russian rule between 1945 and 1991, and art in the 1970s.

But there are other possibilities for using AI to make art. I’d like to conclude by citing one key artist from the Pictures Generation who I haven’t mentioned: David Salle. Curiously Salle is one of the only serious artists without a technology background to be publicly experimenting with AIs. Salle’s process has always been characterized by an innovative use of imagery and a negotiation back and forth between media, often starting with photographs he takes, which serve as the basis for his layered and complex paintings. Described in a lengthy New York Times article entitled “Is This Good Enough to Fool my Gallerist?” Salle’s method reflects a blend of the real and the conceptual, pushing the boundaries of narrative and abstraction in his work​​. Starting in 2023, Salle and a team of computer scientists worked on an iPad-based program trained on a dataset of his paintings and refined based on his input, showcasing an example of how AI can be employed to conceptualize variations of artwork, aiding in the brainstorming process for new paintings​​. Salle’s foray into AI art can be seen as an example of critical AI art, where the use of technology is not merely for the creation of art but serves as a commentary on the process of art-making itself. By integrating AI into his practice, Salle engages in a dialogue with the contemporary art world about originality, creativity, and the role of the artist in the digital age. Concluding the article, journalist Zachary Small lets Salle have the last word.

What will become of his own identity, as the algorithm continues to produce more Salle paintings than he could ever imagine? Some days, it seems like the algorithm is an assistant. Other days, it’s like a child.

When asked if the A.I. would replace him entirely one day, the artist shrugged.

“Well,” he said, “that’s the future.”

Can David Salle Teach A.I. How to Create Good Art? – The New York Times (nytimes.com)

A future, which is still totally reliant on the past.

One last point. As is my wont, in this essay I have focused on art from the 1960s onwards, but there are other models that might come to the fore again in this era. In particular, the Renaissance model of inspiration is an interesting one to reflect upon. Renaissance art theory was underpinned by the concept of imitatio (imitation), which was considered a noble pursuit. Imitation in the Renaissance sense involved studying and emulating the excellence of ancient art to grasp its underlying principles of beauty, proportion, and harmony. However, this process was not about mere copying; it was about surpassing the models from the past, a concept known as aemulatio. And that, very well, may be the future (of the past) in our art.

On Art and the Universal, II

Last July, I wrote a piece “On Art and the Universal, I” and promised part two within a week. It’s almost 11 months later, so here it is. The first piece stands on its own as a critique of the political cynicism of the academic-gallery nexus. This second piece stands alone as well. Read part I, re-read it, or don’t bother. 

As an art scholar and artist, I find the Greenbergian tradition invaluable. I studied for a year with Hal Foster in graduate school and was compelled by Rosalind Krauss’s essay on sculpture in the expanded field, as well as by Clement Greenberg’s efforts to find a trajectory for research within postwar painting. Briefly, Greenberg asserted that each art form should concentrate on its own unique properties or “the specificity of the medium“. Famously, Greenberg believed that the essence of modernism was to “use the characteristic methods of the discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.” To this end, painting, for Greenberg would best focus on the flatness of the canvas instead of imitating the three-dimensionality of sculpture. This was of great utility for the last generation of truly productive artists in the US, from Kenneth Noland to Donald Judd to James Turrell to my father, all of whom engaged with Greenberg—even when they disagreed with him. Disciplinary self-criticism and the specificity of the medium was a research project that embodied an Enlightenment ideal of a shared project of advancing human knowledge in a particular discipline. Krauss, who studied with Greenberg, reinterpreted his philosophy, moving away from the idea of medium specificity to propose art as an expanded field of practices and mediums, including conceptual, installation, and performance art. The object of interrogation ceased to be the medium and became the institution of art itself and with this, a greater element of political critique could be introduced. Foster took this further in his writings on the Pictures Generation, shifting to a postmodern exploration of the process of art making, originality and identity, and the nature of the sign itself.

Although I empathize with the Greenbergian search for politically progressive forces in art, this aspect of the project has run aground, even if is the only part of the project that remains popular. I detail this in my previous post, but in sum, the quest for the political in art has amounted to little more than a justification for guilty consciousness and the drive to affirm one’s virtue. Far from a place of resistance, the political in art is cynical in a Sloterdijkian sense: its proponents know that it has nothing to do with actual political progress, but they claim it nevertheless.

Perhaps not coincidentally, art lost the thread since the 1970s. Even as postmodernists deployed postmodernism as a totalizing concept, they claimed that totalization was obsolete (the classic boomer move of declaring itself the best and last generation at anything). For postmodernists, totalizing historical frameworks overgeneralize the intricacies and nuances of historical events and cultural phenomena, leading to oversimplification and inaccuracies, they overlook differences within a given time period, such as the experiences of marginalized groups, and they perpetuate existing power dynamics by privileging dominant cultural or social perspectives. But the price for rejecting totalizing narratives is that where art used to make clear, measured progress, after postmodernism, it is stuck in an endless loop of pluralism, sustained only by self-justifying statements about politics. Today, the relationship between theory and totality is fractured and postmodern thought, ironically, leans toward irrelevance. In his 1979 La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir (translated as the Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge), Jean-François Lyotard observed that knowledge—primarily science—was being fragmented into incommensurable discourse as an incredulity to metanarratives emerged. Today, the arts and humanities are also splintered into incommensurable discourses. But rather than being a position of greater strength and self-criticism, the fracture of narrative banally reflects our very existence, our selves intensely fragmented by the operations of media. Art practices and theories that exacerbate that fragmentation are merely accelerationist or, more likely, uncritical and reactive in nature. Lacking a metanarrative, however, there is little else they can do besides exacerbate fragmentation. 

I contend that it’s time we breathe life back into the Greenbergian theoretical framework. This revival, however, should begin with a call for art to investigate itself again, not merely play to political activism for the sake of theater. The task at hand is to discern the proper object of knowledge for art, a fulcrum upon which we can rest our research. Or, if not the proper object, a proper object that would be suitable for investigation and productive of knowledge. 

Except for the most feeble-minded of thinkers, the development of advanced levels of networked computation is the single biggest transformation in human existence in many decades. Our sense of what media is and our relationship to it has changed profoundly. Thus, although it is entirely possible for artists to pursue other, legitimate forms of research, my own work largely revolves around the role of technology in our lives. In the last year, I have specifically been compelled to explore the new generation of Artificial Intelligence software, particularly AI image generators.

What is specific to AI image generators is not the creation of the new, but rather their endless capacity to remix the history of art and imagery. We could see this as part of a dialectic, or more simply, as part of a back-and-forth process of art history since the late eighteenth-century loss of the absolute belief in the principles of classical art. After the archeological discovery that the ancient Greeks and Romans did not have a consistent system, art was set adrift with its terrifying newfound freedom. Nineteenth-century eclecticism followed: rules were treated flexibly and forms could be freely combined at will. The backlash came with modernism’s rejection of all past forms and its search for a new, universal language of form, a project refined in Greenberg’s late modernist turn toward the specificity of the medium. In response, Postmodernism critiqued the new and turned toward the semiotic recombination of past forms and/or imagery from popular culture and commercial art. Starting about 25 years ago, Network Culture or Metamodernism supplanted postmodernism, largely relying on a resurgence of interest in technical effects and their capacity to elicit sensation. Think of Anish Kapoor or Olafur Ellison, for example, or the emergence of the very large, technically flawless salon-painting-sized photographs by artists such as Andreas Gursky or Jeff Wall.
  
The era of AI creation is not, primarily, an era of the new. Architecture throws things into heightened relief. A furry, feathery building is not new. Nor is it interesting, except as a means of generating Instagram hits. Within a few years, AIs will be developed to effectively generate endless, plausible architectural models from a set of given parameters (site, area needed, programme, etc.), but even those are likely to remain endless permutations of the sort a follower of Frank Lloyd Wright or Mies van der Rohe might have done in their offices. For now, AIs are not yet capable of producing sophisticated three-dimensional models, but they are capable of producing imagery by remixing content. When something new emerges, it is through unusual juxtapositions thought up by the operator, but also through accidents. Malformed image generations can be interesting: for example, in my project on an alternative history of art in Vilnius, a series of glitched images appeared like the following image, which was supposed to be of a painting exhibit in a gallery. This process can be iterative since open-source AIs such as Stable Diffusion can be trained on specific datasets, so when accidents happen, artists can take those unusual results further. 

AI image generation reveals that all art is already intertextual, that is, shaped by, and in turn shaping, other works through allusions, references, and influences. My father was a modernist but nevertheless spent his evenings looking at coffee table art books of Renaissance and Baroque masters for inspiration. Nor was this an uncommon practice among modern painters. We now have a different way of accessing that cultural subconscious. It does not reveal itself easily either. Working with AI image generators is, for the serious artist, as time-consuming as any other practice. The virtue of a Critical AI Art, however, is to explore how artworks are developed within a network of works, historical and recent, and the cultural contexts that surround them. A Critical AI Art expressly addresses intertextuality and its relation to the idea of originality, not merely because these are the issues raised by AI image generation, but because these are issues inherent to art itself.